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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: GEORGE
D. PERRY.

Supreme Court Case No. 38694

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry,
Respondent on Appeal.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE KATHRYN A. STICKLEN

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT

PETER C. SISSON

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

000001

Date: 5/31/2011

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 02:50 PM

ROA Report
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User: CCLUNDMJ

Case: CV-IE-2009-05214 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased

In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased
Date

Code

User

3/18/2009

NCIE

CCCHILER

I\lew
l\Iew Case Filed - Informal Estate

3/19/2009

APPL

CCCHILER

Application for Informal Probate of Will and
Christopher Bieter
Informal Appointment of Personal Representative

WILL

CCCHILER

Last Will And Testament

Christopher Bieter

ACAP

CCCHILER

Acceptance Of Appointment

Christopher Bieter

STNP

CCMARTLG

Statement Of Informal Probate Of Will And
Christopher Bieter
Informal Appointment Of Personal Representative

LTST

CCMARTLG

Letters Of Testamentary

CDIS

CCMARTLG

Civil Disposition entered for: McCormick, Barbara Christopher Bieter
Subject. Case
K, Other Party; Perry, George D, SUbject.
Close date: 3/20/2009

STAT

CCMARTLG

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Christopher Bieter

STNP

CCMARTLG

Statement Of Informal Probate Of Will And
Informal Apointment Of Personal Representative

Christopher Bieter

LTST

CCMARTLG

Letters Of Testamentary

Christopher Bieter

CD IS

CCMARTLG

Civil Disposition entered for: McCormick, Barbara Christopher Bieter
Subject. Case
K, Other Party; Perry, George D, SUbject.
Close date: 3/20/2009

3/30/2009

CRCL

CCMARTLG

Creditors Claim (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

Christopher Bieter

4/7/2009

IFHD

CCMARTLG

Information To Heirs And Devisees

Christopher Bieter

4/15/2009

MISC

CCMARTLG

Satisfaction Of Probate Claim (Wells Fargo Bank Christopher Bieter
NA)

DEI\lO
DEI\IO

CCMARTLG

Demand For Notice (Larry L Goins For Idaho
Dept Health and Welfare)

Christopher Bieter

CAES

CCMARTLG

Claim Against Estate (Idaho Dept Health and
Welfare)

Christopher Bieter

6/2/2009

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieler

6/4/2009

NOTC

CCCHILER

Notice of Disallowance of Claim (Idaho Dept
Health and Welfare)

Christopher Bieler

CERS

CCCHILER

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieler

6/15/2009

PETN

CCNELSRF

Petition for Allowance of Claim (Larry Goins for
Idaho Department of Health & Wealthfare)

Christopher Bieler

6/25/2009

OBJE

CCNELSRF

Objection to Petition for Allowance of Claim

Christopher Bieter
Bieler

CERS

CCNELSRF

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

MEMO

CCMARTLG

Memorandum In Support Of The PR's Objection
To Dept of Health And Welfare's Petn For
Allwance Of Claim

Biel:er
Christopher Bielter

AFFD

CCMARTLG

Affidavit of Barbara K McCormick In Support of
Objection To Dept of Health And Welfare's Petn
for Allowance Of Claim

Christopher Bieler
Bieter

PPUB

CCMARTLG

Proof Of Publication

Christopher Bieter

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Telephonic Status Conference (1-08-09 Christopher Bieter
000002
@ 2:30 pm)

3/20/2009

11/27/2009

12/4/2009

Judge
Christopher Bieter

Christopher Bieter
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of George 0 Perry Deceased
Date

Code

User

12/4/2009

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/08/2010 02:30
PM) Telephonic Conference

Christopher Bieter

STAT

CCMARTLG

STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk
action

Christopher Bieter

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

AMEN

CCMARTLG

Amended Notice Of Telephonic Status
Conference (1-08-10 @ 2 pm)

Christopher Bieter

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/08/201002:30
PM) Conference

Christopher Bieter

1/8/2010

HRHD

MCURIZDJ

Hearing result for Status held on 01/08/2010
Christopher Bieter
02:30 PM: Hearing Held Telephonic Conference

1/14/2010

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing On Objection To Petn For
Allowance of Claim (2-26-10 @ 9 am)

Christopher BiE!ter

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
02/26/201009:00 AM) Objection To Petn For
Allowance of Claim

Christopher Bieter

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

AMEN

CCMARTLG

Amended Notice Of Hearing On Objection To
Petn for Allowance Of Claim (2-26-10@ 9 am)

Christopher Bieter

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Christopher Bieter

1/29/2010

MEMO

CCMARTLG

Memorandum In Support Of Petn for Allowance
Of Claim

Christopher Bieter

2/26/2010

HRHD

MCURIZDJ

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
02/26/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing Held Objection

Christopher Bieter

12/9/2009

1/21/2010

Judge

To Petn For Allowance of Claim

Christopher Bieter

ORDR

MCURIZDJ

Order Disallowing Claim

CDIS

CCMARTLG

Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho Department Of Christopher Bieter
Health And Welfare, Other Party; Idaho
Department Of Health And Welfare..
Welfare .. Other Party;
McCormick, Barbara K, Other Party; Perry,
George 0, Subject. Case Close date: 3/10/2010

STAT

CCMARTLG

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Christopher Bieter

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion For Stay Pending Appeal (W Corey
Cartwright For Idaho Dept Of Health And
Welfare)

Christopher Bieter

BREF

CCMARTLG

Brief In Support Of Motn To Stay

Kathryn A. Sticklen

APDC

CCMARTLG

Appeal Filed In District Court

Kathryn A. Sticklen

CAAP

CCMARTLG

Case Appealed:

Kathryn A. Sticklen

NOTR

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Reassignment (To Judge Kathryn
Sticklen)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/19/2010

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/23/2010

OGAP

DCTYLENI

Order Governing Procedure On Appeal

Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/26/2010

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing (4-20-10 @ 2:30 pm)

Kathryn A. Sticklen
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3/10/2010

3/18/2010
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased
Date

Code

User

3/26/2010

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/20/201002:30
PM) To Stay Pending Appeal

Stick len
Kathryn A. Sticklen

3/29/2010

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion For Transcript

Stick len
Kathryn A. Sticklen

MEMO

CCMARTLG

Memorandum In Support Of Motn For Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing (4-20-10 @ 2:30 pm)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Stick len
Kathryn A. Sticklen

RPLY

CCMARTLG

PR's Reply Memorandum To Dept's Motn For
Stay Pending Appeal

Kathryn A. Sticklen

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

BREF

CCMARTLG

Brief Re Fiduciary Duty Of PR To Creditors

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/9/2010

RSPS

CCMARTLG

Response To Motn For Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/16/2010

RPLY

CCMARTLG

PR's Reply Memo To Dept's Brief Re Fiduciary
Duty Of PR To Creditors And Motn for Atty Fees
And Costs

Kathryn A. Sticklen

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

AMEN

CCMARTLG

Amended Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

AMEN

CCMARTLG

Amended Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Kathryn A. Sticklen
Hearing resu It for Motion held on 04/20/2010
02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 500 To Stay Pending Appeal

AMEN

DCTYLENI

Amended Order Governing Procedure on Appeal Kathryn A. Sticlden

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Approving Motion for Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/10/2010

TRAN

CCMARTLG

Transcript Of Proceedings Lodged

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/11/2010

NOTC

DCTYLENI

Notice of Lodging of Appeal Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/20/2010

DEOP

DCTYLENI

Memorandum Decision and Order (RE: Motion
for Stay Pending Appeal)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/28/2010

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

6/3/2010

TRAN

DCTYLENI

Transcript Filed

Kathryn A. Sticklen

NOTC

DCTYLENI

Notice of Filing Transcript on Appeal

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MOTN

CCSWEECE

PR's Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs

Kathryn A. Sticklen

AFFD

CCSWEECE

Affidavit of Peter C Sisson In Support of PR's
Motion For Atty Fees and Costs

Kathryn A. Sticklen

MEMO

CCSWEECE

Supplemental Memorandum In Support of PR's
Motion For Atty Fees and Costs

Kathryn A. Sticklen

NOHG

CCSWEECE

Notice Of Hearing (07-12-10 at 2:30 pm)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

HRSC

CCSWEECE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Attorney fees and Kathryn A. Sticklen
Costs 07/12/201002:30 PM)

CTSV

CCSWEECE

Certificate Of Service

4/2/2010

4/8/2010

4/20/2010

4/27/2010

6/18/2010

Judge

Kathryn A. Stick len
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased
Date

Code

User

6/29/2010

BREF

CCNELSRF

Brief and Objection in Opposisiton to Attorney
Fees

Kathryn A. Sticklen

7/7/2010

MEMO

CCSWEECE

PR's Reply Memorandum To Departments Brief
And Objection in Opposition To Attorney Fees

Kathryn A. Sticklen

CERS

CCSWEECE

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticklen

7/8/2010

BREF

CCMARTLG

Appellant's Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

7/12/2010

DCHH

DCOLSOMA

Hearing result for Motion for Attorney fees and
Costs held on 07/12/2010 02:30 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: K. Madsen
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100

Kathryn A. Sticklen

7/2312010
7/23/2010

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion For Extension Of Time In Which To File
Respondent's Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

AFFD

CCMARTLG

Affidavit Of Peter C Sisson In Support Of Motn
For Extension Of Time In Which to File
Respondent's Brief

Stick len
Kathryn A. Sticklen

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticl<len

MEMO

CCNELSRF

PR's Memorandum on Applicability

Kathryn A. Sticklen

CERS

CCNELSRF

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticl<len

BREF

CCNELSRF

Simultaneous Brief RE: Finality and Idaho Code
12-117

Kathryn A. Sticl<len

7/27/2010

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Approving Motion for Extension of Time in
Which to File Respondent's Brief (due 9/2/10)

Kathryn A. Sticlclen

8/26/2010

BREF

CCMARTLG

Respondent's Brief

Kathryn A. Sticlden

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A. Sticf,len

9/16/2010

BREF

CCMARTLG

Appellant's Reply Brief

Kathryn A. Sticklen

9/22/2010

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing (11-04-10 @ 1:30 PM)

Kathryn A. Sticf:len
Stic~;len

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
11/04/201001:30 PM)

Kathryn A. Stid:len
Sticklen

AMEN

CCMARTLG

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Kathryn A. Sticklen

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
11/18/2010 02:00 PM)

Kathryn A. Sticklen

CERS

CCMARTLG

Certificate Of Service

Kathryn A.

HRVC

CCMARTLG

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held
on 11/04/201001 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated

Kathryn A. Stic~Jen
Stick:len

10/13/2010

DEOP

DCTYLENI

Memorandum Decision and Order

Kathryn A. Stick.len
Stick:len

11/18/2010

DCHH

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held Kathryn A. Sticklen
on 11/18/2010 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: No Court Reporter
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100
Document sealed

7/26/2010

10/4/2010

Judge

Stic~Jen
Stic~Jen
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In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased
Date

Code

User

3/16/2011

DEOP

DCTYLENI

Memorandum Decision and Order

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/7/2011

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Document sealed
Appealed To The Supreme Court

Kathryn A. Sticklen

4/11/2011

NOTC

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Preparation Of Appeal Transcript

Kathryn A. Sticklen

5/31/2011

NOTC

CCLUNDMJ

Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Ct.
Docket # 38694

Kathryn A. Sticklen

Judge
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Peter C. Sisson
SISSON & SISSON
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC
2402 West Jefferson Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 387-0729
Fax: (208) 331-5009
Idaho State Bar # 4682
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Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO.
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CV

IN THE MATTER OF:

Case No.

GEORGE D. PERRY,
Deceased.

J

E

0905214

APPLICA TION FOR INFORMAL
APPLICATION
PROBATE OF WILL AND INFORMAL
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE
(I.e. 15-3-301)
] 5-3-301)

APPLICANT.
PERR Y, STATES AND
MCCORMICK, formerly BARBARA K. PERRY,
APPLICANT, BARBARA K. MCCORMICK.
REPRESENTS TO THE COURT THAT:
1.

Applicant's interest in this matter is that of the Daughter and Personal Representative of
Decedent.
Decedent a devisee under the decedent's will and a person having priority for
appointment as personal representative.

2.

The person whose appointment as personal representative is sought is the Applicant and
is qualified to act as such and has priority because there is no person with a higher or
equal priority for appointment. The person whose appointment as personal representative
is sought has priority for appointment as the person nominated in, or pursuant to the
exercise of a power conferred by, the decedent's will.

3.

The decedent died on February 25, 2009. at the age 01'79 years. A copy of his death
certificate is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 1
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4.

Venue is proper because at the time of death the decedent was domiciled in this county.

5.

The names and addresses of the children, heirs, and devisees of the decedent are:

Barbara J. McCormick
2525 .loretta
Joretta Drive
Boise, Idaho 83704

George D. Perry, Jr.
20966 Wells Road
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

Steven A. Perry
8179 East McKenzre
Nampa, Idaho 83687

Richard J. Perry
594 W. Halverson
Middleton, Idaho 83644

Robert E. Boyle
3519 Rose Hill Street
Boise, Idaho 83705

Martha (Marty) Simonson
2085 N. Trailview Place
Boise, Idaho 83702

Martha Jean Perry
c/o Barbara J. McCormick, Trustee of the
Supplemental Care Trust for Martha J. Perry
2525 .loretta
Joretta Drive
Boise, Idaho 83704

Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare
Medicaid Estate Recovery
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036

There are no surviving parents of Decedent. Decedent has no surviving siblings.
6.

No personal representative has been appointed in this state or elsewhere whose
appointment has not been terminated.

7.

Applicant has neither received nor is aware of any demand for notice of any probate or
appointment proceeding concerning the decedent that may have been filed in this state or
elsewhere.

8.

The time limit for informal probate or appointment has not expired because not more than
three years have passed since the decedent's death.

9.

The original of the decedent's will, dated February 4, 2005, accompanies this application.
To the best of applicant's knowledge, neither that will nor any other will of the decedent
has been the subject of a previous probate order.

APPLICATlON FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 2
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03- 19-2009

10.

Applicant believes that the will which is the subject of this application was validly
executed.

11.
II.

Having exercised reasonable diligence, applicant is unaware of any instrument revoking
the will which is the subject of this application and believes that such will is the
decedent's last will.

12.
\ 2.

To the best of applicant's knowledge, the will to which this application relates is not part
of a known series of testamentary instruments (other than wills or codicils), the latest of
which does not expressly revoke the fonner.

13.

Bond is not required under I.e. 15-3-603.

14.

Any required notice has been given or waived.

WHEREFORE, APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:
I.

The decedent's will, dated February 4, 2005, be infonnally probated.

2.

Barbara K. McCormick
McConnick be informally
infonnally appointed personal representative of the estate of
the decedent, to act without bond.

3.

Upon qualification and acceptance, letters testamentary be issued.

---'7'+---0+-----1-A1-

DATED
DATED --~--+------

Peter C. Sisson
Attorney for Applicant

APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL A~D
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 3
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
:ss
)

County of Ada

Barbara K. McCormick, Applicant, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the
foregoing application are true, accurate, and complete to the best of applicant's knowledge and
belief.

Barbara K. McCormick - Applicant
SlJlJSCRJlJED AND SWORN TO
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STATE OF IDAHO
DEPARTf\1ENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE
BUREAU OF VITAL RECORDS AND HEALTH STATISTICS

Stilte
Idan(1
Stille 01 Idano

DAl E F'L.!!C'
F'l.. !:C' BY STATE ~EGISTRAR:
~EGISTRAA:

STATE FilE NO.

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH

3. SOCIAL SeCURITY NUMBER

2 SEX

.c
-"

]

TYPE tJR
"'liNT IN

George D. Perry

o

PEAM"'N~NT
PEAM"'N~NT

4a. AGE ~,1$1
~,l$[ t'''~1\.J,1,.
t'''~I\J,1,.

o
8

BLACK IN"
DO HOT
NOT USE
FELT np PEN

Overland Park, KS

ia. RESlbENC~·
RESIDENC'l· STATE OR fORE.lGN
fOFlElGN COUNTRY

~

X

._ M.'Im
.. d t->u!
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'E
ARMED
FORCES"
:''"!;:
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~
.
Qj
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:E

X

No .
_ ..
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L,,~!

.~eona Cox
~\~'"..
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_
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-.-

X

A"nill

CC'ls'Qn C('(,ntr'-.
C(,I,nlr:,
CC',s'Qn

~lT
12b. BIRTHPLACE IStale, IplnG!)· 'or F('relgn CClunlr.,.1

'le', 'AAIUNG ADDRESS
ADDRESS iSr~[.';..t~·IILl
iSr~[.';':t~-I\Ll r.u.,t,{'r~
r.u.,t\{'r~ c~:) . Sf;>!",.
RELATIONSHIP TC>"DECEDEN-T
TC>"DECEDEN'T 'Je',

Daughter

IS~
~;"J JdurrSS 01 cemelory.
ceme!ory,
lS~ PLACe
PLACe QF'CIISPOSITION
QF'C)lSPOSITION \Nal";-tl
\N<ll~tl ~;-'J
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('lhfl' pl:l.n~)
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Crf'm.lIlOn

C'
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:.
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~ltI.
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Barbara McCormick

,
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n.t"':-!
rJ:("l('-.1

Martha Harper

lln~n(,Wll
_ l'n~n(,WI1

SlJlT'll

Archie Iv.
\'1. Perry

1.i."METHOD OF DISPOSITION
• ,.i."METHOD

2525 Joretta Dr.
83714____
83714..._

Bois~, .10
Bois~,

Z;"C("j(,
r."C(',J('

__
.
.

115. NAME AND CQM~LETE
CQM~LETE ADDRESS OF FUNERAL fACIL,.ITY
fACIL.ITY
115.

•

Cloverdale Crematory
Funer~l Home
Cloyerdale Funer<ll
1200 N. Cloverdale Rd.
1200 N. Cloverdale Rd.
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

MAR t :12009

OF

D/W;!) NAV
J. DIN;!)

GEORGE D. PERRY

8v L t\/l~.r·:~-l;' ..
8\/
LJEl-'ur\

0905214
IE
cv
I, George D. Perry, with the present addressof21 04 Tendoy, Boise, Idaho 83705, being
of lawful age and sound mind and not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence
of any person, do make, publish and declare this my LAST WILL and TESTAMENT
TEST AMENT in the:
manner following, to-wit:
ITEM I
REVOCATION
REVOCAnON OF PRIOR WILLS/CODICILS
I hereby expressly revoke any and all other and former Wills and Codicils to Wills by
me at any time heretofore made.
ITEM II
MARITAL STATUS
I am married and my spouse's name is Martha J. Perry. All references in this Will
to my spouse's name are to Martha J. Perry.
ITEM III
CHILDREN
I have four (4) living children, whose names are as follows, to-wit: George D. Perry,
Jr., Barbara K. Perry, Richard J. Perry and Steven A. Perry.
Richard 1.
J. Perry and Steven A.

Pe~are
Pe~are the

children of my marriage to my wife,

Martha J. Perry. George D. Perry, Jr. and Barbara K. Perry are children of a previous
marriage. Donna J. Holmes and Christine N. Ramsey, also children of my previous
marriage, are deceased. Christine N. Ramsey did not leave issue. Donna J. Holmes left
issue. I intentionally make no provision for any distribution from my estate to any of
Donna J. Holmes' issue.
My wife, Martha J. Perry, has two children from a previous marriage, whose names
are as follows, to-wit: Robert E. Boyle and Marty Simonson. I will refer to them herein as
my step-children. I further certify that I have no other children, living or deceased, nor have
I ever adopted a child.
ITEM IV
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
I direct that my Personal Representative shall not be required to furnish bond, and
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shall be allowed to administer my estate without the intervention of Court, with full power
to sell, mortgage, lease or dispose of all my Estate, real, personal or mixed, at public or
private sale for any reason which may seem right or proper to said Personal Representative,
regardless of whether or not it is necessary to do so for the purpose of administering my
Estate, and I vest full power and authority in my Personal Representative to carry out the
provisions of this, my Last Will and Testament, under a non-intervention Will procedure.
I nominate and appoint the following people in the following order of priority as my
Personal Representative until one such person qualifies and accepts to act as my Personall
Representati ve:
Representative:
1. Barbara K. McCormick, of 2525 Joretta Drive, Boise, Idaho 83704;
2. George D. Perry, Jr., of20966 Wells Road, Caldwell, Idaho 83605;
3. Steven A. Perry, of 8179 East McKenzre, Nampa, Idaho 83687.
My Personal Representative shall have the full power and discretion to do everything
necessary to settle my Estate. I direct that my Personal Representative, shall pay all the
expenses of my last illness and burial, and all transfer and other taxes due on or from my
Estate, all costs and charges of the administration of my Estate and all my just debts, as soon
as the same can be conveniently paid, and that no order of Court be required therefor.
All estate, inheritance, succession or other death taxes, duties, charges or assessments.
imposed on or in relation to any property by reason of my death, whether passing under this
of the residue ofmy
of my Estate,
Will or otherwise, shall be paid by my Personal Representative out ofthe
without proration of any charge therefor against any person who receives such property under
the terms of this Will or otherwise.

ITEM V
FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS
It is my intention to prepare a "Letter of Instruction" regarding my preferred burial
wishes, and I direct that my Personal Representative follow these instructions in so far as
possible.
ITEM VI
CHARACTER OF PROPERTY
of my Estate is separate property and community property. It is my intention by this
All ofmy
Will to dispose of my separate property and my one-half interest in the community property
of myself and my spouse.

Last Will and Testament - ---b~:::XL.J:C~v~·"'7~¥-~lJ.!.~~~I-/J/),o/
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ITEM VII
PERSONAL PROPERTY DISTR1BUTION
I give my personal and household effects of every kind, including but not limited to
furniture, appliances, furnishings, pictures, silverware, china, glassware, jewelry, wearing
apparel, boats, personal automobiles and other vehicles, in accordance with a written statement
signed by me or in my handwriting which I intend to leave at my death. I give all of such
property not effectively disposed of by such written statement to my children who survive me,
to be divided among them as they shall agree, or if they shall fail to agree within six months
after the appointment of my personal representative, to be divided among them in portions of
approximately equal value, as determined by my personal representative.
ITEM VIII
SUPPLEMENTAL CARE TRUST FOR SURVIVING SPOUSE
A. If my spouse, Martha J. Perry, survives me for five (5) days, then I give, devise and
bequeath to her the rest, residue and remainder of my estate IN TRUST, to my Personal
Representative, as Trustee, in lieu of any statutory allowances available to my surviving
spouse. This share of my estate that is set aside for Martha J. Perry, shall be held by my
Trustee, in a trust for the benefit of Martha 1.
J. Perry, in a Supplemental Care Trust in
accordance with the following provisions:
1. Intent.
It is my intention by this Trust to create a purely discretionary supplemental care fund
for the benefit of Martha J. Perry, herein after referred to as the beneficiary. It is not my
intention to displace public or private financial assistance that may otherwise be available to
the beneficiary. The following enumerates the kinds of supplemental, nonsupport
disbursements that are appropriate for the Trustee to make from this trust to or for the
beneficiary. Such examples are not exclusive: medical, dental and diagnostic work and
treatment for which there are no private or public funds otherwise available; medical
procedures that are desirable in the Trustee's discretion, even though they may not be necessary
or life saving; supplemental nursing care and rehabilitative services, differentials in cost
between housing and shelter for shared and private rooms in institutional settings; care
appropriate for the beneficiary that assistance programs may not or do not otherwise provide;
expenditures for travel, companionship, cultural experiences, and expenses in bringing the
beneficiary'S
beneficiary's siblings and other appropriate persons for visitation with the beneficiary.

2. Supplement, not support.
I do not want this Trust eroded by the beneficiary's
beneficiary'S creditors nor do I want the
beneficiary's public or private assistance benefits made unavailable to the beneficiary or
terminated. This Trust is not for the beneficiary'S
beneficiary's primary support. It is to supplement the
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beneficiary's supplemental care needs only.
I have no obligation of support owing to the beneficiary, and the beneficiary has no
entitlement to the income or corpus of this trust, except as the Trustee in his, her or its
the
complete, sole, and absolute, and unfettered discretion, elects to disburse. In this regard tht:
ofthese
Trustee may act unreasonably and arbitrarily, as I could, if! were living and in control ofthest:
funds. The Trustee's discretion in making nonsupport disbursements as provided for in this
instrument is final as to all interested parties, including the state or any governmental agency
or agencies, even if the Trustee elects to make no disbursements at all. The Trustee's sole and
independent judgment, rather than any other parties' detennination, is intended to be the
criterion by which disbursements are made. No court or any other person should substitute its
or their judgment for the discretionary decision or decisions made by the Trustee.
3. Income.
Any income received by the Trustee not distributed to or for the benefit of the Trust
beneficiary, shall be added annually to the Trust's principal.
4. Access to Public Benefits.
The Trustee shall consider all resources and income limitations that affect the
beneficiary's right to public assistance programs. Distribution to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary shall be limited so that the beneficiary is not disqualified from receiving public
benefits to which the beneficiary is otherwise entitled. The beneficiary's probable and possible
future supplemental care needs should be considered by the Trustee in connection with
disbursements made by the Trustee from this Trust. The interests of remainder beneficiaries
are only of secondary importance.
5. Resist Requests.
The Trustee should resist any request for payments from this trust for services that any
public or private agency has the obligation to provide to my beneficiary. In this regard, the
Trustee may not be familiar with the federal, state and local agencies that have been created to
financially assist disabled persons. If this is the case, the Trustee should seek assistance in
identifying public and private programs that are or may be available to the beneficiary so that
the Trustee may better serve the beneficiary.
6. Spendthrift Provisions
No part of this Trust, neither principal nor income, shall be subject to anticipation or
assignment by the beneficiary nor shall the Trust corpus or income be subject to attachment by
any public or private creditor of the beneficiary; nor may the Trust principal and income be
taken by any legal or equitable process by any voluntary or involuntary creditor, including those

r,ast Will and Testament -
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that have provided for the beneficiary's support and maintenance. Further, under no
circumstances may the beneficiary compel distributions from this Trust.
7. Trustee - Authority to Terminate Trust
If the existence of this supplemental care Trust adversely affects the beneficiary from
receiving public entitlements or private support benefits, the Trustee may terminate this Trust.
If this occurs, the remainder interest will be accelerated, and the remainder beneficiaries shall
receive the accrued and undistributed income and corpus then held by the Trustee.
In the event of voluntary termination, as provided for in this article, it is my hope and
expectation that the remainder beneficiaries will continue to provide for the nonsupport care
needs of the beneficiary. This request is an expression of my wishes. It is not binding on the
remainder beneficiaries, and is merely precatory language in this paragraph.
If Martha J. Perry fails to survive me for five (5) days, or upon the death of the
beneficiary or upon the Trust's earlier termination. the trust created for Martha J. Perry, shall
be distributed according to Item VIII (B) of this Last Will and Testament.
8. Trustee's Powers
To carry out the purposes of the Trust created under this Will, and subject to any
limitations stated elsewhere herein, the Trustee is vested with all of the powers and authority
as set forth in the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, being Chapter 1 of Title 68, Idaho Code, as
now in effect and as it may hereafter from time to time be amended after the date of my Will
and after my death. The Trustee shall specifically have the power to invest in non-income
producing assets.
9. Unsupervised Administration
The Trust created by this Will may be administered by my Trustee free from the control

of any court that may otherwise have authority over my estate.
10. Successor Trustee: Trustee Powers and Duties
No resignation shall be effective until acceptance by the successor Trustee. No Trustee
shall be required to post surety or personal bond while serving in this fiduciary capacity.
The Trustee should take whatever legal steps may be necessary to initiate or continue
any public assistance program for which the beneficiary is or may become eligible. The
Trustee may bring such action in any court or regulatory agency having jurisdiction over the
maUer,
matter, to secure a ruling or order that the Trust described in this article is not available to the
beneficiary for any purpose absent specific exercise ofthe Trustee's discretion. Any expenses

Last Will and Testament -
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of the Trustee, including reasonable attorney's fees, specifically incurred in connection with
matters relating to determination of eligibility of the beneficiary for public or private support,
but not limited to such services, shall be a proper charge to the Trust.
II. Choice and Effect of Law
This Last Will and Testament is entered into and executed in the State ofIdaho. It shall
be administered in accordance with the laws of that state.

B. The rest, residue and remainder of my estate shall be distributed in equal shares to
my children and step-children who survive me for five (5) days. In the event any of my said
children or step-children should predecease me or should not be living upon the death of the
beneficiary of the Supplemental Care Trust referred to herein or upon the Trust's earlier
termination, then in that event such individual's share shall lapse.
ITEM IX
CONTEST
Every person under this Will who shall contest in any Court any provision of this
instrument shall not be entitled to receive any property of any type whatsoever under this Will.
That person shall receive absolutely nothing under the provisions of this Will or out of my
estate. Any property which would have passed to that person under this Will, shall instead be
distributed as if such person had died prior to my death without issue. My Personal
Representative is specifically authorized to defend at the expense of my estate any contest or
attack of any nature upon this Will, or upon any portion thereof.
ITEM X
CHARACTER OF DISTRIBUTION
Unless otherwise specifically stated, all distributions, whether of income or principal.
principaL
shall be the separate property of each individual distributee, beneficiary or heir under this will.
All income, rents, issues, profits, gains and appreciation of property distributed to each individual
as separate property shall also be the separate property of each such individual.
ITEM XI
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed these presents and do publish and declare
the same as and for my LAST WILL and TESTAMENT, consisting of eight (8) typewritten
pages, the witnesses' certificate included, and on the bottom of each page I have signed my
name for greater security.
I, George D. Perry, the Testator, sign my name to this instrument this t( ~ay of
February, 2005, and being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that
Last Will and Testament - --"=---:=:"'='-=--"""..:7P-..L-I.c.L~--¥=:....Io<:""':;'.=-f
Page
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I sign and execute this instrument as my Last Will and that I sign it willingly (or willingly
direct another to sign for me), that I execute it as my free and voluntary act for the purposes
therein expressed, and that I am eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under
no constraint or undue influence.

George D. Perry
Testator
We, George D. Perry, Jr. and Steven A. Perry, the witnesses, sign our names to this
instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that the
Testator signs and executes this instrument as his last Will and that he signs it willingly (or
willingly directs another to sign for him), and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of
the Testator, hereby signs this Will as witness to the Testator's signing, and that to the best of
our knowledge the Testator is eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no
constraint or undue intluence.

eOgeDP~,f?~

Residing at Caldwell, Idaho

Steven A. Perry
Residing at Nampa, Idaho

Last Will and Testament -
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STA
TE OF IDAHO
STATE
County of Ada

)
:: ss.
SS.
)

tj7!...
tj"7!..-

day of
February, 2005, before me personally appeared George D. Perry.,
On this
ofFebruary,
the Testator, and George D. Perry, Jr. and Steven A. Perry, the witnesses, known to me (or
art:
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the persons whose names are:
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed the same. IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in this
certificat
ve ritten.

Notary Public in and r Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho.
My commission expires 12112/08.
12/12/08.

Last Will and Testament -
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk
ByLMARTIN
DEf'UT'f
DEI'UW

JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Division of Human Services
LARRY L. GOINS
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 2295
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF
GEORGE D. PERRY,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV IE 0905214

DEMAND FOR NOTICE
(I.e. § 15-3-204)
I.C. § 31-3212
EXEMPT: I.e.

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, (hereinafter the
of orders
"Department") pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-204, and hereby files its Demand for Notice oforders
or other filings pertaining to the estate ofthe above-named Decedent. The Department asserts that
it has a financial or property interest in said estate based upon the amount of medical assistance
behalf of the Decedent's spouse, MARTHA J. PERRY, and
benefits which it was required to pay on behalfofthe
based upon its right to recover the amount of medical assistance benefits paid on her behalf as set
forth at Idaho Code § 56-218.

DEMAND FOR NOTICE - Page 1
Y
:\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\C&D.wpd
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The Department further requests a copy of the Inventory and Appraisement, upon its
preparation within three months ofthe personal representative's appointment, pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 15-3-706.
Notice should be given to the Department through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy
Attorney General, Division of
Human Services, 3276 Elder, Suite B, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
ofHuman
83720-0036.
DA
TED this ~ day of April, 2009.
DATED

~

i2:i=

~i;;i;=

RRYL. GOINS
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
of the foregoing
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that a true and correct copy ofthe
day of April,
DEMAND FOR NOTICE was mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the 13
2009, to:

BARBARA K MCCORMICK
C/O PETER C SISSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE ID 83702
ADA COUNTY CLERK
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 W FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702

!ndJ..L~o
!ntUdLU~D
Marchelle Premo, Legal Assistant
Division of Human Services

DEMAND FOR NOTICE - Page 2
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A TTORNEY GENERAL
ATTORNEY
STATE OF IDAHO
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APR 1~) 2009
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk

JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Division of Human Services

By LM,IlRTIN
DEPurv

LARRY L. GOINS
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 2295
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF
GEORGE D. PERRY,

Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV IE 0905214
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE

(I.e. § 15-3-804)
EXEMPT: I.e. § 31-3212

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (the "Department"),
through undersigned counsel, and hereby makes claim against the above-captioned estate. This
claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover the amount of medical assistance paid
on behalf of the Decedent's spouse, MARTHA J. PERRY, as set forth at Idaho Code § 56-218. The
Claimant has paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of the Decedent's spouse MARTHA J.
PERRY in the amount of $106,251.08, as of April 8, 2009. To the extent that the Claimant is
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE-l
Y:IMRCases\Estate\PenyM\C&D.wpd
Y:\MRCases\Eslate\PenyM\C&D.wpd
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obligated to make further medical assistance payments on behalf
behalfofthe
ofthe Decedent's spouse, it reserves
the right to supplement its claim.

IMPORTANT: This claim is made in accordance with the Department's right to establish
its claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218. As long as the decedent's spouse survives, there: is no
demand for payment of this claim. This claim is made against any property or estate which, at any
time, had been the community property of the decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had been
the property of decedent's spouse. The Department will not object to distribution of the

.~state

to the decedent's surviving spouse. However, the Department demands that, before any other
distribution of the estate, adequate provision be made for the future payment of the Department's

O(b )(2). Transfers of property by either spouse (except to
claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-81 O(b)(2).
one another), including transfers by will and the failure to claim probate allowances, may affect the
eligibility ofthe survivor for Medicaid services, and may be set aside in accordance with Idaho Code

§ 56-218(2).
DATED this

134

day of April, 2009.

~~~_.
~~

RRY L. GO
~RYL.G~

Deputy Attorney General

VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

JULIE RAICHART, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: That I am the Claimant's
Paralegal; that I have read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's estate and know the
contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and belief, the facts stated therein are true and correct.

~~
JU
RAICHART, Paralegal

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 2
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J..lJ~ day of April, 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of the foregoing
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE were mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the '-3
of April,
day ofApril,
2009, to:

BARBARA K MCCORMICK
C/O PETER C SISSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE ID 83702
ADA COUNTY CLERK
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 W FRONT STREET
BOISE ID 83702

~g~~
Division of Human Services

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 3
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Peter C. Sisson
SISSON & SISSON
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC
2402 West .Jefferson Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 387-0729
Fax: (208) 331-5009
Idaho State Bar # 4682

J. DAVJO 11A'IlAfilHO,
I11\'1IAfilHO, Cleft.~
ByE-CHILD
DSIUTV

Attorney for Personal Representative

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF:
GEORGE D. PERRY.
Deceased.

Case No. CV IE 0905214
NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE

OF CLAIM
(I.C. 15-3-806)

TO: THE DEAPRTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE. Claimant.
The undersigned personal representative of the above-entitled estate hereby disallows
your claim for $106.251.08 (and any supplemental claim for further medical assistance payments
behalf of Decedent's spouse) presented on April 13,2009.
made on behalfofDecedenfs
13, 2009. Claimant's reliance upon

I.e. ~

56-218 to make its claim "against any property or estate which, at any time, had been the

community property of the decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had been the property of
decedent's spouse" exceeds the scope of recovery aIIowed
allowed by federal law,
law. is preempted by
federal law. and is hereby disallowed.

NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1
File #08-/97
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Claimant's demand that "before any other distribution of the estate, adequate provision be
made for the future payment of the Department's claim pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-810(b)(2)" is also
hereby disallowed because no assets of the estate are subject to the Claimant's claim, nor will
they be upon Decedent's spouse's death.
Failure to protest the disallowance by tiling a petition for allowance in the above named
court. or commencing a proceeding against the undersigned, within sixty (60) days after the
mailing of this notice shall result in your claim for the disallowed amount indicated above being
forever barred.
DATED this

zJ day of June, 2009.

~d4MQ~
BARBARA K. McCORMICK
Personal Representative

STATE
ST ATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
: ss.
)

On this ~ day of June, 2009, before me personally appeared Barbara K. McCormick.
known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name
is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed the same
same..
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Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho
7J. Idaho
Residing at 1t/47niJ
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15 2009
JUN 15
J. DAVID NAVAHRO, Clerk

JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division

By RIC iJELSON
i·JELSON
DEPUT"

LARRY L. GOINS
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
3276 Elder Street, Suite B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 2295
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST
ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
GEORGE D. PERRY,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV IE 0905214
PETITION-FOR ALLOWANCE
1
OF CLAIM

COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department ofHealth
of Health and Welfare (Department), claimant
in the above matter, by and through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy Attorney General, and
pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-806(b), petitions the Court as follows:
1.

The Department has paid medical assistance (Medicaid) benefits on behalf of the

decedent's surviving spouse, MARTHA J. PERRY in the amount of$109,464.23 to date;
2.

After appointment and pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 15-3-804 and 56-218, a written

ofthe
the Department's claim in the amount of 106,251.08, was timely mailed to the Personal
statement of
Representative of the estate and filed with the Court on April 15,2009;

PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2
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3.

The Department's statutory claim is just and valid, and payment should be allowed for

the total amount of
medical assistance paid on behalf
of the decedent's surviving spouse to the fullest
ofmedical
behalfofthe
extent possible.
WHEREFORE, THE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS that the Court enter an Order allowing
the above listed claim to be paid to the fullest extent possible.
DATED this ~ day of June, 2009.

\....

_A-;_A-;

~
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICA
TE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the II
day of
June, 2009, to:
BARBARA K MCCORMICK
C/O PETER C SISSON
SISSON & SISSON
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE,ID

/Y)tY~
/ Y ) CM~ Q:m
Q2Y;l""
~e
Premo, Legal Assistant

PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2
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Peter C. Sisson
SISSON & SISSON
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC
2402 West Jefferson Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 387-0729
Fax: (208)331-5009
Idaho State Bar # 4682

JUN 25 2009
J. DAVID NAVAR RD, Clerk
By AIC NELSON
DEPUTY

Attorney for Personal Representative
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF:
GEORGE D. PERRY.
PERRY,

Case No. CV IE 0905214
OBJECTION TO PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM

Deceascd.
Deceased.

NOW, Barbara K. McCormick. the Personal Representative of the above-named
COMES NOW.
Sisson, and hereby objects to the Petition for
estate. by and through her attorney Peter C. Sisson.

Allowance of Claim filed herein by the State of Idaho. Department of Health and Welfare.
This Objection is based on the Memorandum in SUPP0l1
SUPPOli of Objection to Petition for
suppo11 to he
be filed in this matter. Oral argument is
A!lO\vance of Claim and atlidavit(s) in SllPPOli
requested at the hearing to be set on this matter. Time for creditor claims runs on August 10,
requcsted
10.
2009. The Personal Representative will notice up a hearing on this matter after that date.

DATEDthis&of.lUne,2009.

1N~
~~

PETER C. SISSON
Attorney for Personal Representative

OJBECTION TO PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1
File #08-197
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Tel: (208) 387-0729
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Idaho State Bar # 4682
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Attorney for Personal Representative
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. CV IE 0905214

IN THE MATTER OF:
GEORGE D. PERRY,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE
PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE'S
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND WELFARE'S PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM

Deceased.

COMES NOW, Barbara K. McConnick, the Personal Representative of the above-named
estate, by and through her attorney of record, Peter C. Sisson, ofthe finn Sisson & Sisson, The
Elder Law Finn, PLLC, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of the
Personal Representative's Objection to the Department of Health and Welfare's ("Department")
Petition for Allowance of Claim.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Personal Representative ("PR"), Barbara McConnick, was appointed in this probate
action on March 19,2009. Pursuant to statute, the Department was given notice of the probate
action on April 3, 2009. On April 13,2009, the Department filed its Claim Against Estate in the
amount of $1 06,251.08. On June 2, 2009, the PR timely filed her Notice Of Disallowance Of

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 1
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Claim, denying the Department's Claim in its entirety. On June 11,2009, the Department filed
its Petition For Allowance Of Claim. On June 25,2009, the PR filed her Objection To Petition
For Allowance Of Claim, noting that the time for creditor claims had not yet passed, but when it
had, she would file a Memorandum in Support and set the matter for hearing. The PR has now
filed the Legal Advertising Proof of Publication from the Idaho Statesman, verifying that legal
notice to creditors was duly published and the time for claims has now passed. She now fil{:s her
Memorandum in Support of Objection to the Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim, the
PR's affidavit in support of said Objection, and hereby requests that a hearing be set on the IPR's
disallowance of the Department's claim this matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. On July 31,2006, Martha Jean Perry, George's spouse (hereinafter "Martha"),
conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the couple's home located at 2104 Tendoy Drive,
Boise, Idaho via quit claim deed to her husband, George Perry. Affidavit of Barbara McCom1ick,
Exhibit A, incorporated herein by reference.

2. As of October 1, 2006, the Department approved Martha for Medicaid benefits.
Affidavit of Barbara McCormick, Exhibit B, incorporated herein by reference.
3.

Martha's health care needs have progressively increased over the years and she now

lives in a skilled nursing facility. From October, 2006, Martha has continued to receive
Medicaid benefits and she receives those benefits today.
4.

Over the years, George's health situation also progressively declined. He ultimately

was forced to enter into a nursing home after a long-struggle to remain home. By this time he
had exhausted his liquid resources and decided to sell his home because he would be unable to
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 2
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maintain it, even if qualified for Medicaid benefits. In an effort to sell the home, he provided the
Department with written verification documenting the fair market value of the home and tht~
Department agreed that the proposed sale price of $150,000 was fair market value. Affidavit of
Barbara McCormick, Exhibit C, incorporated herein by reference.
5.

Unfortunately, delays in receiving response from the Department caused the buyer

who had wanted to purchase the property to back out of that transaction. The home remaim:d on
the market. George Perry died in a nursing home on February 25,2009, before he could
complete the sale of the home with a new buyer who had by that time agreed to purchase the
home.
6.

The Personal Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry consummated the sale

of the home on March 26, 2008, for a total sales price of $160,000. Affidavit of Barbara
McCormick, Exhibit D, incorporated herein by reference.
7. The balance of the house sale proceeds, minus disbursements for administrative costs,
is now held in the Estate's checking account as reflected in the Estate Inventory. Affidavit of
Barbara McCormick, Exhibit E, incorporated herein by reference. The proceeds from the sale of
George Perry's home are the only assets that are contained in the Estate of George Perry. The
Inventory makes clear that all estate assets were George Perry's separate property. The
Department failed to make any objection to the PR's Inventory. George's personal property was
of de minimus value and was given to charity prior to his death when he moved to the nursing
home. The Estate of George D. Perry holds no other real or personal property.
8.

The only property that Martha currently owns is one financial account located at
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Wells Fargo, checking account # ending -3540. This account is an income-qualifying or "Miller"
trust account that was necessary to qualify Martha for Medicaid. Martha's fixed monthly income
(social security and pension) is direct deposited into this account every month. Funds are then
paid out of this account in the same month for Martha's Medicaid patient share of cost, for her
health insurance premium and for her personal needs allowance. This account holds less than
$2,000 at the end of each month after the above amounts are paid out every month. Affidavit of
Barbara McCormick, Exhibit F, incorporated herein by reference. Martha owns no other re:al or
personal property. Affidavit of Barbara McCormick, incorporated herein by reference.
9.

The Personal Representative stipulates and agrees that upon Martha Jean Perry's

death, any amounts left in Wells Fargo checking account # ending -3540 are owed to and will be
paid to the Department pursuant to its right to recover for Medicaid assistance paid out during
her lifetime against assets in which Martha had an interest at her death. Aside from the funds in
this Wells Fargo checking account, Martha does not own any interest in any other property.
Affidavit of Barbara McCormick, incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case requires interpretation of a federal statute and consideration of whether the
Department's application ofldaho
ofIdaho law (I.C. § 56-218) violates federal law and is therefore
preempted by federal law. Under certain circumstances specified by federal law, the states are
allowed to recover correctly paid medical assistance benefits from the estates of Medicaid
recipients. Federal law requires the states to make claims against the probate estates of Medicaid
recipients to recovery correctly paid benefits. Federal law also allows the states to expand the
definition of "estate" to include non-probate assets owned by a recipient at the time of the
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recipient's death. Idaho has chosen this expanded definition of "estate." I.e.
I.C. § 56-218(4).
Nothing in the federal medical assistance statutes authorizes a direct medical assistance estate
claim against the estate of any person other than the recipient of benefits. Despite strong
pressure from the states and others, in 1993 Congress refused to enact legislation to allow direct
claims against the estates of non-recipient surviving spouses.
Under the current statute, the states are permitted to pull back into a recipient's

estatl~

any

real or personal property or other assets in which the recipient held a legal title or interest at the
time of the recipient's death (to the extent of the interest). Idaho's estate recovery statute, Idaho
Code § 56-218, requires that a medical assistance claim be filed against the estate of a deceased
recipient, but also requires that a claim be asserted against the estate of a surviving spouse who
never received medical assistance benefits. The Department's interpretation and application of

I.e. § 56-218 in its estate recovery claims (including the one at bar) conflicts with federal law to
the extent that the Department asserts recovery claims against assets in the non-Medicaid
spouse's probate estate which were not assets in which the Medicaid recipient held an interest at
the time of the Medicaid recipient's death.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the United States government's
principal agency in charge of protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential
human services. The work of HHS is conducted by the Office of the Secretary and 11 agencies.
CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) is the HHS agency that governs the
Medicaid program in the United States. HHS most recently stated in clear and unambiguous
terms that an estate recovery claim by a state could be asserted only against assets in which the
Medicaid recipient held a legal title or interest at the time of death to the extent of the interest.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO
DEPARTMENT'
DEP
ARTMENT' S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 5

000034

In the instant case, none of the assets in the Estate of George Perry are assets in which

Martha Perry, the Medicaid recipient, holds a legal title or interest. Since she doesn't hold any
such interest now, while she is alive, she cannot possibly hold any such interest at the time of her
death. The Department's claim in this probate action is exactly the type of recovery claim which
goes beyond what federal law allows. That is why the PR disallowed the Department's Claim

and that is why this Court should uphold that disallowance.
OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING RECOVERY OF
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS CORRECTLY PAID
Statutory Framework
Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act to ensure

medical care to individuals who do not have the resources to cover essential medical services.
Arkansas Dept. ofHealth
of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006); In Re Estate of
Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436, 439, 111 P.3d 121 (2005). The program is jointly funded with the

states as a "cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance
to participating States to aid them in furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 308,100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Participating states enact legislation

u.S.
and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S.
Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp.
III 2(03). After this, the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Each

state administers its own program within the federal requirements, and the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) administer the program and approve state plans. Arkansas Dept.
ofHealth
ofHealth and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
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One of the requirements imposed on state plans in order to participate in the program and
receive federal funding is that the state must "comply with the provisions of [42 U.S.c. § 1396p]
with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of medical assistance correctly paid,

transfl~rs

of

assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18)
l396a(a)(18) (2000).
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider
assets of both husband and wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.C. §
1396r-5(c) (2000). But there are several provisions in place to protect the community spouse (the
spouse not applying for Medicaid) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of
assets needed to qualify the applicant for Medicaid. The value of the couple's horne is not
included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(5); 42
1382b(a)(I) (2000). The community spouse ofa Medicaid recipient is also entitled to
U.S.c. § 1382b(a)(1)
an allowance of income and assets designated for his or her needs that is not considered available
to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the
recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, to his or
her community spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of
community spouses to contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses
against the accommodation of the community spouse's need to provide for his or her own
support.

Federal Medicaid Recovery Provisions
Although it is not applicable to the facts before us, it is important to start with the pre
pre1993 federal law on Medicaid recovery, because it is the basis for the rationale of several rekvant
cases, including the sole case in Idaho that peripherally addressed the issue at bar. Prior to
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amendments adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, the federal
Medicaid statute stated a general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid
Medicaid benefits, subject to several exceptions, one of which is relevant here:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of
an individual under the State plan may be made, except-except-

****

(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he
received such assistance, from his estate.
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1) (1988).
Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, to recover Medicaid
benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery would be from the
recipient's estate. The statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could
only be made after the death ofthe recipient's surviving spouse. [d.
Id. § 1396p(b)(2)
1396p(b)(2) (1988).
Despite this prohibition against recovery before the death of a surviving spouse, there was no
express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The pre-1993 federal law
contained no definition of the term "estate."
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § l3612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312,627-28
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), (4) (2000)). As amended, the federal
law
federallaw
retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover Medicaid payments correctly
paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the
1993 amendments changed section 1396p(b) in several ways. First, the 1993 amendments
lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55. Second, the 1993 amendments made
recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. Third, the amendments

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 8

000037

added a definition of "estate," which itself had both mandatory and pennissive elements. As
amended, the general nonrecovery rule and the relevant exception read as follows:
(1)
(I) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:

****

(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or
recovery from the individual's estate * * *. (emphasis added)
Id. The amended version of section 13
96p(b)( 1I)(B)
)(B) retained the express reference to recovery
1396p(b)(

from the recipient's estate. Furthennore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the
recipient's estate is only pennitted after the death ofthe recipient's surviving spouse: "Any
adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the individual's
)(2) (emphasis added). As with the pre-I
pre-1993
surviving spouse, if any * * *." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b
I 396p(b)(2)
993
version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or reference to,
recovery from a surviving spouse's estate.
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recove'ry,
with a mandatory provision that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that
authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the scope of probate law:
-[T]he tenn "estate", with respect to a deceased individual -
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State * * * any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of
death (to the extent of
such interest), including such assets conveyed to
ofdeath
ofsuch
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § I 396p(b)(4) (emphasis added).
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Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of "estate" for Medicaid
recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be
part of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone

els(~

on

the recipient's death. For example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right
of survivorship and one dies, the deceased joint tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the
surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the optional expanded
definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to
the surviving joint tenant.
Thus federal statutes place limits on the state's powers to define the scope of recovery of
.S.C. § 1396p.
medical assistance benefits correctly paid. The limits are set forth in 42 U
U.S.C.

of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
Arkansas Dept. ofHealth
Idaho's Medicaid Recoverv Provisions
Idaho Code (I.e.) § 56-218, entitled "RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE" states in pertinent part,
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
fiftyassistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty
five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance may
be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any,
for such aid paid to either or both: ...

(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and

(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of
such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
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deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust or other arrangement. (emphasis added).
Idaho has adopted verbatim the optional federal provision that authorizes states to expand
the definition of "estate" beyond the scope of probate law. I.C. § 56-218(4). Therefore, it
follows that Idaho is required to abide by the interpretation of the language in the federal statute
that CMS and HHS promulgate. Idaho law currently allows the state to seek recovery for
medical assistance paid "from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such
aid paid to either or both." I.e. § 56-218( 1). The Department does not interpret and apply this
statutory language consistently with federal law. In order to be consistent with federal law, the
Department's claims against a Medicaid spouse's estate must be against "assets in which the
individual [Medicaid recipient] had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of
such interest." The Department, however, regularly makes claims against assets in which the:
Medicaid recipient had no legal title or interest at the time of his death. That is the case in this
matter and that is the reason this Court should rule in favor of the Personal Representative's
disallowance of the Department's claim in this case.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Does federal law limit the scope of recovery against the individual's estate or the
estate of the spouse to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her
death, thereby preempting the broader recovery sought by the Department in this case?
2. If recovery is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at thl;:
time of her death what, if any, interest does Martha Perry have in the homestead sale proceeds
that make up the assets in the Estate of George Perry, her deceased husband?
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........
ARGUMENT
I. FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW

Whether federal law preempts state law is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation.
Congressional purpose is "'the ultimate touchstone'" of the preemption inquiry. Malone l'.
v. White

Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504,98 S.Ct. 1185,55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks
Int'IAss'n, Local 1625
I 625 v.
l'. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96,103,84 S.Ct. 219,11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)).
The Court's primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Cal.

Fed. Sav.
Sal'. & Loan Ass'n v.
l'. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81,107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987).
The United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration
"[ c]onsideration of issues arising under the
Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are]
not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congr{:ss.
Congr{!ss. '"

III

Cipollone v.
l'. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516,112 S.Ct. 2608,120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992)
(quoting Rice v.
l'. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230,67 S.Ct. 1146,91 L.Ed. 1447
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516,518,112 S.Ct.
2608).

Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S.
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sal'.
at 280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First, it may do so with express language preempting state law. Id.
Second, it may do so by fully occupying the field, that is, "congressional intent to pre-empt state
law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary
state regulation." Id. at 280-81,107 S.Ct. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230,67 S.Ct. 1146). In
this case, Congress did not expressly preempt state law nor did it so completely occupy the field
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as to leave no room for state action, because the Medicaid program specifically permits and even
requires action by participating states.
The third kind of preemption is at issue in this case. Even when Congress has not chosen to
displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless prepre
empt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state
and federal laws is impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
142143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when the state law
is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67,61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
II. THE DEPARTMENT'S APPLICATION OF I.e. § 56-218 IN THIS CASE
ACTUALLY CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL LAW AND IS THEREFORE
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.
The Department's claim against the Estate of George Perry is premised on the Medicaid
benefits paid out on behalf of his spouse, Martha. Federal law precludes the Department from
asserting a claim against any property which Martha, the Medicaid recipient, does not have l{~gal
title to or an interest in at the time of her death. See discussion, supra. In this case, the
Department's claim against the estate of Martha Perry's spouse must be denied because she has
no legal title to nor any interest in the assets of the Estate of George Perry, nor will she ever have
such an interest, even at the time of her death.
The appellate courts in Idaho have not squarely addressed the issue presented in this case,
although the only two Idaho cases which have dealt with Medicaid recovery claims are discussed
below. However, a very recent decision from the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the
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procedural aftennath of that decision is particularly instructive in this case. In Re Estate ofBarg,
ojBarg,
752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) is the latest state court decision on point and is on all fours with
the instant situation. The Court's analysis in Barg provides an in-depth and exhaustive revit:w of
state court cases analyzing the issue. Reading Barg in its entirety is very instructive on the issue
at bar because Minnesota's department of health and welfare made the same argument in favor of
its recovery action as is made by Idaho's Department in this action. The facts of Barg, when
pared down to the essentials, are essentially the same facts as are present in this probate. For the
Court's convenience, the PR has appended a complete copy of Barg to this Memorandum as
Appendix 1.
In Barg, supra at 73-74, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a provision of the
state's Medicaid estate recovery statute that allowed recovery from the estate of a surviving
spouse for any assets jointly owned by the couple at any point during their marriage. In that
case, Mrs. Barg transferred her partial interest in the couple's home to her husband when she
entered a nursing home. She died without leaving a probate estate and her husband died soon
thereafter. The county then sought recovery against Mr. Barg's estate for the amount of
Medicaid benefits paid out on behalf of Mrs. Barg. The Minnesota Supreme Court detennined
that the county could recover only from assets that the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest in
at the time of her death. Since Mrs. Barg had no legal interest in any property when she died
because she had transferred her interest to her husband while she was alive, the Court ruled that
the county had no way to seek recovery from Mr. Barg's estate. Id.
These are the same facts present in the instant case. Martha transferred her interest in the
couple's home to her husband years ago in 2006, prior to applying for Medicaid benefits. She
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retains no legal interest in that real property, nor in the proceeds from the sale of that real
property, which are the only assets that make up her husband's estate. Statement of Facts
("SOF"),

,-r~.

1-2, 7-8.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota discussed the federal statute at length, which is directly
applicable to the instant case because Idaho has adopted the federal language verbatim in I.C. §
56-218. In discussing the statute at issue it addressed the state's argument that the "other
arrangement" phrase opened the door for the broader recovery allowed under Minnesota's
statute. The Court rejected that argument. The Court's opinion on the scope of the Minnesota
recovery statute, directly on point with the instant case, is cited at length below.
We tum to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a surviving
spouse's estate allowed under Minnesota law is consistent with federal law.
Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 256B.15 allows the state to recover from a
surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital
property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage." (Emphasis
added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority does not
conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 1396p(b) should
be construed broadly and the 1993 amendments were intended to expand, not
restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this argument for broad estate
recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with the dual goals
of federal law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance available to
more qualifying recipients, while protecting community spouses from

pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section
1396p(b)(1) allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 1396p(b)(4)
allows expansion of the estate only to include assets in which the recipient had an
interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" recovery allowed
by subdivision 2 is preempted.

The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring
the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its language.
preSignificantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre
1993 federal law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of
assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but transferred by the
recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of the courts that have
interpreted federal law to allow direct claims against the estate of a surviving
OBJECTIONTO
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-spouse, only one has construed that authority to extend to assets that were
transferred before the death of the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied
on language from the 1993 amendments to support that extension. See In re
Estate o/Wirtz, 607 N.W.1d 882, 885-86 (N.D.2000).
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other
than the Medicaid recipient's estate have construed that authority to reach only
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, that
is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state
probate law or included in the estate under an expanded definition allowed by the
1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 (limiting
recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate
law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 (same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that
recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid recovery
statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid
recipient's estate as defined under state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d
at 851 n.3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of 'estate' in [section]
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the time of death"'); see also In re
of Smith, No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4
Estate ofSmith,
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov.1, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery
against estates of surviving spouses have required that recipient had interest in
assets at time of death)....
death) ....
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting principle
requiring an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. Although the North Dakota
court had acknowledged in its earlier Thompson decision that recovery allowed
under section 1396p(b) is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an
interest at the time of death (indeed that was the basis on which the court
rationalized allowing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate), 586 N.W.2d at
851 n. 3, the court held in Wirtz that any assets conveyed by the Medicaid

recipient to his spouse before his death were subject to recovery from the
surviving spouse's estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. The court stated that limiting
recovery under section 1396p(b) to "assets in the surviving spouse's estate that the
Medicaid recipient had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy
tenancyin-common, survivorship, life estate, or living trust" would ignore the words
"interest" and "other arrangement" in the federal law. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885.
Concluding that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the
court relied on the Congressional intent it perceived "to allow states a wide
latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-86. The court did not
explain why the same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was consistent with
the limitation to recovery from assets in which the recipient had an interest at the
time of death, yet also justified abandoning that limitation in Wirtz.
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We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993
amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied in Wirtz. The plain meaning of
"other arrangement," read in the context of
ofsection
section 1396p(b)(4), is
arrangements other than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the
time of the Medicaid recipient's death.
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional
definition of "estate" allows inclusion of any other real and personal property and
other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor,
heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § II396p(b)(4)(B)
396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further
describes the assets that a state may include in this expanded estate. The clause
describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are
"conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers back to the immediately
preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any
legal title or interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to
whom "such" assets may have been conveyed--a "survivor, heir, or assign ofthe
of the
deceased individual." Id. (emphasis added). And finally, the clause describes
several methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place -
-"through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust,
or other arrangement." Id.
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient
having a legal interest at the time of death. When we construe a federal statute we
must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used." Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326,60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To
read "other arrangement" to include a lifetime transfer would be to read the words
"at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other arrangement"
cannot include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context.
"[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of examples of conveyances that occur at the
time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign
ofthe deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid
recipient, must have died for the conveyance to occur. A recipient cannot have
heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the
deceased" during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language
and its context, the conclusion of the Wirtz court that "other arrangement" is
sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable.
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did
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not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every
decision except Wirtz,
Wirtz. to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to
expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold
that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis
added)

!d. at 68-71.
u.S. Supreme Court seeking to
The State of Minnesota filed a writ of certiorari to the U.S.
overturn the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Barg. In May of2009, the U.S. Solicitor
General submitted an amicus curiae brief authored by not only that office but joined by the
attorneys from the Department ofHHS in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's order inviting
the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. This is THE most recent le;gal
briefing by HHS on the issue. The United States' brief examines and rejects each and every
argument posited by the State of Minnesota seeking to expand Medicaid estate recovery beyond
that allowed by federal law. For the Court's convenience, the entire United States Solicitor

of Barg is attached hereto and incorporated
General's amicus curiae brief filed in In Re Estate ofBarg
herein as Appendix 2.
The import of the United States' briefing in this matter cannot be overemphasized. The
legal positions taken in that brief represent HHS's interpretations of federal law. CMS, as noted
above, is governed by HHS. By accepting federal support for its Medicaid program, Idaho is
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legally obligated to abide by HHS/CMS interpretations of federal Medicaid law. In its 2009
briefing in Barg before the U.S. Supreme Court, the United States Solicitor General and HHS
expressly reject the interpretation and application that Idaho's Department relies upon in using
I.C. § 56-218 to support the claim made against the Estate of George Perry in this case.
The United States in Barg, supra at p. 8-9, stated in pertinent part,
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision is correct and does not warrant
further review. The federal Medicaid Act permits recovery of correctly paid
benefits from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse, but limits that
recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at the
time of her death ...
A. The Decision Of The Minnesota Supreme Court Is Correct
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly concluded that the Medicaid
Act forbids petitioner from seeking to recover correctly paid benefits from assets
in which the Medicaid recipient had no legal interest at the time of her death.
Under the Medicaid Act, a State generally may not seek to recover
correctly paid Medicaid benefits. 42 U.S.C. I396p(b)(1). The Act provides,
however, that a State (1) must seek recovery of nursing home and related benefits
paid on behalf of an individual over the page of 55 from "the individual's estate"
as defined by state probate law; and (2) may, at its option, define "the individual's
estate" more broadly to include any "assets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such
assets conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased individual through
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other
arrangement." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(I)(B), (b)(4)(A) and (B). Thus, the Medicaid
Act, which permits recovery only after the death of the recipient's surviving
spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2), authorizes a State to fIle a reimbursement
claim against the surviving spouse's estate, up to the value of any assets in
which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death.
The Minnesota estate-recovery law exceeds the scope of that
authorization. It permits the State to recover from a surviving spouse's estate "the
value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned
property at any time during the marriage, " Minn. Stat. Ann. § 256B.I5, subd. 2
(2007) (emphasis added), without regard to whether the recipient retained an
interest in the assets at the time of her death. Because a State may not recover
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correctly paid Medicaid benefits except to the extent authorized by federal
law, see 42 V.S.c. 1396p(b)(1), Minnesota's statute conflicts with federal law
and is therefore preempted. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 280-282 (1987). (emphasis added).
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Barg went on to determine whether Dolores Barg
owned any interest in the property held by her husband's estate. It stated,
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead and certificates of deposit no longer
existed at the time of her death. No other recognizable interest has been
identified .... We conclude that Dolores had no interest in assets at the time of
identified....
her death that were part of a probate estate or an expanded estate definition
permissible under federal law, and therefore there is no basis for the County's
claim against the estate.
Id. at 72-73.

The same conclusion follows in this case. Martha Perry retains no legal interest
whatsoever in the house sale proceeds that make up the Estate of George Perry. Nor can she be
said to have any interest in those assets under the expanded estate definition permissible under
federal law. She conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the horne to her husband years ago
via a quit claim deed. SOF, ~ 1. The Department has no valid recovery claim nor will it ever
have a valid claim against the assets making up the Estate of George Perry. The Court should
rule accordingly.
Idaho Cases

In 2005, our Supreme Court considered the Department's claim filed in the probate of a
Medicaid recipient's estate whose spouse survived him. In Re Estate of
Kaminsky, 141 Idaho
o/Kaminsky,
436, 111 P. 3d 121 (2005). Although the issue in Kaminsky was the timeliness of the
Department's clam, the Court did recognize that the Department's recovery claim was properly
made only against the Medicaid recipient's estate. The Court stated,
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Medicaid is a public assistance program designed to provide medical care and
services to persons with insignificant financial resources. The provisions of
Idaho's Public Assistance Law (Chapter 2, Title 56, Idaho Code) and its
implementing regulations provide eligibility requirements. Only persons with few
financial resources qualify for assistance and assistance comes with strings
attached. Included in these strings is a right on the part of the State, pursuant
to I.e. § 56-218, to obtain reimbursement of Medicaid assistance from the
estate of a recipient. Under any reasonable definition, this right of recovery
constitutes a "claim" against the recipient's estate. (emphasis added).

Id. at 439. The Department did not attempt in Kaminsky, however, to assert any claim against the
surviving/community spouse's estate. l
In 1998, our Supreme Court in Idaho Department ofHealth
ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman., 132
Idaho 213, 215, 970 P
.2d 6, 8-10 (1998), held that the version of I.e. § 56-218 then in effect
P.2d
(pre-OBRA 1993) authorized the Department to recover against the surviving spouse's estate but
expressly recognized that such recovery was limited by federal law to assets that were part of the
Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under state probate law. The Jackman Court recognized
that federal law does preempt the authority granted to the Department by I.e. § 56-218, and held
that the only asset that might be recoverable against from the surviving spouse's estate was
community property accumulated by the couple after the execution of their marriage settlemt::nt
agreement. Id. at 215-216. Our Supreme Court has already recognized, therefore, that federal
law does preempt in the area of Medicaid recovery claims - i.e. with respect to I.C. § 56-218.

Jackman is also important with respect to two further points in that opinion.
First, the Court held that the separate property assets of the Medicaid recipient's spouse
(the community spouse) were not subject to an estate recovery claim by the Department. Id. at
I Reference is sometimes made in case law to the "surviving spouse" which is often used to refer to the "community
spouse" or the spouse which is not the Medicaid recipient. This Memorandum refers to George Perry as the
community spouse because he did not in fact "survive" his spouse, Martha Perry, the Medicaid recipient.
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216. This conclusion is consistent with the federal law because the Medicaid recipient does not
own any interest in the community spouse's separate property. In Jackman, the Court held that
all assets transferred to the community spouse upon the Medicaid spouse's approval for Medicaid
by use of a marriage settlement agreement effectively transmuted those assets into the separate
property assets of the Medicaid recipient's spouse, precluding the Department's claim against
those assets. The Court held that the community spouse's separate property, including the
community property transmuted by agreement, was not part of the Medicaid recipient's estate
and not subject to the Department's recovery claim. Id. at 216-217. In this case, all property of
the estate in the Inventory served on the Department was identified as George Perry's separate
property. Those assets are entirely made up of proceeds from the sale of George's home. Martha
conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the home to George in 2006. Therefore, the home
and the proceeds from the sale of the home are George's separate property assets. The
Department never objected to that characterization in the Inventory.
Second, the Jackman Court also rejected the Department's effort to use the post-OBRA
1993 definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(l )(B) as support for a broader right to
recovery. Id. The Jackman Court rejected this argument because the definition of "assets" was
not in effect at the time the agreement transmuting the couple's community property into the
Medicaid recipient spouse's separate property was signed in that case. In other words, the
definition of "assets" that the Department sought to rely upon in Jackman was pre-OBRA 1993.
If the Department seeks to resurrect that argument in this case, the Court should reject it a second
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time, but not because the definition is not in effect. The Court should reject it because the
argument lacks substantive merit.
The State of Minnesota posited the very same argument when it sought certification
before the U.S. Supreme Court in order to reverse the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in In Re

Estate OfBarg,
OjBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). In rejecting the State of Minnesota's argument that the
tenn "assets" supported a broader right to recovery, the U.S. Solicitor General stated,
2.
Petitioner [State of Minnesota] argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on pennissible recovery from the estate of the
Medicaid recipient's surviving spouse, because the Act defines the tenn "assets"
to include "all income and resources of the individual and of the individual's
spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l). According to petitioner, "[b]y including
resources of both 'the individual' and 'of the individuals spouse' in the meaning
of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's resources fall within the
scope of § 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet. 27.

Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statutory definition of
"assets" does encompass resources of both "the individual" (i.e., the Medicaid
recipient) and "The individual's spouse," the particular provision of the Medicaid
Act at issue here refers specifically to any "assets in which the individual had any
legal title or interest at the time of death." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis
added). Petitioner's argument finds it necessary to rewrite that clause to read
"'any * * * assets in which [either or both the individual and the individual's
spouse] had any legal title or interest.'" Pet. 26 (brackets and asterisk in
original) (emphasis added). But this editing does nothing less than make the
statute say the opposite of what it says. The plain language of the operative
provision of the Act refutes petitioner's readings. 2
3. Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act also finds little support in the
Act's other provisions concerning the treatment of spousal assets. See Pet. 27-28.
As petitioner notes, the Medicaid Act generally considers the community
2 In

describing the operation of the amended estate-recovery provision, the legislative history of the 1993
amendments also focused on the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid benefits, rather than the
resources of both the individual and his or her spouse. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 213, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. 835
(1993) ("At the option of the State, the estate against [[which]
which] ......... recovery is sought may include any real or
personal property or other assets in which the beneficiary had any legal title or interest at the time of death. including
the home.") (emphasis added) (footnote original)
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spouse's assets for purposes of detennining whether an institutionalized
individual is eligible to receive benefits. But the Act also exempts certain
property, such as the couple's home, from consideration, 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(10,
1396r-5(c)(5), and allows the community spouse to retain certain amounts of
resources and income that are not considered available to pay for the applicant's
medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and (f)(2). Moreover, once the
institutionalized spouse is detennined to be eligible for benefits, the Medicaid Act
provides that "no resources ofthe community spouse shall be deemed available to
the institutionalized spouse." 42 U.S.c. 1396r-5(c)(4). The Medicaid Act, in
short, imposes significant limitations on petitioner's asserted principle that
"spouses are expected to support each other." Pet. 27. To read Section
1396p(b)(4)(B) in accordance with its plain tenns thus is consistent with the
broader statutory scheme.
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity about limiting
spousal estate recovery to the value of assets in which the Medicaid recipient
had a legal interest at the time of death, the presumption against preemption
does not come into play, Pet. 28 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996)
)--even assuming, arguendo, that this presumption has force in the
(1996))--even
context of a comprehensive federal-state cooperative program like Medicaid in
which the State's program is subject to federal approval. And for similar reasons,
petitioner's suggestion that the decision below improperly enforces against the
State "[a]n ambiguous condition" on the acceptance of federal funds under
Spending Clause legislation lacks any merit. Pet. 28 n.8 (citing Arlington Cent.
(2006». (emphasis added)
Sch. Dist. Bd. OfEduc. V. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,296 (2006)).
Petitioner also errs (Pet. 20-23, 28 n.8) in asserting that the Minnesota
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 1396(b)(4)(B) is inconsistent with the
interpretation of the responsible federal agency. HHS has neither promulgated
regulations nor issued guidance interpreting Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) to authorize
this kind of estate recovery that petitioner urges in this case. To be sure, eMS in
2007 approved Minnesota's state plan amendment incorporating its statutory
spousal recovery provisions. See Pet. App. 89a-93a. But CMS' s approval is not
the equivalent of binding interpretive guidance. Cf. 42 C.F.R. 430.16(a)(I) (a
state plan or plan amendment is deemed approved if eMS does not act within 90
days after submission). Moreover, CMS's approval followed binding judicial
decisions in Minnesota's own courts interpreting the Medicaid Act to limit
recovery to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at time of death.
ofGullberg,
See, e.g., In re Estate of
Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
As set forth above in this brief, see p. 9, supra, HHS also interprets the Medicaid
Act to limit recovery in that manner. (emphasis added).
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The Department applies the language in I.C. § 56-218 too broadly in
attempting to recover against assets in which Martha, the Medicaid recipient, has no title
or interest. Martha conveyed all of her interest in those assets to her husband years ago.
The Department's effort to broaden the scope of recovery allowed under I.C. § 56-218
violates federal law and is therefore preempted by federal law. This Court should uphold
the PR's disallowance of the Department's claim in its entirety.

CONCLUSION

None of the assets in the Estate of George Perry are assets in which Martha Perry will
hold a legal title or interest at the time of her death. She holds no such interest now. She
relinquished any right, title or interest to that property years ago. The Department is applying
I.C. § 56-218 too broadly in making a claim in this probate, in contravention of federal law. The
Department's recovery claim in this action seeks to recover against the separate property assets of
George Perry - assets in which Martha has no title or interest.
For all the foregoing reasons, the Personal Representative respectfully requests that the
Court uphold her disallowance of the Department's recovery claim against the Estate of George
Perry.

/~

DATED this ~ day of November, 2009.

Attorney for Personal Representative
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Appeal from the District Court, Mille Lacs County, Steven P. Ruble, J.
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Mille Lacs County Attorney, Melissa M. Saterbak, Asst. Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, MN, for appellant Mille Lacs
County.
Thomas J. Meinz, Princeton, MN, for respondent Michael Barg.
Julian J. Zweber, St.
st. Paul, MN, for amici curiae Elder Law Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association and National
center.
Senior Citizens Law Center.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Robin Christopher Vue-Benson, Asst. Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae
Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en bane.
OPINION
MEYER, Justice.
The Mille Lacs County Family Services and Welfare Department (County) filed a claim against the Estate of Francis E.
Barg (Estate), seeking to recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of his predeceased wife, Dolores Barg. The
Estate partially allowed the claim, and disallowed the other part. The district court, concluding that Dolores Barg's
interest in the couple's property was limited because she had conveyed it to her husband before her death, evaluated
her interest as a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance. The County appealed, arguing that it was entitled to
recovery from the full value of the property. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, partially allowing the claim
and evaluating Dolores Barg's interest in the property as a joint tenancy interest equivalent to one-half the value of the
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N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn.App.2006). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Factual and Procedural Background.

The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case. Dolores J. Barg was born in 1926, married Francis E. Barg in
1948, and remained married to him until her death in 2004. In 1962 and 1967, in two separate transactions, the Bargs
took title as joint tenants to real property in Princeton, Minnesota. Their home was located on this property. On October
24, 2001, Dolores Barg entered a nursing home in Mille Lacs County, at first paying the costs herself. In December 2001,
she applied for long-term Medicaid benefits.(fn1)
An asset assessment for Dolores Barg was completed in February 2002. The Bargs' marital assets including their
homestead totaled $137,272.63.(fn2) Approval for long-term Medicaid benefits was given retroactive to December 1,
2001.
On February 27, 2002, Francis Barg executed his will,
Will, nominating the couple's son Michael F. Barg as personal
representative, leaving
leaVing his estate to his surviving descendants, and making no provision for his wife. Dolores Barg
transferred her jOint
joint tenancy interest in the homestead property to Francis Barg on July 2, 2002, when her dau~lhter and
guardian of her estate, Barbara Anderson, executed a Guardian's Deed. Also in July 2002, Barbara Anderson deleted
Dolores Barg's name from certificates of deposit the couple held jointly at Bremer Bank. There is no allegation that these
actions were improper or fraudulent.
On January 1, 2004, Dolores Barg died, having received $108,413.53 in Medicaid benefits. At the time of her death,
assets belonging to either Dolores or Francis Barg included three certificates of deposit, a checking account, and an IRA
account, all in the name of Francis Barg alone; one certificate of deposit payable to the funeral home for Dolores Barg's
funeral; two vehicles, together worth approximately $9,000; the homestead titled in Francis Barg's name, valued at
jOintly held at some time
$120,800; and miscellaneous household goods and furniture. All of these assets had been jointly
during the couple's 55-year marriage.
On May 27, 2004, Francis Barg died, never having received Medicaid benefits. On July 30, 2004, the County filed a
claim against Francis Barg's estate, seeking to recover $108,413.53, the full amount Dolores Barg had received in
Medicaid benefits.
Michael Barg disallowed $44,533.53 of the claim, and allowed $63,880. The County petitioned for an allowance of
the full claim, arguing that the entire value of the marital property, both the homestead and the certificates of deposit,
was subject to its claim because Dolores Barg's joint tenancy interest gave her a right to use of the entire property. The
district court concluded that Dolores Barg's interest in the property at the time of her death was
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equivalent to a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance.
The County appealed. The court of appeals explained that, based on In re Estate of Gu//berg, 652 N.W.2d 709
(Minn.App. 2002), the County's ability to recover against Francis Barg's estate was limited to Dolores's interest in marital
or jointly owned property at the time of her death. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496. The court decided that property law
principles should be applied to determine the nature of that interest and that under federal law and Gu//berg, Dolores
Barg retained a joint tenancy interest in the homestead at the time of her death. Id. at 497. The court valued that
interest as an undivided one-half of the property's value, and remanded the case to the district court for a recalculation
of the amount of the claim that was allowable. Id.
The County petitioned for review. The Estate opposed review but sought conditional cross-review on the issue of
whether federal law permits the State to recover at all from a surviving spouse's estate. We granted review, as well as
cross-review, and asked for briefing on whether the Estate had adequately preserved for review the issue of "whether
the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a
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surviving spouse." We granted requests by the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services to file an amicus curiae brief
aligned with the County and to participate in oral argument.(fn3) We also granted requests by the Elder Law Section of
the Minnesota State Bar Association and the National Senior Citizens Law Center to file an amicus curiae brief clligned
with the Estate. After oral argument, we asked the parties for supplementary briefing on the relationship of the 2003 and
2005 amendments of Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 1 and 1c-1k (2006), to the authority the County argues exists under
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1a (2006) and Minn.stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2 (2006), and how that relationship affects
preemption analysis and the scope of recovery permiSSible
permissible under Minnesota law.
Statutory Framework.
Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act to ensure medical care to individuals who
do not have the resources to cover essential medical services. Martin ex rei. Hoffv. City ofRochester,
of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1,9
jOintly funded with the states as a
(Minn. 2002). Medicaid was intended to be the payor of last resort. ld. The program is jointly
provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them
"cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government proVides
in furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980).
Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and submit those
plans to the u.s. Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.c. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III
2003). After this, the states can receive federal payments. 42 USc. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its own
program within the federal requirements, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)(fn4) administer
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the program and approve state plans. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. One of the reqUirements imposed on state plans is that
they must "comply with the provisions of [42 U.s.c. § 1396p] with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of
medical assistance correctly paid, transfers of assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 USc. § 1396a(a)(18) (2000).
ofAtkinson v. Minn.
To receive Medicaid, a person must qualify as either "categorically" or "medically" needy. Estate ofAtkinson
of Human Servs., 564 N.w.2d 209, 210-11 (Minn.1997). A person is "categorically needy" if he is eligible for other
Dep't ofHuman
specified federal assistance programs. ld. at 211. A person is "medically needy" if he incurs medical expenses that
reduce his income to roughly the level of those who are categorically needy. ld. To qualify as medically needy a person
may have income no higher than a defined threshold and may own assets of no more than a defined value. ld. If the
assets of a Medicaid applicant and her spouse exceed the qualifying threshold, they must "spend down" their assets until
they are at or below the qualifying threshold. ld. If a potential Medicaid recipient transfers assets below fair market value
recipient is deemed ineligible for benefits for a time period mandated
within a certain period of time before eligibility, the reCipient
by statute. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c) (2000). This provision prevents people who are not needy from becoming eligible for
Medicaid by transferring their assets away.
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider assets of both husband and
wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 USc. § 1396r-5(c) (2000). But there are several provisions in
place to protect the community spouse(fn5) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of assets needed to
qualify the applicant for Medicaid. See Atkinson, 564 N.W.2d at 211; 42 USc. § 1396r-5 (2000). The value of the
couple's home is not included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. ld. § 1396r-5(c)(5); 42 USc. §
1382b(a)(1) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid recipient is also entitled to an allowance of income and assets
designated
deSignated for his or her needs that is not considered available to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.c.
§ 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead,
to his or her community spouse. 42 USc. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of community spouses to
cornmunity
recipient spouses against the accommodation of the community
contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their reCipient
spouse's need to provide for his or her own support.
Federal MedicaId Recovery Provisions.
Although it is not applicable to the facts before us, it is useful to start with the pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid
recovery, because it is relied on in the parties' arguments and is the basis for the rationale of several relevant cases.
Prior to amendments adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute
stated a general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject

60
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to several exceptions, one of which is relevant here:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the
State plan may be made, except ---

****
(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he received such
assistance, from his estate.
recovel' Medicaid
42 U.s.c. § 1396p(b)(1) (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, to recovelbenefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery would be from the recipient's estate. The
statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the recipient's
Id. § 1396p(b)(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovery before the death of a surviving
surviving spouse. fd.
spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The pre-1993 federal law
contained no definition of "estate."
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312,627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1), (4)
(2000)). As amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover Medicaid
payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 U.s.c. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 1993
amendments changed section 1396p(b) in several ways. First, they lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55.
Second, they made recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. Third, they added a definition
of "estate," which itself had both mandatory and permissive elements. As amended, the general nonrecovery rule and
the relevant exception read as follows:
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following
individuals:

****
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate * * *.

Id. The amended version of section 1396p(b)(1)(B) retained the express reference to recovery from the recipient's
fd.
estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the recipient's estate is only permitted after the
death of the recipient's surviving spouse: "Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only atrerthe
afferthe
predeath of the individual's surviving spouse, if any * * *." 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis added). And like the pre
1993 version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or reference to, recovery from a
surviving spouse's estate.
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery, with a mandatory provision
that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the
scope of probate law:
[T]he term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual --
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate, as
defined

61
for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State

* * * any other real and personal property and other assets in
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which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time ofdeath
of death (to the extent of such interest),
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.s.c. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of
"estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be part
of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone else on the recipient's death. For
decea~.ed joint
example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship and one dies, the decea~,ed
tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the
optional expanded definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to the surviving joint
tenant.
Minnesota's Medicaid Recovery Laws.
Minnesota has long had a policy of requiring participants in the Medicaid program and their spouses to use their own
assets to pay their share of the cost of care during or after enrollment. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(a) (2006). To
implement this policy, since 1987 Minnesota law has provided for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid from the estate of a
recipient or the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1a (originally enacted as Act of
June 12, 1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82, 1987 Minn. Laws 3255, 3347). As relevant here, subdivision 1a provides that, "on
the death of the survivor of a married couple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, * * * the total
amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the
[recipient] or the estate of the surviving spouse."
spouse." ld.
fd. (emphasis added). A claim against the estate of a surviving spouse
for medical assistance provided to the recipient spouse may be made up to "the value of the assets of the estate that
during the marriage."
marriage." fd.,
ld., subd. 2 (emphasis added).
addecl).
were marital property or jointly owned property at any time dUring
The broad estate recovery authority contained in subdivisions 1a and 2 was supplemented in 2003 by amendments
to the statute expanding subdivision 1 and adding subdivisions 1c-1k. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 40-50,
2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751,2205-17. These amendments implement the optional expanded definition of
"estate" authorized in the 1993 amendments to the federal law. See Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(a)(2) (2006); 42
U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The 2003 amendments to the Minnesota estate recovery law modify common law to provide for
continuation of a recipient's life estate or jOint
joint tenancy interest in real property after his death for the purpose of
recovering medical assistance, Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(a)(3) (2006), and include that continued interest in the
recipient's estate. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 19, 1h(b), 1i(a), 1j. The 2003 amendments also establish specific
procedures for exercising claims against these continued life estate and joint tenancy interests, as well as procedures
and waiting periods that differ according to whether the recipient's spouse, dependent children, or other relatives
62

living in the homestead survive the recipient. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 48-49, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec.
Sess. 1751,2213-17 (codified as amended at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 1i and 1j). In this case, the County filed its
claim under subdivisions 1a and 2 and did not rely on provisions added in the 2003 amendments.
The issues presented in this case involve several questions about the relationship between the recovery provisions of
federal and Minnesota Medicaid law. The court of appeals held that a partial disallowance of the County's claim was
proper, relying on its earlier decision in Gu//bergthat the broad authorization in subdivision 2 for recovery up to the value
of all assets of the estate that were marital property or jOintly
jointly owned at any time during the marriage was partially
preempted by the 1993 amendments to the federal law that limit the expanded estate to assets in which the recipient
spouse had a legal interest at the time of her death. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 595-96 (citing Gu//berg, 652 N.W.2d Cit 714).
The County, and its supporting amicus curiae the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services, argue that
the court of appeals was wrong, both here and in Gu//berg, in finding any preemption of the broad estate recovery
authorized in subdivisions 1a and 2. They contend that there was nothing in the federal statute prior to the 1993
amendments that limited the states' authority to pursue estate recovery of Medicaid benefits paid, and that the 1993
amendments were intended by Congress to expand state options, not limit them. Alternatively, the County argues that
even if recovery is limited to the assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, Dolores Barg had
an interest in the property notwithstanding the conveyance to her husband, and the court of appeals erred in valuing
that interest as only one-half the value of the homestead.
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The Estate and its supporting amici curiae counter that federal law authorizes recovery only from a recipient's estate,
and Minnesota law that allows recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is therefore preempted.(fn6) The Estate argues
that recovery is also barred because, to the extent recovery is allowed from the estate of a surviving spouse, federal law
limits that recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death, and
subdivision 2 of section 256B.15 is preempted to the extent it allows broader recovery. Finally, the Estate argues that
there should be no recovery here because Dolores Barg had no legal interest

63
in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, having conveyed her interest to her husband
during her lifetime.
Thus, the issues presented are as follows. First, does federal law preempt the authorization in Minn.Stat. § 256B.15,
subd. la, for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid for a recipient spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse? Second, if
such recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is not preempted, does federal law limit the recovery to assets in which
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, preempting the broader recovery allowed in Minn.stat.
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15,
subd. 2, as to assets owned as marital property or in jOint
joint tenancy at any time during the marriage? Third, if recovery is
limited to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death what, if any, interest did Dolores Barg
have in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, and specifically, was the court of appeals
correct in holding that Dolores Barg had a jOint
joint tenancy interest for purposes of estate recovery even though she
transferred that interest to her husband during her lifetime? We address these issues in turn, after first reviewing basic
preemption principles.

1.
Whether federal law preempts state law is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.

Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. The application of law to stipulated facts is a question of law, which we also review de novo.
Morton 8Idgs.,
Revenue, 488 N. W.2d 254, 257 (Minn.1992).
Bldgs., Inc. v. Comm'r of
ofRevenue,
", the ultimate touchstone'" of the preemption inquiry. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435
Congressional purpose is ,,U.S. 497, 504,98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Assn, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375
U.s. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). Our primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of
U.s. 272,280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683,93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The
Congress. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
Clause - start[s]
United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause'
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that
with the assumption that the historiC
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Opal/one v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608,
120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.s. 218, 230,67 S.Ct. 1146,91 L.Ed. 1447
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11 (citing Cipollone,
Cipol/one, 505 U.S. at 516, ')18,
,)18, 112

S.Ct. 2608).
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, 479 u.s. at 280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First,
it may do so with express language preempting state law. Id. Second, it may do so by fully occupying the field, that is,
"congressional intent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal re~lulation
is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left
- left no room' for supplementary state
U.S. at 230,67 S.ct. 1146). Here, it is clear that Congress
regulation." Id. at 280-81, 107 S.ct. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.s.
neither expressly preempted state law nor so completely occupied the field as to leave no room for state action, because
642 N.W.2d at 11.
the Medicaid program specifically permits and even requires action by participating states. Martin,
Martin,642
The third kind of preemption is at issue in this case. Even when Congress

64
has not chosen to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre-empt
state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, 479 u.s. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683.
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible,
impOSSible, Fla. Lime Avocado Growers,
Clrowers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143,83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when the state law is "an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davldowitz, 312 U.s. 52, 67,61
S.Ct. 399,85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
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II.
We now turn to the question of whether Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la, which requires Medicaid recovery against
U.s.c. § 1396p(b)(l)(B). Because only
the estate of a surviving spouse, is preempted by federal law, particularly 42 USc.
conflict preemption may be applicable, we seek to determine whether compliance with both statutes is impossible or
whether the state law stands as an obstacle to accomplishment of the purposes of the federal law.
requires-The County seeks recovery here under subdivision la of section 256B.15, which authorizes--indeed requires-
recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of the surviving spouse of a recipient. The Estate argues that this state law
authorization to recover from the estate of the surviving spouse is preempted because it conflicts with 42 U.S.c. § 1396p
(b)(l), which prohibits recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits except from the estate of the recipient of the
benefits.
The federal statute establishes a general prohibition against recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to
three specified exceptions:
of any medical assistance correctly paId on behalf ofan
of an individual under
(1) No adjustment or recovery ofany
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the fol/owing
individuals:
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1) (emphasis added). Only one exception potentially applies to the circumstance of this case:
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such
medical aSSistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate * * *.
Id. § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Because this express exception to the general rule against recovery of
Medicaid benefits directs that recovery come from the recipient's estate and makes no reference to a surviving spouse's
estate, the Estate argues that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law. Because
exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed narrowly, Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct.
1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989), it appears on its face that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not permitted by
federal law.
Two courts have agreed with this analysis
analYSis and concluded that section 1396p(b)(l)(B) authorizes recovery only from
/lid, 221
the recipient's estate and does not allow recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. Hines v. Dep't of Pub. Aid,
II1.2d 222, 302 I1I.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d 148, 152-53 (2006); In re Estate of Budney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541 N.W.2d 245,
246 (1995), rev. denied546 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1996). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained that the federal statute
never "counter[ed] the initial blanket prohibition"

65
on recovery by authorizing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. Budney, 541 N.W.2d at 246. The Illinois
Supreme Court noted that under federal and Illinois law, the state had authority to seek reimbursement from the
recipient's estate after the death of his surviving spouse. Hines, 302 I1I.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d at 153. But insteacl, as
here, the state sought recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse. Id. The court explained that federal law allows
only three exceptions under which a state may seek reimbursement and "[a]11 are specifically directed to the estate of
the recipient. No provision is made for collection from the estate of the recipient's spouse." Id. The court declined to add
to the unambiguous language of the federal statute or to recognize exceptions beyond those specified in the federal law.
Id.
The Commissioner argues that Hines and Budney were wrongly decided, misinterpreting the federal statute,
particularly in light of the presumption against preemption. The County contends that this statutory exception to the
nonrecovery principle allows recovery generally against individuals who received benefits after age 55, and does not
narrowly limit the sources of recovery. The County asserts that the reference to the individual's estate is merely a
designation of the timing for recovery rather than a limit on the scope of recovery, because the language does not say
that the state may recover "only" from the individual's estate. The County argues that, absent such express limiting
language, and applying the presumption against preemption, section 1396p(b)(1)(B) merely specifies one potential
source of recovery, the recipient's estate, and does not preclude others, such as a spouse's estate.
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In our view, the plain language of section 1396p(b)(l)(B) comports far more closely with the interpretation of the
Illinois Supreme Court in Hines than with the County's expansive view of the authority imparted by that provision.
Moreover, we know of no court that has adopted the County's broad view of that language alone. Indeed, in explaining
the then-existing law in a report on proposed OBRA amendments in 1993, a House Report referred only to the possibility
of recovery from the estate of the recipient, even when describing recovery after the death of a surviving spouse:
Under current law, a State has the option of seeking recovery of amounts correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under its Medicaid program from the individual's estate if the individual was 65 years or older at
the time he or she received Medicaid benefits. The State may not seek recovery from the beneficiary's
estate until the death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only if the individual has no surviving minor 01
01disabled child.
H.R.Rep. No. 103-111, at 208 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 535 (emphasis added). In contrast,
describing the proposed 1993 amendments to the Medicaid recovery law passed by the House, the same House Report
stated that newly-required state estate recovery programs would have to "provide for the collection of the amounts
correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the
surviving spouse."
spouse." Id. Thus, when the House wanted to describe recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, it said so
clearly.
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly plain language providing only for recovery from the recipient's estate, we
acknowledge that several courts have interpreted the federal recovery provisions to allow recovery from the estate of a
surviving

66
spouse. The courts reaching this conclusion have for the most part relied on the 1993 amendments to the feder-a I law
that allow the states to adopt an expanded definition of estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery. For example, the New
York Court of Appeals explained, in dicta, that although federal law did not expressly provide for recovery of Medicaid
payments from the "secondarily dying spouse's estate," the 1993 amendments gave the states power to recover against
the spouse's estate for certain categories of assets. In re Estate of Craig, 82 N.Y.2d 388, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d
1003,1006 (1993). The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the Craig interpretation that the 1993 expanded estate
provision gave the states the option to recover against a surviving spouse's estate assets conveyed through joint tenancy
or right of survivorship. In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D.1998). Indeed, the court in Thompson
rejected the ruling in Budney that recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law on the
basis that the Budneycourt had not considered the optional expanded definition of "estate." Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at
850. The North Dakota court concluded that "consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light of the
Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative intention to allow states to trace the
assets of recipients of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies." Id. at
851. The court explained that, under the circumstances, it made no difference whether recovery was from one estate or
the other:
Because the expansive federal definition of "estate" in 42 U.s.c. § 1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in
which the medical assistance benefits recipient "had any legal title or interest in at the time of death," it is
oflittle
a matter of
little moment whether the department seeks to recover the benefits paid by filing a claim in
the estate of the recipient after the death of the recipient's surviVing
surviving spouse or by filing a claim in the
surviving spouse's estate.
of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d
Id. n. 3 (emphasis added). Finally, in Idaho Department ofHealth
6,9-10 (1998), the Supreme Court of Idaho also ruled that some recovery of Medicaid benefits could be made from the
estate of a surviving spouse, but held that such recovery was preempted by federal law except to the extent of assets
that had been in the recipient's estate as defined by state probate law.
These courts provide little explanation for their conclusions that the statutory language expressly mentioning
recovery only from the recipient's estate also allows recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. We infer that the courts
viewed the authority to recover from assets that were part of the recipient's estate after the death of the surviving
spouse to fairly imply authority to recover those assets from the surviving spouse's estate to which they had passed on
the death of the recipient. In other words, to the extent assets in the surviving spouse's estate are there because they
had passed to the surviving spouse from the estate of the recipient, recovery from those assets in the surviving spouse's
estate is, in essence, recovery from the recipient's estate.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have made a similar unspoken inference in assessing preemption of
California Medicaid recovery laws in two cases. Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923 (9th Cir.1997); Citizens Action League v.
Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Ct. 1524, 108 L.Ed.2d 764 (1990). In both cases,
the

67
Ninth Circuit addressed whether California's Medicaid recovery law was preempted by pre-1993 amendment federal law.
The California law allowed the state to seek recovery not only from the estate of the deceased Medicaid recipient, but
", against any recipient of the property of that decedent by distribution or survival.
survival.'"
Cal.
'" Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005 (q Joting cal.
Welf. & Inst.Code § 14009.5 (West Supp.1989)). Thus, California law allowed the state to trace assets of the deceased
Medicaid recipient and seek reimbursement from the recipients of those assets.
In Kizerthe plaintiffs were individuals who had owned property in joint tenancy with a Medicaid recipient and had
succeeded to ownership by right of survivorship upon the death of the Medicaid recipient. fd.
lei. at 1005. To determine
whether California's claimed right of recovery from these surviving joint tenants was inconsistent with federal law, the
court looked to section 1396p(b)(l)(B), which, as discussed above, provided the general prohibition against recovery with
the exception for individuals who were 65 years old when they received assistance. fd.
lei. at 1006. The Ninth Circuit noted
that the federal statute provided only for recovery from the individual's "estate," and in the absence of a federell
feder,:!1 statutory
definition of estate, looked to common law for the meaning of the term. fd.
lei. at 1006. The court held that an "e~.tate"
"e~.tate"
under common law did not include property held in joint tenancy at death, and therefore the California law that allowed
lei. at 1008. The court in Ktzerdid
recovery against such property went beyond the recipient's estate and was too broad. fd.
not expressly address the issue of whether assets within the definition of "estate" could only be reached by a claim
against the reCipient's
recipient's estate, or whether federal law would permit the state to follow those assets and make the claim
against a surviving joint tenant--or, as here, a surviving spouse.
Several years later, still applying pre-1993 federal law, the Ninth Circuit again addressed a preemption challenge to
the same broad California Medicaid recovery provision. Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 924. At issue in Bucholtz was application of
the state recovery law to assets of Medicaid reCipients
jOint interests: inter vivos
recipients that had been subject to three forms of joint
trusts, tenancy in common, and community property. lei.
fd. at 924. The court applied the Kizer principle that ,,' use of the
word "estate" in the [federal] recoupment provision limits a state's recovery to property which descends to the recipient's
iel. at 925 (quoting Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005), to each of the
death,'" id.
heir or the beneficiaries of the recipient's will upon death,'''
forms of shared interest at issue. The court concluded that, like the joint
jOint tenancy in Kizer, property held in an inter vivos
trust is not part of the decedent's estate under California common law, and therefore was not part of the estate subject
to recovery under the federal law. lei.
fd. at 926. In contrast, the court explained, a decedent's interest in property held in
tenancy in common or community property is subject to disposition and administration as part of the decedent's estate
fd. at 926-27. The Ninth Circuit concluded not only that the decedent's interest in property held in
under California law. lei.
those forms was subject to recovery under the federal law, but also held, albeit without explanation, that recovery could
be sought from the heirs or beneficiaries who received that property; "[california] may, however, pursue people who
received properly held by the decedent in the form of tenancy in common or community property." fd.
lei. at 928 (emphasis
added). Like other courts, the Ninth Circuit seems to have inferred that the federal law's reference to recovery from the
Medicaid recipient's "estate" conferred
II'

68
authority to follow the assets from that estate and recover them from the people who received the property.
Thus, the courts that have considered the issue are split on the question of whether the narrow reference in section
1396p(b)(1) to recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient allows recovery only through a direct claim a9ainst that
estate, or whether recovery is also allowed from those who received covered assets from the Medicaid recipient's estate,
including the estate of a surviving spouse. Were this an ordinary question of statutory interpretation, we would conclude
that the plain language of the federal statute provides only for recovery against the Medicaid recipient's estate, as the
Illinois court persuasively reasoned in Hines. But we are influenced by the principle that preemption of state laws is
disfavored, combined with the fact that allowing recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is consistent with both the
federal provision precluding recovery from the Medicaid reCipient's
recipient's estate until after the death of a surviving spouse as
well as with the purposes of the federallegislation.(fn7) These additional considerations lead us to conclude that the split
in authority, in these particular circumstances, illustrates sufficient ambiguity about the intent of the federal estate
recovery language that we cannot say that Minnesota's requirement in Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la, to seek
reimbursement from the estate of a surviving spouse conflicts with federal law such that it is preempted.
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Accordingly, we hold that federal law does not preclude all recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse, and the
authorization in subdivision 1a to make a claim against the estate of a surviving spouse is therefore not preempted. The
question remains whether federal law limits the scope of recovery against the estate of a surviving spouse and, in
particular, whether that recovery may reach all property previously held by the Medicaid recipient spouse either as
jOintly with the surviving spouse during the marriage, as allowed by IVlinn.Stat.
subd. 2.
marital property or jointly
l\1inn.Stat. § 256B.15, 5ubd.
III.
We turn to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a surviving spouse's estate allowed under
Minnesota law is consistent with federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 256B.15 allows the state to recover from a
surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at
marriage," (Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority does not
any time during the marriage."
conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 1396p(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993
amendments were intended to expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this

69
argument for broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with the dual goals of federal
law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting
community spouses from pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 1396p(b)(1)
allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 1396p(b)(4) allows expansion of the estate only to include
assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" recovery allowed
by subdivision 2 is preempted.
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of
the plain meaning of its language. Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre-1993 federal
law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but
reCipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow
transferred by the recipient
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed that authority to extend to assets that
were transferred before the death of the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993
N.w.2d 882, 885-86 (N.D.2000).
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 NW.2d
Other courts that have recognized authority to reCOver from a source other than the Medicaid recipient's estate have
construed that authority to reach only assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death,
that is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state probate law or included in the
Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27
estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucho/tz,
(limiting recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate law); Kizet; 887 F.2d at 1006
(same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid
recovery statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under
N.w.2d at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of 'estate' in [section]
state probate law); Thompson, 586 NW.2d
intel'est in at
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits recipient' had any legal title or intel"est
lll
the time of death
death"');
also In re Estate of Smith No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CY, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4
) ; see a/so
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov.1, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery against estates of surviving spouses have
required that recipient had interest in assets at time of death).
Similarly, in relying on the 1993 amendments as authority for recovery from a surviving spouse's estate, our court of
appeals acknowledged that the 1993 amendments limit the assets subject to recovery to those in which the Medicaid
Gu/lberg, 652 NW.2d
N.w.2d at 714 (holding that Minn.Stat. §
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death. See Gu//berg,
256B.15, subd. 2, authorization to reach assets that were marital property or owned jointly at any time during the
marriage, is partially preempted by federal law limitation to assets in which recipient had interest at time of death). And
the court of appeals acknowledged that limitation again in this case. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496 ("After Gul/berg,
Gu//berg, the
state's ability to reCOver was limited to the recipient's interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of the
recipient's death.").
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting principle requiring
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an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. Although the North Dakota court: had acknowledged in its earlier Thompson
decision that recovery allowed under section 1396p(b) is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest
at the time of death (indeed that was the basis on which the court rationalized allowing recovery from the surviving
spouse's estate), 586 NW.2d
N.w.2d at 851 n. 3, the court held in Wirtz that any assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to
his spouse before his death were subject to recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. T~e court
stated that limiting recovery under section 1396p(b) to "assets in the surviving spouse's estate that the Medicaid
recipient had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living
trust" would ignore the words "interest" and "other arrangement" in the federal law. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885.
Concluding that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied on the Congressional
intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." ld. at 885-86. The court did
not explain why the same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was consistent with the limitation to recovery from assets
in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, yet also justified abandoning that limitation in Wirtz.
We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied
in Wirtz. The plain meaning of "other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is arrangements other
than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the time of the Medicaid recipient's death.
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional definition of "estate" allows inclusion of
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest
at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust, or other arrallgement.
42 U.s.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further describes the assets that a state may
include in this expanded estate. The clause describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and
ll
1I
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets
assets" are "conveyed.
"conveyed." The "such
"such"ll limitation plainly refers
back to the immediately preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any legal title or
"such"II assets may have been conveyed--a
interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to whom "such
"survivor,
IIsurvivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual."
individual." ld. (emphasis added). And finally, the clause describes several
"such II assets might take place -- IIthrough
methods by which the conveyance of "such"
"through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
arrangement." ld.
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement."
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets"
assets ll is predicated on the recipient having a legal interest at the time of
death. When we construe a federal statute we must, if at all possible,
pOSSible, give effect lito
"to every word Congress used . " Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.s. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To read 1I"other
0 ther arrangement" to include a
ll
lifetime transfer would be to read the words "at the time of death
death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other
arrangement" cannot
11

71
include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context. II[O]ther
"[O]ther arrangement
arrangement"ll ends a list of eXclmples of
conveyances that occur at the time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual,"
lIindividual," a Medicaid recipient, must have died for the conveyance to
occur. A recipient cannot have heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the deceased"
during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language and its context, the conclusion of the Wirt"court
Wirt;,court
that "other arrangement" is suffiCiently
sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable.
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the federal law to allow recovery of assets in
which the Medicaid recipient did not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale for
finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law
to recover from the "estate"
lIestate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would not be part of the
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow
lIestate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal law clearly limits
states to expand the definition of "estate"
that expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold that
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's
jOintly-owned property at any time during the
estate of assets that the recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned
marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the ti'l1e of
her death.
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IV.
This brings us to the question of whether Dolores Barg had any interest in property at the time of her death that
would allow the County to make a claim against the estate of her surviving spouse, despite her transfer of her joint
interest-at-time-ofinterest in the property prior to her death. As we have noted, the court of appeals acknowledged the interest-at-time-of
death limitation on spousal estate recovery, but nevertheless found that for these purposes Dolores retained a joint
tenancy interest at the time of her death that made the value of that interest recoverable from Francis's estate. Barg,
722 N.W.2d at 496, 497. Eschewing reference to either marital property law or probate law to determine the nature of
any interest at the time of death, the court of appeals looked to standard real property law and Gullberg in deciding that
Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest. Id. at 496-97. We do not agree.
jOint tenancy interest in the property based on its
The court of appeals determined that Dolores retained a joint
understanding that the court in Gullberg had recognized a continuing joint tenancy interest because the lifetime transfer
was an "other arrangement," and because the court apparently understood section 1396p(b)(4) to "explicitly allow[] a
state to broaden the definition [of estate] beyond the meaning used in probate law and to include jOint-tenancy
joint-tenancy interests
that have been previously conveyed to a spouse." Id. at 497. Section 1396p(b)(4) cannot be construed to include lifetime
transfers of property in the phrase "other arrangement" because the plain language and the context require that phrase
to be limited to conveyances occurring upon the death of the recipient. For that reason, we cannot

72
agree with the court of appeals' characterization of section 1396p(b)(4) as allowing the expanded definition of estate to
1396p(b)(4) requires that any interest
include "previously
"preViously conveyed" joint tenancy interests. The language of section 1396p(b)(4)
included in the expanded estate must be one in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death,
not one that was previously conveyed. We conclude that Dolores did not retain a joint tenancy interest in the property at
the time of her death, because that interest was effectively and legally transferred before her death.
The question remains whether Dolores had any other interest in the property at the time of her death that may be
considered part of an expanded estate for recovery purposes under Minnesota law. We agree with the court of appeals
that courts should not look to marital property law to find such an interest, because the statute in which marital property
is defined limits the definition to the purposes of that chapter. Minn.5tat. § 518.003, subds. 1, 3b (2006);(fn8) see Barg,
722 N.W.2d at 496. Similarly, we agree that the recognizable interests at the time of death cannot be limited to those
defined by probate law, because the purpose of section 1396p(b)(4)
1396p(b)(4) is to allow states to expand the definition of estate
beyond probate law. See Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 497. We therefore agree that real property law principles, informed by
principles
prinCiples of probate law, should be the basis for ascertaining any interests at the time of death. Any interest recognized
must be consistent with the underlying foundational rationale that recovery from a surviVing
surviving spouse's estate is allowed
only because of its relationship to the recipient's estate, from which federal law expressly allows recovery. With those
principles in mind, we caution that for an interest to be traceable to and recoverable from a surviving spouse's estate,
the interest must be (1) an interest recognized by law, (2) which the Medicaid recipient held at the time of death, and
(3) that resulted in a conveyance of an interest of some value to the surviving spouse that occurred as a result of the
l\Ilinnesota law must have
recipient's death. Further, to the extent the interest is not part of the standard probate estate, IVlinnesota
expanded the definition of estate to include the interest, as authorized by section 1396p(b)(4).
1396p(b)(4).
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead and certificates of deposit no longer existed at the time of her death. No
other recognizable interest has been identified.
The County argues that the reference to marital property in subdivision 2 reflects the Minnesota legislature's intent
to make all marital property subject to spousal estate recovery. But subdivision 2 makes no reference to an interest at
the time of death or to re-defining the probate estate to include all marital property, even property transferred prior to
death. This is not surprising because subdivision 2 was enacted long before the optional estate definition authority was
added to federal law.
The district court indicated that because Dolores was married to Francis
FranciS even after the transfer of her interest in the
homestead, she retained some interest in the property. But whatever that interest, it dissipated
diSSipated at Dolores's death,
rather than resulting in transfer of an interest of value to Francis.
We conclude that Dolores had no interest in assets at the time of her death that were part of a probate estate or an
expanded estate definition permissible under federal law, and therefore there is no
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basis for the County's claim against the estate.
Finally, we note that in 2003 the Minnesota legislature amended section 256B.15 by extending the definition of
estate for Medicaid recovery purposes to include assets owned by a recipient spouse in joint tenancy or life estate at the
death. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 40-50,2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751, 2205-2217
time of her death,
Minn5tat. § 256B.15, subds. 1, lc-lk). The amendments do not mention the other fOl'ms
fOI-ms of
(codified as amended at Minn.Stat.
conveyance at death listed in the federal definition of "estate," except that the "right of survivorship" is mentioned with
respect to joint tenancies. Jd. subds. 1(a)(6), 19, lh(b). Thus, the legislature chose only to include two forms of
ownership in the expanded definition of estate. Also, as provided in the federal law, the inclusion of joint tenancy and life
estate interests in the recipient's estate is expressly limited to interests the recipient owned at the time of death.
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. lh(b)(2), li(a). The amendments further limit the scope of recovery by exemptinq from the
reach of subdivisions lc through lk a "homestead owned of record, on the date the recipient dies, by the recipient and
the recipient's spouse as joint tenants with a right of survivorship." Minn.5tat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(a)(6). In 2005, the
legislature retroactively made the provisions continuing life estates and joint tenancies effective only for life estate and
joint tenancy interests created on or after August 1, 2003. Act of July 14, 2005, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 4, art. 7, 2005 Minn.
Laws 2454, 2649 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(c)).

It is difficult to discern the intended reach of the 2003 amendments.(fn9) If the pre-2003 law allowed recovery
against the surviving spouse's estate as argued by the County, there was little need to enact the 2003 amendments to
reach those assets in the case of a recipient who leaves a surviving spouse. The parties apparently agree that the 2003
amendments do not apply to or influence this case, for reasons that are not clear to us.
It suffices to say that even if the 2003 amendments were applicable, they would provide no basis for the County's
claim. The new subdivision li specifically applies to circumstances in which a Medicaid recipient against whom 21 recovery
Minn5tat. § 256B.15, subd. li(b). That subdivision provides
claim could otherwise be filed is survived by a spouse. Minn.5tat.
procedures for filing a claim without making a recovery until the death of the surviving spouse. Jd., subd. 1(f). If this
subdivision were to be applied to this case, several limitations would preclude recovery. Dolores Barg, the recipient,
jOint tenancy interest at the time of her death. If she had owned a joint tenancy at the time of
owned no life estate or joint
jOint tenants with a right of
her death, it would have been a homestead owned of record by her and her spouse as joint
jOint tenancy was
survivorship, and thus exempted from the reach of subdivision li. Jd., subd. 1(a)(6). Finally, that joint
established in the 1960s, well before August 1, 2003.
In summary, we hold that federal law does not preempt all Medicaid recovery from spousal estates, and Minn.Stat. §
256B.15, subd. la, is therefore not preempted to the extent it allows claims against the estate of a surviving spouse of a
Medicaid recipient. However, the allowable scope of spousal estate recovery is limited. Subdivision 2 of section 256B.15
is preempted to the extent that it allows recovery from assets in which the deceased Medicaid recipient did not have a
legal interest at the time of death, and to

74
the extent that it permits recovery beyond the extent of the recipient's interest. Finally, we hold that Dolores Ba"g had no
interest in property at the time of her death that can form the basis for recovery against the estate of Francis Barg.

v.
We have concluded that the County's claim for full recovery against all the assets in Francis Barg's estate was
preempted by federal law because recovery is limited to assets in which Dolores had an interest at the time of her death,
but the question of the appropriate remedy remains, because the County argues that the Estate waived the right to deny
the claim in its entirety. Although we have decided as a matter of law in our preemption analysis that the state is
preempted from requiring
reqUiring reimbursement from assets in a spouse's estate in which the recipient spouse had no interest
at the time of her death, that does not resolve the remedy issue here. Although a state may not compel payment from a
spouse's estate beyond the scope authorized by federal law, federal preemption does not preclude an estate from
voluntarily paying all or part of a claim that could not be compelled.
Here, the Estate only partially disallowed the County's claim, thus allowing the remainder of the claim. Minnesota
Statutes § 524.3-806(a) (2006) provides that, on petition of the personal representative after notice to the claimant, the
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court may "for cause shown permit the personal representative to disallow" a previously-allowed claim. But the personal
representative made no such request here. When questioned at the hearing in district court whether the personal
representative was challenging the entire claim of the County, the representative affirmed that he was challen9ing only
the part already disallowed. When the district court affirmed that partial disallowance and the County appealed, the
Estate did not file a notice of review in the court of appeals to challenge the implicit award to the County of the allowed
part of its claim. A respondent who does not file a notice of review to challenge an adverse ruling of the distrid: court
waives that issue in the court of appeals. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 106; Ford v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R.
Co., 294 N.W.2d 844, 845 (Minn. 1980). Having partially allowed the County's claim and having then failed to properly
seek a reversal of that allowance in both the district court and court of appeals, the Estate will not be permitted to seek
that relief for the first time in this court.
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court's denial of the
County's claim for full recovery is affirmed. The court's remand for an award to the County based on the existence of a
joint tenancy interest is reversed. The matter is remanded to the district court for entry of judgment based on the partial
allowance made, but not subsequently challenged, by the Estate.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
ANDERSON, PAUL H., J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
DIETZEN, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case.

Footnotes:
FNl. "Medicaid" is the popular name for this cooperative federal-state program. See 42 U.s.c. § 1396-1396v (2000).
In Minnesota it is referred to as "medical assistance." Minn. Stat. § 256B.02, subd. 8 (2006).
FN2. For purposes of determining eligibility of one spouse for Medicaid, the value of a couple's home is excluded. 42
U.s.c. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (5) (2000); 42 U.S.c. § 1382b(a)(1)(2000). In the asset assessment for Dolores Barg, $104,875
was excluded. This amount corresponds to the value of the home, one jointly-owned
jOintly-owned vehicle, and a burial lot. When
completing the asset assessment, a portion of the couple's resources is reserved for the needs of the spouse not
applying for Medicaid. 42 U.S.c. § 1396r-S(c)(2),
1396r-5(c)(2), (f)(2)(A) (2000). Protected assets for the non recipient spouse, Francis
Barg, were calculated to be $24,607.
FN3. The Commissioner's motion to supplement the record on review is granted as to the following documents:
05-012i Idaho
North Dakota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 95-016; Indiana Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 05-012;
Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 01-006; and Minnesota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 06-10. The motion is
denied as to the e-mail correspondence dated November 4, 1999.
FN4. Formerly the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). See Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer,
534 U.S. 473,479 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002).
FN5. Throughout this opinion, our discussion of spouses is premised on circumstances similar to those of the Bargs.
One spouse, who we refer to as the recipient spouse, applies for and receives Medicaid benefits. The other, who we refer
reCipient spouse.
to as the community or surviving spouse, receives no Medicaid benefits and survives the recipient
FN6. The Estate sought cross-review on this issue of "whether the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly
paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a surviving spoLlse." We requested briefing on whether that
issue had been adequately preserved for review. The County argues that the Estate failed to preserve the issue because
it only partially disallowed the County's claim, it confirmed before the district court that only the disallowed portion of the
argum>~nts go
claim was contested, and it asked the court of appeals to affirm the district court's decision. The County's argum~nts
to the scope of the remedy available in this case, an issue that we address infra. But this issue also has a legal aspect
independent of the specific scope of recovery available in this case. That legal component is necessary to a thorough
analysis of the preemption issues presented here, and we will therefore address the issue in that context. No new or
controverted facts are needed in order to address this purely legal question, and no prejudice will result from our
consideration of the issue because the parties addressed the issue in their briefs to the district court, the court of
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appeals, and this court. See Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 566 N.W.2d 683, 687-88 (Minn.1997).
FN7. The United States Supreme Court has described Congress's passage of the anti-impoverishment provisions as
an effort to "protect community spouses from' pauperization' while preventing financially secure couples from obtaining
of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.s. 473,480, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935
Medicaid assistance." Wis. Dep't ofHealth
(2002). Allowing recovery from a spouse's estate does not risk impoverishing a community spouse, because the spouse
must be dead for the recovery to occur. Nor does it impede the furnishing of Medicaid benefits to other impoverished
individuals; indeed, it can be expected to do quite the opposite. See West Virginia v. U.S. Dep't ofHealth
of Health & Human
Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir.2002) (noting that Congress expected the estate recovery provisions to allow
government to realize savings of $300 million over five years, and that the savings have been even greater).
FN8. Formerly Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subds. 1, 5 (2004).
FN9. The parties' supplemental briefs shed little light on this question.
MN
N.w.2d
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No. 08-603
LEO VOS, DIRECfOR,
DIREcroR, MILLE LAcs COUNTY,
MINNESOl'A, FAMILY SERVICES AND WELFARE
DEPARTMENT, ET
El' AL., PETITIONERS

v.
MICHAEL F. BARG

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

This brief is filed in response to the Court's order
inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the
United States. In the view of the United
UnIted States, the peti
petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
STATEMENT

1. a. The Medicaid program, established in 1965 in
Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Medicaid Act), 42
U.S.C. 1396 et 8eq., is a cooperative federal-state pro
program under which the federal government provides fund
funding to States to provide medical assistance to eligible
needy persons. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301
(1980).

To participate in the Medicaid program, a State must
develop a plan specifying, among other things, the cate
cate-

gories of individuals who will receive medical assistance
(1)
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2
under the plan and the BPeclftC kinde of medical care and
eervicea
eervices that will b. covered. 42 U.S.C. 1896&. State
Medicaid plans
for Medi
Mediplana are reviewed by the Centers tor
care and Medicaid Services (eMS) (formerly the Health
Care Financing Admlnl.tration) In the Depart;1nant
Depart1nant ot

Health and Human Servtce8 (HHS). 42 U.S.C. 1896; see
66 Fed. Reg. 85,487 (2001). If eMS approv_ a State'.
pl~
reimpl~ the State ia thereafter eligible for federal reim
bursement tor a specified
apecitled pereentqe of the amounts
"expended • • • as medical aaNJiBtance
-atance UDder the State
plan."
plan'" 42 U.S.C. 1896b(a){1), 1896d(b).
b. The Medicaid Aet requiree
partidpatfng Statets
State.
requires partidpaUng
to provide Medicaid benefits to the "categorieal
"categorieally needy,"
8&needy." that ie, those persona eligfble tor tlnanclal 8&
atatance uDder
spec1fled federal programs.
Atkin..
under IIpec1fled
Atki7U
v. RifHInJ.,
RifHIrtJ., 477 U.S. 1M, 167 (1986); see 4.2 U.S.C.
1896a(a)(lO)(A)(1)(IV),
1896a(a)(lO)(A)(t)(IV). (VI) and (VII).
The Act also
exteDd benetlte
beneftts to
alao permits States to extend
the "medically needy," that la, "perao~
"perao~ laeking the abD.
abD.Ity to pay for medtcal expenses,
expenees, but with lDeomea t.oo
larg'e to quality for categorical
ScIwHriJwr v.
eatMgorical _latance." ScIwHri.1wr
Grall PGtUMnJ, 458 U.S. 34, 37 (1981); see 42 U.S.C.
1896a(a)(10)(C).
1896&(a)(10)(C). To quality . . medteally needy, a person
may have meome
tneome no higher than a detlned. threshold and
may own aaaeta ot DO
deflnftd value. If the
no more than a detlnftd
aueta of • Medicaid appUeant eJCcee<!
elCceed the qualifying
threshold, .he must ".pend dawn" her _setal unW they
qUalityina threshold. See 42 U .S.C.
are at or below the qualityin"
189611(.)(17).
1896a(a)(17).
When a married person 18 lnBtitutionaUzed
in.
nurainBtitutWnaUzed in
• nUrB
ing home or other fac:lllty.
ecmaidere the
fac:Wty. the Medicaid Act eonaidere
&aaete
spouat'! and the non
non_aet. of both the tDAItituttonallzed
tDAltttuttonallzed apOUlM!
tnJJdtutionaltzed,
deterrntnbuJdtuttonalized. or "community,"
"community'" spouse tn deterrntn
Ina
Ing the appUeant'. eUgfbUtty for beDeftte. 42 U .s.c.
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1396r-5(c). To prevent the community apouee from beiDi:'
being
impoveriahed . . . reault of a required llpend-down of
88seta
aa~ta. such . . thEl
thE\
88set877 the statute
st.atute e:xempta certain aa~ta7
couple's home and an automobU., 42 U.S.C. 1882b(a)(1),.
1396r-6(c)(6),
retain.
1396r-o(c)(6), and allvwe
allowe the community spouse to retain,
a certain level of reeourcee and income that are not con·,
7
aidered available to pay for the applicant
applicant's
s medical care"
42 U.S.C. 1396r-6(d)
IB96r-6(d) and (t)(2). See Wi.CO'Kain
Wi.conain Dep't of
SfIT1J& v. Blu,m#J1", 584
478, 480
H_alth & Famil-v SfIT1JtI.

u.s.

(2002)

(antl-impoverlehment
(antl-impoverl.ehment provisions are Intended to

"protect coll1JJ1unity
coll1JJlunity spoU8e8 from

'pauperi~tion7 whUe
'pauperi~tion7

preventing tinanetally seCU1"e eouplee from obtaining
Medicaid asa1atanee").
Mediass1atanee"). Furthermore, although the Medi
caid Act generally forbids a Medicaid appl1cant or her
spouse from tran.t'erring
aaeeta at below market value in
traD.rerring aaeet8
order to become eligible for beneftte
beneftte,7 42 U.S.C.
1896p(c)(lXA), the atatute expreesly perm1t8 the appli
applicant to trana'. asaeta,
homeassets, including an Intereet in the home
stead, to the community SpOU8e,
spouee, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(2).
Once the lnatltutionalized spouse Is determined to be
eligible tor beneftte, the atatute provides that "no
··no re
resources ot the community spolUle
spo1Ule shall
shan be deemed avail
available to the institutionalized spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396r
1396r5(c)(4).

c. ~ a general rule7 the Medicaid Act forbids Statea
State8
from aeeking recovery ot Medicaid benetlts that were
correctly paid. 42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(1); Bee
aee alllo 42 U.S.C.
1896a(a)(18). The statute providea
provide. an exc:eption7 how
however, for recovery trom tbe estates of certain tnatttutton
Instltuttonalized and older beneftcfaries.
Before 1998. the Medicaid Ace. recovery provision
permitted, but did Dot require, States to recover benefits
paid OD behalf of certain individoals.
individuals. from the individu
individuals' estatea. 42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(1)(B) (1988). In 1998,

•
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4
require States to
Congress amended Section 1396p to reqnire
benefits in certain circumstances.
recover correctly paid benefitl!l
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993), Pub.
amended. the
L. No. 103-66, § 13612, 107 Stat. 627. As amended,
Act's estate-recovery provi5ion requires States to seek
ot an individual who was perma
permarecovery in the case of
1396P(b)(1)(A), and in
nently imstitutionalized, 42 U.S.C. 1396P(b)(l)(A),

thereafthe case of a person who received, at age 55 or thereaf
communityter, nursing facility services, home and community
based services, or related hospital and prescription drug
services, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(1)(B). In addition, a State
has the option to seek recovery of the cost of other items
or services paid on behalf of individuals over the age of
55. Ibid. The recovery "may be made only after the
any," and
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any,"
only at a time when the individual has no surviving
chilsUrviving chil
dren under the age of 21 or children who are blind or
recovdisabled. 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2) and (2)(A). Such recov
unery may be waived In cases where it ''would work an un
due hardship." 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(3).
beneThe statute provides for recovery of the cost of bene
fits paid on behalf of an individual over the age of 55
estate'" 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(1)(B).
from "the individual's estate/'
The term "estate," for those purposes, "shall include all
real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual's estate, 8$ defined for purposes of
statState probate law." 42 U,S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(A). The stat
ute further provides that an individual's "estate"
may include. at the option of the State ... ... ., any
other real and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any legal title or intereet at
inthe time of death (to the extent of such interest), in

cluding such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
tenassign of the deceased individual through joint ten
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5
ancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life e$tate,
living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B).

2. Since 1987, Minnesota law has
bas provided for recov
recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of a recipient's
surviving spoulSe, as well as
recipialS from the estate of a recipi
ent. Act of June 12,1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82 (Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 2568.15 (2007». Minnesota's estate-recovery law
provides that ural claim against the estate of a surviving
spouse who did not receive medical assistance, for medi
medical assistance rendered for the predeceased spouse, is
limited to the value of the assets oC the estate that were
marital property or jointly owned property at any time
during the marriage." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 256B.15, subd.
2 (2007).
3. In 2004, petitioner filed a claim against the estate
of Francis Barg, in which he sought recovery of Medicaid
benefits paid on behalf of Mr. Barg's predeceased
spouse, Dolores Barg. Pet. App. 4a. 1
marriage, the Bargs purchased real
a. During their marriage.
property in Princeton, Minnesota, to which they took
title as
nursa8 joint tenants. In 2001, Ms. Barg entered a nurs
ing home, and shortly thereafter applied for, and re
received, long-term Medicaid benefits. Pet. App. 2a-3a.
Ms. Barg subsequently transferred her joint tenancy
interest in the homestead property to Mr. Barg. At the
time of the transfer, the assessed value of the property
was $120,800. Ms. Barg also terminated her ownership
interest in certificates of deposit the couple had held
jointly. [d. at 3a-4a.

or

I On March 2, 2009, this Court granted the State otMinne.ota's
MinnetOta's con
conditional motion to intervene M a party .ugned with petitioner Vos. All
references in this brief to "petitioner" refer to petitioner V08.

"(J-,I
'CJ-.I
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Ms. Barg died in 2004,
baving received a total of
Z004, having
$108,413.53 In medical-assistance benefits through the
state Medi~aid
Medi~aid program. Mr. Barg died five months
later. Pet. App. 4a.
b. In his claim against Mr. Barg"e estate, petitioner
80ught to recover the fun amount of Medicaid benefits
paid on bebalf
behalf of Ms. Barg. Pet. App. 4a. Respondent,
who is the representative of Mr. Barg's
Barg'! estate, allowed
$68,880 ;us
estate. but disallowed
ae a claim against the estate,

$44,538.53. Ibid. I
Petitioner filed a claim-allowance petition in state
court. The district court upheld the partial disallowance.
Pet. App. 46a-51a.
46a-518. The court relied on the Minnesota
Court of Appeals' decision in In re Estate of Gullberg,
652 N.W.2d 709 (2002), which held that Minnesota's
estate-recovery law is preempted Insofar as it penults
penn ita
recovery up "to the value of the 88sets or the e8tate that
were marital property" at any point in the marriage, be
because 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2)(B) permits recovery only "to
the extent of" the Medicaid recipient's interest at the
tbe
time ot
of death. Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714. The court
concluded that, at time of her death, Ma. Barg's interest
&Meta of Mr. Barg's estate that were marital prop
in the 888ets
propintel"elSt in the homestead and
erty, including a life-eetate intel'elSt
a personal property allowance, totaled $68,880. Pet. App.
5Oa-51a.

c. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded for recalculation of petitioner's allowable
claim. Pet. App. 52a-648. Like the district court, the
ReIlpondent'a partJst allowance oC $68,880 apparently rested on
I Respondent's
Barg (1) had. on.halftnterelSt
on.haJfintereet in the homestead,
the premise that Me. Barr
bomestead,
$lS8.88O. at the time ofher
other death,
death. despite the inter viv06 trana
tranavalued at $lS8.88O,
personaJ property allowance fD
fer, and (2) was entJtled to. peraonaI
fn the amount

of S5OOO. See Pet. App. 49a.

:~.:1
:~.:I
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eourt of appeals concluded that, under federal law, the
claim was necessarily limited to the value of Ms. Barg's
interest in specified assets at the time of her death.
Id. at 58a (citing Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714). The
court of appeals concluded, however, that Ms. Barg's
interest in the homestead at the time of her death was a
interest. valued 8B a one-half
joint tenancy interest,.
one-ha1f interest in the
propertys value of $120,800, or $60,400. Id. at 62a.
d. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part
and reversed in part, concluding that petitioner was not
entitled to full recovery from Mr. Bar~s estate. Pet.
App.la-45a.
As an initial matter, the court rejected respondent's
contention that federal law completely preempts Minne
Minnesota's estate-recovery law insofar as it permits recovery
from the estate of the Medicaid recipient's surviving
19a-308. The court concluded that
spouse. Pet. App. 19a-30a.
allowing recovery from a8 surviving spouse's estate is con
consistent with both the Act's preclusion of recovery from
the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a
surviving spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2)(A), as well as the
purposes of the Medicaid Act's recovery provisions. Pet.
App.29a.
The court concluded, however, that federal law limits
the scope of recovery against a surviving spouse's
estate to the value of assets in which the recipient spouse
had an interest "at the time of death," 42 U.S.C.
1396p(b)(4)(B), and thereby preempts Minnesota's
estate-recovery law insofar as it permits the State
to reach any other assets "that were marital proper
property or jointly owned property at any time during the mar
marriage:'
Pet. App. 31a (quoting Minn. Stat. Ann.
riage."
§ 256B.15, subd. 2 (2007));
(2007»; see id. at 30a-37a.
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The court further concluded that Ma. Barg did not
bave any intereat In the homeatead or bank accounta
account. at
the time of her death, because she had transferred her
iDtereet in tJioee au.tIS to Mr. Bara before ahe died. The
court therefore held that pet.itloner
le.al entitle
entitlepet.ttloner had no ie.at
ment to satisfaction of the State's
ae- .
State'., claim from those ueeta.
eete. Pet. App. 87a-48a. But because re.pondent bad
partially allowed petitioner'. claim, and never chaUenaed
chaUenae<i
the district court's award ot that partial allowauce of
$68,880, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that peti
petitioner could recover that amount. /d.
Id.. at 48a-40a.
DISCU88ION
The Minneeota Supreme Court's
Court~. decisioD
deci.ioD fa correct
and does Dot warrant further reviflW'.
revifIW. The federal
Medicaid Act permit. recovery of correctly paid benellta
benefit.
tram the estate of the recipient'. aurvivins spouse, but
limft8 that reeovery to the value ot a&l8eta
a&l8et8 in which the
reciplent
recipient had a lep
lecaJ. intere.t at the time of her death.
Although the ~t
~t
~ t in thia cue cUtfen from the ~
t
in 1ft,,...
[n.,... 6etaU
/iJetaU qfWin.,
qfWina, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 20(0). the
differenee may not reflect a disagreement about the
difference
meaninc of federal Medicaid law, but only dtver'lrent
diverJrent con
conclusion. about when, under state law, an individual re
retains a legallnterut In aueta conveyed to a spouee. The
t.aIns
petition for a writ of certiorari ehould be denied.
Dedttoa ot
Of 'I'he MbmNOta Sa.........
A.. Th. Dectttoa
Su......... Coan 1. Co....
Co....
reel

1. The MinUe8ot&
MinUe80ta Supreme Court correctly con
concluded that the Medicaid Act. forbide petitioner from
aeektna to recover correctly paid benetlte trom _eta In

wbfob
Medteaid recipient had no lecaI
interest at the
..
biob the Medleaid
leca1lDterest
time of her death.
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Under the Medicaid Act, a State generally may not
Hek to recover correctly paid Medicaid beneflt&. 42
1896p(b)(1). The Act provid.
provid...
U.S.C. 1896p(b)(l).
., however, that a
nuniDtr home and re
reState (1) mN08t seek recovery of nuniDtf
lated beneftta
beneflta paid on b4llhalt of an tndMdual over the age
..the individual'. estate" .
... defined by state
ot 56 from ·'the
ma~, at ita option, deftne "the indi
indiprobate law; and (2) ma~,
vidual's _tate" more broadly to include any "asaete in
which the individual had any legal title or Interest at the
time of death (to the extent of Buch interest), including
Buch asaets conveyed to a survivor, heir or aaaign of the
deceaaed individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
survtvorahip, life estate. living trust. or other
common, sun1vorahip,
"2 U.S.C. 1896P(b)(l)(B).
1896P(b)(1)(B), (b)(4)(A) and
arrangement." .u
(D). Thua, the Medicaid Act, which permits recovery
recipient-s surviving apouse.
apouse,
only after the death of the recipient's
reim42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(2), autborizell
aathor1zell a State to tile a reim
bursement claim agalnat the surviving spouse's estate,
recipup to the value of any &Mete in which the Medicaid recip
Ient had a legal interest at the time of her d.ath.
The Minneaota eetate-recovery law exceeda the scope
of that authorbation. It pennfta the State to recover
from a snrvtvlng
&IIseta
survtvlng spouse's _tate "the value of the asseta
of the estate that were marital property or Jointly owned
property at ma~ ti."". during tJu m4rria.ge," Minn. Stat.
AnD. I 266B.16, subel.
sUbel. 2 (2007) (emphaeia added), without
regard to whether the recipient retained an interest in
the 88set8
88seta at the thne of her death. Because a State may

not recover correctly paid Medicaid benefiu
benefitll except to
the extent authorked
anthorked by federal law, .ee 42 U.S.C.
1896p(b)(1), Minnesota's statute contlictB
contlict& with federal
law and Ie therefore preempted. See
S •• Cal(fm-nia.
Ftfld.
Ca.l(fm-nia. Fed.
Sew. & Loa.,.
Loa", A •• 'n v. GuftTa, 479 U.S. 272. 280-282
(1987).
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2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on permissible reeovery
from the estate of the Medicaid recipient's surviving
spouse, because the Act defines the tenn "asl5eta"
"alSl5eta" to in~
elude "all income and resources of the individual and of
Accordthe individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(1). Accord
ing to petitioner, "[b]y including resources of both 'the
individual' and 'of the individual's spouae' in the meaning
of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's
faJI within the scope of § 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet.
resources fall
27.

X

Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statustatu~
tory definition of "assets" does encompass resources of
both "the individual" (i.e., the Medicaid recipient) and
"the individual's spouse," the particular provision of the
"asMedIcaid Act at issue here refers specifically to any "as
intersets in which the individual had any legal title or inter
(emest at the time of death." 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(4)(B) (em
added). Petitioner's argument finds it necessary
phasis added),
to rewrite that clause to read "'any
'Uany * * * assets in
which [either or both the individual and the individual's
BpOU86] had any legal title or interest.''' Pet. 26 (brackBPOU86]
ets and asteriks in original) (emphasis added). But this
editing does nothing less than make the statute say the
opposite of what it says. The plain language of the oper
operative provision of the Act refutes petitioner's reading.'
pro• In describing the operation ot the amended estate-recovery pro
vision, the legislative history of the 1993 amendments also focused on
benefits, rather
the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid benefits.
than the resources of both the individual and his or her apouae. See
H.R. Con!. Rep. No. 218, l03d Cong., 1st Sese. 835 (1993) ("At the
option of the State,
State. the eitate against [which] • • • recovery is 80Ught
property or other assets
may Include any real or personal properly
8S&ets in which tJw

'ON 3I'01d
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3. Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act also finds
little support in the Act's other provisions concerning the
treatment of spousal assets. See Pet. 27-28. AJ5 peti
petitioner notes, the Medicaid Act generally considers the
community spouse's assets for purposes of determining
whether an institutionalized individual i8
is eligible to re
receive benefits. But the Act also exempts certain prop
property, such as the couple·s
consideration, 42
couple's home, from consideration.
U.S.C. 1382b(a)(1), 1396r-5(c)(5).
commu1396r-5(c)(5), and allows the commu
nity spouse to retain certain amounts of resources and
income t.hat
that are not considered available to pay for the
applicant's medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and (f)(2).
Moreover, once the institutionalized spouse is deter
determined to be eligible for benefits, the Medicaid Act pro
provides that "no resources of the community spouse shall
be deemed available to the institutionalized spouse." 42
U.S.C. 1396r-5(c)(4). The Medicaid Act.
Act, in short, im
imposes significant limitations on petitioner's asserted
principle that "spouses are expected to support each
other." Pet. 27. To read Section 1396P(b)(4)(B) in accor
accordance with its plain tenns thus is consistent with the
broader statutory scheme.
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity
about limiting spousal estate recovery to the value of
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal inter
interest at the time of death, the presumption against pre
preemption does not corne into play, Pet. 28 (citing Medtron
Medtron470, 485 (l996))-even
ie, Inc. v. Lokr, 518 U.S. 470,485
(1996))-even assum
assuming, arguendo, that this presumption has force in the con
context of a comprehensive federal-state cooperative pro
program like Medjcaid
subMedicaid in which the State's program is sub
beneficiary had any legal title or interest at the time of death, including
the home. j (emphasis added).
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j ect to federal approval. And for similar reasons, peti
peti-

tioner's suggestion that the decision below improperly
enforces against the State "[a]n ambiguous condition" on
the acceptance of federal funds under Spending Clause
legislation lacks any merit. Pet. 28 n.8 (citing Arlington
Cent. Sck. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,
296 (2006».
a~serting
Petitioner also errs (Pet. 20-23, 28 n.S) in a~serting
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of
interpreSection 1396p(b)(4)(B) is inconsistent
Inconsistent with the interpre
neitation of the responsible federal agency. HHS has nei
interther promulgated regulations nor issued guidance inter
preting Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) to authorize the kind of
estate recovery that petitioner urges in this case. To be
sure, eMS in 2007 approved Minnesota's state plan
its statutory spousal recovery
amendment incorporating ite
provisions. See Pet. App. 89a-93a. But eMS's approval
is
Is not the equivalent of binding interpretive guidance.
amendCf. 42 C.F.R. 430.16(a)(1) (a state plan or plan amend
ment is deemed approved if CMS does not act within 90
submission). Moreover, eMS's approval fol
foldays atter 8ubmission).
lowed binding judicial decisions in Minnesota's own
courts interpreting the Medicaid Act to limit recovery to
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at
B.g., In r6 Estate of Gullberg, 652
time of death. See, e.g.,
N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). As set forth
8Up1'a, HHS also interprets
above in this brief, see p. 9, 8Up1'4,
the Medicaid Act to limit recovery in that manner.
Doe, Not Warrant Further Review
B. The Decision Below Doe'

1. Petitioner contends (Pet. 24-25) that review is
warranted to resolve a conflict between the decision bebe

low and the North Dakota Supreme Court's
Courtts decision in

'ON :NJHd
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Wirtz, supra.' In Wirtz, much as in this case, a Medicaid
recipient had transferred assets
a8set8 to his spouse before his
death, and the State sought to reeover the cost of the
Medicaid benefits from the 13pouse's
spouse's estate after her
death. The court held that the State was permitted un
under 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B) to recover the value of any
assets "in which the deceased recipient once held an in
interest," including
inclUding assets conveyed to his spouse before
his death. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886.
But the different results in this case and in Wirtz may
not reflect a disagreement about the meaning of federal
Medicaid law. Notably, the North Dakota Supreme
Court, like the Minnesota Supreme Court, stated that
the State "[could] assert a claim against real or personal
4 A:J the Minneljota Supreme Court noted (Pet. App. 21a-22a), two
other state courtti have concluded that Sectlon 1396p(b) authorizes re
recovery only from the estate a Medicaid
MediCaid recipient, and not from the
estate of his or her spOU$e.
Depo.rl1rumt ofPu/).
Pub. Aid, 850
spouse. See HiTUJ'
Hi1UJ' v. Depo.rt1rumt
N.E.2d 148 (Ill. 20(6); In reE8toteofB?J.dMY,
(Wis. Ct.
reE8toteo/B?J.dMY, 641 N.W.2d 245 (Wi!.
App.1996). But those decisions and the decision below are not in con
conflict. Both Hfnu and Budney
Budnefl are consistent with the principle that a
State may recover from the estate of a Medicaid recipient's survivinC
spouse if it exercises its option under Section 1396p(b)(4XB) to define
!.he individual's estate more broadly than it Is ddtned \Ulder
\Illder state pro
probate law. See Hi'l'l.68, 850 N.E.2d at 153-154 (explaining that the state
legialawre could have defined the recipient's estate in such a way u to
provide tor; recovery ot certain assets from the estate of ltis survivinl
survivin,
spouse, but had chosen not to do :to); Budney,
Budney. 541 N.W.2d at 246 &;
n.2 (holding that a state statute authorizing full recovery from a sur
surelltate exceeded the State's authority under 42 U.S.C.
viving spouse's eat.ate
1396p(b), without considerini whether it would have been permissible
6Urvtving spouse's estate the value of
for the State to recover from the surviving
assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death). Re-
R&-chall~ethe Minnesota Supreme
spondent here, in any event, does not chall~e
conclusion that a State is pennitted to recover from the elrtate
Court's concluSion
e$tate
of a surviving spouse in some circumstances. See Bl'. in Opp. 6,8-9, 19.

or
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property, and other assets
BSsetl5 in which [the recipient] had
any legalliLle or other intere5t
intere~t at his death." Wirtz, 607
N
.W.2d al:,
N.W.2d
at 885 (emphasis added); see also ibid. ("Our
inquiry • ...... is ......... whether [the recipient] had
'real and personal property and other a5setlS in which
[he] had any legal title or interest at the time ofdeath.
of death. It)
..)
(emphasis added). Although its reasoning is not entirely
clear, the court in Wirtz appeared to conclude that the
recipient in that case, despite (ormal conveyance of cer~
tain assets before death, retained an intere5t
interest in the rele
relevant property until his death, when the interest was con
conveyed to his spouse through "other arrangement." 607
N.W.2d
N .W.2d at 885 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B». The
court did not elaborate on the nature of that interest,
although it referred to the State's argument that
the recipient had retained a "marital or equitable inter
interest" in the assets at the time of his death, icl. at 883, and
noted that other courts had interpreted Section
1396p(b)(4)(B) to reach stateAlaw community-property
and homestead interests, id. at 885.
The different results reached by the North Dakota
Supreme Court and the court below on similar facts thus
may reflect not conflicting interpretations of federal
Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under
state law, a spouse retains a legal interest in property
conveyed to his or her spouse. Compare Wirtz, 607
N.W.2d at 885-886, with Pet. App. 38a-40a (concluding
that, after Ms. Barg transferred her interest in the
homestead and bank accounts, she no longer had a legal
interest that could have been conveyed to Mr. Barg upon
her death), and id. at 40a (noting that Minnesota law
"makes no reference to • • • re-derming the probate
estate to include all marital property, even property
death").
transferred prior to death"),

'ON
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Even it the decisions in Wirtz and this case do reflect
Media disagreement as
aa to proper interpretation of the Medi
caid Act, this Court's review would not be warranted.
Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of federal
The Minne50ta
Sulaw is correct, and to date, only the North Dakota Su
follOwing an
preme Court has allowed Medicaid recovery following
Assuminter vivos transfer of 35sete between spouses. Assum
t.he North Dakota Supreme Court mis
mising arguendQ that. the
understood federal Medicaid law, rather than simply
applied a peculiar feature of its own property law, the
conNorth Dakota court has not had an opportunity to con
sider HHS's interpretation, and the conflict may work
itself out as the issue is further addressed in the lower
courts.
2. Although petitioner (Pet. 31-33) is correct that
estate-recovery efforts are important to the Medicaid
program, questions concerning the scope of the Act's
estate-recovery provisions have not arisen frequently,
recovand relatively few States have opted to seek estate recov
ery to the maximum extent permitted by federal law.
EvaluaSee Office of Assistant Secretary for Policy & Evalua
tion, HHS, Policy 87'.
8,.,.. No.6, Medicaid Estate Recovery
tbl. 4 (Sept. 2005) (only nine States make
Collection8 tbI.
use of federal policy options); see also Pet. 81.
maximum U8e
Moreover, although the federal Medicaid Act limits
estate recovery to those assets in which the Medicaid
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death, the
nature and extent of such interests remain largely the
domain of state law. Notably, Minnesota's Governor has
proposed redefining marital property interests to permit
recovery of medica.l assistance trom the estate of the
Governo-r's
later-surviving spouse in this context. See Governor-'s
~010-11 Bi
BiRecommendation, Minnesota State Budget, ~010·11
ennial Budget, Human SenriC6S
Senri.C6S Dep't 132 (Jan. 27,

3/'O-/d
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2009). That. proposal has not become law, nor has it been
howreviewed by the Secretary of HHS. The proposal, how
to
ever. suggests that Minnesota may be able to work to.ward greater asset recovery consistent with the clear
terms of federal Medicaid law.
CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.
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Peter C. Sisson
SISSON & SISSON
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC
2402 West Jefferson Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Tel: (208) 387-0729
Fax: (208) 331-5009
Idaho State Bar # 4682
Attorney for Personal Representative
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF:
GEORGE D. PERRY,
Deceased.
--------------------------------~
------------------'

STA
TE OF IDAHO
STATE
County of Ada

Case No. CV IE 0905214

AFFIDA VIT
AFFIDAVIT
OF
BARBARA
K.
OF
McCORMICK
IN
SUPPORT
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE'S PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM

)
: SS.
)

BARBARA K. McCORMICK, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. I am the duly appointed Personal Representative of the above entitled estate and the
daughter of decedent, George D. Perry ("George"). I make this affidavit based on my
personal knowledge.
2. On July 31, 2006, Martha Jean Perry, George's spouse (hereinafter "Martha"), and my
long-time step-mother, conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the couple's home

AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA K. McCORMICK IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE'S
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1
File #09-039
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located at 2104 Tendoy Drive, Boise, Idaho via quit claim deed to her husband, George
Perry. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit A is a true and
correct copy of the Quitclaim Deed in which Martha quitclaimed all of her right, title and
interest in that real property to George.
3. As of October 1,2006, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("Department")
approved Martha for Medicaid benefits. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Department notice of approval for
Medicaid.
4. Martha's health care needs have progressively increased over the years and she now lives
in a skilled nursing facility. From October, 2006, Martha has continued to receive
Medicaid benefits and she receives those benefits today.
5.

Over the years, George's health situation also progressively declined. He ultimately was
forced to enter into a nursing home after a long-struggle to remain home. By this time he
had exhausted his liquid resources and decided to sell his home because he would be
unable to maintain it, even if qualified for Medicaid benefits. In an effort to sell the
home, he provided the Department with written verification documenting the fair market
value of the home and the Department agreed that the proposed sale price of $150,000
was fair market value. A true and correct copy of the December 16, 2008 letter from the
Department agreeing that $150,000 was the fair market value of the property is attached
hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit C.
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6. Unfortunately, delays in receiving response from the Department caused the buyer who
had wanted to purchase the property to back out of that transaction. The home remained
on the market. George Perry died in a nursing home on February 25,2009, before he
could complete the sale of the home with a new buyer who had by that time agreed to
purchase the home.
7. The Personal Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry consummated the sale of
the home on March 26, 2008, for a total sales price of $160,000. A true and correct copy
of the settlement statement on that closing is attached hereto and incorporated herein as

Exhibit D.
8. The balance of the house sale proceeds, minus disbursements for administrative costs, is
now held in the Estate's checking account. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the Personal Representative's
inventory of the Estate. The proceeds from the sale of George Perry's home are the only
assets that are contained in the George's Estate. The Inventory makes clear that all estate
assets were George Perry's separate property. The Department failed to make any
objection to the PR's Inventory. George's personal property was of de minimus value and
was given to charity prior to his death when he moved to the nursing home. The Estate of
George D. Perry holds no other real or personal property.
9. I handle Martha's finances for her. The only property that Martha Jean Perry currently
owns is one financial account located at Wells Fargo, checking account # ending -3540.
This account is an income-qualifying or "Miller" trust account that was necessary to
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qualify Martha for Medicaid. Martha's fixed monthly income (social security and
pension) is direct deposited into this account every month. Funds are then paid out of this
account in the same month for Martha's Medicaid patient share of cost, for her health
insurance premium and for her personal needs allowance. This account holds less than
$2,000 at the end of each month after the above amounts are paid out every month.
Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit F is a true and correct
copy of a letter from Paula Guenat, Premier Banker at Wells Fargo, establishing that as of
9/9/09, this account had a balance of$1,682.96. Martha owns no other real or personal
property.
10. The Personal Representative stipulates and agrees that upon Martha Jean Perry's death,
any amounts left in Wells Fargo checking account # ending -3540 are owed to and will be
paid to the Department pursuant to its right to recover for Medicaid assistance paid out
during her lifetime against assets in which Martha had an interest at her death. Aside
from the funds in this Wells Fargo checking account, Martha does not own any interest in
any other property. No other property could possibly pass from Martha to George Perry's
Estate or to any other individual upon Martha's death because she doesn't own or have
any interest in any other property.
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SA YETH NAUGHT.
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Guy A Henry
823 Park Centre
Nampa Id 83651

IDAHO

DEPARTMENT

OF

&WEI.lFARE
HEALTH &WEIJFARE
We provide interpreter services at no cost. If you need help reading this letter, please call us at 1-866-262-8640. After your call is
answered, please wait on the line while you are connected with a translator.
al
Nosotros proveemos los servicios de un interprete, sin costo alguno. Si necesita ayuda leyendo esta carta por favor llamenos at
1-866-262-8640. Cuando contesten su Hamada, favor de esperar un momento en la linea mientras Ie conectan con un traductor.

Martha J Perry
C/O Sisson/Sisson
605 E Highland View
Boise ID 83702

November 24, 2006
Case Number 714828

Important Information About
Your Health Coverage
Your Health Coverage for Martha Perry is approved starting the first of
October 2006.
Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) for Martha Perry are appr,oved
starting October 2006.
You may need to pay part of the cost of your care. You will get a separate
letter from our Regional Medicaid Unit wlth the payment informatiol1.
information.
If you don't agree with this decision about your application or case,
please call me. We can review the facts used to make this decision
together or you may ask for a hearing. In a hearing you and I tel'l a
neutral person from outside Health and Welfare, called a hearin9 officer,
about your case. This person w"ill decide if the Department actlon on your
case was correct.
You may ask for a hearing in writing or by calling me. If you make a
hearing request in writing you may make a copy for your records. You may
use a hearing request form from our office or just write on a piece of
paper why you want a hearing. Then mail, fax, or bring your request to my
office.
If you would like a hearing, you must make your request by December' 24,
2006.
Guy Henry
208-465-8444 (phone) 208-442-2810 (fax)
HenryG@idhw.state.id.us

Case Manager: Guy Henry

Caseload: SS

Case: 714828

Field Office: 3214
000101
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We based your Health Coverage on the following facts.

Your family size is . . . . . . . . . .

1

Monthly Income:
Social Security, pension and money from other sources
Money from work . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total money for month . . . . . . . . .
Limit for your household size . . . . .

$1,396.77
$0.00
$1,396.77
$1,056.00

Monthly Deductions:
Money from work not counted . . . . .
Money from other sources not counted.

$0.00
$20.00

Countable Assets:
Such as cash, bank accounts, investments & vehicles
Limit for your household.
. ........ .

$0.00
$2,000.00

More Information About Your Health Coverage
The first time we approve Heal th Coverage, we send each el igible pierson a
Idaho Health Coverage card. If you haven't already received a card, one
will arrive in about 10 days.
Keep your card in a safe place.
me for a replacement.

If your card is lost or stolen please call

Always take your card with you when you get health care services.
We do not discriminate on the basis of:
» Age
»Color» Disability
»Religion
»Race
»National Origin

»

Gender

If you believe you have been discriminated against, you can file a
complaint at your local Health and Welfare office or at either of the
offices listed below:
» Civil Rights Manager
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID
83720-0036

Case Manager: Guy Henry

» Dept of Health and Human Services
Region X
Mall Stop RX-11
2201 6th Ave
Seattle, WA 98121

Caseload: 55

Case: 714828

Field Office: 3214
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DEPARTM ENT

OF

OEe 1u 200B

HEALTH & WELFARE
C.l. "BUTCH" OTTER· GOVERNOA
RICHARD ~~~ffi~&·
~~~ffi~&- ~,T'2 008

DIVISION OF MEDICAID
BUREAU OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS
PO. Box 83720
Boise, 10 83720·0036
PHONE 208·287·1150
FAX 208·334·6515

Sisson & Sisson
2402 West Jefferson St
Boise ID 83702
RE: George E. Perry MID# 1525875 and Martha J. Perry MID# 1525874
Dear Mr. Sisson,
The Department acknowledges the proposal for the property owned by Martha and
George Perry at 2104 W Tendoy Drive, Boise ID. Upon reviewing the documentation
you provided, and the current market, the Department agrees that the proposed sale price
of $150,000 is fair market value. Please inform me who the title company will be, as the
department will need to review the preliminary HUD I Settlement Statement prior to the
closing.
I will need to know what your client's intent is for the proceeds. Will they be using it to
pay privately for the skilled nursing and or nursing home fees? They may only use it for
their care and not gift any away. Your prompt response is appreciated.
We thank you for your cooperation and continued communication with the department.
If you have questions or need any assistance, please feel free to call me.

;{~~

Estate Recovery Officer
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TITLEONE CORPORATION
1101 W. River St.
st.
Boise, ID 63702
(206)424-6511

'-II.
".

STATEMENT OF SETTLEMENT FOR SELLERS
PROPERTY ADDRESS: 2104 W. Tendoy Drive, Boise, 10 63705
PURCHASER/BORROWER(S): Karyl Hayden
SELLER(S): Martha Jean Boyle and Estate of George Donald Perry
SETTLEMENT DATE: March 26, 2009

DISBURSED: March 27, 2009

PRORATION DATE: March 27,2009

DEBIT
Contract Sales Price
Prorata Sewer & Trash
Payoff of first mortgage

160,000.00

03/01/09

thru 04130/09

$

57.30

Wells Fargo

32.88
66,574.75

Ada County Treasurer
2nd half 2008 Taxes
01/01/09 to 03127109
County Taxes
9,600.00
Commissions - Total commissions: to 6.0000

861.56
251.12
9,600.00
9.600.00

1,000.00
Less Deposit Retained
4,800.00 Group One
4,800.00 Swope
SwoDe Investment Properties
ProDerties
TItle
One Corporation
TItleOne
Settlement or Closing Fee
Westcor Land TItle Insurance Company
TItle Insurance Premium
Recording Fees

CREDIT

262.50
785.00
9.00

TItleOne Corporation

Subtotals

78,343.93

Balance Due TO Seller

81,688.95

TOTALS

160,032.88

160,032.88

160,032.88

The above figures do not include sales or use taxes on personal property

APPROVED and ACCEPTED

SELLER(S):

h1{)L(& ~~
~
tntX-f&

A~ ~
# "-/

ESCRpj\'
ESCRpyv AG~N._

t1C/.d1(UaKm/~~
~6adJ(?4Km/t(ft~
~-k GtitL/~
GtI!L/~
B~ 1
oll~.k o"",;I:illeOne Cor~~
/
7!/.Juo/l~~d"~;ritleOneCor~

Marttii(Jean
Mart~JeanB~

/

Estate of George Donald Perry

BvJ?O--tAfkB.
Bvi?O--tA'kB- ,;/ Y11 (~ ~
~~~.
~~~.

(A0982008.PFD/A0982008/21 )
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90-DAY INVENTORY OF PROPERTY OF
GEORGE D. PERRY, Deceased
Date of Death: February 25, 2009
RECAPITULATION

Community Property
Schedule A - Real Estate
Schedule B - Cashllnvestments
Cash/Investments
Schedule C - Miscellaneous Other Property
Schedule 0 - Expenses/Costs paid since 0.0.0.
TOTAL NET VALUE

Separate Property

$
$

$
$

$

$

$

$

(4,693.04)

$

$

77,09592

81,788.96

SCHEDULE A - REAL ESTATE

Community Property

Description

Separate Property

$
Totals

$

$

SCHEDULE B - CASH

Community Property
Estate checking wlWelis Fargo

Totals

$

$

=$=========$=======8=1=,7':88.96

SCHEDULE C •- OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PROPERTY
Community Property

Totals

Separate Property
81,/'88.96
81,1'88.96

Separate Property

$

$

$

$

SCHEDULE 0 .- EXPENSES/COSTS PAID SINCE 0.0.0.

Publication fee
Attorney's fees
Filing fee

$
$
$

Amount
(100.04)
(4,500.00)
(£13.00)

Totals

$

{4,6~13.04)
(4,6~13.04)
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•
Date

09 f 09 ,2009
f 2009

To: Barbara McCormick
FBO Martha J Perry
2525 N Joretta Dr
Boise, 10 83704
US

Regarding Customer:
Martha J Perry
2525 N Joretta Or
Boise, 1083704
US

Concern:
To Whom It May Concem:
This letter is verification that the customer named above has an account with Wells Fargo. This account, number
2578173540, was opened 01/1412009 and has a current balance of $1682.96.
If you need deposit information, refer to the customer named above. The account holder can provide deposit
information from their monthly statements.
Please call the Wells Fargo Customer Service location at 1-800-869-3557 (1-800...TO-WELLS)
(1-800-TO-WELLS) if you hi~ve any
questions. We hope that this information is useful.
Sincerely,

(I
(1

--=Rt~DwnJ
--=Rt~DwnJ
Paula Guenat
Premier Banker

TQOM120699
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By PATRICIA A DWONCH
DEPUT'(

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste. B
POBox 83720
Boise ID 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 3361
[cartwriw@dhw .idaho.gov]
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov]

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
GEORGE D. PERRY,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV IE 0905214

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF
CLAIM

--------------)
-----------------------------)
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the
"Department") and submits the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of its

Petition for Allowance of Claim:

I.
ISSUES AND SUMMARY
The personal representative has filed her "Memorandum in Support ofthe Personal
Representative's Objection to Department of Health and Welfare's Petition for Allowance of
Claim" (hereinafter "PR Brief') which argues, in essence, that the spousal recovery provisions in
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1I
Y:IMRCases\Estate\PerryM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd
Y:\MRCaseslEstate\PerryM\Memorandum
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Idaho Code § 56-218(1) are invalid and pre-empted by federal law. This argument relies
primarily on the reasoning found in a Minnesota Supreme Court case, In re Estate of Barg, 752
N.W.2d 52 (2008), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minnesota's spousal
recovery law was partially preempted by federal Medicaid law.
The personal representative's reliance on Barg, however, is misplaced. Whether a
spouse's estate is subject to recovery is a question of state marital property and probate law. The
Idaho Supreme Court has already considered this exact issue in the case of Idaho Department of
Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) (copy provided)', and held
that Idaho law permits spousal recovery where the property had been owned by the Medicaid
recipient or jointly owned after October 1, 1993. Because each Supreme Court was interpn:ting
its own state's law, Barg is not necessarily inconsistent with Jackman, but ifit is, Jackman
controls in Idaho, not Barg.
Jackman is dispositive in this case. Even ifit were not, however, the real property in this
estate was jointly held at the time of the decedent's death because the decedent's attempted
transfer of the property to himself, using his power of attorney, was improper and invalid.
Therefore, even the Barg decision does not support the disallowance of the Department's estate
recovery claim.

'Copies of relevant cases have been provided together with the exhibits as a convenience to court and counsel.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
Y:\MRCases\EstateIPerryM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wp<!
Y:\MRCases\EstatelPerryM\Memorandum
Allowance.wpd
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2

000112

II.
BACKGROUND FACTS

George D. Perry ("George") was born

and died February 25,2009, at the

age of79. Martha J. Perry ("Martha") was born

and at the time of this

memorandum is still living. Martha was previously known as Martha Jean Boyle and, no later
than September 18, 1977, was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of certain real
property in Ada County. Exhibit A. At some point in time later, Martha and George were
married. On November 18, 2002, Martha executed a Quitclaim Deed, with the grantor named as
"Martha Jean Boyle" and the grantee as "Martha Jean Perry & George Donald Perry." Exhibit B.
At some point, with Martha's health declining, George and Martha needed assistance in pa)ing
for Martha's care. About September 15, 2006, they applied for medical assistance, also known
as Medicaid, to help pay for Martha's care. Martha was determined to be eligible for Medicaid
beginning October 1, 2006. Since that date, the Department has provided payment for Martha's
care, through the Medicaid program, in the sum of at least $108,364.23. 2
About July 31, 2006, George purported to transfer Martha's interest in the real proP(:rty to
himself, signing a Quitclaim Deed on behalf of Martha as her Power of Attorney. See
Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick. As stated earlier, George died February 25,
2009. On March 19, 2009, Barbara McCormick was appointed personal representative for
George's estate and on March 26,2009, Barbara McCormick executed a Deed of Distribution
conveying the real property to one Karyl Hayden. Exhibit C. The inventory does not reflect the

2This
2This was the amount on April 27, 2009. Medicaid expenditures are ongoing.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 3
Y:\MRCases\Estale\PerryM\Memorandum
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real property, but shows "Cash/Investments" in the sum of$81,788.96, which are the net
proceeds of the sale of the real property.3 On April 8,2009, a Medicaid lien was filed with the
Secretary of State's Office securing the Department's interest in George's estate.
A Notice to Creditors was published April 8, 2009. About April 15, 2009, the
Department filed its Claim Against Estate in the sum of$106,251.08. The Department's claim
was presented as a contingent claim and stated as follows:

IMPORTANT: This claim is made in accordance with the Department's
right to establish its claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218. As long as the
decedent's spouse survives, there is no demand for payment of this claim. This
claim is made against any property or estate which, at any time, had been the
community property ofthe decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had been the
property of decedent's spouse. The Department will not object to distribution of
the estate to the decedent's surviving spouse. However, the Department demands
that, before any other distribution of the estate, adequate provision be made for the
future payment of the Department's claim pursuant to Idaho Code §
15-3-81 O(b
)(2). Transfers of property by either spouse (except to one another),
O(b)(2).
including transfers by will and the failure to claim probate allowances, may affect
the eligibility of the survivor for Medicaid services, and may be set aside in
accordance with Idaho Code § 56-218(2).
About June 2, 2009, the personal representative filed a Notice of Disallowance of Claim. On
June 15,2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim.

3The personal representative suggests that the Department has somehow agreed with her characterization of the
estate property as separate property because "the Department failed to make any objection to the PR's Inventory." PR
Brief, p. 3, ~ 7. While it makes no legal difference, the Department notes that there is nothing in the probate code that
requires the Department to object to errors in the inventory. Therefore, there was no "failure" on the part of the
Department and the Department has neither acquiesced or agreed to anything by not objecting to the Inventory.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
Y:\MRCaseslEslale\PerryM\Memorandum in Support of Pelilion
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 4
Y:\MRCaseslEslate\PerryM\Memorandum
Petition for Allowance.wpd
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III.
THIS IS AN ORDINARY SPOUSAL RECOVERY CASE OF
THE TYPE ANTICIPATED BY IDAHO CODE § 56-218.
A.

Estate Recovery Is Simple in Concept.
While the statutes and rules governing estate recovery can be complicated, the concept of

estate recovery is actually quite simple:
Nursing home care has become astonishingly costly. Medicaid assists elderly couples in
paying for nursing home care. Medicaid is the payer of last resort. Unlike Medicare, Medicaid is
not an insurance program; there are no premiums or payroll deductions. Medicaid is a public
welfare program paid for with general fund monies from both the state and federal governments.
Normally, a person must have exhausted their own resources before becoming eligible for
Medicaid. A single person can have no more than $2,000 in available resources to qualify.
When one spouse of a couple needs assistance, the healthy spouse, who will stay at home, needs
the home, the car, and money, just to survive in the community. The Medicaid spouse is allowed
to transfer assets to the non-Medicaid spouse to provide for his needs.
When both spouses have passed away, the couple's assets are recovered to repay
Medicaid, up to the amount Medicaid has paid. Medicaid assists the needy elderly. It is not
intended to preserve an inheritance for the able-bodied heirs of Medicaid recipients.
B.

This Is an Ordinary Case Falling Squarely Within Idaho Code § 56-218(1).
The personal representative suggests this is an "as applied" challenge to Idaho law, as if it

is not the law itself she attacks, but merely the "Department's application of' the law. 4 Make no

4 pR Brief, pp. 4, 5, 13,
4PR
l3, 19.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 5
Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryMlMemorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd
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mistake, however, her attack goes to the very core of spousal recovery in Idaho and would
eviscerate Idaho's estate recovery law. The system is designed to assure the couple's assets are
available for their needs and permits them to freely transfer property between themselves to
accomplish that. If recovery were not possible from assets conveyed to the spouse for his needs,
the only spousal recovery that would be made would be from people too ill-informed to hire an
elder law attorney to help them transfer their assets.
Where a single individual is on Medicaid, recovery is simple: When that person dies, the
state recovers from the assets of her estate. When the nursing home spouse dies first, she
normally has so little, her property simply passes to her surviving spouse and the state waits. for
the second death, the death of the surviving spouse, and recovers from the estate of that spouse.
When, however, the non-Medicaid spouse dies first, as in this case, there are three possibilities:
(1) Ifthe couple's assets pass by law to the Medicaid spouse, the state merely waits for
the death ofthe Medicaid spouse and can recover from the resulting joint probate;
(2) If probate is opened for the non-Medicaid spouse, and the property passes to the
Medicaid spouse, the Department must file a claim, but will defer recovery and will recover from
the remaining estate of the Medicaid spouse;
(3) Ifprobate is opened for the non-Medicaid spouse, and the couple's property is to pass
to third parties, the Department must file a claim and the estate must provide for the
Department's future recovery of Medicaid payments.
This is the process created by Idaho Code § 56-218(1):
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law
medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
Y;\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd
Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\Memorandum
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 6
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was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such
assistance may be recovered from the individual's estate.
estate, and the estate of the
spouse,
any. for such aid paid to either or both:
spouse. if any,
(a) There shall be no adjustment or recovery until after the death of both
the individual and the spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual has
no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or
permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.c. 1382c.

(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate will be
authorized pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under
this section may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse.
(c) The claim against the estate of the first deceased spouse must be made
within the time provided by section 15-3-801(b),
Code, if the estate is
15-3-801(b). Idaho Code.
administered and actual notice is given to the director as required by subsection
(5) of this section. However, if there is no administration of the estate of the first
deceased spouse, or if no actual notice is given to the director as required by
subsection (5) ofthis section, no claim shall be required until the time provided
for creditor claims in the estate of the survivor.
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added).
The Department's claim in cases like this falls under Idaho Code § 15-3-810 and requires
that, before assets are passed to third parties (not the spouse), arrangements are made for the
future payment of the Department's claim:

15-3-810. Claims not due and contingent or unliquidated claims.
(a) If a claim which will become due at a future time or a contingent or
unliquidated claim becomes due or certain before the distribution of the estate,
and if the claim has been allowed or established by a proceeding, it is paid in the
same manner as presently due and absolute claims of the same class.
(b) In other cases the personal representative or, on petition of the personal
representative or the claimant in a special proceeding for the purpose, the court
may provide for payment as follows:
(1) if the claimant consents, he may be paid the present or agreed value of
the claim, taking any uncertainty into account;
(2) arrangement for future payment, or possible payment, on the happening
ofthe
of the contingency or on liquidation may be made by creating a trust, giving a
mortgage, obtaining a bond or security from a distributee, or otherwise.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR ALLOW
AN CE OF CLAIM - 7
Y:\MRCases\Estate\PenyM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd
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Idaho Code § 15-3-810 (underline added). The contingency, of course, is the death ofthe
Medicaid spouse.
In this case, the entire estate is traceable to property Martha, the Medicaid spouse, owned
at the time she married George. By rule, the Department makes its recovery only from property
in which the Medicaid spouse had an interest at some point in the past. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20
provides, in part:

20. Limitations on Estate Claims.
* * * A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to
the value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1,
I,
1993, community property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate
property, and jointly owned property
....
property....
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20. Therefore, if George had had separate property, that had always been
retained as his separate property, the Department would not recover from that property for
Medicaid paid for Martha.

IV.
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY
REJECTED THE PRE-EMPTION ARGUMENT MADE
HERE.
The personal representative makes the simplistic argument that federal law only permits
recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient. She argues that since Martha transferred her
property to George before George died, and George carefully disinherited Martha in his will,
Martha must now be left destitute on public assistance, and the heirs named in the will should
share the estate assets free from any claim for Medicaid reimbursement. Obviously, this is not
what the legislature intended and is contrary to the simple principle of Medicaid recovery.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 8
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Congress and the legislature intended to assist the Medicaid spouse and protect the non-Medicaid
spouse. They did not intend to spend taxpayer money paying for Martha's care so George's heirs
could have Martha's property. Were the drafters of the Medicaid recovery laws so shortsighted?
No. The Idaho Supreme Court has already considered this question and has upheld estate
recovery in cases such as this.
A.
The Federal Pre-emption Issue Was Thoroughly Presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in
the Case ofIdaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman.
In the case ofIdaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132
l32 Idaho 213,
2l3, 970
P
.2d 6 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld recovery from the estate ofthe non-Medicaiid
P.2d
spouse. In the Jackman case the Medicaid spouse, Hildor, transferred all her property to her
spouse, Lionel, in order to qualify for Medicaid. Hildor passed away and Lionel passed away
two weeks later. Jackman was appointed personal representative of Lionel's estate and the
Department filed an estate recovery claim. The personal representative challenged the
Department's claim on numerous grounds including federal pre-emption. Exhibit D.
D.55 The Idaho
Supreme Court upheld Idaho's spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definition of
estate permitted by federallaw 6 and adopted by Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b), together with the
l396p(h)(l), validated recovery of property that had, at
definition of assets found at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l),
I, 1993, been community property.
any time after October 1,

5 S0 that the court can see how completely the pre-emption argument was made to the Idaho Supreme Court in
Jackman, the Department has provided copies of the briefing in the Jackman case as Exhibit D hereto. The same
argument the personal representative makes here was made by Jackman. See Respondent's Brief (Oct. 8, 1997),
I997), Section
IV, p. 16.

642

U.S.c. § 1396p(b){4)(B).
I396p(b){4)(B).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 9
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The Jackman decision must be read carefully because ofthe way it was decided. The
final decision is an edited version, altered on re-hearing, of the original decision of the court. It
is helpful to understand the original decision and the reason for the court's alteration on
rehearing. In the court's first decision, the Supreme Court held wholly in favor of the
Department. Exhibit E. Upon Petition for Rehearing, the Supreme Court modified its decision
because the effective date of the federal law on which they had relied in their original opinion
was after the date of the couple's marriage settlement agreement. The court, therefore, held that
recovery would be limited to property that had been community property after the effective date
ofthe federal law, "OBRA 93."7
93.,,7 Effectively, the court upheld spousal recovery against the
federal pre-emption argument, but in the Jackman case, the couple's property had been divided
by a marriage settlement agreement in April, 1993, prior to the effective date of the law.
The published summary ofthe case correctly captures this two part holding:
... The Supreme Court, Johnson, 1., held that: (1) ifthe estate ofthe individual
who received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay the full amount of the
assistance received, the Department can recover the balance from the estate of the
surviving spouse, but (2) federal law, as in effect when recipient and her husband
entered into marital settlement agreement transmuting most of recipient's and
husband's community property into separate property of husband, limited the
Department to recovering any community property recipient and husband may
have accumulated after the agreement.
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 213, 970 P.2d at 6 (underline added). Justice Johnson's introduction also
explains the court's holding:
This is a Medicaid recovery case. We conclude that section 56-218(1) of
(I. C.), as it existed at times applicable to this case, authorized the
the Idaho Code (I.C.),

7This
limiting spousal recovery to property that
7This limitation is embodied in IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 cited above,
above,limiting
had been community property at any time after October 1,
I, 1993.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
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Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) to recover from the
available estate of a surviving spouse the balance of Medicaid payments received
by an individual who was fifty-five years old or older when receiving the
payments if the individual's estate is inadequate to repay the entire amount. We
conclude, however, that federal law applicable to this case prohibited this
recovery, except from any community property the spouses may have accumulated
after a marriage settlement agreement transmuting their community property into
separate property of each.
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 214,970 P.2d at 7 (underline added). Justice Johnson explained that the
Department was limited in the Jackman case only because the marriage settlement agreement
was executed before the effective date of the federal law expanding the definition of estate for
Medicaid recovery purposes:
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8,
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of
13611(e}. Therefore,
the enactment ofthis Act [Aug. 10, 1993J."
19931." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e).
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true
even though 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4),
1396p(b}(4}, which applies to Medicaid payments for
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1,
I, 1993, authorizes the
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(l), "other assets" are
I.c. § 15-1-201(15).
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C.
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the
agreement, is not part ofHildor's estate.
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7,970 P.2d at 9-10 (underline added).
To understand the breadth of the Jackman decision and why it necessarily applies in this
case, it is valuable to understand that the Supreme Court's reasoning is based on the interaction
between Idaho marital law and federal Medicaid law. As discussed more fully in section V,
below, what property is available for estate recovery is a question of state law, not federal law.
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Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b) and 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) provided the expanded definition of
estate. Then, importantly, 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(1)8 provided as follows:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any
income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to
actionbut does not receive because of action
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's
spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1) (underline added). Therefore, where a spouse divests herself of assets,
even where permitted by Medicaid law, those assets are estate assets for purposes of Medicaid
recovery.
As noted, above, in Jackman, the court altered its decision because it determined the
transfer of assets from Hildor to Lionel occurred prior to the enactment of the OBRA '93 which
included both 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) and 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(1).9 The court remanded
the matter for a determination of what community property the parties had acquired since their
marriage settlement agreement. The only reason the Department was not permitted to recover the
property transferred through the marriage settlement agreement was because of the timing: the
marriage settlement agreement divided the property before the effective date of OBRA '93.

~ow 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l) (the numbering was changed after DRA 2005).
9See

Exhibit D Jackman Respondent's Rehearing Brief, p. 28.
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Therefore, the Jackman case conclusively holds that in Idaho, the Department may
recover from the estate of the spouse as long as the property had been community property,
jointly owned property, or the property of the Medicaid spouse, at any time after October 1,
I, 1993.

v.
THE DECISION IN BARG DOES NOT CHANGE
JACKMAN.
The personal representative bases her claim of preemption on a Minnesota case, In r,~
r'~
Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). In Barg the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
Minnesota's spousal recovery statute was partially preempted by federal law. As discussed
above, the Jackman case relied on the interaction between Idaho law and federal law. Therefore,
There:fore,
the Barg holding and the Jackman holding, in which each state's highest court was interpreting
its own law, is not necessarily inconsistent.
A.

The Barg Decision Did Not Consider the Decisive Issue in Jackman.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Jackman, found 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)lo significant in

their analysis. The original decision stated the following:
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as
well as from the estate of the surviving spouse. The federal definition of asset is
significant. Federal law includes within the recipient's estate "all real and
personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate ..."
... " and
"any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had
..... " 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); I.C. §
any legal title or interest at the time of death ....."
56-218(4). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income and
resources as well as Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not
affect the status of the assets that federal law considers to be part of the recipient's
estate because the definition of assets includes "income or resources which the
individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because
l~OW 42 U.S.c.

*1396p(h)(1).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 13
Y:\MRCases\EstateIPenyM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd

000123

of action by a person ... with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the
individual or such individual's spouse." 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(l)(B).
1396p(e)(1)(B). Jackman's
signing of the agreement constituted action by a person on behalf of Hildor and
Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the Department from recovering the balance
of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate.
Jackman, original opinion, p. 4 (Exhibit E) (underline added). On rehearing, the Supreme Court
did not retreat from their original holding except to recognize the marriage settlement agreement
was executed before the "assets" definition of 42 U.S.c.
U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)(B) came into effect:
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8,
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361
13611(e).
1(e). Therefore,
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the
def'mition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l),
1396p(e)(1). "other assets" are
defmition
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C. § 15-1-201(5).
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the
agreement, is not part ofHi1dor's estate.
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7,970 P.2d at 9-10 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court didn't
1396p(e)
e) (1 ). In fact, by necessary implication, it
change its mind about the effect of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(

ofassets
stated that with the definition of
assets contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)
1396p(e)(l) the transferred
assets would have been part of Hildor's estate, and therefore, subject to recovery.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Barg, did not even consider the effect of this important
definition of "assets." Therefore, the Barg court didn't even consider or discuss the section of
federal law the Idaho Supreme Court found dispositive in Jackman.
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B.

The State of Minnesota Has Already Amended its Law to Overcome the Barg Holding.
The Barg decision is an anomaly with limited application. It runs directly contrary to

other state supreme court decisions such as Jackman and In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882
(N.D. 2000) (copy provided). It is understandable, then, that Minnesota has already amended its
hoJding of its supreme court in Barg. Exhibit F is a copy of changes
state law to overcome the holding
made to Minnesota law in 2009 for the express purpose of fixing the Barg decision. This
legislation makes it clear that a Medicaid recipient's marital assets, at death, include assets
jointly owned at any time during marriage, even when transferred by the Medicaid spouse to the
non-Medicaid spouse. See Exhibit F, Subd. 2b. This is exactly the effect of the Idaho Supreme
Court's holding in Jackman.
Obviously, if Minnesota can correct Barg by a statutory change, it is state law and not
federal law, per se, that creates the problem. The Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of
Idaho's existing law already overcomes the Barg decision.
The personal representative here cites, with approval, the Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari. II In that brief, the Solicitor General
argues that Supreme Court review is unnecessary because Minnesota is in the process offix:lng
offix:tng
the Barg decision through new legislation. In doing so, the Solicitor General recognizes that
what property is available for estate recovery is a question of state, not federal, law:
Moreover, although the federal Medicaid Act limits estate recovery to
those assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of her
lIThe personal representative claims, without any authority whatsoever, that "Idaho is legally obligated to abide
by HHS/CMS interpretations offederal Medicaid law." PR Brief, pp. 18-19. She goes on to suggest that Idaho must
follow the legal arguments of the Solicitor General in its Amicus brief in Barg. ld. This is not true. Idaho is bound by
federal law and appropriately promulgated rules, not by legal arguments by federal government attorneys.
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death, the nature and extent of such interests remain largely the domain of state
law. Notably, Minnesota's Governor has proposed redefining marital property
interests to pennit recovery of medical assistance from the estate of the
later-surviving spouse in this context. See Governor's Recommendation,
Minnesota State Budget, 2010-11 Biennial Budget, Human Services Dep 't 132
(Jan. 27,2009). That proposal has not become law, nor has it been reviewed by
the Secretary ofHHS. The proposal, however, suggests that Minnesota may be
able to work toward greater asset recovery consistent with the clear tenns of
federal Medicaid law.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, pp. 15-16
(underline added) (Appendix 2 to PR Brief). Therefore, the Solicitor General clearly recognized
that state law, not federal Medicaid law, detennines what property is available for Medicaid
recovery.
The Solicitor General, in its Amicus brief also discussed the North Dakota Wirtz case,
and noted that the contrary holding in Wirtz could simply be a difference in state law, and not
necessarily a conflict with Barg:
Although its reasoning is not entirely clear, the court in Wirtz appeared to
conclude that the recipient in that case, despite fonnal conveyance of certain
assets before death, retained an interest in the relevant property until his death,
when the interest was conveyed to his spouse through "other arrangement." 607
N.W.2d at 885 (quoting 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4)(B)). The court did not elaborate on
the nature of that interest, although it referred to the State's argument that the
recipient had retained a "marital or equitable interest" in the assets at the time of
his death, id. at 883, and noted that other courts had interpreted Section
1396p(b)(
4)(B) to reach state-law community-property and homestead interests,
1396p(b)(4)(B)
id. at 885.
The different results reached by the North Dakota Supreme Court and the
court below on similar facts thus may reflect not conflicting interpretations of
federal Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under state law, a spouse
retains a legal interest in property conveyed to his or her spouse.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, p. 14
(underline added) (Appendix 2 to PR Brief).
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Like the North Dakota Supreme Court in Wirtz, the Idaho Supreme Court has already held
that Idaho's law pennits recovery under the circumstances of this case. These holdings are not
necessarily inconsistent with Barg. The Barg decision has limited application to Minnesota and
has already been corrected by a change in Minnesota law.
VI.
GEORGE'S GIFT OF MARTHA'S PROPERTY TO
HIMSELF WAS INEFFECTIVE TO ELIMINATE
MARTHA'S COMMUNITY INTEREST.
In this case, Martha brought the real property of this estate into the marriage as her sole
and separate property. See Exhibit A. She later transferred the property to herself and to George,
granting George an interest in the property. Exhibit B. George later transferred Martha's interest
to himself. Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Barbara K. McConnick. However, the transfer of
Martha's interest to George, was not perfonned by Martha, but by George using his power of
attorney for Martha. See id. The power of attorney, however, contains no provision pennitting
gifting, much less, self-gifting. Exhibit G. Indeed, the power of attorney includes some language
clearly prohibiting self dealing. See Exhibit G,

~~

G and H. George's gift to himself was,

therefore, invalid, and failed to eliminate Martha's interest in the real property. While this failure
Barg, this estate is still subject to
is irrelevant under Jackman, even if the court were to follow Barg.
recovery.
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A.
A Power of Attorney Does Not Support Making Gifts Unless it Contains an Expres~!
Authorization.
It is black-letter law that a power of attorney does not grant authority to make gifts absent
an express provision in the power of attorney granting that power. As stated in 3 Am. Jur. 2d
Agency § 87, "The authority of an agent to make a gift on behalf of the principal must be
express." Courts have uniformly supported this view. In Kunewa v. Joshua, 83 Hawaii 65, 924
P.2d 559,565 (Haw.Ct.App.1996) (copy provided), the court explained:
Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the absence of express written
authorization, an agent may not gratuitously convey the principal's property to
himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768 (Fla.App.l978) (agent
exceeded authority in appropriating for agent's own use funds in decedent
principal's checking account in the absence of clear language to that effect in the
power of attorney), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla.l979); In re Estate of
DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253, 352 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.1974) (power of
attorney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held to encompass an
authorization to attorney-in-fact to make gift to himself of principal's property;
such a gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and self-dealing, a
presumption which can be overcome only with the clearest showing of principal's
intent to make the gift), affd, 47 A.D.2d 589, 363 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975).
Kunewa, 83 Hawaii at 71, 924 P.2d at 565; see also Matter of Estate of Crabtree, 550 N.W.2d
168 (lowa,1996)
(Iowa,1996) (absent express grant in power of attorney, of power to make gift,
attorney-in-fact did not have that power) (copy provided); Aiello v. Clark, 680 P.2d 1162, 1166
(Alaska 1984) (in the absence of express authority to make a gift, none maybe made) (copy
provided); Cheloha v. Cheloha, 255 Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291 (1998) (no gift may be made by an
attorney in fact to himself unless the power to make such a gift is expressly granted in the
instrument itself) (copy provided).
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Idaho law is consistent with these pronouncements. In Idaho, powers of attorney are
strictly construed not to authorize acts beyond those specified. Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47
Idaho 306, 274 P. 800 (1929) (copy provided); accord Eaton v. McWilliams, 52 Idaho 145, 12
P.2d 259 (1932). In the case of Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348,210 P.
1003 (1922), the Idaho Supreme Court said:
... [I]f an agent makes any profit in the course of his agency because of his failure
to inform his principal of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of due
diligence he should have ascertained for his principal, the profits of such
transaction, as a matter of law, will belong exclusively to the agent's principal.
The law guards the fiduciary relation, which the relation of principal and agent is,
with jealous care. It seeks to prevent the possibility of a conflict between duty and
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall work with an eye single to the
interest of his principal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his principal,
either for himself or for others.
Jensen, 36 Idaho at

,210 P. at 1005 (underline added).

Likewise, Idaho Code § 32-912 requires an "express power of attorney" for one spouse to
conveyor encumber community property:
32-912. Control of community property. - Either the husband or the
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and
either may bind the community property by contract, exctmt that neither the
sell. conveyor encumber the community real estate unless
husband nor wife may selL
the other joins in executing the sale agreement, deed or other instrument of
conveyance by which the real estate is sold. conveyed or encumbered, and any
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the
spouse who did not so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife may
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell,
conveyor encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds,
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in conformity
herewith are hereby validated.
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Idaho Code § 32-912 (emphasis added).12 The title company may have recognized this defc;~ct
when it required the signature of Martha on the closing statement when the personal
representative sold the real property.13 See Exhibit "D" to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick.
Therefore, even if the court were to find that Barg were controlling law in Idaho,

thc;~

estate is still subject to the Department's claim: The deed George executed conveying Martha's
interest in the property to himself, using his power of attorney for Martha, is ineffective to
extinguish Martha's interest in the real property.
VII.
CONCLUSION

The question presented by the personal representative has already been conclusively
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court in the case ofIdaho Department of Health and Welfare v.
Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in ~.arg
has no application to Idaho marital property law. Even ifBarg were applicable in Idaho, this
estate is still subject to recovery because George's attempted gift of Martha's interest to himself
is invalid. The Department's claim should be allowed in full.
DATED this 29th day of January, 2010,

Deputy Attorney General

12The
12 The Uniform Power of Attorney Act, adopted in 2008, was not in effect at the time of the transfer of Martha's
interest to George, but it also includes the requirement for an express grant of authority to make a gift of the principle's
property. Idaho Code § 15-12-201(1)(b), (c).
13Barbara K McCormick signed not only as personal representative for George's estate, but also as attorney in
fact for Martha.
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DEED OF DISTRIBUTION
!+rfI~2rxf(
!+rfI~2rxf( Ai/lSD BY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
THIS DEED, made by BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of George D. Perry, deceased, Grantor, to KARYL HAYDEN, an unmarried person,
Grantee, whose current address is 2295 Sunset Peak Road, Boise, Idaho, 83702;
WHEREAS, Grantor is the qualified Personal Representative of said estate, filed as Case
No. CV IE 0905214, in Ada County, Idaho;
WHEREAS, Grantee is entitled to distribution of the hereinafter described real property
THEREFORE, Grantor quitclaims, transfers, and conveys to Grantee the following
described real property in Ada County, Idaho:
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

with all appurtenances.
EXECUTED this/C, day of
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BARBARA K. MCCORMICK,

Personal Representative of the Estate
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On this ~ day of
, 20~, before me, the undersigned, a notary
4 d
public'
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EXHIBIT "A"

lot 115 of Columbus Park No.2, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 16 of Plats at Page(s) 1065
and 1066, official records of Ada County, Idaho.

Exhibit "A"

Legal Desctiption
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In the Matter of the Estate of

)
)
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON,
)
)
Deceased.
)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - : ))
)
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
)
WELFARE,
)
WELFARE.
)
Petitioner/
AppeUant,
Petitioner/Appellant,
)
)

Supreme Court No. 23928

)

vs.
~.

BARBARA JACKMAN, PERSONAL
REPRESENT A TIVE for the Estate of
KNUDSON,
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON.
Respondent.
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STATEl\1ENT OF THE CASE
A,
A.

Nature Of The Case.
lies tate recovery" case. The petitioner/appellant is the Idaho
This is a Medicaid liestate

I'Department"). The respondent is the
Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department").
appointed personal representative of the estate of Lionel Knudson, Barbara Jackman .
(hereinafter "Jackman" or "personal representative"). Jackman is the adult daughter of
Lionel and Hildor Knudson, both deceased.
Medicaid, referred to as "medical
medical assistance" in Idaho statutes, is a joint StatelI

federal program that provides medical care to the poor. I Eligibility is based on limited
income and resources of the Medicaid recipient and the recipient's spouse. Certain
resources (in this case the decedents' home) are excluded in determining eligibility.
Where Medicaid pays for nursing care or certain home-based care for persons over 55
years of age, Idaho Code § 56-218 (Appendix A) permits the State to recover its
recipient'S spouse, after both
Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient or the recipient's
have passed away. This case involves the State's attempted recovery from the estates
of a deceased Medicaid recipient and her deceased spouse.

I Unlike Social Security or Medicare, Medicaid is not an insurance program. No premiwns are paid
does. Rather,
for entitlement to benefits. There is no pool which assumes the risk ofloss as an insurer does,
Medicaid is a fonn of welfare funded directly by taxpayers.
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B,
B.

Course Of Proceedings.
This matter arose as a claim by the Department against the estate of Lionel

Knudson for recovery of Medicaid payments made on behalf of Lionel Knudson's
spouse Hildor Knudson. The personal representative failed to pay the Department's
claim and the Department brought a Petition for Allowance of Claim, to which the
personal representative objected. Hearing was held on May 6, 1996, and the court,
William C. Hamlett, Magistrate, presiding, entered a Memorandum Decision
(Appendix B) on January 17, 1997, holding the Department was not entitled to recover
from Lionel Knudson's estate. The Department appealed to the District Court which
reviewed the briefs filed before the magistrate and accepted supplemental briefs. The
District Court, heard oral argument on May 28, 1997, and affirmed the magistrate's
decision by order entered June 4, 1997. This appeal followed.
C.

Statement Of The Facts.
Hildor L. Knudson, the spouse of Lionel Malcolm Knudson, was a recipient of

Medicaid. R. p. 25. From about January, 1993, until her death on October 27, 1994,
Medicaid paid for most of Hildor's nursing home care. In all, the public paid
$41,600.55 on her behalf. R. pp. 25-40.
Hildor was eligible for Medicaid because, through a Marriage Settlement
Agreement (Appendix q, she had conveyed the bulk of her interest in community
property to her spouse. R. pp. 63-66. Such inter-spousal transfers are permitted by
APPELLANT'S BRIEF -~ 2
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.~

both State and federal law
law..2 Indeed, the very purpose of the Marriage Settlement
Agreement was to impoverish Hildor so she would be eligible to receive Medicaid.
Lionel Knudson, as the community spouse, received all of the couple's property except

for an irrevocable burial trust and $1 ,90fr3 in the parties' accounts. R. pp. 63-66. The
agreement was signed, on behalf of both parties, by Barbara Jackman, who, according

to the agreement was Hildor Knudson's guardian and the holder of a durable power of
attorney for Lionel Knudson. R. p. 65.
Hildor died October 27, 1994. R. p. 67. Lionel died just two weeks later on
November 11, 1994. R. p. 10.
2S, 1994, probate proceedings were initiated for Lionel's estate
On November 28,
by the appointment of Barbara Jackman as personal representative. R. pp. 10-18.
10-IS.

Hildor's estate was not probated. On January 9, 1995, the Department filed a claim
against Lionel's estate. R. pp. 19-20.

At the time of her death, Hildor was in possession of a bank account in the
$1,S61.30 and her burial trust. R. pp. 58-61.
5S-61. As stated, above, no probate
amount of $1,861.30

proceeding was initiated. Rather, Jackman obtained the money from the bank account

ee 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c)(2); IDAPA 16.03.05.693.01.
2See
2S
3For eligibility pmposes,
pw-poses, Hildor Knudson's resources had to be reduced below $2,000. See 42
U.S.c. § 1382(a)(l)(B).
1382(a)(1)(B). Medicaid eligibility for persons such as Hildor Knudson is based upon eligibility for
SSI
55I or AABD. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(lO)(A)(l)(l).
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Jackman's
about August 1, 1995, by affidavit. 4 R. pp. 67-69. About August 22, 1995, Jackman's,
attorney paid $1,638.03 to the Department. R. pp. 70-71. The Department had
previously notified Jackman's attorney that it would accept the payment only as a
partial payment, not sufficient to satisfy the Department's estate recovery claim. R.
pp. 143-147 (Appendix D).
On December 26, 1995, the Department filed a Petition for Allowance of Claim.
R. pp. 21-22. The personal representative of Lionel Knudson has valued the estate at
$40,798.35.

4Pennitted in small estates by Idaho Code § 15-3-1201.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Idaho Code § 56-218 permits Medicaid payments to be

recovered from the estate of the recipient's after-deceased spouse.
2.

Whether the court should have granted the Department's Petition for

Allowance of Claim.
3.

Whether attorney fees and costs should be assessed against Jackman.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 5
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ARGUMENT
Estate recovery has a long history in Idaho, beginning no later than 1943. The
purpose has always been to permit elderly recipients of public aid to keep their homes .
(and in some cases other limited assets), but to obtain repayment from those assets after
the need for them has ended. In this case the personal representative, Jackman,
intentionally manipulated the estates of her parents to impose the costs of her mother's
care on the public, while obtaining a windfall for herself. Idaho Code § 56-218 was
not intended to permit this injustice.

I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a case is appealed from a district court's appellate review of a magistrate's
decision, the Court makes an independent appellate review of the magistrate's decision,
after giving due regard to the district court's ruling. Ausman y. State, 124 Idaho 839,
840, 864 P.2d 1126, 1127 (1993); In re Estate of Reinwald, 122 Idaho 401, 402, 834
P.2d 1317, 1318 (1992); Swope y. Swope, 122 Idaho 296,298,834 P.2d 298,300
y, McNelis, 119 Idaho 349, 351, 806 P.2d 442, 444 (1991); State Y,
(1992); McNelis y.
y.

Woolf, 120 Idaho 21, 22, 813 P.2d 360, 361 (1991) rev. den. (1991); State y. AllisoD,
Allison,
112 Idaho 572, 733 P.2d 793 (App. 1987). An appellate court will freely review
y, State, 124 Idaho 839,840,864 P.2d 1126,1127 (1993);
questions of law. Ausman y.

Son, 120 Idaho 185, 188,814 P.2d 917, 920
Clements Farms. Inc. v. Ben Fish & SOD,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 6
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.....

(1991); In re Goeri2,
GQeri2, 121 Idaho 26, 28, 822 P.2d 545, 547 (App. 1991) rev. denied
(1992).
In this case, there are no
nQ material issues of fact and the matter presents only
issues of
decision after
Qf law.' Therefore the standard is free review of the magistrate's decisiQn
giving due regard to the ruling of the District court.
II.

IDAHO CODE SECTION 56-218 PERMITS SPOUSAL
ESTATE RECOVERY IN THIS CASE.
A

Estate Recoyery History and purpose in Idaho.

v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009
In the case of State ex reI. Nielson y,
(1948) (Appendix E), the executor of an estate denied the claim of the State for
recovery of old-age assistance payments made to the decedent. The State brought an
action against the executor to which the executor demurred. The trial court sustained
the demurrer and dismissed the claim, believing the estate recovery statute in question
to be violative of the Idaho Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the

law, pointing to the valid public purpose behind the estate recovery law:
Provision ... for recovery against the estates of recipients has been
part of the law of this State continuously since March 2, 1943, when
Chapter 119 of the Laws of 1943 became effective. Section 2 of such Act
added Section 24-a to the Public Assistance Law of the State and read as

~Before the magistrate, Jackman argued spousal estate recovery is preempted by federal law. The
magistrate ruled against Jackman on that issue, and Jackman has not cross-appealed. The sole issue,
therefore, involves the interpretation ofIdaho law. See R pp. 148-154.
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follows:
Section 24-a. Recovery from recipients6 • On the death of any
recipient, the total amount of assistance paid or relief granted under
this Act shall be allowed as a preferred claim against the estate of
such person and shall be subject only to the expense of the last
illness, funeral expenses not to exceed $100.00, and expenses of
administration of said estate. No claim shall be enforced against
any real estate or personal property of a recipient while such real
estate is occupied by the recipient, a surviving spouse, or a
dependent ....
Chapter 119, 1943 S.L. [Appendix F]
Nielson, 68 Idaho at 229, 191 P.2d at 10tO.
In examining the above provision, the court reviewed 1939 changes to the Social
Security Act which permitted the State to retain all sums obtained through estate
recovery.7
recovery.? In doing so, the court noted the logic of recovering such sums after the
death of both husband and wife:
A most generous thing for the Congress to do in this: It gives a state, for
instance Idaho, a much larger amount of money to use in avoiding placing
the aged and needy in poor-houses, by granting assistance to those owning
the homes in which they live and enabling them to continue to live in such
homes until both husband and wife have passed on, after which, of
course, they no longer require the use of a home. The generosity of the

Congress does not end there. It also provides more money to meet the
requirements of the needy and destitute who are not the owners of homes.
6 At fIrst blush, one may wonder why "spouse" is not mentioned in this statute. The difference
between the original old age assistance and Medicaid, however, is that old age assistance was paid to enable
people to remain in their homes instead of a "poor-house." The practice of impoverishing a spouse to pennit
I 980s. See infra.
Medicaid to pay for nursing home care did not arise until the I980s.

7 The 1935 Social Security Act required States to pay Yl of amounts recovered through estate
7The
recovery (the same proportion as the federal share) to the federal government. Social Security Act of 1935, §
2(a)(7) (full text available at http://www.ssa.govthistory/35actinx.html). Today, the State is required to pay a
proportionate share (approximately 70 percent) of amounts recovered through estate recovery to the federal
government.
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Nielson, 68 Idaho at 231, 191 P.2d at 1011. Later, the court further expounded on the
public policy behind estate recovery:
The statute, in line with modern ideas, makes it possible in many
cases to avoid placing the needy aged in institutions and contemplates the
granting of assistance to those who may own the home in which they live
or other property as well as to those absolutely destitute, if their income
and sources of subsistence are not sufficient to meet the statutory
standards. Under these provisions the recipient of public assistance is not
required to liquidate all of his property. Ofttimes the recipient continues
to live in his own home, which he is able to preserve for use during his
lifetime and for the use of his widow during her lifetime after his decease.
The method of caring for the needy aged has proven far superior in many
cases to placing the needy aged in institutions. It has not only
ooly proven to
be more efficient and economical from the State' s standpoint, but more
humanitarian, providing the recipient with a more normal existence,
freeing him of much of the stigma and many of the hardships and
disagreeable features of life in an institution.
Nielson, 68 Idaho at 232-3, 191 P.2d at 1012.

Several years later, the court upheld successor provisions which permitted a lien
to be imposed on the property of old-age assistance recipients:
The old-age assistance law is to be distinguished from so-called
'poor laws' or 'indigent statutes' in that the old-age assistance act does not
require that the recipient be a pauper or absolutely destitute to entitle him
to payments thereunder.

***

The conditions imposed by the statute are not so onerous as those
ordinarily imposed in private lending transactions. On the contrary, .the
wbo own a
law proyides a fair and humane plan by which needy aged. who
home, may secure old-age assistance while continuing to occupy and
borne, rather than being required to mortgage or sell it, and
enjoy their home,
consume the proceeds in liying expenses before receiving aid. At the
same time it preserves the property as a means of reimbursing the welfare
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9
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fund, thus giving the recipients the satisfaction of paying their own way as
fund.
far as they are able. and with the least hardship. It also reduces the
amount which must be continuously provided by the taxpayers of the state
and nation, who, through their legislative representatives, have voluntarily
assumed the moral obligation to provide such aid. It is a matter of
common knowledge that some states have so burdened themselves with
various forms of public assistance and old-age pensions that the threat of
insolvency has forced a modification of their plans. In all states the
burden of such assistance has become a major problem. Various methods
of recovery have been devised, and perhaps none has been entirely
satisfactory. Among such plans some states have provided for
reimbursement by relatives, legally responsible for the care of their needy
elders. This, however, has been found difficult of application and, in
some circumstances, unjust. Instead of requiring the relatives to provide
state, our Jaw Jirnitg
the support, or to reimburse the state.
Umits recovery to the
estatk. or the real property.
property, of the recipient. The relatives are asked only
to forego,
payments, what they otbenvise
otbenvjse might
forego. to the extent of such payments.
inherit.
Newland Y.
y. Child, 73 Idaho 530, 537-9, 254 P.2d 1066, 1069-71 (1953) (citati.ons
omitted, underline added) (Appendix G).
Clearly, Idaho estate recovery provisions have always had the purpose of
permitting the elderly to obtain assistance while preserving their homes and other assets
to reimburse the public after their deaths.

Idaho Code § 56-218 Was Passed Specifically to Recoyer Inter-spousal
B.
Transfers.
Idaho's current estate recovery law was passed in 1988. S.L. 1988, ch. 49, § 1,
p. 73 (Appendix H). 1988 was a significant year with regard to the application of
public assistance laws to married couples. Hea:lthy elderly persons were under pressure:
to divorce their ill spouses so Medicaid could pay for the ill spouse's nursing care
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without depleting assets needed for the care of the healthy spouse. In response,
Congress enacted the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, P.L. 100-360, §
303, amended by the Family Support Act of 1988, P.L. 100-485. Among other things,.
things"
these acts amended sections of the Social Security Act replacing asset transfer
restrictions in the Supplemental Security Income law with transfer penalties under the
Medicaid law, and permitting interspousal transfers of assets. See 42 U.S.C. §§
1396a(a)(18) and 1396p (Appendix 1) and notes thereto referencing the 1988
1396a(a)(l8)
amendments. These federal changes became effective July 1, 1988. [d. Sometimes

called federal spousal impoverishment, or FSI, the effect of these changes was to
permit spouses to transfer assets from one to the other to "impoverish" the ill spouse so

he or she could qualify for Medicaid nursing payments.
The same issues had apparently been on the mind of the Idaho Legislature, since
the legislature beat Congress "to the punch" with the addition of section 20ge of title 56,
Idaho Code. S.L. 1988, ch. 50, § I, p. 74 (Appendix H). This new section was
enacted
to reduce the number of situations in which medicaid regulations as they
apply to long term care costs, cause either the destitution of the entire
family, or a dissolution of marriage carried out to prevent destitution.
Idaho Code § 56-20ge(I). Section 20ge provided for the use of community property
principles in determining the Medicaid eligibility of a married person. The section had
to be amended the following year to conform to the federal changes. See S.L. 1989,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 11
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ch. 67, § 1, p. 107 (Appendix J); Opinion of the Attorney General 89-3. Both section
20ge and the new estate recovery law were passed on the same day. See Appendix H.
It makes sense that the estate recovery law, passed at the same time as provisions
permitting spousal impoverishment would be drafted to permit recovery of those
transferred assets. Logically, the new estate recovery law permitted spousal estate
recovery:
56-218. RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE. (1) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on
behalf of an individual who was sixty-five (65) years of age or older when
the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the estate,
or if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be
charged for such aid paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim
for such medical assistance correctly paid to the indivi~ual may be
established against the estate, but their shall be no adjustment or recovery
thereof until after the death of the surviving spouse, if any ....

S.L. 1988, ch. 49, § 1, p. 73 (Appendix H).8

c.
Langua~e of the Estate Recovery Law, Whjle Archaic.
C.
The Langua~e
Archaic, Clearly Anticipates
Recovery from a Survjving Spouse's Estate.
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) now reads as follows:
56-218 Recovery of certain medical assistance. - (1) Except
where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who
was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such
assistance may be recovered from the estate. or if there be no estate the
any, shaU
shalJ be charged for such aid paid to
estate of the surviving spouse, if any.
or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical assistance
either Of
correctly paid to the individual may be established against the estate, but

8This language may have been drawn from Oregon law. See O.R.S. § 413.200.
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there shall be no acijustment or recovery thereof until after the death Qf
of
the surviving spouse, if any ....
IdahQ Code
CQde § 56-218(1) (underline added) (Appendix A). Reading this sectiQn
Idaho
section as a
whQle, its meaning is clear: if the Medicaid recipient has an estate frQm
whole,
from which recQvery
recovery

can be made, then recovery is made from that estate, but only after the death of the
surviving spouse; if recovery cannot be made from the estate of the recipient, then
frQm the estate of the surviving spouse.
recovery is made from

Jackman contends that the "if there be no estate" language should be interpreted
as a qualifier, i.e., recovery can not
nQt be made from the spouse's estate if the recipient
dies possessed of
inconceivable that any persQn
person
Qf any property whatsoever. Since it is incQnceivable
could
interpretation conveniently nullifies
CQuid die without any possessions
pQssessions at all,9 Jackman's interpretatiQn
Qf the statute.
recQvery provisions
prQvisiQns of
the spousal recovery
IdahQ Code § 56-218, however,
hQwever, is not
nQt part of the prQbate
probate code. The "if there be
Idaho
nQ estate" does not
nQt specify whether a recovery can be made, but rather, directs an Qrder
no
order

for making the recovery.
qUQted language is archaic, it is not unCQmmQn
While the quoted
uncommon in statutQry
statutory language.
YQrk statutes contain
cQntain several similar references describing tQ
New York
to whom certain
mQneys are paid:
moneys
all elderly nursing home patients have some income from Social Security or another pension.
While most of this is used for the recipient's care, a small portion is kept in an account for the patient's
personal needs. Even if that were not true, even the meager possessions of a destitute nursing patient, such as
a photograph or a toothbrush, constitute an estate under the probate code. See Idaho Code § 15-1-201 (15),
(37) (Appendix K).
9Almost
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If there be no surviving spouse and no surviving child or children of the
deceased under the age of eighteen years, then to such dependent or
dependents as defined in section seven of this article, as directed by the
workers' compensation board; and if there shall be no such dependents,
then to the estate of such deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable
funeral expenses as provided in subdivision one of section seven of this
nQ estate, to
tQ the person
persQn Qf
article, or, if there be no
or perSQns
persons paying the
funeral expenses of such deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable
funeral expenses as provided in such subdivision one.

NY Vol. Amb. Ben. § 10 (underline added); see also NY Work. Compo § 15 and NY
Vol. Fire Ben. § 10 (containing nearly identical language); United States Steel CQrp.
Corp. v.
y.
Workers Compensation
cPa. 1988) (citing Pennsylvania
CQmpensatiQn Appeals Board, 536 A.2d 515 (Fa.
law with very similar language). The "if there be no estate" language is used in a
y. pritchard
Pritchard & McCall, 255 Ala.
context very similar to that here in the case of Penny v.

13, 49 So.2d 782 (1951):
Under the Codes of 1852, 1876, 1886 and 1896, the fees of jurors
and witnesses in such cases were made payable out of the estate of the
person of
county
Qf unsound
unsQund mind or,
Qr, if there be DO
no estate, out of the cQunty
treasury. Section 2763, Code of 1852; 5054, Code of 1876; section
3695, Code of 1886; section 1385, Code of 1896. Under the Code of
1907, section 1385, and that of 1923, section 7293, the pay of jurors is
made out of the county treasury as under the Code of 1940. The pay of
witnesses is required by the Code of 1907, section 3681, and by the Code
of 1923, section 7241, to be paid as jurors are out of the county treasury,
the same as under the Code of 1940.
Penny, 255 Ala. at 17, 49 So.2d at 784 (underline added).
In each of the above instances, the language in question was not a qualifier, but
rather a designation of the order of priority. In each instance, the "estate"
lIestate" in question

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 14
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was either a source or a receptacle of funds. The same is true here. The language in
Idaho Code § 56-218 is not a qua1ifier.
qualifier. It simply means that if recovery can be made
from the estate of the recipient, then that estate is looked to for recovery. If full
recovery cannot be made from the estate of the recipient, then recovery can be made
from the estate of the spouse.
A person whose nursing care is paid for by Medicaid can have no more than
$2,000 in liquid assets. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(1)(B).lo
1382(a)(l)(B).lo Therefore, a person who is
eligible because all his or her property has been transferred to the spouse will never
have more than $2,000. The legislature was certainly aware that such small amounts
would pass automatica1ly
automatically to the surviving spouse through the probate homestead
allowance and exempt property allowance. See Idaho Code §§ 15-2-401 and 15-2-402.
Moreover, since Idaho Code § 56-218(1) specifically forbids recovery while the spouse
survives, there is never a recipient's Ilestate" to serve as a source for estate recovery
when a spouse survives. To the contrary, recovery can only be made from a recipient's
estate if (1) the recipient is pre-deceased by the spouse, or (2) the recipient later
becomes ineligible for Medicaid due to a monetary windfall such as an inheritance.
In the ordinary course of things, then, recovery is made from the estate of the
recipient when the recipient's spouse has pre-deceased (in which case the recipient

lOMedicaid is a "categorical" eligibility program. Elderly nursing patients qualify based on eligibility
1396a(a)(lO)(A)(l)(l).
for SSI or AABD. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(lO)(A)(l)(I).
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already owns the spouse's share of the property), and (more commonly, since the
recipient is typically the less healthy spouse) recovery is made from the estate of the
recipient's spouse when the recipient passes away first. This is what the legislature
intended.
ID.

THE INTERPRETATION PROPOSED BY JACKMAN
IS UNFAIR TO THE NEEDY AND LEADS TO
ABSURD RESULTS.
A.

Jackman Intentionally Manipulated Her Parents' Estates.

As noted, above, Hildor died in possession of $1,861.30 and pre-deceased her
husband. Lionel, as surviving spouse, was entitled to at least the first $7,500 of his
wife's property. 111\ Whether Lionel got it is not clear. Jackman obtained Hildor's
money by affidavit. R. pp. 67-69. Her attorney kept some of the money for his fee,
and sent the remainder to the Department. Of course, neither Jackman's attorney, nor
Jackman herself, had any authority to deal with Hildor's estate in that fashion. Idaho
Code § 15-3-103 requires a legal appointment for a person to assume the powers of a
personal representative. Jackman was only appointed as personal representative for
Lionel's estate, not for Hildor's. If, when Jackman's attorney sent money to the
Department, Jackman was acting as personal representative of Lionel's estate, then the

least, the probate homestead allowance in the amount of $4,000, and
11 A surviving spouse takes, at least.,
the exempt property allowance in the amount of$3,500, irrespective of any will, and ahead of the decedent's
unsecured creditors. See Idaho Code §§ 15-2-401 and 15-2-402.

.....

'
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money had already passed to Lionel's estate, and Jackman was paying the Department
frQm Ljonel's
LjQnel's estate.
from
The fact that Hildor had any property, at all, would mean, under Jackman's
not recover
interpretation of the estate recovery law, that the Department could nQt
LiQnel's estate. Then why was the mQney
anything from Lionel's
money sent? In an effQrt
effort tQ
to make it
appear as if the Department had already recovered from Hildor's estate.
nQ question
questiQn but that Jackman manipulated her parent's estate to attempt
There is no
to reap

awindfall for herself. 12

12

B.
The Interpretation Adyanced by Jackman Is BQth
Both Unfair and Leads tQ
to Absurd
Results.
Qf the estate recovery
recQvery law advanced by Jackman WQuid
interpretatiQn of
would make
The interpretation
it so simple to avoid, that estate recovery would almost never occur. Since every
Medicaid recipient will leave an estate (as defined by the prQbate
probate code), nQ
no recovery
frQm any recipient's spouse. Estate recQvery
pQssible from
will be possible
recovery would Qnly
only be pQssible
possible
from unmarried recipients. A married person could simply give all his or her property

Qbtain nursing care at public expense, and have the property passed Qn
to the spouse, obtain
on tQ
to
the adult children.
Qf those
thQse whose spouses had pre-deceased WQuid
Of course, the adult children of
would not
reCQver from
frQm their parent's estate. They WQuid
stand by and see the Department recover
would simply

12The magistrate noted., in his Memorandum Decision, that "[i]t is Wlfefuted
12Tbe
wtrefuted the estate was
...."" R p. 151 (first fujI
manipuJated by the personal representative ....
full paragraph) (Appendix B).

~

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 17

O;\WcaBRIKNUDSONlAPBRlEJ'.WPO
O;\WcaBRIKNUDSONlAPBRlEJ'. WPO

000160

encourage and assist their elderly parent to marry a Ustraw" spouse, and have the parent
transfer all the property to the spouse, with a prenuptial agreement to pass the property
on to the adult children after the parent's death. 13
At oral argument before the District Court, lackman's
Jackman's attorney argued that

som(~

property, such as the family home, was an exempt resource and did not have to be
conveyed to the spouse to enable the other to be eligible for Medicaid. 14 Therefore,
according to Jackman's attorney, the Department would still recover when such
property was not transferred. All this means is that the Department would only recover
from the estates of people who can not afford the advice of an estate planning attorney.
It is manifestly unfair, and perhaps unconstitutional, to condition estate recovery on

whether the Medicaid recipient can afford an attorney.
IV.
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARDED
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AGAINST
JACKJ\.1AN•
JACKl\1AN.
In the case of State ex reI. Nielson y. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009
(1948) (Appendix E), in which the court discussed the benefits of estate recovery to the

I3WhiJe some may doubt adult
aduJt children wouJd engage in such tactics, this is not at all farfetched. In
13WhiJe
this case, Lionel and Hilder may have been totally Wlaware that Hilder gave all her property to Lionel: the
marriage settlement agreement was signed for both of them by Jackman. R. p. 65. The Department has dealt
aduJt children have gone to great lengths to hide property from estate recovery.
with cases where an adult
l"The Department does not have the power to prevent such transfers since they are specifically
allowed by federal statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2) (Appendix. I).
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elderly, the court recognized that there was really no argument between the recipient of
assistance and the State, but only between the State and the recipient's heirs:
The conflict of interest here is not between the State and its needy aged.
It is between the State and the heirs, next of kin or other distributees of
the estates of the deceased recipients. "The right to dispose of one 1 s
property by will, and the right to have it disposed of by the Jaw,
law, after
decease, is created by statute, and therefore the state may impose such
conditions upon the exercise of this right as it may determine. "
Nielson, 68 Idaho at 223, 191 P.2d at 1012 (citations omitted). The court reiterated
this fact in the later case of Newland

y Child,

73 Idaho 530, 254 P.2d 1066 (1953)

(Appendix G):
Instead of requiring the relatives to provide the support, or to reimburse
the state, our law limits recovery to the estate, or the real property, of the
recipient. The relatives are asked only to forego, to the extent of such
payments, what they otherwise might inherit. As was suggested in State
reI. Nielson v. Lindstrom, the real objection to this lien Jaw
ex rei.
law is that of
the prospective heirs.
The conflict of interest here is not between the State and its needy
aged. It is between the State and the heirs, next of kin or other
distributees of the estates of the deceased recipients. State ex reI.
Lind.rtrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009, 1012.
Nielson v. Lintistrom,
Having no vested interest, they have no right to complain. In re Smith IS

Estate, 188 Okl. 158, 107 P.2d 188; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §
228.
Newland, 73 Idaho at 539, 254 P.2d at 1070-1. This case, likewise, is really between
Jackman and the Department.
manipulated the estates of her parents to place
In this case, Jackman intentionally manipUlated

the burden of her mother's nursing care costs on the public, and retain a windfall for
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herself. She has denied the Department's claim and opposed recovery by the
Department unreasonably and without foundation. The Department is, therefore,
entitled to an award of its attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.
Because the question is certain to arise on remand, the denial of attorney fees to
Jackman should also be addressed. A personal representative who brings or defends

an

action in good faith is entitled to attorney fees from the estate, whether the personal
representative wins or loses. Idaho Code § 15-3-720. This creates a "Catch 22" for the
Department in cases such as this where the Department's claim exceeds the value of the
estate, because the personal representative can challenge the Department's claim at the
Department's own expense. However, in this case, Jackman, having intentionally
manipulated her parents' estates, has not defended against the Department's claim in
good faith and should not receive attorney fees from the estate. Likewise, in this case,
Jackman has taken the actions she has, not for the benefit of the estate, but for her own
Jackman's
benefit. The estate should not be reduced by attorney fees incurred in lackman's
pursuit of her own interests in the estate. Eliasen y. Fitzgerald, 105 Idaho 234, 668
P.2d 110 (1983).

CONCLUSION
Despite lackman's
Jackman's manipulation of her parents' estates, the Department is
entitled to recover from the estate of Lionel Knudson. The language of the estate
recovery statute, while archaic, is not susceptible to Jackman's interpretation and can
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 20
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only be read to permit spousal estate recovery under the circumstances of this case.
The decision beiow should be reversed and the Department's Petition for Allowance of
claim granted.
DATED this 8 day of September," 1997,

v.
u.

COREY C
GHT
W. COREYC
Deputy Att ey General
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56-218

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LAW

section are severable. [1941, ch,
ch. 181, § 14, p. 379; am. 1943, ch, 119, § 1, p.
1974. ch, 233, § 8, p. 1590; am. 1978,
228; am. 1951, ch, 246, § 4, p. 520; am. 1974,
ch, 74, § 1,
I, p. 207; am. 1989, ch, 67, § 2, p.
I, p. 148; am. 1981, ch,
ch. 121, § 1.
107; am. 1995, ch. 214, § 4, p. 742; am. 1996, ch, 50, § 8, p. 147.1
ch, 214 is compiled
Compiler's Dotes. Sections 1613(c) and . Section 3 of S.L. 1995,
1995. ch.
1917fc) and (d) of the Social Security Act, as § 15·5·409a.
referred to in this section, are compiled 8S 42
1996. ch, 50 is compiled as
Section 7 of S.L. 1996,
U.S.C., § 1382b and 1396p, respectively.
§ 56·210.

be
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56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective unt:il
July 1, 1998.] - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with
federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual ~ho was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual'
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or ~f there be no
estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid
paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c. Transfers
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district
court.
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, Or a surviving child who is
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally
U.S.C. 1382c, the amount of any medical assistanee
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C.
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (5.5)
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and
may be paid from the estate.
(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient.
.
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent'
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
assign. of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy iln
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code.
(6) The department may file lien against the property of any estate
subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against real
property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days after the depart
department is notified in writing of the death of the individual for whom medicai

~,

nno
!d
h
:0

Ie

r

d
D

~

(

~
,."

...- ~.

a

~.<~;~~:;.~:

~~"r'I"!I'!'!!!l,"'""'!""!'~-~_

. ·.:~~7:~:J}i.~~r~i~~~~:~· .·

-.-..-.~-..,-,._-~.__ ..,.- .__

_"_ _•._,

_ -.._.

'.

000166

..'.

56-218

-.

:'. :
"

.''
.

assistance was paid under this chapter, file the lien in the same general form
and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3)(a), Idaho Code, in the office of
the recorder of the county in which the property of the estate is located. The
lien shall be recorded, indexed, and extended in the manner provided in
sections 56-218A(3)(a)
56·218A(3)(a) and 56-218A(5), Idaho Code. In order to perfect a
security interest in personal property, the department shall, within ninety'
(90) days after the department is notified in writing of the death of the
individual for whom medical assistance was paid under this chaptE!r, file the
security interest in accordance with chapter 9. title 28, Idaho Cod4~. Failure
to file a lien or a security interest does not affect the validity of clai.ms made
pursuant to this section.
imple(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple
ment this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
hardship waivers for the following circumstances:
(a) The'only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for
other family members; or
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the
deceased individual to public assistance. {I.C., § 56-218, as added
a:dded by
1988.
1988, ch. 49.
49, § 1, p. 73; am. 1994, ch. 329, § 1, p. 1059; am. 1995, ch. 105,
§ 1,p. 336.]
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56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective; July 1,
1998.] - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with 'federal
law medical assistance pursuant to. this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate: or if there be no
estate the estate of
the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged far
for I>uch aid
ofthe
paid. to either or both;
bothj provided, however, that claim for such medical
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the'
the·
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the
death of the surviving spouse, ifany.
if any, and only at a time when the individual
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. ·1382c.
'1382c. Transfers
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an actioriin the district
.
.
court.
' .
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surViving child who is
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally
disabled as defined in 42 tr .S.C, 1382c, the amount ofany
of any m'edical assistance
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55)"
(55f
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and
may be paid from the estate.
estate .

",
,'
.
'

:

Compiler'. Dotes. For this section 8S ef
effective July I, 1998.
1998, see the following section
alao nwnbered § 56-218.
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(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient.
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: .
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to survivor, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code.
(6) The department may file a notice of lien against the property of any
estate subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against
real or personal property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days
after the department is notified in writing of the death of the individual for
whom medical assistance was paid under this chapter, file a notice of lien in
the same general form and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3)
56·218A(3) (a),
Idaho Code, in the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to section
. - 1904, Idaho Code. Failure to file a notice of lien does not affect the
,.....,Idity
'lIlIIII!tldity of claims made pursuant to this section.
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple
implement this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
hardship waivers for the following circumstances:
(a) The only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for
other family members; or
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the
deceased individual to public assistance. [I.C., § 56-218, as added by.
1988, ch. 49, § 1,
I, p. 73; am. 1994, ch.
I, p. 1059; am. 1995, ch, 105;
ch, 329, § 1,
§ 1, p. 336; am. 1997, ch. 205, § 2, p. 607.]

a

Compiler's notes. For this section as ef·
ef
fective until July I, 1998, see the preceding
section also numbered § 56-218.
Section 10 ofS.L. 1997, ch. 205 read: "Not"Not
withstanding the effective dates specified in
section 1 through 9 of this act, noLhing in this
act shall take effect unless the secretary of
state shall certify to the Idaho Code CommisCommis
sion that he has received a sufficient approappro
priation to provide for the development ofthe
technology required to .implement
,implement the previprovi-

sions of this act. If the certification is noL
made by the twenty·first day after Lhe ad
adjournment sine die of the First Regular Ses
Session of the Fifty-fourth Idaho LegislaLure, this
act shall be null and void."
The Secretary ·of
'of State has so certified to
the Idaho Code Commission and thus the
Chapter 205 became effective as prescribed
herein.·
.
Section 1 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 is compiled
as §§ 45-1901 through 45·1910.

56-21
SA. Medical assistance liens during life of recipient. [Effec
[Effec56-2l8A.
tive until July ·1, 1995.]
1998.] - (1) The department may recover and may
impose a lien ag~inst the real property of any individual prior to his death
for medical assistance paid or about to be paid under this chapter on behalf
• an individual:
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(a) Who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for
the mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individual is
required, as a condition of receiving services in such institution undElr
undE!r the
state plan, to spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amotmt of
his income required for personal needs; and
(b) With respect to whom the department has determined, after notice
and opportunity for hearing, that he cannot reasonably be expected to be
discharged from the medical institution and to return home.
(2) No lien may be imposed on the home of an individual under subsE!ction
(1) of this section if any of the following is lawfully residing in such home:
(a) The spouse of such individual;
(b) Such individual's child under age twenty-one (21) years;
(c) Such individual's child who is blind or permanently and totally
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c; or
(d) A sibling of such individual who holds an equity interest in such home
and who was residing in such home for a period of at least one (1) year
institution .
prior to the individual's admission to the medical institution.
(3)(a) In order to perfect the lien, the department shall file in the office of
the recorder of the county in which the real property of the individual is
located a verified statement in writing setting forth the name and last
known address of the individual, the name and address of the official or
agent of the department filing the lien, a brief description of the medical
assistance received by the individual, the amount paid or about to bEl paid
by the department on behalf of the individual, and, if applicable, th,e fact
that the amount of the lien may increase over time. The county recorder
shall record the claim in the real property records of the county where the
claim shall be indexed, as deeds and other conveyances are requir,ed by
law to be indexed.
(b) The department shaH file any lien under this section within ninety
(90) days of the final determination of the department, after hearing if
any, required in subsection (1Xb) of this section, with the exception of
property against which the department is prevented from filing a lien
pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. With respect to the property
described in subsection (2) of this section, the department shall file a lien
within ninety (90) days after the department is notified in writing' that
subsection (2) of this section ceases to apply to the property.
(4) Any lien imposed in accordance with subsection (1) of this section
shall dissolve upon the individual's discharge from the medical institution
and return home.
.
(5) The lien, or any extension thereof, may, within five (5) years frOID the
date of filing for record, be extended by filing for record in the office of the
county recorder a new verified statement setting forth the information
required in subsection (3Xa) of this section, and from the time of filing the
lien shall be extended in such county for five (5),years, unless fully rell~ased
rel.~ased
or otherwise discharged.
(6) No recovery shall be made under this section for medical aSsistance
correctly paid except from such individual's estate as defined in subsElction
subsE!ction
(4) of section 56-218, Idaho Code, and subject to subsections (3), (5) and (6)

....
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:.:::tion 56-218, Idaho Code, or upon sale of the property subject to a lien
may be made only after the death of such individual's surviving spouse,
l.y, and only at a time:
:) When he has no surviving child who is under age twenty-one (21)
;ars, or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42
i.S.C. 1382c; or
» In the case of a lien on an individual's home under subsection (1) of .
lis section, when none of the following is lawfully residing in such home
,ho has lawfully resided in such home on a continuous basis since the
ate of the individual's admission to the medical institution:
0)
(i) A sibling of the individual, who was resid\ng in the individual's home
for a period of at least one (1) year immediately before the. date of the
individual's admission to the medical institution; or
(ii) A son or daughter of the individual, who was residing in the
individual's home for a period of at least two (2) years immediately
before the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution
and who establishes to the satisfaction of the state that he or she
. provided care to such individual which permitted such individual to
reside at home rather than in an institution.
imple7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple
.nt this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
r~c;hip waivers, as provided in section 56.218(7),
56-218(7), Idaho Code, and a
r~c;hip
V" ure for notice and opportunity for hearing on the department's
termination that an individual cannot reasonably be expected to be
;charged from a medical institution and to return home. [I.C., § 56-218A,
added by 1995, ch. 105,' § 2, p. 336.]
~ompUer's Dotes. For this section as ef·
tive July 1,
I, 1998.
1998, see the following section
o numbered § 56-218A.

See. to see. ref. This section is referred to
in § 56-218.

56-218A. Medical assistance liens during life of recipient. [Effec
[Effec56·218A.
ve July 1,
I, 1998.] - (1) The department may recover and may impose a
'n against the real property of any individual prior to his death for medical
.sistance paid or about to be paid under this chapter on behalf of an
dividual:
(a) Who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for
the mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individual is
required, as a condition of receiving services in such institution under the
state plan, to spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount of
his income required for personal needs; and
(b) With respect to whom the department has determined, after notice
and opportunity for hearing, that he cannot reasonably be expected to be
discharged from the medical institution and to return home.
(2) No lien may be imposed on the home of an individual under subsection
) of this section if any of the following is lawfully residing in such home:
(a) The spouse of suc~ individual;
(b) Such individual's child under age twenty-one (21) years;

,.;

.

'.

000170

• ' ....
:,.j'~':":"""~~
•.
- ' .. ..:•.
j'~':":''''''~~

56-218A
56·218A

18

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND WELFARE

(c) Such individual's child who is blind or permanently and totally
disabled as defined in 42 V.S.C. 1382c; or
(d)
(d> A sibling of such individual who holds an equity interest in such home
yl~ar
and who was residing in such home for a period of at least one (1) y,~ar
prior to the individual's admission to the medical institution.
(3)(a) The lien shall be perfected by filing in the office of the secretary of
state a notice of lien pursuant to section 45-1904, Idaho Code. The notice
of lien shall include, in addition to the information required by section
45-1904, Idaho Code, the amount paid or about to be paid by the
department on behalf of the individual, and, if applicable, the fact that the
amount of the lien may increase over time.
·(b) The department shall file any notice of lien under this section within
fina1 determination of the department, after
ninety (90) days 6f the final
hearing if any, required in subsection (1) (b) of this section, with the
exception of property against which the department is prevented from
section.'With respect to the
filing a lien pursuant to subsection (2) of this section'-With
property described in subsection (2) of this section, the department sha.ll
sh3.11
file a notice of lien within ninety (90) days after the department is notifie,d
in writing that subsection (2) of this section ceases to ap!ply to the
property.
property.
. (4) Any lien imposed in accordance with subsection (1) of this section
shall dissolve upon the individual's discharge from the medical imstitution
and return home.
. (5)'
(5)" No recovery shall be made under this section for medical assistance
correctly paid except from such individual's estate as defined in subsection
(4) of section 56-218, Idaho Code, and subject to subsections (3), (5) and (6)
of section 56-218, Idaho Code, or upon sale of the property subject to a lien
and may be made only after the death of such individual's surviving spouse,
if any, and only at a time:
(a) When he has no surviving c\:1ild
c}:lild who is under age twenty-one (21)
years, or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42
V.S.C. 1382c; Or
(b) In the case of a lien on an individual's home under subsection (1)
0) of
this section, when none of the following is lawfully residing in such home
who has lawfully resided in such home on a continuous basis since the
date of the individual's admission to the medical institution:
(i) A sibling of the individual, who was residing in the individual's home
for a period of at least one (1) year immediately before the date of the
. individual's adnlission to the medical institution; or
(ii) A son or 'daughter of the individual, who was residing in the
individual's home for a period of at least two (2) years immediately
before the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution
Elnd who establishes to the satisfaction of the state that he or she
provided care to such individual which' permitted such individual to
resige at home rather than in an institution.
(6) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple
implement this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
hardship waivers, as provided in section 56-218(7), Idaho Code, and a
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procedure for notice and opportunity for hearing on the department's
determination that an individual cannot reasonably be expected to be
discharged from a medical institution and to return home. [I.C., § 56-218A,
as added by 1995, ch. 105, § 2, p. 336; am.1997, ch. 205, § 3, p. 607.1
Compiler'. Dotes. For this section as ef·
ef
fective until July 1,
I, 1998, see the preceding
section also numbered § 56·218A.
56-218A.
Section 10 of S.L. 1997; ch. 205 read: "Not·
"Not
withstanding the effective dates specified in
section 1 through 9 of this act, nothing in this
act shall take effect unless the secretary of
state shall certify to the Idaho Code Commis·
Commis
sion that he has received a sufficient approappro
priation to provide for the development of the
technology required to implement the provi·
provl'

sions of this act. If the certification is not
made by the twenty-first
adtwenty·first day after the ad
journment sine
Ses·
8ine die of the First Regullll' Ses
sion of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, this
act shall be null and void."
The Secretary of State has so certified to
the Idaho Code Commission and thus the
Chapter 205 became effective as prescribed
herein.
Section 4 of S.L. 199~, ch.
th. 205 is compiled
as § 63-3051.
63·3051.

56-223. Public assistance not assignable.
Public assistance
awarded under this act shall not be transferable or assignable, and none of
the money paid or payable under this act shall be subject to execution,
attachment, or other legal process; except that the department may transfer
funds to another public agency in lieu of payments to recipients, said funds
to be transferred by such agency to project sponsors for payment as wages
to said recipients participating in special work projects. [1941, ch. 181, § 23,
p. 379; am. 1969, ch. 30, § 2, p. 51; am. 1997, ch. 30, § 1, p. 54.1
. . , 56-224. Recovery. - The department may recover the amount of any
public assistance obtained by any person who was not entitled thereto. If at
any time during the continuance of assistance, the recipient thereof becomes
possessed of any property or income in excess of the amount stated in the
application, it shall be the duty of the recipient to notify the state
department immediately of the receipt or possession of such property or
income. Any assistance granted after the recipient has come into possession
of such property or income in excess of eligibility standards, may be
recovered by the state department.

.

On the death of a recipient who has received public assistance to which he
was not entitled, or who has received public assistance in an amount greater
than that to which he was entitled, by reason of possession or having come
into possession of resources which he did not disclose to the department, or
which had, or which acquired, a greater value than was disclosed, the total
amount of such assistance paid to such recipient to which he was not
entitled shall be allowed as a preferred claim against the estate of such
recipient. [1941, ch. 181, § 24, p. 379; am. 1951, ch. 246, § 5, p. 520; am..
am ..
1997, ch. 31, § 1,
I, p. 55.]
56-227C. Subpoena power.
OplniODS of Attorney Geoeral. Refusal
OpinioDs
provide records or documents on the
grounds that such records or documents are
disclos~re pursuant to the Idaho
exempt from disc\os~re
Act· does not constitute ·rea"reaPublic Records Act'does
to

sonable
excuse- for failing to
son
able cause or legal excuse"
comply with the Department of Health and
Welfare's administrative subpoena,
subpoena. OAG
95-6.
A document's lack of availability under the
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDIC:U.L

;

17

,'·1 n.

I

~,.

..:;

I

J.

e~ici:"

OF THE STATE OF ID&qO. IN AND FOR ·THE COUNTY OF

LA~~
LA~~

1

In the Matter of the Estate
of:
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON,
,Deceased.
.Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

SP94-0353

MEMORANDUM DECISION

)
)

The State of Idaho, throuqh the Health and Welfare Division,
seeks

to

recover

Knudson from
Knudson.

Medicaid

paYments
payments

made

on

behalf

of

Hildor

the estate of her deceased spouse Lionel Malcolm

This recovery has been initiated by the State's
State I s f iliric:r

OlE'

a Petition for allownce of claim against Lionel Knudson's estate.
The facts are not in dispute. and the parties have exhaustively
briefed the legal issues.
The 1ega1 issue submitted in this matter is whether the stat:~!
stat~!

may recover Medicaid assistance paid onbehalf of'a
of "a pre-deceased
spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse when the pre··
deceasing

spouse,

who

has

received

Medicaid

payments,

dies

poss"essed
possessed of an estate.
In assistance of discussing the issue presented, the Court:
finds
'..'.,

'.'

the
following
..
. - .
.
..facts:
1.

H~+dQ~
H~+dQ~

ang

~~Qn~+ Kn~q~Qn
Kn~q~Qn w~~~ ma~~~~d
~~Qn~~
ma~~~~d pe~s.ons;
pe~s.ons;

2. On S November 1993 Hildor and Lionel executed a MarriagE!
.......
....,..

Settlement Agreement which defined their community property and!

148
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(

~

then

al tered

separate.

the

character

of

those

properties

making

the!m

Hildor received property characterized as separate in a,n

amount of approxinately $1,900.00+:
3. The alteration of the character of the community property
was done to make Hildor eligible for Medicaid:
4. Hildor died on 27 October '1994, and at death had received
public Medicaid benefits in an amount of $41,600.55;
5. Lionel died on 11 November 1994.

His estate was offered

for informal probate on 28 November 1994:
1994;
6. The estate of Hildor was collected by procedures authorized
by I.C. 15-3-1201 on 1 August 1995.

The residue of her estate,

$1,638.03 was tendered to the Department of Health and Welfare as
settlement of monies due under I. C. 56-218 which the Department
rejected as a full and final settlement;
settlement:
7. The Department filed a claim against the estate of Lionel

on 9 January 1995 for the $41, 600.55 paid as medical assistance for
Hildor.

A Petition for Allowance of the claim was filed on 215

December 1995.

On 6 February 1995 the personal

representativ,~
representativ,~

objected to the Petition for Allowance.
8. The estate of Lionel had an Inventory value of $40,798.35.
DISCUSSION
The initial grounds stated by the Objection to the Petition
for Allowance was the State's claim exceeds the authority under
Federal Medicaid statutes, particularly 42 USC 1396p( bl.
b).

From that:

departure point the excellent briefing by both parties addressed
that profoundi ty and also impl icated the more prosaic issue of

thE~

interpretation of the Idaho statute, I.C. 56-218.
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As a

predicate to participation in the

Federal Medicaid

program the applicable Federal Lat-l requires the State enact a plan
for adminstration.
adminstration, execution of the congressional intent, and fc)r
recovery or adjustment of payment assistance.

Some parts of the

Federal enactment are mandatory and some are optional. 42 USC 1396
et. seq.

In the cases of recovery.
recovery, the underlying Federal statu1:e

r42 USC 1396p(b)(4)1 defines "estate" in more broad terms than the
probate definition by al·lowing
al"lowing the State the option of

includin~p
includin~p

..• (A)ny other real and personal property and other
assets in which the individual had any leqal title or
interest at the time of death (to the-extent of such
interest), includinq such assets conveyed to a survivor
heir, or assiqn of the deceased individual throuqh ioint:
tenancy, tenancy in common.
estate.
common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust, or other arrangement.
The state of

Idaho elected to exercise the optional form (If

recovery by enacting I.C.

56-218,

which at I.C.

56-218(
4 )(b)
56-218(4)(b)

replicates the above-cited Federal language.
The personal representative argues the Estate of Budney, 54,1
N.W.2d 245 (Wis.App.1995) is authority for the proposition the
Idaho statutory scheme for recovery is
unpersuasi ve.
I find that authority unpersuasive.

pre-~mpted
pre-~mpted

by Federal

la~"

Likewise, the Estate of Craigr,
Craigr.

624 N.E.2 1003 (N.Y. 1993) is not on point to the present issue a.s
it did not construe a spousal recovery statute.
Based upon the specific statutes above cited or referenced,
and the fact

the Idaho law,

I.C.

56-218(4)(b)

permitted
permi
tted optional Federal statute language,
language.

replicates the
th.e

and there is no

compelling case authority to the contrary, I conclude that I.C. 56
56218 does not

allow for recovery in excess of the authority granted

by 42 USC 1396p, and conclude that the State can recover from the
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estates of

(

(

survivin~
survivin~

spouses under the appropriate factual and

legal predicates.
The more prosaic question to be addressed is whether,
the

facts

of

this

case,

recovery

is

allowed

against

Knudson's estate under the authority of I.C. 56-218.

undE~r
undE~r

LionEll

A critical

fact in this case is that Hildor died possessed of an estate of
approximately

$1,900.00.

It

is

unrefuted

the

estate

WelS
WclS

manipulated by the personal representative in a manner which would
leave a residual after estate expenses and payment of final debt:s
(i.e. no payment of statutory allowances).
I.C. 56-218 provides in part:
Recovery of certain medical assistance. (1) Except where
exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older
when the individual received such assistance may be
recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the
estate of the surviving spouse, 'if
-if any, shall be charged
for such aid paid to either or both; •••
This specific Idaho enactment, optional under Federal law,
law contains
I

the curious phrase, "or. if there be no ,estate'
_estate- the estate of the
surviving
survi
ving spouse. "

The State urges the· definition of estate

include the Federal definition adopted in I.C. 56-218(4).

That

assertion is beyond dispute as the Idaho enactment replicates the
The state then expands'
expands - its

wording of the Federal statute.
argument

to

adopt

the

Federal

definition

of

"other assets"

appearing at 42 USC 1396p(e)(1):
resoect to an individual, include:s
The term "assets", with rescect
all income and resources of the individual and of the
individual's spouse, including any income or resources
which the individual or such individual's spouse does no~t:
receive because of ...
Clearly the Federal law intended an estate to include the

incomt~
incomt~
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(

135 (1990). When a statute is unambigious, it must be interpretl:!d
in accordance with its language, courts must follow it as enacted,
and a reviewing court may not apply rules of construction.
v.
v, Windmeie:r,:.
Windmeie:r.::.

121 I 189, 191 (1991).

~:e
~:e

As this is a matter (:If

significant public policy regarding the recovery of public monies,
and the issues certainly demand the review of a court of record,
this Court adopts a most conservative approach and concludes on the
above facts and law that":
1. Idaho Code 56-218(4) does not adopt the Federal definition
of "asset" appearing at 42 USC 1396p(e)(1);
2. Hildor Knudson had a separate estate of $1,900+ at "the
time of death".

Hildor Knudson had no "legal title or interest" i.n
in

Lionel Knudson's "real and personal property and other assets" as
~

required by I.C. 56-218(4);
3. The language of I. C. 56-218 (1) stating "or if there be nlo
estate" is limiting language requiring an absence of estate on th.e
part of the individual receiving assistance before the estate of
the surviving spouse may be charged.

That conclusion is made with

full recognition of the state's argument that a toothbrush could be
construed as an estate, though de minimus.

The conclusion is

further supported by the statutory provision appearing in I,C.
I.C. 56
56218( 1) detailing the right of the State to set aside transfers
without consideration.

That provision would appear to provide the

State with a legal method of recovering properties transferred to
preserve

estates

cumbersome.

for

nonspousal

heirs,

though

admi ttedly

No such action to set aside the transfer is before thle

Court and no opinion as to the voidabili ty of the transfer is

153
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expressed.

representative is directed to prepare an order
The personal represent~tive
submit sa,me
consistent with these findings and conclusions and to sUbmit
to State's counsel for approval.
So ORDERED this 11th day of "January 1997.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILlNG

;r~"'~;
I do hereby certify that a full, true ;t;··~;
rr;~U,>~~
correct copy of the foregoing was rr;~U>~~
to:,
~
-J./. :
iku'~
~ pcb......,
_
iku' ~pcb,
ilia..¥) ~C&

on this ~l day of

1-

~w
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XWIAGE
AGREEMElf'l'
KWIAGE SETTLEMD'l'
SETTLmmN'l' AGREEME!f'l'

We,

LIONEL KNUDSON and HILDOR KNUDSON,

(COfPY
tOfPY

husband and wife,

hereby enter into the following marriage settlement agreement for
the purpose of changing the character of our community property and
for

the purpose of defining our· mutual

rights

and 1nterests

concerning our property.
1.

Our community property includes the following:

Family residence loc'ated at 331 North Garfield, Moscow, Latah
County, Idaho more particularly described as:
Block I, Lot 6 of Oylear's Addition

1986 Ford Tempo

Two Irrevocable Burial Trusts at Short's Funeral Home in thE!
the!
amount of $5,000.00 each.
West One Account
West One Account
West One Account
First Security
First Security

#
#
#
#
#

0010615402
0100426145
0010070074
0281551186754
0281551186753

Personal property and household effects
2.

We hereby change the character of the above-described

community property to separate property by dividing the value into
two parts as follows:
LIONEL KNUDSON shall have as his sole and separate
property personal pr'operty
property and household effects now in
his possession; the community residence fully described
above; 1986 Ford Tempo; the irrevocable burial trust in

....,.
....... XARRIAGE

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Page

C£RTI FI ED COpy

63

1

of 4

000179

,.

("

095109

his name; all but $1,900 in the following bank accounts
West

One

Account

# 0010615402,

0100426145, West One Account

West

One Account

#

# 0010070074, First Security

# 0281551186754, and First Security # 0281551186753

HILDOR KNUDSON

shail have

as

her

sole and separat1e

property personal property and household effects in her
possession; the irrevocable burial trust in her name, and
$.1,900 from the above cited bank accounts.

3.

We further specif ically agree that the income, rents ..

issues, profits, capital gains, and other earnings or increases on
our separate property as described above and the proceeds from any
disposi
tion thereof constitute the separate property of the person
disposition
owning such property and are not community property.

The forgoin9

also shall apply to all property that may be separately acquired
hereafter by either of us in any manner whatsoever.
4.

serving

This agreement shall not disqualify either of us frODl
and

acting

as

personal

representative,

guardian,

conservator, or trustee of the other I s estate if so appointed by a.
court or if so designated or nominated by the other.
S.

Notwi thstanding the provisions of this Agreement, either

of us shall have the right to transfer or convey to the other any
property or interest therein that lawfully may be conveyed or
transferred during his or her lifetime or by will or otherwise upon.
death, and neither of us intends for this agreement to limit or
Page 2 of 4
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tlJ
restrict in any way the right and power to qive
give to the other or to

receive from the other any such transfer or conveyance.

6.

This

Agreement

shall

be

construed

and

enforced

in

accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho even though one or
hereafter·becomes domiciled in
both of us may now be or hereafter'becomes

anotha~
anotha~

jurisdiction.

7.

If any provision of this Agreement or any right waived or

for· any reason be invalid or unenforceable,
retained by it shall for'

the other portions of this Agreement nevertheless shall continue tlj
full force and effect.
8.

This Agreement shall take effect upon its execution by

both of us.
DATED this

~ day of
&.

iio~() ''L/
l/
JLJ..d.o.u
iio~()
HILDOR KNUDS N by her
HILDOR KNUo~N by her

yuard,ian,
ARA JACKMAN
yuard.ian B
l)O-Lb
evLtc
~~
I

;y:

STATE OF Idah

)

county of Latah
County

}}

)

SSe

-&:..

On this
day of ~ , 1993, before me, a Notary
BARB~~
Public in and for the State of Idaho personally appeared BARB~~
JACKMAN guardian for HILDOR
HILOOR KNUDSON, known to me to be the person
JACKMAN,
whose name is SUbscribed to the forgoing instrument, and
aru~
····~/··";,i
.. ~ .
acknowledged to be that she executed the
me.
....
~~~ .. ";.i•.:::'\~
I

• ·\1\1 13
(lll ..i (J
(J ~~'.;~i:~
•'
.~ -';;'

~~~'"'. ~:..,>i·;~·\
~:>:":;~
~~~.

~
-.
.

-.. I;' -.•• . .' ...'1:.:.

'"I •
'",

.:

.:

• • • ' ".'1'.:.
.-. ~ .. ~
, I.n :.~ ~:-..• '

.. , ;.

Notary Public for I.d:al1~/I.~··-, ;.};:
I.d:aH'~".~··" ':: .... ",:
... · '..
',. ;. ..:
..: r.: : 1 . .':,
Residing at Moscow ...·
;9./.23/93·,\: !:,';
My Commission Expires ;9./.23/93"\:
0 .:

••

rj

!!.

,.
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STATE OF IDAHO
county of Latah

)
)
)

SSe
SS.

W--

On this
day of ~
Public in and or the State of Idaho
JACl<MAN,
JAC1<MAN, holder of LIONEL KNUDSON's
known to me to be the person whose
forgoing instrument, and acknowledged
same.

, ~993, before me, a Notary
BARB~~
personally appeared BARB~~
Durable Power of Attorney,
thl!
name is subscribed to th,!
to be that she executed thl!

Wl.lliam
C. Kirseh;' ':'),
':l'- l~ n "'("'.,' '.. .
WJ.lliam c.
Notary Public f~r ~Idaho.·'
~Idaho.·, _ : .,.
Moscow·!
.·,i/l
;.",,\'~"';
Residing• at:
Moscow'!',i"
;.•
,,,\'~"';
""" \, ...L.
•
.....
""',
My COmInJ.ssJ.on
COmInl.SSl.on .Ex~n.r~~:.,
.Ex~n.r~~:.. ","...'' / ' .'):.
9-23-93
"..:/' .... ;...... \~~ .
"..:/'
_#

".

. . : • • ,"

.. I.
I, \

.

\\.
"

'

-,

""

J~

""f,. '.,
"., 'J :'1.~'~~F·
:'1.~'~~F.·
·IIJ ...·~ l\. .....~··
~ ..
.. ·IIJ...

....
.....

'
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NO. --~~==-::N:o:-----~~=::==N:o::---
AT TliE REQUEST vr ~
DATE 1I HOUIt

~r,)S"'S--'n
~r,)S"'S--'n

\\, \ ~~

~Mlt,"""?

M.

SUSAN PETERSat

LATAH COUNTY RECORDER
fEE $ \s:::;.
\s;;;. .00\>'\1<
.oo\>'\}< BY :;=.... oecc
9:«::.C .(~
,' ....~
~ ......"="'--\
......"="'--\

~\ "<0 ~~~
~
~~'e,~..::>
~O~O~ ~ ~~'~~..::>
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ALAN G. LANCE
ATTORNEY GENERAL

JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHIEF OF HEALTH
AND WELFARE DIVISION
ANN COSHO
Deputy Attorney GeneralGeneral
Health and welfare Division
450 W. State - 10th Floor
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0036
Telephone:
(208) 334-5537

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF

)
)

Case No. SP 94-00353

)

LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON,

)
)
)

Deceased.

CLAD! AGAINST
AGAINS'l' ESTATE
ES'l'ATE
(I.C. § 15-3-804)

)
)

EXEMPT:

I.C. § 31-3212

---------------)
-------------------------)
COMES

NOW

the

State

of

Idaho,

Department

Welfare, by and through its counsel, ANN COSHO,

of

Health

and

Deputy Attorney

General, and hereby makes claim against the above-captioned estate.
This claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover
the amount of medical

assistance paid

on behalf

Knudsen, as set forth at Idaho Code § 56-218.

of Hildor L.

The Claimant has

paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of Hildor L. Knudsen in.
the amount of $41,600.55 as of December 24, 1994.
CLAIM AGAINST
AGAXNST ESTATE - 1

19

To the extent

000183

(

that the Claimant is obligated to make further medical assistancE3
payments, it reserves the right to supplement its claim in

thi~~
thi~~

proceeding.
DATED this

j?

day of January, 1995.

iUJ~'
~
iUJ~'
CO"SHO

ANN

Deputy Attorney General
VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
ss.
County of Ada
Dora L. Morley, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
that II am the Claimant's Estate Recovery Specialist; that I haVE!
read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's estate
and know the contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and
belief, the facts stated therein are true and correct.

,~
c!
d ;17~
:77~
Dora L. Morley
Estate Recovery
I.··..·..""
,"
I.··
..
·
..
""
ti~1oAi ~ before me this &~ day of January
SUESCRIBE~~
January.
Specia!~st
Specia!~st

'...

1995.

•

I/ ~ OT....;
.. ~\
OT....;..
~
£]a =
•
~ A-t \
..
II
i * i _._ J--: 5~U
5~U ..rYl
r YI G
j.J7.. ~
S 'J-a
'Jj{J
C;
Notary Public for .Idaho
c; *" i
-;.
';. ~~"..
\.

11 Ll

l;

-:.O i'
'~ 11
l! OF rn~V' ~

~"
-1l-,............
~"-1l-.,,,
.........-:oi·
,"

i~

I

Residing at:
e,(-:t-a-L
e,<1'IA--L
.
CCQ .•
Corcunission Expi~es:
Expi~es: Cilz.3/2..
q/"2.3/2..cco

r

...

.,~
,,~

'I

"·,,".¢dTIPICATE OF HAILING

THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of'
the foregoing CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE were mailed first class, postage!
prepaid, on the
&~ day of January, 1995, to:

William C. Kirsch
Attorney for the Estate
PO Box 9384
Moscow, ID 83843

CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 2

Latah County Clerk
Magistrate Division
PO Box 8068
MOSCOW,
Moscow, ID 83843-0568

20
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marks complained of by the Company, rere
spondents insist that by such instruction
the court impliedly instructe-d the jury not

and that
that "It
"It must
must
to consider
consider the
the remarks,
remarks, and
to
be presumed that the jury followed and
obeyed" the
the instruction.
instruction, It
It is
is just
just aa little
little
obeyed"
difficult
.to
understand
how
respondents
difficult .to understand how respondents
could be
be: right in both instances.

disMILLER, Justice (concurring and dis
senting) .

"

four specifications
I concur in the first fOllr
presented
in the
the majority
majority opinion,
opinion, but
but dis
dispresented in
sent to the fifth specification reversing the
judgment
for the
the reaSOn
reason that
that the
the asstrted
asstrted
judgment for
inflammatory
and
prejudicial
remarks
of
inflammatory and prejudicial remarks of

respondent's attorney 10
to the jury arc nut
[16] As pointed out by the court in sufficient to warrant a reversal.
Bandoni v. Walston, supra, that:
(dissenting).
BUDGE, Justice (dissenting),
"While a large discretion is allowed an
I cannot concur
attorney in prese~ting
Concur in the opinion as written
prese~ti ng his case, nevertheneverthe
less, where, in doing so, he oversteps the in the above entitled case, therefore dis
disbounds of propriety and fairness which sent.
should characterize his conduct as an officer
of the ~ourt,
~ourt, such conduct, where not cured

'\.

' ).

by a proper instruction [as in the case at
bar], may, if proper and timely objection is
made [as in the instant case], be ground 191
1009
191 P.2d
P.2d 1009
for a new trial or for reversal of the judgjudg
rei. NIELSON et
at al. v.
STATE ex reI.
LINDSTROM.
ment by the reviewing court."
No. 7403.
(17) It appears to us justice win best
be served by granting a new trial. That
Supreme Court or Idaho.
will put the parties, respectively, back in

100tS_
April 1, 1W8.

.'

I:

•

the position they occupied at the time of
I. Paupers <::=:>40
the original trial and give each party a
Under common law, no reco\'ery of
chance to present the case anew to the
court and jury, and, at the same time, will money paid by state for old age assistance
avoid the danger of doing appellant a grave was allowable where payment was not made
by accident,
accident. fraud or mistake.
injustice.
The judgment is reversed and the cause
remanded with directions to grant a new
trial. Costs awarded to appellant.
GIVENS, C.

J" and HYATT,]..
HYATT,]., concur.

2. paupers 03=>40

The grant oi old age benefits under
Public Assistanee
Assistance Law is unconditional as
far as the recipient is concerned and creates
creat(!s
no obligation on part of recipient to repa)'.

,
.I

.'

:

..

...• ~

.

, ",
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STATE v. LINDSTROl\I
Cite ... 63 Idaho !!l!6
2l!6

Laws 1941, c. 181, § 1(m);
I em); Laws 1947, c:.
237.
3. Paupers =€==>3
€ =>3

The granting
granting of
of aid
aid to
to its
its needy
needy aged
aged is
is
The
a well recognized
recognizcd obligation of the state
and is a governmental function tending to
promote the public weI fare.

227

of Idaho and another, against Nels Lind
Lindstrom, executor of the estate of Frans G.
Magnus, deceased. From an order sustain
Sllstaining demurrer and dismissing action without
leave
plaintiff appeals.
appeals.
leave to
to amend,
amend, the
the plaintiff
Reversed with direction.

Robert E. Smylie,
Smj'lie, Atty. Gen., and John
A. Carve~,
Carve~, Jr., J. R. Smead, and Robert B.
Assr. Attys. Gen., for appellants.
The statute authorizing assistance pay- . Holden, Asst.
ments to needy aged persons and reCOVf:l'y
reCOVf:I'y
State laws providing for such recoveries
of such payments
paj'ments out of estates
esrates of needy app.:ar
appear to Qe
QC contemplated by the federal
aged persons is not unconstitutional as givgiv statute.
stat lite. 42 U.S.CA.
V.S.c.A. § 303(b) (2) (B), 53
ing or loaning credit of state. I.CA.
I.c.A. Stat. 1361, (1939).
§ 15·609;
15-609; Laws 1941, c. 131, § I(m);
l(m); Laws
The power of state legislatu
legislatures
res is plenary
1943, c. 119, § 2; Laws 1947, c. 237; So·
So
succession to property by
in the matter of sllcc<!ssion
ct seq., 2(a) (7),
"""'cial Security Act, §§ 1I et
will or inheritance. The right is created
V.S.c.A. §§ 301
3(b) (2), as ameudcd. 42 U.S.c.A.
which may at any time
by the Legislature, \\rhich
et seq., 302, 303(b) (2); Canst. art. 3, §
abolish it. Bankers Trust Company
CompallY v.
19; art. 8, § 2.
V.S. 647, 43 S.Ct. 23.3,
Blodgett, 1922, 260 U.S.
5. Paupers ~43(1)
~43(1)
5.
67 L.Ed. 439; State v. ]\{ollier,
l\{ollier, 1915, 96
The determination of eligibility of appliappli Kan. 514, 152 P. 771, 773, L.R.A.1916C,
cant for old age assistance does 110t de·
de 551; In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 1945, Cal.
Ica\'c all eses App., 161 P.2d 589.
pend on whether applicant will Iea,'c
tate whell he dies. Laws 1941, e. 181, §
Recovery provisions are creatures of
I (m); Laws 1947, c. 237.
statute. As such, they have been generally
l\ULLER,
I\ULLER, J., dissenting.
Slate v. Whitver, 1942, 71 N.D.
upheld. State
664, 3 N. W.2d 457; Hawkins v. Kansas
Social \-VeHare Board, 1938, 148 Kan. 760,
Wel84
P.2d 930; Department of Social Wel
Court, Second
SecOlld JuJu
Appeal from District COllrt,
Cal.App.2d
316,
175
fare
v.
Wingo,
1946,
77
liS
County; A. L.
dicial District; Clearwater Coullty;
P.2d
262.
Morgan, Judge.
4. States

~119
~119

paj"
Action to recover old age assistance P:lYThe Constitution of the State of Idirhn
Idi"hn
ments by the State of Idaho on the relation prohibits the loan of the credit of the stat"
N..
Slate to private individuals or corporations.
of N
.. P. Nielson, State Auditor of the State

t:'\..o·

I
j

,f
Ii

{(-

',.

: I.,.·

,.

!

1:
~.

L·
L'

r
I.:

I ,
I

~

I

:;
i j

I ~

.

I,
i'
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I

'Ii;.
JJ

,

i'
f:
,.

f
.'
"

f

.,
f:,

Const., Art. VITI,
VIlI, sec. 2; Consl.,
Const., Art.
Consl.,
VeIl, sec. 4; Consl.,
Const., Art. XII, sec. 4.
VIlT,

There can be no recovery of money paid
for old age assistance under the common
Jaw. City of Worcester v. Quinn.
Quilln. 30~
law.

The prohibition of these constitutional
provisions is primarily directed against the
combination of
of public
public funds
funds or
or credit
credit with
with
combination
the
capital
of
private
persons,
corporate
or
the capital of private persons, corporate or
' . .
h
h' , d
actIVItIes held
eld pro
Iblte
natural. The
prohibited
Th e activities
have generally
generally involved
involved the
the element
element of
of en
enhave
scheme-so
terprise, or profit-making private scheme'S.
Commissioners of
Atkinson v. Board of CommissiOllers
COUllty, 1910, 18 Idaho 282, 108 P.
Ada County,
L.R.A.,N.5., 412; School District
1046,28 L.R.A.,NS,
No.8 v. Twin Falls County :Mutual Fire InIn

Mass. 276, 23 N.E.2d 463,
~63, 125 A.L.R. 70].

prohibitThe loan of the State's credit is prohibit
At. ed to or in aid of any individual. At
kinson v. Board of COllnty Commissioners,
\08 P. 1046, 28 L.R
..A.,N.S.,
18 Idaho 282, 108
L.RoOA.,N.S.,
412; i\1cDoJlald
i\lcDollald v. Doust, 11 Idaho 14,
I~, 81

sura nee Company, 1917, 30 Idaho 400, 164
surance
P. 1174.

Whitc v. Pioneer
P. 60, 69 L.R.A. 220; White
Bank & T. Co.,
Co" jO Idaho 589,298 P. 933.

The term "loan" in the cited
citcd constitution
constitutional
provisions
has
been
construed
to mean
mean
al provisions has been construed to

applicatio-;;"
The making of payments upon appJicatio-;;"

\Vithouc st:ltutory
\Vithouc
st:ltutory authority
authority there
there can
can be
be
no
recovery
of
money
pnid
for
old
age
no recovery of money pnid for old age as
assi~tance
si~tance or relief. In re Humphries' Will,
125
253.
125 Misc.
Misc. 62,
62, 210
210 N.Y.S.
N.Y.S. 253,

for
for old
old age
age assistance
assistance under
under the
the statutes,
statutes,
aa transaction
transaction which
which creates
creates the
the customary
customary coupled
coupled with
with the
the provisions
provisions for
for repayment
repayment
as to
relation of
of lender
lender and
and borrower.
borrower. Bannock
Bannock and
and restriclions
restrictions as
to transfer
transfer of
of property,
property,
relation
is
contractual
relationship.
Consl. Art.
County
v.
Citizen's
Bank
and
Trust
Comis
contractual
relationship.
Const.
Art.
Coullty v. Citizen's Bank and Trust Com
VIlT,
Sec.
2:
Hawkins
v.
State
of
Kallsas
.
pany,
1933,
53
Idaho
159,
22
P.2d
674.
VIlT,
Sec.
2:
Hawkins
v.
State
of
Kansas,
pany, 1933, 53 Idaho 159, 22 P.2d 674.
Kall. 760, 84 P.
Social 'l-Veliare
\oVeliare Board, 148 Kan.
165 l\Iisc.
Misc.
rc Beuingaso's
Beningaso's Estate,
Estatc, 16j
The above cited constitutional provisions 2d 930; Jn re

actions of the 459,
459, 300
300 N.Y.S.
N.Y.S. 951;
951; In
In re
re Black's
Black's Estate,
Estate,
have been held to be a bar to actiolls
ISO .Misc. 433,269
~33, 269 N.Y.S. 511; In the i\b.ti\b.t
Stat~ and other
othcr political sllbdivisiollS
subdivisiolls ollly 150
Stat~
2~2 App.Di,·. 781, 174
Indepeud- ter of Katie
Katic Long, 242
when faith or credit is pledged. Indepeud
eltt School District NIl. 6 v. Common N.Y.S.427.
School District No. 38, 1942, 64 Idaho 303,
The mere acceptance
131 P.2d 786; Hansen v. Independent ance does not gi"e
gi,-e the
School District No. I, 1939, 61 Idaho 109, reCover
recover the payments.
c;S P.2d 959; School
SchOOl District No.8 v. Twin Will, 125 Misc. 62,210
Falls County Mutual Fire Insurance Com
ComFalJs
pany, supra.

reSamuel F. Swayne, of Orofino, for re
spondent,
spondent.

of old age assistassist
State the right to
Tn re Humphries'
253 .
N.Y.S. 253.

SUTPHEN. District Judge.
SUTPHEN,
The State of IJaho, on relation of its
Anditor and Commissioner
Commissiollcr of the De
DeState Auditor

i
".": I
'.":

000187

STATE \'.

LINDSTRO~I
LINDSTRO~1

Cite oa 68 IdAho ~26

229

panment
partment of Public Assistance, brought this credit of the state shall not, in any manner,
action against the executor of the estate of be given, or loaned to, or in aid of any in
inl\'fagnus, deceased, to recover dividual, asociation, municipality or corpo
Frans G. l\ofagnus,
corpoamounts paid in old-age assistance to decedece ration."
dent during his lifetime and does not inin
'[1]
reco\,'[I] Under the common law no reco\,
volve in the slightest what should be taken
ery or"
o( money paid by the State for old
oldi':lto consideration in the initial a ward of
age assistance was allowable where pay
payold-age assistance; therefore, authorities
ment was not made by accident, fral,ld
fra1,ld or
involving such questions are not in point
mistake. City or" Worcester v. Quinn, 30 I
herein.
Mass. 276, 23 N.E.2d 463, 125 A.L.R. 707.
The complaint, In brief, sets forth: Thlls,
Thns, any right the appellant may ha\'e to
that Frans G. 11agnlls,
11agnus· d.uring
d,uring his lifetime reCO\"l~r
recon~r in this action must be based upon
'-'1de
'-'Ide application for and was granted oldold
_ ; assistance; that commencing in March
......,;
-1943 the Department of Public Assistance
paid him, in monthly installments each

OUr statutes.
.
Pro\'ision, however, for recovery against
agaInst
the estates of recipients has been part of
the law 0 f this State continnously
continllously since

;

month to and including july 1946, the sllm
Sllm
:March 2, 19-U, when Chapter 119 of the
total 0 f $1,651; that Frans G. Magnus diee!
died
19~3 bec:lme
became effecti\'e.
Laws of 19~3
effecti"e. Section 2
testate August
August I,
1946, leaving
leaving an
an estate:
estate: of sllch Act added Section 24-a to the Pubtestate
I, 1946,
of such Act added Section 24-a to the Pub
that respondent
respondent was
was duly
duly appointed
appointed and
and lic Assistance Law of the State and read
that
lic Assistance Law of the State and read
qualified as executor of the estate; that apap
as follows: "Section 24-:1.
24-a. Recovery from
pellant duly filed
tiled claim with the eXeclltor
eXeClltOr
recipients. On the death of any recipient,
for the amount of assistance paid; that the
the total amount of assistance paid. or re~
executor rejected the claim, and this suit
lief granted under this Act shall be allowed
properly ensued as provided by section 1515
as a pre ferred claim against the estate Of
609, 1. C. A. Idaho Trust Co.
Co, v. Miller, 16
stIch
Sl1Ch person and shall be subject only to the
Idaho 308, 102 P. 360.
expense of the last
laSt illness, funeral expenses
The trial court sustained respondent's dede not to exceed $100.00, and expenses of ad
ad-

murrer to the complaint and dismissed the ministration of said estate. No claim shall
accepting respondent's be enforced against any real estate or per
action apparently acceptil1g
perbe SOllal
contention that the alleged transactions besuch'
sonal property of a recipient while such·
tween the State and deceased amounted to real estate is occupied by the recipient, a
a loan and that such a loan is unenforceable surviving spouse, or a dependent, but the
because repugnant to the inhibition concon Statute of Limitations shall not begin to
Con run against such claim so long as the col
tained in Section 2 of Article 8 of the Concolstitution of this State that: "* *
* ** the lection thereof is prohibited, as hereinabove

1

t

r

Ii
lI
I

),
•I
,
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shal1 be made by the 1945, Chap. 109; S.L.1947, Chap. 237) falls
!provided. "Such claim shaH
of
cooperative assist
assist- within the inhibitions of Section 2 of Ar
Ar<county or, in cases
::ance, by the State on behalf of all
aU partici
partici- ticle 8 of the Constitution of the State of
]pants
assistance." Idaho.
)pants contributing to such assistance,"
Chapter 119, 1943 sL
It is insisted an action cannot be main~
reBy an Act (Chapter 237, S.L.194i) the tained against the estate 0 f a deceased re
1947 legislature repealed the above quoted cipient for the recovery of the amount of
thereot enacted the fol
fol- assistance granted such recipient during his
section and in lieu thereo!
Aulowing provision for recovery from estates Ii fetime. Old-age assistance began in Au
of recipients; "Section 24-a. Recovery gust, 1935, by the enactment by Congress of
recip- the Social Security Act, Title I, Chap. 531,
From Estates. On the death of any recip
amouut Act of August 14, 1935, 49 U.S. Stat. at
ient of old-age assistance, the total amount
of assistance paid such recipeint under this Large, p. 620, <12 U.S.CA. § 301 et seq.
De- Section 2 provided for old-age assistance.
act may. in the discretion of the State De
P;1.ragraph (7) of Subdivision (a)-a part
partment, be allowed as a claim against P;,\ragraph
Actthe estate of such person after reasonable of Section 2 of the Social Security Act
funeral expenses, the expenses of the last read: "(7) Provide that, if the State or
illness, and the expenses 0 f administering any of its political subdivisions collects
the estate have been paid. No claim shall from the estate of any recipient of old-age
be imposed against any real estate of the assistance any amount with respect to oldold.
recipient while it is occupied as a home by age assistance furnished him under the
a surviving spouse, or against any personal plan, one-half of the net amount so coHect
col1ectproperty of less that $100.00 in value. The cd shall be promptly paid to the United
certify, to the State States
State Department shall certify.
States...."
Auditor the amount recovered from each

disestate as above provided, and a proper dis
shal1 be made by the State
Slate
tribution thereof shaH
asAuditor in proportion to the amount of as
sistance contributed ~y the state and the
federal government for such assistance."
Chapter 237, 1947 Session Laws.
Thus, in view of the statute, the ques
question before us is whether the granting of
conold-age assistance under the terms and con
ditions of our Public Assistance Law (S.L.
1941, Chap. 181; S.L.t943,
S.L. t943, Chap 119; S.L.

It will bc .,otcd paragraph (7) did not

. make it manc1atory upon a state or any popo
any
litical subdi\'isioll of a state to collect anything whatsoever from the estate of any
pararecipient of old-age assistance. That para
graph simply provided that if a state did
oldcollect from the estate of a recipient of old
oneage assistance, then
thell and in such case, one
half of the net amount collected should be
promptly paid to the United States. Thus,
the state \ViiS left absolutely free to deter
determine whether it would, or would not, col
col-
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lect from the estate of a recipient, but if it
decided to and did collect, then it was made
mandatory that one-half of the net amount
collected should be promptly paid to the
United States.

state from the estate of a deceased recipirecipi
ent of assistance. A most generous thing
for the Congress to do in this: It gives a
state, for instance Idaho, a much larger
amount of money to use in avoiding placing
About four years after the enactment of the aged and needy in poor-houses, by
the Federal Social Security Act; to wit, granting assistance to those owning the
August 10, 1939, the Congress amended it. homes in which they live and enabling them
By the amendment, paragraph (7) above to continue to li\'e in such homes until both
sim- husband and wife have passed On, after
quoted, was omitted; but a provision of sim
cours~, they
th~y no longer require the
ilar import was included in the amendment which; of course,
ConThe
generosity of the Con
use
of
a
home.
in that by paragraph No. (2) of Section 303
ent!
provides
gress
does
not
end
there.
It
also
(b) U.S.c.A. 42, it was and is provided as
That any
any part
part of
of the
the more
more money
money to
to meet
meet the
the requirements
requirements of
of
follows: "Provided,
"Provided, That
follows:
the
needy
and
destitute
who
amount recovaed
recovaed from
from the
the estate
estate of
of aa de
de- the n~edy and destitute who are
are not
not the
the
amount
eeased recipient which is not in excess of owners of homes.
ceased

~

1

"

·1'

~ ~,

I

I,

~!:..
~~ -,I.

t

I,

.Hq:,"
.

r

I

C

I

~

"

.'
"

l'

the amount expended by the State or any
Morgan v. Department of Social Securi
Securipolitical subdivision thereof for the funeral ty, 14 Wash.2d 156, 127 P.2d 686, is eited
cited
expenses of the deceased
deeeased shall not be con
conin support of the contention that a state
sidered as a basis for reduction under
decannot recover from the estate of a de
clause (8)
(B) of this paragraph."
ceased recipient of old-age assistance. It
In other words, by that amendment, the appears the opinion in that case also cov
covCongress still left a state absolutely free ered the companion cases of Laura M.
co11<.:ct from the estate of
0 f a deceased re
to collcct
re- Camfield and William
\Villiam L. Jacobson v. The
provided that any Department of Social Security of the State
cipient if it chose to, but provid~d
part
part of
of the
the amount
amount recovered,
recovered, not
not in
in excess
excess of \l/ashingtol1.
\Vashingtoll. The question was' not prepre
of
funeral ex
of the
the amount
amount expended
expended for
for funeral
ex- sented to the Washington court in the Mor
Morpenses should not be considered as a basis gan
gall case, supra, as to whether the legislature
for reduction under clause (B) of the same of the State of \Vashington could, or could
paragraph.
not, under the Washington Constitution,
The sole purpose of omitting paragraph provide for the collection or recovery of
(7) above quoted, from the amendment of assistance granted a deceased recipient in
1939, was that Congress intended that a his lifetime. That this is true cannot be
state should no longer be required to pay to questioned, because all three at
ot the above
the United States one-half of the net named persons were very much alive, mak
makamount of whatever was recovered by a ing application for and demanding assist
assist-

~.

I
i

f
i.,

'.
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ance under \Vashington's Senior Citizens
Grants Act, which the \Vashington court
passed on,
on.

deprovide for any relief whatever to the de
serving, and needy, and that would be sim
simserving.
ply absurd.

While the humanitarian purpose of our
[3] The granting of aid to its needy
as- aged is a well recognized
Public Assistance Law, which grants as
recogniz~d obligation of the
sistance to the deserving and needy, is not state and is a governmental function tend
tenddirectly attacked, it is, however, indirectly ing to promote the public welfarr.
wclfarr. Ala
Ala~ttacked upon the ground-among others
others- meda County v. Jamsen,
~ttacked
JallSsen, 16 Cal.2d 276,106'
that the law is unconstitutional; because, it P.2d II,
J J, 130 A.L.R. 1141; 41 Am.Jur. 690.
is argued in effect that the transaction by
[4] Thl\s, its character as to all eligible
and through which Frans G. Magnus, now
recipients having been determined to bc
deceased,
deceas~d. was grahted assistance, created
creat~d
private, it follows that
public rather than private.
a debt which amounted to a loan-hence,
grantin)5.of
the grantinj5
of such aid is not within the
repllgnant to the inhibition conlained
contained
was repugnant
recovconstitutional inhibitions unless the recov
proin Sec. 2, Art. 8 of our Constitution pro
abovc quoted made
ery features of the Jaw above
viding that: "The credit of the state shall
thc
Wilthe law subject to such inhibitions. Wil
not, in any manner, be given, or loaned to,
liams
\'. Baldridge, 48 Idaho 618,284 P. 203;
Iiams v.
or in aid of any individual, association, mu
muState v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199,212 P. 771;
nicipality
nicipaJity or corporation."'.
corporation."',
Alameda COllllty
Un
Coullty v. Janssen.
Janssen, s~pra.
s~pra.
Un[2]
[2] The
The grant
grant of
of old-age
old-age benefits
benefits under
under doubtedly the state has the authority to pro
proour
our Public
Public Assistance
Assistance Law
Law appears
appears to
to be
be vide for public assistance for ils
ilS needy
unconditional
as
far
as
the
recipient
is
unconditional as far as the recipient is con
con- aged, and the gO\'eTllmental
gO\'erumelltal nalure of the
cerned. It creates no obligation on his service determines its character as not giv
eerned.
givpart to repay public assistance to which he ing or loaning the credit of the stale. Sup
Supwas lawfully entitled. There are
ar~ no provi
provi- piger v. Enking, 60 Idalio 292, 91 P.2d 362.
sions therein which condition the grant Oil
The law (19.t!
(19';1 S.L., Chap. 181 at Scc.
Sec. I,
ei ther the non-ownership 0 [r property or
Subd.
(m)
defill~s
that:
"(m)
'Ne~dy
aged'
Sllbd,
dcfin~s
'Ne~dy
the ownership of less
Jess than a prescribed
shall
meall
any
persoil
65
years
or
older,
mcal!
pcrSOil
yt:ars
minimum of properly.
whose income and sources of snbsistcnce
subsistence
If respondent is right In his contention
insufl;icicnt to supply him with the com
comare insuA'icient
our Public Assistance Law is unconstitu
unconstituwit~
mon necessities of lire
li£e commellsurate
commensurate wit:t
tional, even though it creates no obligation
his needs and health, ...til ...til .....
til"
on tlie part of any recipient of relief to rere
pay any part of the relief granted, it WOUld,
The statute, in line with modern ideas,
of course, carried to its logical conclusion, makes it possibl~
possible in many cases to avoid
mean the legislature would be powerless to placing the needy aged in inst~tutions and
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contemplatfs the granting of assistance to
contemplates
. those who may own the home in which they

difficult to see how the recovery feature,s
of the Public Assistance Law can be said

live or other property as well as to those
absolutely destitute, if their income and

to be giving or loaning the credit of the
State,
State.

sources
sOllrces of subsistence are not sufficient to
inThe liability of the State is in no way in
meet the statutory standards. UnJer these creased
cr~ased by the presence of these recovery
provisions the recipient of public assistance provisions in the law.
Jaw, The State does not
is not required to liquidate all of his prop
prop- oblig;\te itself to do anything more because
erty. .ofttimes
Ofttimes the recipient continues to of such provi~ions.
provi~ions. However,
Howe\'er, it does re
relive in his own home, which he is able to ceive the b~nefit
benefit of the
th~ provisions in qucsques
preserve
presfrve for use during his Ii fetime
fctime and for tion and should.
shoUld. it seems, be classed
c1asSfd a recip
recipthe
thf use of his widow during her lifetime ient
icnt of crcJit rather than the giver thereof.
after his dfcease,
decease. This method of caring
for the needy
necdy aged has proven far superior
in many cases to placing the needy aged in
institutions.
institutions, It has not only proven to be
marl'
morl' cflicit:nt
cfficit:nt and economical from the
State's standpoint, but more humanitarian,

......
....... pro\'jding
pro\,jding the recipient
recipi~nt with a more normal
existence. frl'eing him of much of the stig
stigma and many
of
the
hardships
and
dis
man),
disfcatures of Ii fe in
ill an institution.
agreeable features
reCO\'fry provisions, supra,
[5] These recovery
ha ve nothing to do with the determination
assistof the eligibility of any applicant for assist
,me\.",
h<: will or will not leave all
'me.... \Vhether he
estate When he dies makes not one iota of
0 f
Thc benefit received by the re
redifference. The
morc
cipient who leaves an estate is no more
happfns to
than that of the recipient who happens
none,
have none.
In thl' light of our determination that the
granting of aid to the needy aged by the
State does not fall within the inhibitions 0 f
the constitution against giving or loaning
indi\'idual, it is
the credit of the State to an indi\'iduaJ,

....

....

.
r·

The conAict of interest here is not between
necdy aged.
aged, It is between
the State and its needy
the State and the heirs, next of kin or other
distributees of the estates of the deceased
distribntees
reCIpIents, "The right to dispose of one's
onc's
reCIpIents.

r'

f~

t

propaty by will, and thc right to have it
disposed of
0 f by the law, after
a fter decease, is
created by statute, and there
therefore
fore the state
exermay impose sllch conditions upon the exer
cise of this right as it may determine."
Trust Company \', Blodgett,
Blodgctt, 260
Bankrrs' TruSt
S.CI. 233, 234, 67 L.Ed. 439,
U.S. 647, 43 S.Ct.
rd., % Conn. 361, 114 A. 104,
quoting Id.,
thal: "To
howcv<:r, that:
Respondent says, however,
sustain the repayment of old age assistance
legislatllre plenary power to regll
regllby virtue legislatllrc

,I
L
L
f:

I
I\

i't'
I'I

latl! descent and inh('ritance,
late
inh~ritance. is to violate
Section 19 of article 3, of the Constitution
of the State of Idaho because this (is)
class legislation, placing burdens on the

,i
I

1
•
I

aged-needy not imposed upon other rccip
recipaged-ncedy
ients from the State."

!

Thf
reThe section of the constitution last re

!

1

t·

fcrred to prohibits the legislature from
ferred

:'

.
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special laws in certain enu
enupassing local or special1aws
merated cases, among which is listed:
"a fleeting estates of deceased persons
de* * It" and "changing the law of de
scent or succession."

it must clearly appear to be so." Bannock
County v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 53
Idaho 159, at page 176, 22 P.2d 674, 680.
The case, therefore, will be reversed and
respondthe trial court directed to overrule respond
ent's demurrer to
t~ the complaint. COSts to
appellant.

proThe repayment of old-age assistance pro
apvision of our Public Assistance Law ap
pears to be gen~ral
gen~ral rather than special in
GIVENS, C.
HOLDEN, J.,
J.. and 1\1c
1\1cits terms, as it operates upon all the aged
DOUGALL,
D.
J.,
COI\C\Ir.
DOUGALL, D. J., cOllcllr.
needy and their estates in like situations.

r,J-,

"A statute is general if its terms apply
(dissenting).
MILLER, Justice (dissenting),
to, and its provisions operate upon, all per
perOn August 14, 1935, the 74th Congress,
sons' and subject-matters in like situation."
SecuriSess. I, Ch. 531, enacted the Social Securi
Jones v. Power County, 27 Idaho 656, 150
ISO
ty Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. Title I
P. 35, 37; In re Bottjer, 45 Idaho 168, 260
ther.:of provided, "Grants To States For
P. 1095.
Assista!lce." When used in Title
Old-Age AsS;Sta!lce."
"A special Jaw applies only to an individ
individ- I of said Act the term of old-age assistance
ind"ividuals.
ual or number of individuals out of aa. single means money payments to aged ind'ividuals.
appropriaclass similarly situated and affected, or to Section I of said Title made an appropria
sim- tion and the Slims
a special locality. A law is not special sim
sums appropriated and made
appli available under said Act were to be used in
ply because it may have only a local application or apply only
ollly to a special class, if in matching payments with states which ~a'd
sllbmitted pl,lIls to be approved by the So
Sofact it does apply to all such classes and submitted
al! similar localities and to all belonging to cial
cia I Security Board as established by Tille
Title
all
anc! under state plan for
the specified class to which the law is made VII of the Act and
old-age
assistan"ce.
Boa rei of County
assistan'ce.
applicable.
Mix v. Boarcl
Commr's, etc., 18 Idaho 695, 70S, 112 P.
215, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 534; Hettinger v.
Good Road District No.1,
No, 1, 19 Idaho 313,
In
re
Crane, 27 Idaho 671,
318, 113 P. 72\;
721;
at page 690, 151
lSI P. 1006, L.R.A.1918A, 942."
Y. Wright, 60 Idaho 394, at
Ada County v.
page 403, 92 P.2d 134, 138.

Section 2 provides for state old-age as
assistance and subsection (a) thereof is as
follows:
o.ld-age as
asfOllows: "(a) A State plan for o.1d-age
sistanc\! must (I)
(1) provide that it shall be
sistance
ill effect in all political Sllbdivisiol15
sllbdivisiol1s of the
jf administered by them, be
State, and, if
mandatory upon
upon them;
them; •• •• ."
...
mandatory

"The rule is that before a legislative en
en.actment
wil! be held to be unconstitutional,
actment will

Other provisions of subsection (a) arc
cnumcrated.
ellumera
ted.

..

----------------~-_
~
--------------------------------~-----".~
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follows: ner that assistance was no longer neces
neeesParagraph (i) thereof is as follows;
.. (7) provide that, if the State or any of its sary.
political subdivisions collects from the eses
The complaint in this case shows that it
tate a f any recipient. a0 f old-age assistance is an action in debt. It also shows that the
any amount with respcct to old-age assist
assist- deceased (Frans G. Magnus) was paid the
an)'
ance furnished him LInder
under the plan, one-half aggregate sum of $1,651 for old-age assist
assistof the net amount so collected shall be ance, and that no part of the said sum has
p'romptly paid to the United States."
been repaid to the state, and that there is
mani- now due and owing the state of Idaho the
From section 2, subsection (a) it mani
old- said sum of $1,651.
festly appears that the State plan for old
mLlst con
conage assistance is mandatory and must
requiremeilts in or
ortain certain prescribed requiremcilts
der to entitle a state to "Grants to States
for Old-Age Assistance under the Social
\Ye particularly invite at
atSecurity Act." \Ve
(7), which authorized
tention to paragraph (i),

'iWU
'IWO state to .:ullcct
cullect from the estate of a recip
recipient of old-age assistance any and all
amounts paid under the plan, In other
words, any right :mcl authority of a state
to collect from the estate
estat~ of a recipient of
old·age assistance must come from and
old-age

r
~;

.

"

.

V:

h·

I

.,

1;

The statutory provision under which the
action was commenced and is sOllght
sought to be
24-a_
maintained is as follows: "Section 24-a.
Recovery From Estates. On the death of
any recipient 0 f old-age assistance, the total
amount of assistance paid such recipient
under this act may, in the discretion of the
State Department, be allowed as a claim
eSlat~ of such person after rea
reaagainst the estate
sonable funeral expenses, the expenses of
thc last
I:1.st illness, and the expenses
adminthe
expens~s of admin
istering the estate have been paid."

I:.
~,
~

,:

I.

>

,I.

..'

.'
.'",'

i

parathrollgh the provisions contained in para

In the caSe of State ex reI. Dean v.
all- TIrandjord et at,
graph (i) aforesaid, anJ. without such au
aI., 108 Mont. 447, 92 P2U
P.2t1
thority a state is not entitletl
entitleu to file a "alit!
valit! 273, 279, being a mandamus procecdil)g
proceedi!)g 10
claim against the estate of a deceased
deceas..:d recip
recip- compel payment
p:lyment of full amount of monthly
am')tl11t old-age assistance, it is said: "\Vhcn the
ient or maintain an action for any am,)\lnt
subj eet of relief for the aged indi
wh;ltsocver, irrespecti"e of the manncr
nlanncr in whole subject
indiwh:ltsoever,
consider~tion, when the
as- gent is taken imo consideration,
which an estate of a recipient of old-age as
aud state legislation is
sistance was acquired, that is, whether the history of federal alld
recipient had co\'erc:d up property or in
in- given proper effect.
effect, when the national
come at the time of making application for plans and the subsequently enacted state
assistance, or after being awarded assist
assist- plans of the different states are understood,
in- it would seem that none of the state plans,
ance he had come into property and in
come which he did not report and which including our own, were ever devised to
sufficient to provide him in snch
stich man
man- stand or operate without the cooperation
was sufficient.

','

"

~;

I'

t
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1\,i
I .
1:
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L
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of the federal government. [Authority J.
If this be true, and we think that it is be
beyond question the outstanding theory of the
whole matter, then it is obvious that our
law must be construed. /101 as a/l ;/,d"pe/ld;/Id"pe/ld
ent Act, but in COlljlmcliOIl
Ihc federCOlljunction with thc
feder
ll 
al ACI, Ihal is, Ihe 1'W'o
adminIv.lO Aels mllst
P11llst be admi
lslc,,£,d
togdls£"r as a ullified code (If lows
lslcr£'d 10gdll£"r
cll<lclcd by emlgress
COtlgress and JlI':
111': stal.:
stat.: l"gislal,'gisla
11,,,e
Illre for l1Ie
Ille COlllplele
complele Gild
and COlllp"cJzellsi~lc
co",prcllells;~lc
cOlllrol
cOlilrol of thc ST/bj,·cl."
STlbj"cl," (Emphasis ours.)
We have indicated that authority for any
acti
vity by a state incident
activity
incidellt to reCO\'ery
recovery or
the collection of payments from the estate
of a deceased recipient was embodied in sec
section 2 of Title I of the Social Security Act
as originally enacted. Section 2, of the
Act, was subsequently designated as
original Acr,
Section 302, and the provision contained in
paragraph (7) of section 2, as originally
enacted, was repealed and in the case of
Morgan v. Department of Social Security,
14 Wash.2d 156, 127 P.2d 686, 693, it is said:
.. It is evident that there is a conAict hetwee!1
FeJeral act and those
the provisions of the Feueral
state statute. In the portion of the
of the slate
thc
quoted is found the fol
Federal act above quotcd
folold.age as
lowing: '(a) A State plan for old-age
asSiStiUlce must .. .. .. (7) effectivc July
sistance
I, 1941, provide that the State agency shall,
need, take into consideration
in determining nced,
income and rcsourccs
resources of an in
any other incomc
indiviuual claiming old-age assistance.'
assistance.'''"
divillual
Accordingly, any fonner
former provision that a
Acc;ordingly,
state or its political subdivisions might col
col"frofT! the estate of a recipient of oldlect .frofT!
old-.

authoriz~d b::
age assistance IS no longer authoriz~d
and; which is tb,
the Social Security Act, anJ;
audio:
oilly source of authority of states and/o:

their political subdi"isions, any claim of the
state against the estate of Frans G. i\l:lg.
IIUS, deceased, or the commencement of an
nus,

-

againsL Nels Lindstrom, the
rhe exeeu··
action against
tor of his estate, is a nullity, and cannot be
sanctioncd,
sanctioned.

atIn support of the statement that any at
recovery is a nullity because unau
unautempted rccovcry
Lhe Federal act, we here men
menthorized by the
tion that there is also, another reaSOn why
110

recovery :s permissible and that is that

the actioll was a direct action addressed to
the original rather th:ln
th:lll the appellate ju
jurisdiction
risdictioll of the court. Thus, \\"e
II'e arc con
COIlfrontcd
fronted with tll'O propositions, (I)'
(1)' that no
recovery can bc
be h:ld for the reaSOn that
there is no authorization therefor by the
Federal act, and (2) that the court had no
jurisdiction in that the only right the
thc court
had in the premises was undcr and through
its appellatc jurisdiction.
In the case of Bowen v. Department of
Social Security, 14 \Vash.2J 148, 12i P.2d
Pold
682, 684, it is said:
"I\t thc
the time the constitution [State] was
adopted, civil procedure
proce-dure was gOl'emed by
the practice act of 1881. Code
Codc of 1881, p.
35 Section 1,
I, chapter 1,
I, prOl'ided
prOl·ided that:
..
'The common law of England .. .. *
(Lc'A.
laws of
rule of

,.
/.

iO-116) and the organic :tet
:let aud
alld

\Vashington Territory shall be tlte
the
\"lashington
COlirtS of this
decision in all the courts

',.
.1

000195

.

i' .
'"

•••"'.'::
EO

";.'::

..

.'J;'
.',;,

~

.

I
I

STA
TE \'. L1NDSTRO:'>[
STATE
L1NDSTRO:,>[
Cite
Cit" ... 08 Idaho 2~6
226

237"

Territory.' And § 2 provides that: 'There arising before administrative bodies are In
s~all
s~alJ be ill
iu this Territllry hereafter but one no sense civil actions as they were under
underform of action [Le.A.
[I.e.A. 5-101] for the enen stood at common law.
forcement or protection of pri\'ate rights
"Colonel O. R. McGuire, a member of the
and the redress of private wrongs, which
American Bar Association's special com
comshall be called a 6z:il actio/l.' * * *
mittee on administrative
administrativc law, in an article
. "It hardly requires argl1ment
argument to demondemon published in 26 Georgetown Law Journ:.I,
J ourn:.I,
strate that the court proceedings provided 574, 589, says: '. * * administrative
for in § 9 of chapter 1,
I, Laws of 1941, the "law
hw is a separate and distinct branch of the
senior citizens grants act, do not come withwith law, It is not common Jaw,
law, equity, or ad
adin these provisions of thc practice act of miralty law * • .'"
Thc cO!lrl
cOllrl proccdillgs f'rovided
provided for
1881. The
The case of i\lorgan v. Department of
in that (Ict
oct (Ire 1I0t cOllllllellced il~ allY
any cOllrl.
cOI/rt.
Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 156, 127 P.2d
IW'··f Ilrcir
TIrL')'
TI'L')' 11<1'··f
tlrcir illceplioll
illceptioll ill lire
tlrc departllleni
departlJlcnt
686, 692, 70S deals extensively with Title I
.wciol sl'Cllri/)"
sallrity, lind find Ihcir
their 7t'ay
7('ay 10
to Ihe
the
of .wC;(Il
oi the Social Security Act, and the adoption
the
('ollrts Ihrougiz
through ,1ppcal-1I01
11ppcal-llot by !('ay of Ihe
('ollrls
of the plan submitted b)'
by the state of Wash
WashiSSIlGIICC of Sll1JtlllOlIS.
Sll11t11IOIIS.
iSSIIGIICC
[Emphasis ours.]
ington Ihrough
through the pro\'isions of initiati ve
"further than that, the functions now exex 141, :1.nd
require:l.ud in accordance with the rcquire
erciseJ by administrativc bodies under 1eg
leg- ments of the act and the approval of the
isl:lti,·c
is1:lti,'c authority were practically unknown Social Security Board as provided il}
iQ Sec
Secto Amcrcian
Amcrciau jurisprudence at the time our tion 302 of the Act. Contained therein' it
constitlllion
constitution was adopted; and, so far as we is said:
can ascerla
ascerta in, they were wholly unknown
"A transcript of the minutes
minlltes of the meet
meetto ollr
Ol\r territorial jurisprudence. To say
ing of the federal social seCltrity
secltrity board
boarel at
that court proceedings arising out of the exex
which illitiative 141 was cousidered,
considered, con
conercise of such administrative functions are
tains the following:
civil actions in contemplation of the limitalimita
.. 'Section Three, suhsections (g) and
tion On this court's jurisdiction, contained
violaIhis initiati\'e
iniliali\'e measure are in viola
in
ill § 4, art. IV, of the constitution, would (h), of this
make that provision
SecuprOVISIOn 'e:'(press
'e:<press purposes tion of the prO\'isions of the Social Secu
which were never within the minds of the rity Act, which
Jllly 1,
whieh became effective, JlIly
I,
disrepeople in agreeing to it.' People v. HardHard 1941, in that the state agency may disre
ing, supra [53 Ivlich. 481, 19 N.W. ISS]. gard certain "income and resources" in de
deWhat pertinent anLhorilies
anthorities there are on the termining whether an applicant is eligible
subject lend support to thc view that court for old-age assistance; and may also be in
present I)' effective provisions
proceedings ,flowing from controversies violation of presently

I

"

~
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<...... .;; to allow recipients certain income and
.sources, and independent of Grants-InGrants-In
Aid. which was not provided for in Title I
)f the Social Security Act, and that such
leemingly inconsequential provisions
provIsIOns as
:ontained in subparagraphs (g) and (h)
:ue
are in violation of the Social Security Act,
closely knit adherence
due evidently to the Closely
coopcrati\'e legislative effort of state
to the coop<:rati\"e
and national governments in carrying out a
public purpose common to both. I f the
hoard lleld that the pro\'isions contained
al
in subparagraphs (g) and (h) which alal
lowed certain income and resources not alA.:t to be disdis
lowed by the Social Security Act
regarded in determining the amount of asas
sistance to be awarded a recipient then
there is no need to speculate as to what
.-said board would hold 011
on the question of
.-aid
the validity of the state of Idaho to file a
preferred claim against the estate of Frans
G. Magnus, deceased, or to institute a suit
in the District Court against his executor
eXecutor
under the provisions of section 24-a, supra,
law
for the full amount of Grants-In-Aid lawfully paid Magnus as a recipient of old-age
de
aSSistance, instead of handling it as a departmental matter in accordance with law,
or that the State might assume that any
such provision was legal since paragraph
(7) providing for reco\'ery as contained in
-the original Social Security Act had not
been Ii fted therefrom and is still contained

239

recognized obligation of the state and is a
govt:rnmemal function tending to promote
the public weliare." In support of such
statement we are cited te the case,
case. of Ala
Alameda County v. Janssen, 16 Cal.2d
Ca1.2d 276, 106
P.2d II, 130 A.L.R. 1141; 41 Am.Jur. 690.
Said case
legisla.
caSe deals with an Act of the legisla
ture of California of 1929, providing finan
finan-

I

. ,-

I\

.j'

cial assistance to needy aged who met cer
certain requi remenlS, and whose property did
not exceed specified values. There were no
matching funds available or involved. It
is of no assistance in determining whether
a state may coUect
col.lect any or all of the amounts
paid a recipient of old-age assistance.

..,

"'.

,,'

The majority opinion treats the Public
Assistance Act as the only legislation in-'
L aw"~
volved, and that Section 24-a, Session Law.~
1947, as the sole and only measure of deter-I
milling the right of the State to reCOver any
payments made to recipients of old-age as
assistance. Said opinion does not take into
account that payments of old-age assistance'
is a cooperative function and that without
such cooperation the State would be power
powerless to act.

BowclI v. Department of
In the case of Bowell
Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 148,
148. 127 P.2d
682, a proceeding wherein thc
the respondent
Bowen made a d.:mand upon the Director
of the Department of Social Security of
the State of \Vashington, to increase his
award of $34 a month to $40 a mQnth
month and
therein.
demanded "a fair hearing" under the pro
proopinion states that, "The visions of section 8, p. 7, of the act, which
The majority oplnlon
granting of aid to its ncedy aged is a well provided that said hearing should be had

.....,
'

c
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not more than 30 days after
a fter the receipt of visions of the Social Security Act and not
notice. More than 30 d:lys having elapsed in accordance with the state Act allowing
Bowen gave notice of appeal to the superior income and resourCeS in addition to the

!,.,.
~

240

.

court of Grays Harbor county. A motion
to quash the notice
nOlice of appeal was interposed
by the department and the Supreme Court
in passing upon the matters involved said:
le:lst, that it is composed
"To the extent, at le:lst.
of 'federal matching funds' the fund from

p:lyment of sums for old-age assistance,
payment
fo.· the purpose of
but more particularly fOI'
emphasizing a matter heretofore pointed
out, that is, that any controversy between
a recipient and the department of social
insecurity must be determined in the first in
stance in the department and find its way
to the courts only through appeal and not
by way of issuance of a summons. In this
department hau
had deducted ~Il
~11 from
caSe the uepartment

which 'Senior Citizens Grants' are paid is
essentially a trust fund, for the proper ex
expenditure of which the state department 0off
social security is responsible to the federal
government."
each of the recipients because

0

f home

: The fact that 24-a, Laws of 1947, authorownership, combined
combined Jiving
living and
and the
the use
use of
of
author ownership,
water
without
payment.
The
recipients
izes a recovery of all amounts, without
reservation, theretofore
thereto fore paid recipients 0off sought a hearing before the Pierce County
'old-age assistance, it is apparent that the \Ve!f:lre Department which recommendeu
recommended
'payment of assistance to recipients, which

d:sthe deduction and the recipients being l!:s

may subsequently be recovered, must be
Otherwise there
::characterized
characterized as a loan, otherwise
could be no provision for .recovery, and
under those
those conditions,
conditions, of
of course,
course, would
would
under
be offensive to Section 2 of Article 8 0 f
the Constitution
Constitution which
which inhibits
inhibits the
the loaning
loaning
the
of the credit of the state to any individual.

S:ltisfied with the amounts of grants, rec.
rec.-

In the case of Burguorf et al. v. DepartDepart
ment of Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 209,
ques
127 P.2d i09, practically the same quesarc involved as in the case of MorMor
tions are
gan v. Department .of Social Security. I
pur
quote therefrom, not so much for the purreci
pose of showing that grants-in-aid to reci-

\Velfare
Dep:lrtommended by the County Wei
fare Depa.rt
ment, requested a fair hearing thereon
before
the director
director of
of the
the state
state department.
department.
be
fore the
The hearings were
Were had, and therea fter the
director approved
approved the
the recommenuations
recommendations o'f
o'f
director
the Pierce county
coullty weI
wei fare department, and
aW:lnled e:lch applicant a grant in the sum
awarded
of $29 each month. "The recipients, being
0 f the opinion tha.t
that they were each entitled ._
of
to a grant in a greater amount, appealed - :...,;.:....-'I~:§
supefrom the departmental orders to the supe
rior court for Pierce county. A fter a
departhearing, .the trial court reversed the depart

As mental orders, and remanded the cases to
pients unuer the Washington Public As141, the department, with instructions that each
sistance Act, as embodied in initiative }41,
pro grant should be increased,
must be made in accordance with the proincreased. and payment

 ------ ._------
-
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thereof in the increased amount be made
~,19~O.
retroactive to date from December ~,
19~0.

IdaI1D !:s

partmcnt, 110 nc\\I'
ha\'ing
partment,
ne\1I' evidence ha
\'ing been
oITered
party,"
olTered by either party."

From
From these
these judKmel1ts
jud):,mel1ts the
the department
department of
of
The controversy
controversy grew
gT('W out
Ollt of
of the
the fact
fact
The
social securitr
social
sccurity has
has appealed.
appealed. The
The cases
cascs that
that each
each reeipiellt
recipient sought
sO\l~ht aa g'rant
oi
:s~O
g'rant oi ;S40
han:
hl.'aring before
han: been
been consolidated
consolidated for
for hearing
beforc and
and thcre
was
dedllcted
from
said
amount
therl.' was deducted from said amOUllt
this court."
becallse of home ownership, and $3 be
be$i because

caus ... of comhined
comhin.:d li\·ill~.
li\·ill~.
The ju<1:!l11ents
jutl)!!11ents ill the cases at
a[ bar were caus...
rc\"erseu Wilh
with instruclions
instructions to enter jud~
j\ld~
re\'erseu
Further qllotin):,
lJuolinK from Halsell et al. v.
ments affirmin~
affirmiJl~ Ihe orders 0 f the depart
departmellts
Department of Social Security, supra:
J)cparlment
ment.
con". • • III accordance with the con
a!. v. Depan
DepartIn the case of Halsell ct al.
court entered
entereu its de
dechlsions of law,
Jaw, Ihe
the coun
ml'llt of Social Security.
Security, I~ Wash2d i09,
ml'nt
remandill~ the proceeding to the de
deCree rt:mandill~
127 P.2d il I, something 0 f the same prop
proppartment, with directions
tlirections to revise the
osition
cOlltaineu in the case of Burg
Burgosilion as cOIHaineu
awards
awarus b)'
by eliminating
diminating- therefrom the tie
ucdorf v. Department of Social Security,
uuctions allo\'e referred to. From this de
ue,...,. supra,
supra. was up for Ul.'tcrmination.
u.:termination. The
cree the tlcpartmellt
ucpartment of social security of
Gra)'s
count}' welfare uepartment
Grays Harbor county
ucparlment
the Slate
\\'ashilll,"ton has appealed
state of Washilll,'1on
appealeu 10
to
recommemkd
rccommemkd that a grant be made
maue to 1\lr.
l\Ir.
this court,"
court."
Halsell of $30 per month, anu that a simisimi
"The trial court was
\\'as evidentl}'
evidently of the
lar grant be made in favor of ~(rs,
~(rs. Hal
HalO(lllllon
that
the
del!llctions
a!Jo\'e
opinion
delhtctions
aho\'e rcferretl
referreu
sell. "The recipients.
recipients, being uissatistieu

...

with the
the recommend.tlion
recommend.tlion of
of the
county
with
the county
\\'el fare uepartmenl. relJuesteu
re!)lIesteu a fair hC:lr.
he:lring bcfon: the director of the uepartment,
which hearin!:
hearing WaS
was granted and the testi
testi-

..

to,
made by
to, maue
by the
the director,
director, were
were not
not in
in ac
accordance with the pro\'isions of initiati\'c
initiati\'e

*. *

HI. • • •
"We ha\'c
ha\'e <Ietermilled this question con
con-

mOllY reduced to writing.
Based upon
the recon.!
reconl so madl.',
made, the director rendered

trary to respondents'
rcsponuents' contention. As stated

his ueeision June 19, 19~1, affirming the
th~
ac:ion of tbl:
till! count)'
county wd fare
farc department,
anu aawaruill):'
wardiUK :la grant to each recipient in

~lorgan
~!org:ln et
ct al. v. Department of Social
Security, (I~
[1~ Wash..2t1
Wash..2u 13f)], 12i P.2d
P,2u 686,

the amount of thirty dollars
uolJars per month.
month,
Feeling aggrieved
aggri~ved by the decision of the

own terms muSt bc
be construed in connection
with the F
edera! statute, and that certain
Federal

uirector, the recipients appealed to the
superior court, Where
where the mattl:r
mailer W:lS
was

harmony with the Federal
Feueral laws and
anu must

hearcJ
heard upon the record made before the deG.~ 1u,\
lu,\ lIu-lli
uu-lli

in our
ollr opinion in the eOl1solidated
consolidated cases of

we arc eonvincetl
convinced that initiati\'e 141
I~I by its

provisions of the state statute arc not in

uisregardeu."
be disregarded."

[
I,

I·I.

~
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reversThe judgment appealed from was revers
afed with instructions to enter judgment af
firming the order of the department.
In Vol. 42. Am.Jur., p. 698, sec. 254:

grant an injunction against rates alleged to
be unreasonable or discriminatory. The
doctrine is applied in the face of statutes
which expressly purport not to abridge or
alter existing remedies on the ground that
such a provision cannot be construed to
continue rights which would be absolutely
inconsistent with the statute:' (Innumer
(Innumerable aUthorities are cited in support of the
foregoing doctrine.)

"The Federal courts have established
th~ 'primary
jurisdiction doctrine: developed in cases
construing the Interstate Commerce Act
[49 U.S.C.A. § 1I et seq.], but given general
application to Federal administrative bodies
In
other than
than the
the Interstate
Interstate Commerce
Commerce Com
ComIn support
support of
of the
the doctrine
doctrine that
that an
an action
action
other
district court be
bemay not be instituted in a distriCt
mission. and applied by the Federal courts
mission,
adcause of a controversy arising before an ad
in relation to state administrative bodies.
ministrative department, we cite the case
[\\"oodrieh v. Northern Pac. R. Co.; 8 Cir.,
Pet~rson v. Livestock Commission,
of Pet~rson
71 F.2d 732, 97 A.L.R. 401.]
il,(ont., 181 P.2d 152, 157, wherein it is
i\-(ont.,
"The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is held:
that the courts cannot or will not determine
"It is generally held that statute wh ich
a controversy involving a question which
attempts to place the court in the place of
adminisis within the jurisdiction of an adminis
a commission or board to try a matter anew
tratiye tribunal prior to the decision of as an administratiYe
administrative body is unconstitution
unconstitutionthat question by the administrative tribunal, al as a delegation to the judiciary of non
non-

a set of principles known as

It

t·

.1

~

i

J'

J .

!

nature of the question and of the inquiry
and the action required for its solution.
The courts will not take jurisdiction even
betemporarily, pending an investigation be
fore the administrative
administratiye tribunal, so as to

,

,
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where the question demands the exercise of jUdicial powers. A few of the many cases
sound administrative discretion requiring so holding are the following: Steenerson
ser- v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 69 Minn. 353,
the special knowledge, experience and ser
administrativ~ tribunal to de
de- 72 N.W. 713; State v. Great Northern Ry.
vices of the administrativ~
termine technical and intricate matters Co., 130 Minn. 57, 153 N.W.247, Ann.Cas.
es- 191iB,
1917B, 1201; In re Hunstiger, 130 Minn.
of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is es
47~, 153 N. W. 869; State ex rei. Dybdal v.
sential to comply with the purposes of the 47~,
regulatory statute administered. The prin
prin- State Securities Comm., 145 Minn. 221, 176
Regisciple is derived from a consideration of the N. W. 759; State Board of Medical Regis
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tration v. Scherer, 2?1 Ind. 92, 46 N,E2d
Iration
N.E2d
602; In re Fredericks, 285 Mich. 262, 280
,W. 464, 125 A.L.R. 259; Mojave River
N .W.
11'1'. Dist. v. Supreme Court, 202 Cal. 717,
1rr.
262 P. 724; Borreson v. Department of
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14'N.E.2d 485;
Public Welfare, 368 Ill. 425, 14·N.E.2d
Referring to the c~se of Alameda Coun
CounIn re Opinion of Justices, 85 N.H. 562, 154 ty v. Janssen, supra, that was an action in
mandamus to compel Janssen as Chairman
A. 217.
of the Board of Supervisors of Alameda
"Statutes providing for appeals somewhat
lit:ns
County to execute certain releases of liens
similar to that under consideration have
and cancellation of restrictive agreements
been held valid by interpreting them as not
with respect to real property of the recipi
recipino\'o in the full sense of
granting trials de novo
ents of financial aid granted under the propro
that expression but as con ferring authority
visions of old-age security act of the state.
for the court· to pass upon the lawfulness
In 1937 the California Legislature amended
commisonly of the order of the board or commis
sections 2224 and 2225 of the Welfare and
Departsion. Examples are: ;\'[organ v. Depart
Institutions Code, into which section 4 of
ment of Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 156,
the Old-Age Security Act had been incor
incor...,27 P.2d 686; Investors Syndicate v.
porated, to eliminate the provisions of such
IlL 413, 38 N.E.2d 754; Lloyd
Hughes, 378 III.
theliens as well as the provisions making the
21-1- Ind. 700,
v. City of Gary, 21.J.
iOO, 17
Ii N.E.2d
aid a debt of the recipient to the state and
836.
county. Section 2225 was amended to pm
pr<>"The only proper questions that may be vide that, "all liens and mortgages hereto
heretotried by a court
COllrt on appeal from an order fore created under the provisions of said
sueh as the one
olle here involved is whether chapter are hereby released and the board
the commission acted capriciously or arbi
arbi- of supervisors of each county * * .,
exetrarily or without jurisdiction or authority arc hereby directed and authorized to exe,
cute
and
record
appropriate
instruments
under the law. People of State of New
theYork ex reI. X ew York & Queens Gas Co. of release." Janssen, as chairman of the
board of supervisors, refused to execute
\'. :\lcCal1,
:'I1cCa11, 245 U.S. 345, 38 S.O. 122, 62
".
said liens and releases on the grounds that
EqualL.Ed.337; State ,'.
\'. State Board of Equal
th~
it ,'iolated
\'iolated section 31 of article IV of the
l'Ilont. 413, 185 P. i08,
708, 186 P.
ization, 56 l\lont.
Cali fornia
fLlrnia Constitution, prohibiting the
697."
legislature from making or authorizing any
ft of public money and also tha t it dolat
opinion has been re
re- gi it
dolatSince the majority 0plnlOn
",ritten,
written, there is included therein the case ed prohibitions in the United Stales
States aml
l\tass. California Constitutions against the pas
pasof City of \Yorceste-r v. Quinn, 304 l\'lass.
obligatioll
276, 23 N.E.2d 463. 125 A.L.R. 707. I fail sage of any law impairing the obligation
to see wherein said authority is of any as
as- of contracts. The court in passing on
011 the
sistance whcn applied to the majority opin
opin- question, construed the constitutional pro
provision as follows [16 Ca1.2d
ion.
IOn. I will reier
rt"ier to said matter later.
Cal.2d 276, 106 P.2d

oL •. _ .

000201

III

l

r

_ _I

..._---------------_.

!:===========------==-============_I!!I!!!
244

.'

G,S·IO:\HO
REI'Oll.TS
GS·\O:\HO REPOll.TS

14J: "Section 31 of article IV of the Cal
Cali fornia Constitution prohibits the legislegis
lature from making or authorizing a gi ft
of public money or thing of value to any
individual or corporation. The next clause,
however, proviucs
secprovillcs that nothing in this sec
tion shall prevent the legislature from
granting aid pursuant to section 22 of ar
article IV which amhorizes the granting of
aged, Therefore the re
aid to indigent aged.
release of a lien by a county, pursuant to sec
sec0 f the \Velfare
\Vel fare Code, does not
tion 2227 of
of section 31, article
constitute a "iolation Ot
IV, if (1) it is a gift of public money or
thing of value, or (2) it is a grant of aid to
indigent aged under section 22 of ~rticle
IV,"
IV."
It will be observed that section 22 of
article IV a0 f the Constitution, authorized
the granting of aid to indigent aged. We
have no such pro"ision in our constitution
b~eause the liens, mortgages and
and it was bt!cause
established an existing debt, that
contracts establisht:d
Janssen, even in the face of section 22 of
article IV, a foresaid, and the legislation
that was enactt:d,
enacted, refused
rdused to sign releases of
the liens that had been incurred by the
recipients of aid to indigent aged. The
"Thus, in View
majority opinion recites, "Thus.
of the statutes.
statutes, the qllestion before us is
whether the granting of old-age assistance
under the terms and conditions of our

of this cOllrt? Is it because of there being
lega public assistance act, or because the leg
islature has
ha.s seen fit to amend said act by
reincluding therein a provision for a re
covery of the amount 0 f assistance paid a
reCipient. Section 2"-a, supra,
stlpra, is not a
reCipient,
jurisdicpart of the substantive law of this jurisdic
tion. But, to the contrar)',
contrar)", is purely pro
protion,
recedural, and, incidentally, is the first re
sort in an attempt to establish a collection
agency of the Public Assistance Act. The
h[f respondent
rcspondent
majority opinion observes, "[f
is right in his contention that the Public
Jaw is uncon5titutional,
unconstitutional, even
Assistance law
lhough it cre:ltes no obligation on the part
though
relief to repay any part
of any recipient oi reliei
of thc
the relief
relit:f gramed, it would, of course,

,

.

,,i ~
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-4•

,

.

••

•
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• oJ:
.\.::
..
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carried to its logical conclusion, mean the

s

"f"
.,'

legislature would be powerless to provide

:..\.j "I

for any relief ,,"hatever
\\'hatever to the deserving

and need}',
needy, and that would be absurd,"
absurd."
From the foregoing, it is made to appear
that section 2+.a
2+'a is superior to all other
phases of the Public Assistance Act. I
know of
0 f no one who asserts, or insists,
that the payment of old-age assistance, in
the first instance, violates the credit pro
provision 0off section 2.
2, article Vll[ 0off our con
constitution. It is the enforcement or attempt
attempted en
forcement
0
f
the
recover}'
provision,
enforcement of
recovery
"fly in the
written into the law, that is the "fl}'
ointment." \\-ithout such r·ecovery pro
prowith vision no one would contend that the act
Public Assistance Jaw * * * falls within the inhibitions of Section 2 of Article is offensive to the constitution. The en
enIdaho," forcement
forccment of the recovery provision, how
howS of the Constitution of the State of Idaho."
What brings the question to the attention ever, is questioned and objected to because
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forcement.off necessity shows that the
its en forcement.o

collected shall be promptly paid to the
,..
matpayment of old-age assistance to a recipient United States.' ,.. ,.. • The only mat
cO"ered by this pro\·isioll of the act
aet of
is in the nature of a loan. If it were not ter cOI'ered
re- Conl;r~ss
in the nature of a loan it could not be re
Conl;r~ss and by our own statute which
cOI-ered
pro"ide for the
cOI'ered and the contention, as I sec it. is incorporated it was to prol'ide
that section 24-a. the recovery provision, app,)rtiollmcnt
chat
ilpP'Jrtiollmcnt anJ
anu distribution of suc!l
SlIC1"i
and a nullit)"
nutlity, and there
there- procc~d,
is unconstitutional amI
proceeds as may be realized
realizcd from the estate
fore incapable of enforcement.
oi a recipient
rl!cipient of aid, and both enactments
of
part
left untouched any liability upon thl!
the pan
re1 submit that before the State can re
oi
of the estate of a recipient to reimburse
recicover from the estate of a deceased reci
the city.
A statute is to be iaidy
iairly and rcarea
city, .-\
obpient of assistance there must exist an ob
sonilbly construed anu
and its scope is not to
sonably
ligation on the part of the estate to pay
be ('x tended by construction beyond its
b~
','!
"~ amount soug-htto
sought to be recovered. In
authurities] .
apparent limits. [Citinl;
apparellt
[Citin!,! amhuritiesJ,
.....",er
oblig;jtion In
....",er words, a contractual oblig;\tion

•

some form or manner between the State
and the deceased recipient, during his Ii fe·
fetime must be establishecl. In speaking of
said matter, relative to the right of a
reco\'er from the estate of a de
destate to reCO\'er
old-age assistance, the
ceased recipient of old·age
Social Security
Sl!curity Act of August 1~, 1933,
U.S.c.A. §§
49 U,S.Stats.
U.S.Stats. 620, Title 42, U.S.c..-\.
,301-306 was mcntioned in the case of
ot
City of \Vorcester v. Quinn. supra [304
465]. and therein
ther!;:in it
:'lass. 276. 23 :-..'.E.2d 465],
is said:

Legisla"Both Congress and our own Legisla
liabiliLY concon
ture were content to let that liabiliL)'
tinue to n:st upon the prillcipi.:s
principles \If comcom

,;

"

mon law and to share in the
th~ proceeds of
actions where payments had heen made
throug-h
thrOllg-h ;1.ccident,
;lccident, fraud or mistake. The
hali oi
mere right to share in one half
of the net
reciamount collected from the estate of a rcci
aid. withollt establishing any obli.
oblipient oi aid,
gation upon the part of the estate to pay
any new remedy,
aud without creating an)'
collecmust be construed to mean that the collec
tion from
the estate
estate must
must be
tion
irom the
be had
had by
by present
present
remedies under our existing Jaw. This
relaconclusion is also supported by the rela
lionship
tionship existing between the Federal and
State
State gO\'ernmcnts
gOI'ernml!llts in
in the
the establishment
establishment and
and
maintenance of old age assistance. ,.. .. ,..

"This act
act of
of Congress
Congress prodded
prodded for
for the
the
"This
Fl!deral funrls for old age assisgrant of Federal
assis
States as should adopt an old
tance to such Statcs
age assist:mce
assisl;1.nce plan containing certain re
requirements,
one
of
which
was
that
'i
f
the
quirements, one of which was that 'i f the
any of its political subdivisions col
colState or an)'
est:lte of any recipient of
lects from the estate
615 of the committee on
"Report No. 613
old-age assistance any amount with respect ways and means recommended the passage
old-age assistance furnished him under of thc
thl! social sccurity
sl!curity bin (H.R. 7260). The
to otd-age
tht: plan, one-half of the net amount so bill then contained s. 206,
206. captioned 'Over
'Over-
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payments during life,' which provided that
'If any recipient, through errOr or otherother
exwise, has recei ved benefit payments in ex
cess of the amount to which he is entitled,
and dies before such overpayments have
been adjust~d,'
adjust~d,' then his estate shall repay
a certain amount to the United States. In
the same report, at page Ii,
17, it appears that
the purpose of this section was to secure
from the State one half of the Federal
contributions paid to recipients from whose
estates the State has recovered on account
of payments 'because those persons had
been defrauding the State.' The commitcommit

l!,',.
:J

as did
did the
the committee
committee On
On ways
ways and
and means.
means. agree, expressly or impliedly, to repay the
as
It is
is clear
clear that
that Congress
Congress merely
merely provided
proVided amount paid him, how can any obligation
It
for r,'imbllrscmenl
r,'imbllrsement from
from 1/,,·
till: eslate
estate of
of a
for
a attach to the estate.
estate, With these observa
observadecellsed
rc:cipiel.t
wllo
IIad
l"rou9"
crror
deceused rccipielll who had Ihroll9h error tions must we not conclude, that the only
rcceived ov.rpllYlllcll/s
ov.rp"ymcllts durillg
during !lis
or fraud rcccived
his recovery
recovt:ry that is permissible "rests upon

tilll'". And the only purpose of our
life timL',
Legislature in enacting that portion of

the prillCiIJles
princiIJles of common law and to share
procet:ds oi actions where payments
in the proceeds

relative
what now is section 4 of c. 118A
lI8A relativt:

have been made through accident, fraud
or mistake."
mistake." There is another matter I
cJisposed to mention, and which our
feel Jisposed
legislature seemingly overlooked in enact
enacting Sec. 2~-a, supra, and is unnoticed in
the majority opinion, and that is this: This
jurisdiction is one oi the eight community
property law states. All property acquired
wife,.
after marriage by either husband or wife..
(Sec. 31·907,
31-907, 1.c..-\.)
1.c._-\.) is community prop
property.

or mortgage.
mortgage, from the estate of a reciIJient
reciIJienl
oi aicJ,
aiJ, was a declaration of, the public
policy of this' Commonwealth that when

..
•

ff '•

~

,',

rt!

44::

'I'
'1'
~ tI

(Emphasis

If it is said that Section 2~-a furnishes
the right of the State to recover from
estates "the total amount oi assistance
paid" to a recipient under the act (Ch. 237,
La ws 19~7),
19~i), and that the applicant for as-,
sistance was in formed of the provisions
ancJ there
thereof the act and acquiesced therein anJ
to, there is then established the relationship
St:c. 2 of art.
of debtor and creditor and Sec.
8 of the Constitution, extending credit to
an individual,' is violated. And, again, if
saicJ there is no violation of the credit
cn:dit
it is saiJ
report No.
No. 628,
628, recommended
recommended provision of the Constitution, where then,
tee on
on finance,
finance, report
tee
provision of the Constitution, where then,
the adoption
adoption of
of bill
bill H.R.
H.R. i260
i260 containing
containing we
the
we ask,
ask, is
is the
the obligation
obligation upon
upon the
the part
part of
of
said s. 206, and gave (page 29) the same the estate to pay.
pay, If the recipient of aid,
explanation of the purpose of this section during his lifetime, did not consult and

to reimbursement, other than from bond

d

accident, fraud or mistake."
ours).

recovery was had one half of the

proceed~

would be paid to the national treasury.
[Citing authorities].
"Under that law there can be no reo
covery where payments
pa)'ments were not made by

! •. '
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The demurrer to the complaint says that
Hu~band and wife are equal partners
consti~
in community estate. Kohny v. Dunbar, it does not state facts sufficient to consti
sus~
21 Idaho 258, 121 P. 544, L.R.A.,N.S., 1107, tute a cause of action. The trial court sus
Ann.Cas. 191JD, 492; Peterson v. Peter
Peter- .tained the demurrer without leave to amend
and dismissed the action. In so doing the
425,
son, 35 Idaho 470, 207 P. 425.
jur
court was
interest
ill
community
property
was right.
right. He
He had
had no
no original
original jur~
\Vife's
\Vife's interest in community property Court
isdiction
of
the
controversy
and
could
en
is
vested
intcrest
of
same
nature
and
exisdiction
of
the
controversy
and
could
en~
is vested intcrest of same nature and ex
tertain
the
same
only
in
his
appellate
capa
tent as
as that
that of
of her
hushand. [I-luir
v. Poca
Poca- tertain the same only in his appellate capatent
her hushand.
II'luir v.
city.
24-a, Session
Session
tello, 36
36 Idaho
Idaho 532,
532, 212
212 P,
P. 345.
345.
cit)'. Furthermore,
Furthermore, Section
Section 24-a,
tello,
Laws 1947, was void in that there is no
No distinction is made between husband
prO\'ision
pro\'ision for recovery under the Social
and wife as to degree, quantity, and nature
Security Act which is necessary because
communor extent oi
of interest each has in commun
of the cooperative functions and efforts
propert)'. Ewald Y.
v, Hufton, 31 Idaho
ity property.
aforeof gO\'ernment and stale laws.
Jaws. The afore
373, 173 P. 247; Peterson v. Peterson,
mentioned state statute is not in harmony
.supra.
with the Federal social security laws and
Upon the death of either husband or for that reason must be disregarded as all
wiic, one-half of all community property
wife,
acts 0 f the Social Security Act, and the
sllf\"iYor, subject to the
shall go to the slIn-ivor,
administerPublic Assistance Act, must be administer
testacommunity debts, etc. In case no testa
ed tOl;echer
toS'ether as a unified code of laws enen
mentary dispusition shall have been made
acted by Congress and the state legislature
by the deceased husband or wi fe 0 f his
or her
her half
half 00 ff the
the community
community property
property it
it for
for the
the complete
complete an~
an~ comprehensive
comprehensive con
conor
1~ 113 I.C trol of the subject. "The matter in the
shall go to the survivor, (Sec. 14-113
A.)
A) subject to the community debts, etc. final analysis brings us to the fundamental
5ubj ect of relief in
old';lge assistance cannot proposition that the subj
A recipent of old-;lge
lLability against the community its \'arious phases, as provided by law, was
create a liability
propeny
property without the husband or wife, if strictly within the scope of legislative au
au.such there be, joining in the encumbrance thority. That branch of the government
.incurring such liability,
very properly and necessarily assumed the
liability.

In the instant casc
case the doctrine of prim
primary jurisdiction is particularly applicable
th,1! section 24-a, Session
for the reason th'lt
Laws 1947, providing for a recovery from
a recipient
recipicnt of old-age assistance places
the discretion thereof within the state
~ .department,
. department, an administrative jurisdiction.
~

~,

-_

iii •!:.
.....:.. ...
.. . .",
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,
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ex
function of pro\'iding the amount to be expended for that purpose, and the manner
and method of distribution. The judicial
department has neither power nor inclina
inC\ination to usurp that authority. If inadequate
provision has been made for the meritori
meritori~
ous necessities of the un fortunate people
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state, we may sympathize personally ceased, for approval as follows: *
of the state.
• *
• ."
."
but we are powerless to intervene officialofficial The Department of Public Assistance of
Iy."
oldly." State v. Brandjord, supra [108 Mont. the State of Idaho granted and paid old
44i, 92 P.2d 2i9].
deceased. as per
Zi9].
age assistance to said deceased,
folloWing itemized statement (following
the following
Plaintiff's action is instituted under the
amount
is the monthly date and monthly amOunt
provisions of section 24-a, supra. The recrec
paid Magnus as per the creditors preierred
ord shows that the first payment of oldold
claim which is attached to and made a
age assistance was made in i\"Iarch
i\'Iarch 1943,
part of the complaint.) "This claim is
and that Magnus died about August 1,
I, 1946.
made and filed as a preferred claim against
The Departmellt
Departmeur of Public Assistance,
Assistance. evievi
said estate under the provision of Section
dentl}'
dently in construing section 24-a, supra
2, Chapter 119, Idaho Session Laws 1943."
says, no claim may be filed against a home
th:lt the record disclos
disclosIt will be observed th:H
while it is being used as a residence by a
thl! complaint was subsequently
es that the
surviving spouse. There is nothing in concon
;lmount claimed
amended to show that the :lmount
nection with the application for old-age
to be due and owing to the state of Idaho
assistance, or otherwise, that discloses that
was under the provisions of the Public
said applicant in becoming a recipient,
Section'
Assistance Laws as amended by Section·
either expressly or impliedly, contracts to
4, Chapter 237, Session Laws 1947, and the
repay any amount paid him by the state.
provision contained in the claim as being
case. is
Section 24-a, supra, in the instant case,
under the Laws of 1943 was not stricken
retroacti ve, both as to the 1947 act and,
therefrom.·
therefrom.' The record also discloses that
likewise, to the Act of 1943. There is
the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiffs
nothing in
in the
the complaint,
complaint, or
or the
the record,
record, to
nothing
to complaint
complaint was
was argued
argued and
and submitted
submitted for
for
advise us as to whether there is a survivsurviv decision, and sustained without It.:a\'e
It;a\'e to
ing spouse in this case, nor, as to the nature :lmend
amend and the action dismissed September
of the estate, if any, of which Magnus was 26, 194i. That there was a stipulation
possessed at the time of his death. The allowing the amendment
am.:ndment showing that the
action
was
prosecuted
under the proyisions
"Creditors Preferred Claim," filed
tiled by the
Department of Public Assistance of the oi Section 4.
4, Chapter 237, Session La ws
State of Idaho,
Idaho. In the Matter of the EsEs 1947, nunc pro tunc by interlineation and
tate of Frans G,
without the same having previously been
G. Magnus, deceased, recites, withollt
"The undersigned creditor of Frans G. submitted to the trial court asking that
Magnus. deceased, herewith presents its the complaint be reinstated.
claim against the estate of said deceased
\'ouchers to l\els LindLind
with the necessary \·ouchers
de
strom, executor of the estate of said de-

We submit that the order of the trial
.:ourt sustaining the demurrer and dismiss
dismisscourt
ing the action should be affirmed.

6

w., .'
w..

.~\-.
'~\-'.
. · ..." : . , .
"~L' >:';\'
~~;l
"
,
"

_.-,

I:~.
I:~.

.'...
'.-.....
. . >.
._.... . :~'.
..
:~'.

,',

.-,;.. .

.'\".,.
.'\".,"

000206

.

- ..

P'.~'

.. ..•...~.

~!f:

.228

IDAHO SESSION LAWS

C.119 '43

knowledge of the real purpose of the public assistance pro- .
gram' and the administration thereof.
. (d) To recommend to the State Department of Public
: {~'.. :'.•:, ~
Assistance such rules, regulations, policies and procedure, as
in the judgment of the Council, shall
shaH increase efficiency,
effect economy and generally improve the administration of
:.
.. '
',. ..
_ _
public assistance.
;{:.:':...",:,:,
;'~.::,;: 'o;{:"'
:.:•.......
:'. ,
(e) The Commissioner of Public Assistance shall pro
proreguJations gov'
gov. mulgate all necessary and proper rules and regulations
.. erning the procedure of the County Council of Public
., Assistance.'
Assistance.·
.
..
. (f) Nothing herein is intended, nor shall
shaH be interpreted,
to prevent the right of appeal or limit
Jimit opportunity for ppfair hearing before the State Department of Public Assist
Assistance as provided by Section 16,' Chapter 181, Idaho Ses
Session Laws of 1941; nor as preventing the State Department
~ ~
of Public Assisb;mce from administering the public Tsistance laws of this state as a single state agency. .
., .
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE...,.... EMERGENCY. An
.. ...•... ,
- ~. •
,
emergency eXisting therefor, which emergency .is hereby
.... declared to exist, this Act shall be in full force and effect
~f~~:"":.';":_. . ......
.',q,'.;.:.~~~'(.;....;. -', ' from and after its passage and approval.
Approved March 2, 1943.
~i~\~~-~"
....

;

~.

OJ,

"

:.·~:.i r':~ "l:i.';:,.:~'.:,~:"·, .~~:~~:~ ~~~~:~m~:~!:~~~:~~;::yTS::
,I, ,_,'

.
'
:S~;'\" ".
:70'4~)""')

,',

"



~~iii"~'"
·ltd. tG . '
.
-;~.L:·45'(1stE-S)

"-:1::-82 Sec.1·,'"

·~tD. . ~ . --:.:.:~:

CHAPTER 09

.

:."

(H. B. NO. 191)

AN ACT
AMENDING SECTION 14 OF CHAPTER 181, IDAHO SESSION
. . , ,LAWS OF: 19:i1, PROVIDING THAT PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
.. - •..'. SHALL NOT BE GRANTED TO ANY. PE~.gON .A.SSIGNINQ
..
OR TRANSFERRING HIS PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE'
. ,;: :. ",:OF .RENDERING HIMSELF ELIGIBLE FOR ASSISTANCE; ...
~Dm~tr:" :,:/·:;.~·,FURTHER AMENDING ~HAPT'ER 181, IDAHO . SESSION }... ! .. , .
. .. :. "LAWS OF'1941, RELATING' TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE BY'-:'" . I .
:::'''··::ADDiNG FOUR NEW SECTiONS IMMEDIATELY' FOLLOW-':.:;·. ;,
:.. .' ',. ,:I.NG-.S.ECTION 24, TO BE NUMBERED.. SECTIONS 24~a;~24-b7'<;: "
.,.~ ': ::24-~·':A.N'D'24-d, 'RESPECTIVELY; PROVIDiNG ;FOR~E-~.'··· .
:'I., ,~. _-fOYE'*i' 'F~Q~ 'RECIPIENTS OR 'THE ESTATE"S.- OF ~R~;:\:.~~r,.
"
CIPIENTS IN CERTAIN CASES AND THE DISTRIBUTION' .'.
OF S'UCH RECOVERIES; DEFINING 'FRAUDULENT ACTS', ;
ni'SE~URING PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND' PROviDING ' ..
'"

"
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000207

..,.;.,

't!f;..~,-,~,.,.;.,
't!f;..~,-.~

..' ..

-

'

C.ll9
C.1l9 '43

-

;.

"'

.

IDAHO SESSION LAWS

229

PENALTIES THEREFOR; FIXING'THE EFFECTIVE DATE
OF THIS' ACT AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY.

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Section 14, Chapter 181, Idaho Session
Laws of 1941, be, and the same is hereby amended to read
.
as follows:

-..

.,

SECTION 14. AWARD OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE.
Upon the completion of the investigation, the state depart.:
ment 'shall determine whether the applicant is eligible for
provisions of this act, the type
public asistance under the 'provisions
and amount of public assistance he shall receive, and the
date upon which such public assistance shall begin. Public
assistance shall be paid in the manner prescribed by the
state department. Public assistance shall 'not be granted~,
granted •.
under this act to any person who has made an assignment ;
or transfer of property for the purpose of rendering himself .:
eligible for assistance under this. act.
I
SEC. 2. That Chapter 181 Idaho Session Laws 1941, be,
and the same is hereby amended by adding four new sections
thereto immediately following Section 24, to be numbered
SeCtions 24-a, 24-b, 24-c, and 24-d, respectively, and to read,
as follows:
.'
SECTION 24-a.-Recovery from recipients. On the death
:L,~4:i e. 119/
:L"~4:i
\19/1
recipient, the total amount of assistance paid orre-· .ec,
of any recipient,the
.ee, 2 (24,,/
(24"1
preferred. repealed' .
lief granted under this Act shall be allowed as a preferred"
e. 23i i
S.L. '47 c.
·against the estate of such person and shaU &e sub
sub- .e<:.
claim 'against
'e<:, 3 p.
p, 586. I
ject only to the-expense of the last iUness,'
iUness; funeral expenses
not to exceed $100.00, and expenses of administration 0/

.r

•

"

...

'." "';

..I

...

said estate. No claim shall be enforced' against any real

estate or personal property of a recipient while such real.
real,
estate is occupied ~y the recipient, a surviving spouse, or It .
dependent, but the Statute of Limitations shall not begin
to run against such claim so long as the collection thereof is
prohibited, iu hereinabove provided
provided..
.... Such claim shall be "made
made by the county or, in cases Of,
of.
cooperative assistance, by the state on behalf of all partici- .
pants contributing to such assistance.
.
....
SECTION 24-b. D~tribution of recover.ies. The ~~a,te·.ii,·s.i.~'.43·~:ml
~~a.te·.ii,·s.i.~·'43'~:1I91
Department shall certtfy to the State Audttor the amount ,'}""".
,'·i."". 2 (24b)
.di{J7';:"'s~~~'!!~c. 237
recovered from each estate' of recipients, and a proper ,di{J7';:"'s~~~~1~c,
be' made by the State Auditor in prQ-:'
pr9,-=:':'::':".-;'
~~C;:~~~~._. ,
tributionthereof shaU be'made
,";"· ~~c;:~~~~
to the amount of assistance contributed by tl!'€"··.
tl!-€'··. :"~;':;'~h.'?'
:'·~;':;'~h.'?'
portiO?~ ..to
state, the counties and the federal government for Such ...,"' ':.:
': ,: ......
assistance.
.
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SECTION 24-c. Fraudulent Acts-Penalty. Whoever
knowingly obtains, or attempts to obtain, ·or aids or abets
any person in obtaining, by means of a wilfully false statement O·r representation, or other fraudulent devices, assistance or rel-ief to which he is not entitled, or assistance or
relief greater than that to which he is justly entitled, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof
shall be fined not more than $900.00, or be imprisoned for
not· more than six months, and be both so fined and imprisoned in the discretion of the Court.,..
Whoever sells, conveys, mortgages or otherwise disposes.
of his property, real or person,al, or conceals his income or
resources, for the purpose of rendering him eligible for any
.. form of relief, theretofore or .thereafter applied for and received, to which he would not otherwise be entitled, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof
shaLL be fined not more than $900.00, or be imprisoned for
not more than six months, or be both so fined and imprisoned
at the discretion of the court. ,
.
...~ Every person who· knoWingly aids or abets any person
. in selling, conveying, mortgaging o·r otherwise disposing of
his p'roperty, real or personal, or in concealing his income
or resources for the purpose of rendering him eligible for
any form of relief, theretofore or thereafter applied for and
received, to which he would not otherwise be entitled, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof
shall be fined not more than $900.00, or be imprisoned ·not
more than six months, or be both so fined and imprisoned at
the q.iscretion of the court. /
. . .. '
SECTION 24-d. EFFECTIVE DATE-EMERGENCY.
An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby
declared to exist, this Act shall .. be in full force and effect
from and after its· passage and approval.

Approved March 2, 1943.

CHAPTER 120
(H. B. NO.

158)

AN ACT

~

..

TO AMEND CHAPTER 20, TITLE 39, IDAHO CODE ANNOTATED, BY ADDING THERETO TWELVE NEW SECTIONS,
NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY SECTIONS 39-2021 TO SEC-TION 39-2032, INCLUSIVE, WHICH NEW SECTIONS AUTHORIZETHE DETACHMENT FROM·A ·STATE HIGHWAY
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Ilbllo it is

:Ill .:stalolishcli
,:stal,lish':I! g'nH:llltee
I)i
:III
g'1I:lTalllCC lli

our constitlltion
constitution th:lt C\'cr)'
l:\'cr)' person has Illonr
m
aliell;.I.1I..: riolns JlIrin~
JlIrill~ his lifetime: to
aliclI:d.llc

;lC'
;lC-

.....

.
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quire, possess anJ enjuy property. The re
requircJ
quireJ cXl'cmion
cXl'cution of Ihe
the "Exhiloit
"Exhiltit ;\"
:\" J~ a
conJitiun prl"cl',knl
pr...cl·,knt 10
to n'cei\'il1!.'"
n'cej\,il1!.'" illrtJll'r
iurtJ1l'r ,old
conJiliun
,,1.1

Rul'er:
R"I'~r: E. Smylie. :\lty.
;\Ity. Gen., a.nd
and \Vil.
\Villiam IIf.
r. Hakl·S.
Hakt·s. :\s~l.
:\~~I, :\11)",
:\11)". Gen.,
Gcn., fat
for re
re~Ptlllllc:nt.
~Ptlllllc:nt.

age
dc··
agc assistance ailer .Iuly
.lilly lSI,
lsI, 1~'~I,
1~'~I, is in d...
ril-!ht 10
uispuse of onc's
OIlC'S property'
Till' ril:ht
to dispuse
flJgaliun
n)~"tiull oi sllch CUII~!llllliunal
eUII~!IlllliUII,,1 ri;,:ill.
ri;,:i11. III'
lly ;!ih"r
;lilt'r ,i<':Ith
,kath :s
crcatcu lly
uy statute, a.nd
and
is a rig-ht created
allu\\'illg
allu\\'ing I'l"rsons
ll.:rSOllS rCCl·i\·in~
rCCl-i\-ill~ uhl
u10l :'1:C
a1:e 'I~,:st·
;l~~:st· the Il'~isla[llre
Il';!islalllrc may illlpuse Slid! cUIll..IitioDS
cUl1l.1itioDs
anel'
ancc 10
to control ;IIlJ enjuy t11\:ir
tll\:ir u"'n
u\\'n I'rIlV' lI(llJlI
UPI)II lhe
Ihe ,·xer.:i~c
l'xerc;,c ui the ri~ht
ri~ht as it sees,
sccs,
crty, fac:lit:ltcs.
\\'cl· :il. ::::.1<:
fac:lit:ItCS, the puulic
pulllic intercst
inler.:st and
amI \\"el·
:O:::.t<: .·x
,'X rd.
~il'l>ulI \'. LinJstrom.:;
LinJstrom,.:
~il'l>ull
f:!.n·,
bn', alld
ant! "iJs the indi!:l'lI\
in<!il:l'lIl a~l·tI
a~<·t1 'IS \Vl·n
\\'<·!I a~ I'.'~~.
\'''~~, {_,
!u;.hu ':':1;,
':':ti, I~J\
I~I\ I',.!.I 1(1)(};
Bankers'~·.·
{., 111;,hu
tOOl}; Bankers
'",.
a Jireci
Jirecl grant oi munl·Y.
mun<·y. Uy [,.,·in:;
[,.,·111g' ;01.1,'
;01,1,' tu T
.
1'1'
"'
'
"
T
~
,
~
,-,,!
Trm:
(u. \'.
\', Blo<i~~·;t.
<Hi, ""
.f.3 S
S.• ,I:'
rll~: \..U.
• O<I~l·tt. :!tiO
_tlu V.S.
...... ~. ""',
,!
scll
sell the prullerty
prul,crty ur u!.taill
uI.taill luans
lualls thl'n'uII,
till-n'ull, Ct. 2.13,
':.13, ,,;II;' LEd.
LEd . ';..i~l"
.;..i~),
',;'
it is possible fur ,Jir"ct
uirl'ct ;lid to hc
he l'i:lllinatcd
<'!:lIIin"ted
Th" lq:.,lalllrc has
ha~ thl' ri~ht to c1a.ssify
classify \ " "
for a limc.
jlllolic Irc:"lIr:;
trc:"nr:.. rclil'\,cll
r... li,·\·....1
tim.:. and the pnolic
pl'r~,,", ;II1U
;I1IU ulljects
uhjccts
purpose
le{-' 1\" ",
ior
the
pllrpose
of ler-'
to the extent
cxtent [hat the recipient is rdil'\'l,J
rdil·\"l·J
i~l:Iti"n
which
cl;ls~i!ic:\tillll
u~
lsl:lti\ln
\\
h:ch
cl.ls-llieatillll
will
not
be
U~'1
oy ex<:rcise
e.':<:rcise uf bis inalit'nable
inalil'nabl" ri~ht
ri~ht tu ~un·
IIl1k,.s it is pa11lahly
pal\lably arhitr:try.
arl.itr:lry. Crom v.~ "
~ct 1I11!c,.,
propl·rty. Artich:
Artidc I. Sec, I,
trol his o\\'n proPl·rty.
Frahm.
Frahm, 1~1_'lI. J.i (d,dlo
(01;1110 314, 19.3
19.1 P. 1013;·1,
1013;,1
Idahu Cun:;titmion:
CUII:;titmion: :\bmcd:l
:\l:Imcd:t Cuunty
CUllllty v.
Juahu
:5talc
,',
Ldl,,\\,ay.
1~'116.
11
1,laho
i
19,
lW',
IW'
.Ianssen. 16 Cal.2J T.6,
2:'6, 1M P.ll!
P.21! 11, 130 :\.
A. :5tatc ,'. LdltlwJY, l~III6, II
.Iansscn,
p, .!:,
.• ~.~.,
10'),
2:. 4 J..IL\
LIL \.,~
,~.,
Iln, 114 AIll,St.
Am.St. 283;':
2SS if:
L.R. I HI, 1147; 11
II ;\m.Jllr.,
Am.Jur., Cunst.uw,
Cunst.uw.
\\'0)001 Cilia I Co. ,',
L'h;IIJ1I1Jn, 1927.
1927, ~~"
~~,
Hie: \\"lllld
\', L·h;lIJ1l1:tn.
allJ 1147, § 3.3::.
1145, 1146 anJ
l !, .!tlJ 1':45.
j,bhu .:''i
.'• • 'l".~ ~'
.:''il!,
.,"
To achie"c
reachie"e constitutiunal
constitutiollal IIniiurmity
IIl1i iurmilY re
l'ru\"isiul1s
l'ru\'isiuns fur the
thc re':II\'l~ry
recI,,'ay of moner~:
'I'lircs
O/Jl'r:lIl' ;llike upun all ",ho
\\'ho
'Illires th;lt a ~aw o/,l'ralc
~ranll"\.l
~rantl-J fur puhlie
puhlic assistaJlce
assistallce (Iurpo:iCs
pllrposes f~:"
pro\'i:;ium.
cume within the scupe uf ils pro\'isium.
th
the... c,t;lte
~>t;Ltc ui Ihe
thc r~cipi~llt
r~cipi~llt aJ ftet
ftcr l.kath
I..kath aiel.;
ai!:l.'
nul \I\1o,;UII,til\ltzunal
b,'inl> ;1;, luan of th~~c
\IIlculI,titutzunal as
a~ b"inl>
the~c
appC.oar as to no!
Such uniiurnlity Jucs not app""oar

.

"

h-~I~latllre

ri~ht

pl'r~II'h

I

('

i

I
I

I
1I

j

j

a5 a cJ,.ss
cJ:iSS whu n'cci\'(~J
n'eci\"(~J the
all persuns as

\'ariuus types of puolic a~si,.t;)llce,
"ariulls
assi,.t:lllcc.

Herein

~pecial class is sin!,;leJ
sinl;leJ Ullt, i. c.,
e., thuse re
a ~]>ecial
rc-



~t;IIC'S creJit to an illJi"iclll;11.
iliJividll;LI. State
StJte .y~::.
.y~:: ,
~t;lI<:'s
LllltI~lr"II1,
LlIltl~lr"II1, I'.QS.
l'.qS. f~'\
f~'i Id;lho
Id;tho ~6, 191 P2d:':
P.2d:'

I\).~);
I\),~): \\"alll>cr~
\\'all!>cr~

,..
I'llhlio:
, .. L't:th
L'I:lh 1'lIloli.:

\\'df~'"
Wdf~

(ulllm:~~iun, 1~4'.J,
1~4'.l. 11~
ll~ Clah
Ctah ':42,
':42. 203 P.2d,", .'
;11;<: a~si~tancc"
assi~tancc" who own ~l';11 (ull1m:~~iun,
ceiving' "ulJ ;IJ;C
ceivil1g'
estale, ur some intercst therein,
Iherein,
estate,

Su ...\11\,
\m.
Eu



,)'
• ,):l.

StatllteS i6,
76, § 5~; UiJ; \'''lUU ell::ll
Jur., St:ltutes
CIII;,1
O1apman. 4: IJ:lhu
hl;lhu 3liO,
3~O, 403, 263 P.
Co, v. o.al'mal1,

..

Slate ,'.
\'. Lilllblrol\1,
Lillllstroll1. ~ Idaho
I<laho 226. 191
IC)I
45; St:ltc

1'.2.1
1'.211 1009, anJ cases
(:is''S citeJ as tv ;;cneral
beneral

and special laws.

'YLOR, .Justice.
.rll~tic('.
T,\ 'YLOR.
;\I'I"'lIalll~

arl'

hll~b:ll1d

rl'cil'ients oi uIJ·;\!:c :ts~i"t;\lICC umler
Siale Public ..\ssi~t:lllc(, Law, Thi~ lO1.w,

, j

!11fl :
~HItI :
"'III,'
"1111
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Cito! ns ;3 (tJullo

ae~,": in
ill 11'l~I,
II')~I, er~ates
st:lte Dc?artmcnt
DC'?:lrtment
ae~,"\
er~atcs the state

1'~lhlic ,\~SiSI;lllce
.\~SiSI;lIlCC' as the agency of the
oi !'~Ihlic

1

CHILD
ii~l)

vcs
\'esti!;:ltion
the d.:partmel1t
d.:partmellt of the
tlle cir.
Clr·
t il;:ltiol1 by thc
cumstanCes oi
applic:1l1t. a determina·
cumstancc:s
I)i the applicant,
Ikternlina·

tion or
of eligibility,
all,l :\InOIlIlt
lion
eli~ibiljty, and the lype all'\
alllonnt
go\"t:rul11ent to cooperatc
cooperate with
wilh thc
the
stal~ governmcnt
l)i an
all a\\':I"1.
a\\':lTlI.
oi public assistancc in case ,)i
fClk~al
fc,k~:l1 ;:'<l\'crllmcll[
;!'!l\'crllment in c:lrrying
c:lrryiug out the
prl')\'i,kei
As oriKillail),
IlriKinall)' ellacte,l
cllactcl\ the :lct
act prl'lVillcl1
purl")~"~ "i i.:d.:r:d anu
auu statc
st:lt.: :11::5
?crtaill'
purl")S,'S
acts ;Jcrtaill'
(or rc:co\'Cry
reco\"Cry oi any
allY pufllic
pllfllic a~~istancc
a~si~tal\cc paid
plll,li<: assistancc,
assistallcc, and
alld proJviJin;
prIJ\'iJin; thc
the {or
in~ :0 pnl,li.:

,

i

.i

:

!

ther~lo.
to any
allY persoll who W:1S
w.1.S not elllitie,l
clltitlcll therelo.
and ;or rc:covcry
reco\'cry from
irom thc
the cstatCS
~states Ili
'li .(c·
.lc·

.i
I
i

:I,,,j;:anc(' shall
shal\ bc
be awarde,l
awardc,l 1I1:':.:r
:I,,,i,,:ancc
1I1:,:a this

ccased rccipielllS
r~cipiellls under ccrt:lin
certain couditi'lI\s
conditi.lIls
cC:lscd
allli in the ,liscrctioll
,liscrction oi the
th.: state
st:l.tc .kr
awi
,kr art ·

:1'::
p ... r;ons atlc!
allc! i:lmilics
i:lmilies .... ho do ~ot h:\\"c
h:\\"('
;1':: :0 p...

IlICII!.
llICIlt.

ten~;, conditions and means
mealls oi ,arryil1~
,arryil1~
tcn~;.
cIT,·ct the puhlic assistancc
assistance tl1.:rc;lI
t!1.:rc;n
into cIT,-(\
pro\':ded i<lr.
itlr. Th.: 3ct
3.:t provitl"s
pro\"i,ks th:l: .'." Pulllic
pro":dcd
ruhlic

:I V;I i la hk rcsoll
r~SIlIl rce S
,'lCome :l1l.i
.'lcomc
all,i :IV;\

..::.:nt
SII r.=
r.=.,::cnt

to

'--r.ro\':,!c aa rC'a,oll:lhl.:
~talhl.'r<1 I)!
health
·..-r.ro\":lic
rca,oll:lhl.: stalhl.'r<i
I): hcalth
:1.nd
,,\cll.kin..;-", I.e. § 56-)):,
:III'! :'urtllcr,
:'urtller,
;lnd ",'cll.kin!.;"",
56-))5. :Ill'!
.j!e!.i\t:e :I'Si,t:III':':
:I,Si>l;IIIC': ",hall he :lwa~rk<l
:lwa~ek.! tl)
to
that .)!,\.;\t:c
n.:c.::: p'"Or1e
pl'orle whl) ha"c
ha\'c :ltlaitled
attaincd 1:-:':
nf
nee,:::
t:-:·: :11:-:
al:<: of

rl3 YC:lrs".
.'"~:lr~", mll,iect
mll,icer
1,3

:6-~Ll;-.
I.e. ~ :6-:~Ll;-.

10

.:~rtaill li::-,::ati',II'.
~crtaill
li::,.:~ati"t1'.

~c~:itln :t>-21I),
5n-210, 1.(;, pro
pro·
~c~ti<ln

;ctC'~ :
\" ;etC'~

anHlltnt of
-The anHluut

:l~sistal1cl.: whi.:~
whi.:~
:l~sistal1cl.:

O1:1y
O1:1Y

rc.:'p.cnt ,hall he elicihie
clil:ihle 10
r~,=~i\'e
rce'pn:nt
to rc'=c:'"c
~h ... lI hc
he ,lctcrmin,:u.
,\ctC'rmineu. ill
in aCC<lr,i.:lncc
"h"l1
aeC<lr'i~ncc

wi:':! Ihe
thc rules
r':~lIlati<lllS 'Ji the
W!:':1
ruks allu
auu rC~III:lIi"us
st;;.:.; dcp:lrtment,
dep:lrlmellt, with dlle n'~:I~'! tl)
te)
st..:.;

his rl'<tllir':1111'Ilt5,
rl'<JI1:n:111Cl1t5, and
a 11<1 the (Iln.;:ti·J115
o,n.;:ti·JII5
case. :1m.!
til.: ir.eCllllc
ir.~()lnc
e:x:still!,: in his case,
e:xistinl,:
aml to the

1

\

.1

1

;
{

III lfl~1,
Ifl~1. Ille
:\,;si~lancc Law was
In
the ruhlic :\~5istancc
amelldcd hy :l.tldin:.!'
thereto, § ~rl-~.!~;\.
~O-~.!~;I. l.e..
amclllil'd
atldin:':" thereto.
material parts .)i
'Ji which
i,)I\.)\\';:
the matcrial
\\'hich an: as [IJII,)\\,;:

1

I
I

I

I

1~31 :Ill
:III old·a::!:':
old· a:;:·:
"Er";eCll\'C
"Er"iccl;\'C July I, 1~~1

.1

as,i~I;111(C
ullrler !IIi;
aSSi~I;IlI(C :lwanlclt
awani<:.! IInder
tlli~ ac~ ;.)

pr'Jpcrt)' or
allY
rcal pr"pcrty
I)r any

j

pTllpcr;y sh:lll
shall 1)<:
n'al p"'l'cr;y
I,,:
slLhj.:ct I.,
rCCo\'cry, :'Ildt
rCC<l\'cry
suhject
tl' reco,'cry.
:'uc!l reC\l'"cry
he accClll1pli,h"d
accompli,i1l'd in acclInl;llIcc
shall hc
aCClJrf!;IIlCC

I

persons
pcrSllns
;u\I.:rl'>t"
illtr.:r\'>t"

nwnill~
n\\'uin~
III
111

I

I

'j

cli"..:cti\'e
cli'c<::ti\"e thcr,'aiter:
thcr":\iter:
"I:Z)
E.:l<:h rccipient
recipi':lIt 0;
"I
a) E.1.eh
O[ or ;lpl'lic:l1It
,1.pplic:lm

prop,'rty Ilr
I)r any imer,'sts
i1ltcr,·~ts in
ill rC:ll
rC:l1 pmper
proper·
prop,·rty

I

,I

with
i.)lIowill;: I'ro"isi,lIts
I'ro\,is;'JIIS 10
to bl!
wilh Ihe
the i'llIow;lI;:
be

.,"I·"~c assi,IOlIiCC
asSi~(Ollice w\t!)
O\\,IIS rc:ll
real
for .,"I·"~c
\\"11.) owns

,

.,..
.,
"

>

I ••

I
I

,

j

,

\

all': rcso\;rce~
re;o\;rC~~ :1\,aila!>!.:
an':
a\'aiJaol.: to him :'~I)m

,h;tli he n:'lnirc,1
rl'lllIire,1 to elltcr
ellter intI)
illto :I;ree·
ty sh;dl
:I;rce
nl,'lLt in
ill thc
the manlier
manllcr :l11f\
:l1L11 [orm
[orlll I'fl,,..:rih.
pTl,,.erih.
nl"IlL

I, ,

\\"hatcv~r ;,)1\rce,
;.)1Irce, ;lIltl
\\'hi~!1 ,.i:a\1
,j'::1\1 he
\\'hatcver
;11111 whic!1

departlllcllt 1Iy
ed
hy the
ell lIy
thc statc .Jcpartllll'lIt
hy WIIlC!l
wllle!1

I

:;u~eient. when
\\"hell addeu
add"Ll 10
i::~,,"":
"u~cient.
to Ihe
the i::c'lmc

the reeipicllt
r~e;pi':l\t sh:lll :I\.:r.;e
tlt:lt :;nch
:;uch Tl':l1
n'al
lhe
:I\.:r<:c th:lt

:11:1:
Tl'~.)\Ir~l·S dct<:rminc.[ to be :i\'a;!·
;a\,ail
al:': fl'~,lI\rc\'~

property or :Illy
in rl':ll
rcal l'rol'"
l'r .. ,,·
prl"ll'crty
:111)' intcn'sts
int<:n'sts ill

flrm'ide him \\'::h
\\"::h
abie: to him. to [Irm'ide

crt)' has heen
hcen :I,,~il-:llc(1
:I~~i!-!t1c,1 as security t'lr
crt)"
t<>r

:l

n::.~.l\Iahk ~\1bsisten.:c
~\1bsistenec ':lI111jla:illk
<!1I111p:l:iJ,k ·....ith
·.... ith
n::i~'l11ahk
•

•

II

illrthcr provides
providcs for
fl)r an .:lp{lli.
The: :let inrth.:r
~p{lli
••o• ..,.ation hy

;J.

l'TQ~I'~cti\'e rccipi<:nt,
r~cipicnt, 3n
an in
inl'r<J~Jlecti\'e

the rccl)\,cry
rccovcry oi all
tho:

o"l':I~e
o"I.:I~c

thereafter ;lwar!\cd
awarl!l:d to him.

I

:lSstst:lllce
:lSSlSt:lIlCO:

..

•

..

"(0)
Upnn m:lkilll;
makinl; :III
awarel oi
,,1.(·
"(I» Up.,11
:111 :l\\':lr<1
I)i "I·l
a!-,:e :lssist:lllce
assist:lncc thc
th~ statc
state dcpartlllcllt
dCP.1rtlllt.:llt
a!:c
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~::I;

t oi

shall Corth\\'ilh
forthwilh file such 19reement
:Igreement for

vi~iol\s
vi~;ol\s

r,'.:urdillg' \\'ilh
wilh Ill.:
tile COIIIll)"
COlllllr rr:.:ord,'r uf

~"(lIriIY :\':1,
~t'(lIrity
Act. 42

Ihe:
whidl Ihe rl':l1 pr"!,l"rly
the: COllllly
cOllllly in ",hidl
pr"l'l"rty

\\'hil.: Ihis :"t
il~ ..1i
.. Ji mali,"
\\'hile
act it"

<h'~crih\"\l
<h'~crihl'll
;1/'.(
;111.(

ill SlIdl
slI.:h

a~n','n1l"1Il
a~n"'II1l"lIt is ,illl;II"11
,itll;ll",1

Ihe
lhe filillg"
filillg' :111.1
:11111

rl"l'''rdil1~
rl'l'''rdill~

uj
ui 'lI.:h
'''.:h

oC Tide
of

X;II;:,I:.1I Sol'i:lr
Sorilr
Ihe X:ll;:,I:,11
s.:q~
scq~

ti.5,c..-\. § 301 et

I'r')\'isillll
no I'r'l\'isillll

iur
jur n"\'t',",:ry
n'\''',",:ry frl)l~.
fr"I~. till' prtll',-ny
prnl','ny or ~s.atC's.
~s.atC's.
oj d'T""""\
01''1'""",.1 rt·(:l'i"l\l'.
n',ll'i"I1"', it .lilt'S
.1111'S rt"ll1Irc
r"Ilmn: lhat
Ihat
oi

:,::r~I'I1ll"1Il ,,11:&11 ha,'.:
:1::rl'l'll1l'llt
h:I\'': Ihe
the ~allh'
~anll' l'I'·n·t
,'Il·n·t
a lil'll
lil"ll hy
h.l' jlld;:IIh"111
jlld;:lIh"l1t Ull
Ull "a;oI
~aid n'al
ro'al l,r"I!l,r"I!"
,'ny, From Ih"
oj lilill:':
th" lil1l"
time "i
lili,,:.: "j
"i 'Ill'h
'1ll'1I

~I.,It, 1,11\'
1.1\\' I,,'
,1..1<'

a:.:
a;: rt"'l11
n'"III "II II all oj Ihe
the r,':.!
r,':11 l'r''1 ... r:~'
T:~·

;o.tI!l~l·\·~ :nU
;o.t1!I~l·\·~

IIWrt'in
...·nrne
llwn·jll ,k,cril,,'"
,k"crilot'd ,11;.11
,11:dl hI' ;\11.1
:\IId lIlI...
·"me

1':1\
II:.' 't:~:,'
I':" :lll'nl'
:lh'lIl' :al,~:nu;:
:ll'~:lIl1;: :.,
:', 11:.'
't:I:,' irl1:l1
inl:!1 the

char;:.·"
j"r all .",i'I,III':C
cll;lr;:"d willt
Wilh a 1:1':1
1:":1 i"r
.",i'I,lll'C

11:11:,,11,,1
;':,I\','r:::II"III, ,),:111
,It:dl I", "r,',in.:n!
"r,·,jll.:n! by
l1:1t:"I1"1 ;':'I\'I'r:::'"'nt,

;1>
;\>

hy
loy l!ll"
1!1l' :q'l,!t,':lllt
:'I'I,II,':lIlt :1,
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in<iig-cllls, Ih
there
10
... re is 110
no con-

\ L.'L\ 3-17.
:\'. \L.'L!

>1:l\lli,,";\1 or ,:oll1J:lol1·I:\w
':01111:1011·1;1\\' dUlY n'stilll;
n'still!; lipan
"1:lIIli,,":l!
IIpon

.,.
., .
"
'::',

the )t:lIe
I'r.,vi.!c >lIl'l'ort.
>llpl'ort.
lhe
)1:11 ... to I'r,'\'i'lc

i':
i("

[5.61

\\'e held in 5t:lIe
51:11e ex reI. ~il·l"nn

Li!ld~trom. 68 Idaho 226,
\'. Liud,trom.
226. 191 P.:,l \l1(l'),
\!I()l).
).!rantin~ olf
o)f aid 10
to its
1012, th:lt "The J.:rantin~
is a wcl1
\\"cll n'~lll:lIi~I',l
"hli:,:atilll\
n'~"':ni~",l "hli:'::ltillll

net{J~'
a~ed
ncttJ~' al!ed

"tate and is a .~'l\·I·rnl1ll'lItal
.~'I\·I·rn11ll"lItal i1lllClilln
i1lllction
oi the "'atc
tendin!: to promote the p1lhlic w.-!i;lre."'
\wILlrc."

..\nr limitation
lim;tation upon lhe
the prlll'crty
property r;:.:hls
ri:.:hts of
..\nr
recil'il'J1!s in Ihe
the applicatioll ,li
tIll: li"n law
rce:pi"J1ls
'li Illl;
I'"rl'''~c,
is amply
anl1'ly 51ll'poned
5111'porled h~' a )l1I1oIi.:
p1lltlic 1'1Irp"~c.

namely to promote the "commun
"common ,HI
namel)"
\\'1'1 i:He."
Pn'amhle. It is thi"
thi~ fllI!.li.:
fI"rl'''~'' 1'1
t" which
Pn·:lmhle.
fl1I1IIic flllrI'U""
all lJ"ndici:lrics
b"ndici:lrics mmt lu"k
luuk to j1l,tiiy
ju,tiiy Ihe
the
paymellls thcy n:ccive.
n:c\:;\'e.
payme1lts

plIlllic
It is this puhlic

pllrpo~e which s;1\'{'s
s;w{'s the emire
entire p1lhli.:
pllhlie as·
aspnrpo~e

si~lancc law from direct
dire.:t conllict "'ith
~,'c
sistance
\\'ilh ~,·c'

tion 2. art.
art, S.
S, !.!aho
I,laho COll~t.,
COll~t., pru\"i.tinlo:'
pru\'i.till!o!" lhat
that
lion
,;ratl! ~hal1 11111.
llot. in any
"The creuit
cretlit oi the ,;laIc
manner, hc
he goi\'l'n,
to, or ill aid
manner.
goi,",.·n, fJr 10:ln.,d
loan"" 10,
indi,·;,III:lI.
oi any intli\'i'l1l:ll.
:-':icl:.OIl
:--:ieboll

\',
\'.

•

•

Lin,btrom,
Lind"trom.

...

State ex reI.

s1lpra;

\1:\1"".1:1
..\1:\1"",1:1

\', Janssen, 1(j
l(i Cal.1,1 :!;'(" 100i 1'.::,1
CUIIIUY \'.

11, 130
\30 ;\.L,R.
IH1;
11.
..\.L.R. 1H1;

~Ior~a!l \'. 'kpt.
Ikpl. oi
~lor~all

The recipient
re.:ipient
Th...

h:I> II"
ri~ht to a"i"tallce
a,~i>tall':': payments.
h:l,
"" veSll',j
\'e~tl'd ri~hl

i'

l)n thl' ':ulltr:try,
CulHr:try, his ril:hl
ri~ht thado
thaeto is entirely
l)1IIh,'
elltirely __ : '.':.
.'\
.... :\,
:\" slI...
,,\ .:r'·:llur...
':r,'atllre oJ
o,i ,1:lll1t
>1:lll1te.
sl1chh it is subject,'~
subject.·~ :':;:
to lJ,·ill~
bl·illL: "':<:1"11'1.-".
o::<:tl·I1,l.-d. dim;ni"hl'd,
dill1;ni"hl·d. eOtlliitiolled
','
10
cOl1l1itiolled :.:,.' :':'

allr"~:ltl:d 1.~·
1'~' Ih...
tht:' k).:i"lal1ln:.
k)!i"lamn:.
or ahr"~:ltc.l
hill1
him

.!>S,'T!
IU .L'S,·T!

Til
,.
T LI entitle.'
entitle, ~ ",~

,,;lIc!\
ri~III, hc
he nmst
nlll~t comply:.
comply, .
slI... h ri~hl.

f:..:.

Il·;.

Wllh :lit
;\11 Tl'a",'l\aloh'
Tl'a"lIlaloh' alld lhllhii,crimillatory.,
lhllhii::crimillatory,.~:~:~ :.
"'lIh
cOII,lili":I,
;.y till'
cOII,liti":I, ilill""".,j
illll",,,.,j ;'y
th,- 1",,:i,I:lli\'e
lq.:i,lal;ve author-. ,.:
'. . :

",

1I""lle l·Olllll'·.
,'te .. \'.
\', ~lyhre.
~h·hre.
149 Ne~7::
Ne~:;:'
11""",,,
l'OIlIlt~·.
. ,·t(
.
."
ll
Iili".
21>2: ;O:c"Io"y
,ili , 3': ~.\\':.1
~.\\':d 2'>2:
;O:clIlo"y \',
\'. Fair, iO'.,
iOI "' ': ~
II )hi" '\;'1'.
'\;'1', ,~l.
.~1. ~~ X.E ..!.!
.!,! 1.i'-I:
\.i'.I: Division of, .:
.\:.:e,), ,·tc.,
,.!.:., ,'.
ll"l(all, 143 Ohio:':"
Ohio:':' .....
:\id ior :hc .\::ell.
\'. 11"1(:111.
~!. 1
I :'Ii.
:'Ii, 54 ~. E.2.1 ;')0:
I: ..\
..\ flnl>.
nnll, SIS :\,L.R.?A.L.R.?o ..
~t.
;")0: 1:
~'I.!: 4ll
411 .\Ill.Jur.,
('(,II"i"n:'. § i, p. 966
966.
~11.!:
.\I11.Jur.. !'(,II"ill1l',

...

in'.
ilY,
.

'"\\'h:lt a\'I',,1/.1I1I;
"\\,h:lt
al'",·Il.lIl\~ aPfl";lr
aPfl,-:lr entirely to

O\"l'r~,,,,k
o\'\'r~, .. ,k
'·('~h·"
"r~h'"

in

.

:111\'
:1I1V

i"
till'\" ha\'e no
i:: :h ... :act Ih:\t
that tlll'Y
..

~"(;~~.
~ ~'.

7,~t
~,"; r : '

ri,-=hts in nld ~,,:.c
~1\:C hc:ncrits
hcnctlts Qr·~..
ril:hts
...~~ ..

The state'-:
Thc
stat';-:
::::~
,."

tlllla iorm oi rdid,
"Iha
rdid.

ha~.

m:ly.
... rits,
m;IY, ';IS
;IS it ha~, l:r:llll
J:ralll Slich
slIcll bell
bClICtlts,

i~ flot
not rnillircd
rnll1ired to Jo so.
it i"

111
In

but~'L
but:'.

'

~ • • ~ 'L' ~

gn.nt-~..::··.·
gn.nt.~
·'.·

ill!!, lh"1ll
th"1l\ it may illlp""e "lIch
~1I.:h con.1itions"':!.
con.1itions"':! \;
inl:"

lld\'(:rilll::'
\'.
Ild\'erilll::' \',

a~
'l1'" i,r"l'cr
:111J jll~t.
a~ it <l...
.J\'\·111~
i1rlll'er :IIlJ
.iu~t. If:l per- rooi: '.~
~)/1
~)/1 :1.:',;"\'1,,
ac'''I'I,. :Ia J.:ralll.
J.:rallt, he muSl
mllst accept it'.~;~:'~
~lIhH'<:: III
Dimke Y. \'"r('
SU"!"O::
til Ihe
th.: cOllllil
cOl"li! iOIl":'
iOll"'"

JlJt L:.S,
L",S. 61'J,
61,}, 57 S.Ct.
S.O, ~ltH, Sl
SI LEJ.
I);l\'is, Jut

01 ~lillr:. _".1, _"..IS :-;.\\. I:J, llt7=:'''''~
Fillke, _'1111
Fiuke.

SUI'ial
\\'a~h.2J 156.
156, 11; 1'.2.1
5ul'ial Security,
5ecuritr, 1+ \\'a~h.2J
6.o.:,f,:
:\llge1c~ Conllty
COllllty v.
v, 1..,
1..'\ FII""Il'.
FIl.,1Ih·, ~
tj..')f,: Lus :\nge1c~

wl.:?d

~;-U,
~;U,

129 P.2<1
P.2d 3;-8;
378;

.

.

.

--

-"~'.'::

..

paJ.:e
;")..;.,::.~~
paJ.:<: ;'1),

,::~,<

reierrcJ to in the
the: Lindstrom .:ase
be
reicrreJ
ca~c is 10
to bc

[91 Th,' .:'Ol1diti'l1l" impo"eJ b~' the s~(:'
lIt~ :Lre
:1\Jt ;\J
onl'r\JlI~ :IS thost
thosc ()rttinanlyj"
,,""II~ll'rIlY'
ute
arc :IOt
so Ol1aO""

uIIJt:'rstooo
than ;L
mandaullJ...
rstooo as a moral rather thall
a manda

i!tlI"'~~'.J
illll"I",,<!

obli~ation, The
th.: :\mcri.
;\meritory obli~ation,
The: theory of the

th~' (,,"frary,
);\\\" provide:s
providcs II
On th~·
(lIl1lr:lry, the: !;IW

citizen
SIlPCJn political system is that the ciliz
...n Sllp

:md huma11" plal1 by which l1...edr

pons the state, not the re'·crse.
re"crse,

own

P,81
P.81

The "obli)::\lion
"obli~ation of

Ihe
the

state-'
statc"

E\'ell
JS
E"en as

~'

:l

private ICII,lil11:
ICII,lill":- ttranS3.eti~~,
'alllsaCtlo~s;0
ill privale

hom .... 1I1:IY sccl1re old,age:

.~

f all""

,

a~, "'~~

assi~~$f
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contilluin~ to occupy and enjoy :heir
while continuin~
home, r:lther
r:lIher th:m being requin:d
required to ::!I)rt·
::ll)rt·
home.
;;:\~e or sell it, and consume the proc~5
proc~s in
;;:I~e
li\"in~
li\"il1~ expenses
cxpcnses bciore recei"ing
recei\'ing 3id.
aid. ,\t
the prl)pC~l"
prl)pc~y as
the ~ame time it presen'es thc
m~:tnS oi reimbursing the wcl
we\i:lrc
i:lre :anci,
:ancl.
a m~al1S
thus l;i"inb
l>i"inb thc
the rceipiellts
reeipicnts thc
the satisiac::on Ili
Ilt
paylll):
:hcir OWII
OWIl way as iar
tar as th~:'
th~y arc
payllll: :heir
~blc. :u',d
:ll'.d with the least h;lrdship.
h;lrdship, I: 3:;1)
l:;1)
rcdlh:,'S :he
amollllt whieh
which nlllst
nllI~t b.: co::::::u
cc:::::::uredll,"s
the amulIllt
uusl~' i'~'J\'ideci hy the taxl'a~'ers oi thF ,:at~
oj

nat:oll, who, thr')\1~h their Ic:,,';!:.ltjve

the real ohjection to this lien
licn law is that of
Ihe
prospeclive heirs.
the prospective
"The conflict oi interest here is not
between the State
St3t~ :1nll
:11\11 its ncedy
needr 3~e'l.
a~e.1.
It is Il\:twecn the Slale
State and
alld the
th.: heirs,
1I.::tt
nc:tl oi kin or other distriblllees
Jistriblltecs oi the
e,::l.Ies oi the deceased reeipiellls."
recipients."
e,:J.tc5
St:lte ex reI. ~iclstJll
~ic!st)n \'. Lindslrom,
Lindstrom, o.i
Stale
ri-i

Id.• ho 216.
216, 191 P.
P..?d 11)1)1),
11)1)9. 1/)12.
1/)12,
Id.•l1o
Ila\'il1;;- ntJ \'estet! interest, they ha\'e no
ri\:hl ttl complain. In r~ Smith's Eslatc, I~~

m.1.

!::;l, 10; P.:?d ISS; 16 c.rS" COllst:tU·
'.,re,entati\·cs, have "olulltariiy a,;o;:ned 1:"lIal 1_'1W, § !.!.,!,
t~.: mural
moral ob!il::ltiull
ob!i)::ttioll 10
?ru"iJe ~uc~
t~c
to ?ru\'iJc
sUc~ aid.
aid,
Al'pd!:llIts :llso contenrl that, since
[101
[101 Al'pd!:lllts
h is a mallcr
matter ot
01 eommon
common knowled~~
knowl.:J~~ :!lat
:!1at

,vmc
burdened them~:\'es
them~:"cs
>vme states
st:ltes h3\'c
ha'·c so burdcned
with ,'anous
torms oi
plloli.: assistanc.:
ll1,1
w:[h
\'anuus torms
oi public
assistanc.: an,!
lJi<kq::,e
,.ellsiolls that
thlt the
the threat
threat of
of :='<01.
ui.[.a!=e ;u:nsiolls
:=-<01.

thcir ,lalUS
,1:ttUS as c1ii;'ihle
clig-ihle r«:ipiellts
recipients ot tllrl·a~e
nld·a~e
Ihcir
3ssislance
assistance .....as
..... as cSlahlished
cstahlished 3n,1
anl\ reco~nized
reco~nized
prior
to
Ihe
1931
amendment,
al1plica
prior to the 1931 :lmenciment, the
the arplicl'

jHo\'ision to
has iorced
iorcc<i 3a modirie:ttion
oi :hcir
:hc:ir tion
tim1 oi
ot [he
the ncw
new jHo"i5ion
to Ihcm
them wtJulri
wt)ulri
has
mud:rieation oi
constitute
n:trtlsllccli\'e
oi
33,'cstetl
\'cSled
ccti\'e in\'asitln
l'iJ.IlS,
III
all
states
the
burdcn
oi
suc:'
lScOllstitutc
retrtlsll
in,'asinn
oi
pians. III all states the burden oi suc:' as
ri!:,ht. .-\s alrcad~' n'lle'!, recipi"ms can ac
si:tal1l:c has
has Ixeome
major pr1lhlcm,
prl,hlcm. "':H.
si:tallcc
become 3
3 1113jor
':J.r· ri!;"ht. '\5 alrea<l~' n'lte'!, recipi<:nts can aeqllire
no
\"c~tt<1 riy;;ht
iou~
mcthods
oi
reco,'cry
~a\"e
becn
ricv':!ed,
qllirc
no \"c~ted
riy;;ht ullder
under thc
the statule.
5tatl11e, The
The
jOll~ methods oi reCO\'cry h3\'C been <ie\'":scd,
let;i~latllre may Il1ndiiy
condit inns tJi
t)i
let;i~latllre
mtllliiy the cOlldititllls
:ll:d
;ll:d rc~:-,;IPs
rC~:-,;IPS 1I0llC
110ne !las been
bc.:n emirely
e1ltirely !J.tis.
assi~laltce.
assi~lalh:c, or delly it 3ltogether,
altogether, 3t J"ny
i:actMY, .'\mollg
plans some
somc ;:.o:es
5:":':5
i:acIMY.
.·\mollg such plalls
time.
"c provided
pro\"ided ior reimhursemcnt
r.:imhur~cl\1cnt b~'
by ~c!a·
~~!a·
ha "e
[11) It is also ctJnlell.lerl
cnntell.ler\ that appcllants
t;\"e~. k:.::llly
ca~~ I)i
t;\'e~,
k:.=:111y responsible ior the ca~c
V,:l'::Y
\',:l,y

'il-niee! cfjll:ll protection
proteclion of Ihe
ciders. This, however, has
ha; ;;":en
;;":o::n arc .kllied
the law,
law. .\rt.
.\rt,
their HCcUy
neeuy duers,
I,
§
Z.
ItI:lhtl
Ctlll~titlltitJll,
The
CtllllClllioll
iv:,l1\u ,!dicult ot applicat:on
ldahn COII~titntinll.
contcntiol1
iv:,!l\u
applic:ll:on and, in !·Jm.:
!'JmC
Ins:ead of rl·qu:::n::
r,'qu:::n:: is that they, as owners tli
nt n";'\1
n'al prll(lerty,
prl,pcrty. are
c::cllm:;t:\nc,'s, unjust.
c::'llmst:lnCl's.
ulljuS\' Instead
rdati\'cs to providc
SUI'Pvrt, 0:::
discriminatcd al;airlsr,
a!;airlsr, in that they arc
lrc re·
rc·
the relatives
pro\'idc the SUl'purt,
r;~ to
~o discriminated
re:tnhl\r~l'
51:11e, our law limils
limits rl:C7\'cry
rCC7\'cry
re:tnhllr~l' the Slall:,
to the c~:;lte,
or
the
rcal
property,
0: :he
c~t;lte.
rl:al
~he
The relalivcs
relativcs arc asked
a~ked on;:
on; ... :'l
rC'::l'ient. Thc
rc.::p":nt.
(l;tymcnts, "hat
ior.:,;u.
iore;;u. to the e:tt,:nt
e:tt,~nt oi $uc:t (l;'\ymcms.
-:;-hOlt

fjllired to gram
grant 3a lien UJlon
upon their propcrlY,
property,
whereas Ileelly
a~e,1 wl1l) h;\\,c
flO real e5
ncclly a..:e.1
h:\\'e 110
eslate,
hut
may
own
persollal
prtJperty,
t:tte,
prt)pcrty,

arc
;'lid withl)nt
are ~rantell
~rantcII :lid
withl)l1t sllch
such rCfjllirelllellt.
rCfjlliremclIt,
otherwise might inherit,
inherit. ,\s WlS
.. ~. and 3re
are therdore preferred.
prcicrred. It is reetJ~
recn~they olherwise
was !,!'''~
nized
that
d~e
ICl:islatllre
has
bro:lt1
dis
l,ed :n State
e.'C
rd.
Xiclson
v.
Lindst;om,
nizetl
d~e
Ic!:isllture
h;ls
bro:w
disSt:1te c:.."C
Xielson

......,
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crl'tioll:Lry Iluwa 10 Ill:lkc c:I:l~~iri'::lli"l1~
oi

I'.:r~,",s
I'l'r~"I1S

and
al1d

pr"l'crlr
pr"l'l'rrr

'ur
hJr

;111
all

purpur

933; Dill1ke ", [-,illl,;,-.

':1 1'1 ~rillll.

\I"')Ill" 1~'''lIl\Y
1~'''I1L1y
\\'. ;-.~: "'"llll'

,'1,' .• ",
\'.
,'I,',.

:'1,

~~1.~ ~.

:o.lyhn', 1~9'
:'Ilyhn·.

;\"1,, IIIi",
IlIi", .;~ :\,\\',':d
X,\\',':d ':h'::
':/1':; III r,' l'l'illion
l'l'illioll of
whi,h
:lC· :\"1,,
whi.:h it may
Illar bWlully
b\\'illily ~,'d;
~<'l'k to :Ie·
Ihl' ,TlI:'ti.:,':'.
.T1I:'1i.:,',., ~::
~3 :'\,IT.
X.IT. ;;"..:.
3".:. I;;~
I~~ .\, '!I;";
':1;"; :\n
:\nSu
lOll;.;' as Ihe
S<.I 10'1;.;'
the ,·I;""ill'::1,i.1I1>
,'!:,,:,i 11\: a Ii.lI1> lh..
lLo.
~!1
.\.T..I~,
~II':;
"\III1U.
i12,
II".
~ll
.\.T..I~.
~ll':;
"\III1U,
1':5
AI_R.
i12.
arC' IJa~,·.r IIpon
IIpon :--t)lIh."
:'"t)lIh." h·;:itl111:U\.'
h·;:itl111:lh: :.;rullrl,l
:.: rlJll 11,1 qi
rC)s,'~
pos,'s

curnl'li~h.
cUllll'lish,

,
),

dirT"r':!1l'C'
oIi,T,'r<:lll'': Ill,·lw,.:n
hl'IWl'l'1I th
thl'... p.:rsulls
pl'rSulIs ur
<.Ir "h.i'·CIS
'lh,i'·':IS
.:!a~~ijj,'d, :lrl"
IIl1r'::1;lll1;d,k' ,'r
:Ire' !lui
nul 1II1r'::I,ol1:d,k'
,Ir ~rh;Ir:HY,
~rhilnrr,

anti ',,,,'ar
'I",'ar

:1 r"l':,:,,4HlalJlc f"l'!:ll\1)11
J,·;,:l~.
r"l'!;ll\1)11 tn
In ~lh
~lh.·.• JI·;,:l~.

1~1l1\"l'
1~1l1\"l' pllrJlU~l'.
pllqlu~l'. SU\.-!,
su\."!, ,"·!:1.,,;::,111l·:lli"I:~
,"·!:1.,,;::,111l·:lli"I:~ ,1.1
,Ill nflt

111:.1
B::: \\'",,,1
\\''''101 ......
1,... 111;,1
(<.I. ".
", (h:I\'I11:II1,
Cha 1'1ll:1I1, 4~ I.]:lh"
I,]:dl" ,,..
-:/1. ~/'.i
~/·.i ['.
[', ~,;:
L"u.
..-:11.
j{,,'.,'c
\'. L'iIY
j{",.".: ".
L'ity lli [">'::llcll'I,
l'OI-::11.:II", ;-n {.ialt"
l.iah.1 31.\.
21X p,.?,]
\', E\'al1~,
1'];11",
P,.?,l li~~: S!.ll':
S:,lll' ,',
E,'alls, ~.l 1']:11",
50, ~43 I'.?I\
.• ::il:,l\::,",
:0,
I',?!l ;-~..;; ~ll ~\m.Jur
~\m,Jur,.
::il:'ll::"',
\·;"l:Ilc IIIl"
,'j"l:\tc
III<' CIII1"lil:llilll1,
':1l1l"tit:lIiOI1,

S ::::,
::~, p. ".
u.

r121

4

.

. 1,
,j

4
~

r

-: {
: ;

..
,I..rl
"

,

'; tol

Wilh'lI 111,'
:lIl1h"rity oi Ihe
Ihc 1t-;:1,1:llure,
witllOl'
th,' ;L1llh"rity
k;:l,I:l!ure, it
i~ 11,,1
:n :lllY
:U'Y :'l'm
111,':11 "r
.. r ",!'<'..:i;11
lI"t :11
~l'me... a 1.11';,1
...·o:i;11 law,

th,'
11l,·.lIIill~ oi the
Ih,' 1L1t·.lIIin,;
lh~ ",l::;tiult:on.
\',':::tiutl:on,

~l:'ll'
~t:'lt" ,',-':
,',": rd. :'\id""1
:,\id"'l1 Y. Liu,blr":tl.
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CHAPTER 49
(H.S. No. 451)
,.'.;:l
.,'.;:l
~

.... '

AN ACT
iitATING TO HEDICAL ASSISTANCE; AMENDING CHAPTER 2, TITLE 56, InAHO
iit!TING
',-')' CODE, BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 56-218, IDAHO CODE, TO PRO
PROJ.l
VIDE FOR THE RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL ASSISTANCE; AND REPEALING
J~
'~'" SECTION 56-224c, IDAHO CODE •
'~'.'

.'. '1""-:
".,.:

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

SECTION 1. That Chapter 2, Title 56, Idaho Code, be, and the same
hereby amended by the addition.thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be
kDovn
56-21B, Idaho Code,
Gode, and to read. as
kDown and designated as Section 56-2lB,
,follows:
.follows:

1'''
l' ';

1_
i.

.~
'~

~edical
56-218. RECOVERY OF CERTAIN HEDICAL ASSISTANCE. (1) ~edical
.,as.istance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual
.,.,.istance
'vllo was siKty-fLve
silCty-fLve (65) years of age or older when the individual
'¥bo
r~ceived such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there
: received
be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be
"cbarged for such aid paid to either or both; provided, however, that
. claim for such medical assistance correctly paid to the individual may
be established against the estate, but there shall be no adjustment or
,be
'recoverY,thereof
surv1vIng spouse, if
recoverY,thereof until after the death of the surviving
any, and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child who
I,
I. under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and
recipitotally disabled. Transfers of real Or personal property by recipi
eat. of such aid without adequate consideration are voidable and may
be:8et aside by an action in the district court.
~.~', (2) Except where there is a surviving
surVIvIng spouse, or a surviving
~,~',
~Ud who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or perma
perma~ild
lIentlyand
Ilelltlyand totally disabled, the amount of any medical assistllnce paid
~der this chapter on behalf of an individual who was sixty-five
~der
(65)
rears of age or older ~hen
~hen the individual received such assistance is
Jear.
pro'-.:claim against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship pro
.- ceeclipgs
escace •
~eeclipgs and may be paid from che escace.
';:' (3) NOthing in this section authorizes the recovery of the SlDQunt
alllQunt
from the estate or surviving
survlVlng spouse of a recipient to
t;o the
., ~f cyaid
tJlyaid frolll
btent that the need for aid resulted frolll
from a crime
C'.rime committed
c:01l1lllitted against
..tent
.~. recipient.

.>,

"', SECTION Z. That Section 56-244c, Idaho Code, be, and the same
hereby repealed.

is

Approved Karch 21, 1988.
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CHAPTER 50
(H.B. No. 562)
AN ACT
RELATINC TO MEDICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER THE MEDICAID PROGRAM; AMENDING
CHAPTER 2, TITLE 56, IDAHO CODE, BV THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION
DETERHINING MEDICAL
56-20ge, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE A PROCESS FOR DETERMINING
MARRIED COUPLES; AND REPEALING SECTION
ASSISTANCE ELIGIBILITY FOR HARRIED
INF
32-915, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO A WIFE'S DUTY TO SUPPORT AN INFIRM'
HUSBAND.

I
I
It
!
~

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Chapter 2, Title 56, Idaho Code, be, and the same
hereby amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be
to read as'
kno~ and designated as Section 56-20ge, Idaho Code, and
follows:
is

ASSIS
56-20ge. ELIGIBILITV OF MARRIED COUPLES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
legislatu
UNDER THE MEDICAID PROGRAM. (1) It is the intent of the legislature
whi
in enacting this section to reduce the number of situations in which
medicaid regulations as they apply to long term care costs, cause
either the destitution of the entire family, or a dissolution of mar
riage carried out to prevent destitution. It is further the ihtent of
righ
this legislation to protect the community and separate property rights
of a married person whose spouse applies for medical assista
assistance
regardless of whether they are living together.
(2) (a) In determining the eligibility of an aged, blind or dis
assistanc
abled married individual or of a couple for medical assistance
inc
under title XIX of the social security act, the amount of income
and resources to be counted as available to such individual or
couple shall
be calculated in accordance with the community prop
sha~l.be
pro
erty provisions of chapter 9, title 32, Idaho Code, or should it
be to the advantage of such individual or

couple,

in

accord
accordance

with the methods utilized by the federal supplemental securit
security
income program under title XVI of the social security act.
(b) Where both spouses are applying or are covered by medical
assistance, the same method of counting income and resources shall
liabil
be applied to both spouses and utilized to determine the liability
of each for the cost of medical care; however, for any month for
which either spouse receives a supplemental security income pay~
56-20 or
ment or a state supplement under section 56-207, 56-20B
56-209a, Idaho Code, or for which an application is filed and sub
sequently approved, the methodology of the supplemental security
income program shall be applied.
.
eirn.<r••••
(c) The presumption of the availability of income under either
the community property or supplemental security income method
be rebutted by either spouse.
(d) The department of health and welfare shall furnish to eac
medical assistance applicant who is aged, blind or disabled,
clear and simple statement in writing advising them of the provi,

:.
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IDAHO SeSSION
seSSION LAWS

:hi,
:his section.
y provision of this section or the application thereof
n or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall
ler provisions or applications of the section that can be
~ithout the invalid provisions or
applications, and to
rovisions of this section are severable.
~.
_d.
I

That

Section 32-915, Idaho Code, be, and the same is

21, 1988.

CHAPTER 51
(S.B. No. 1402)
AN ACT
COMMISSION; REPEALING SECTION 22-2919, IDAHO
CHAPTER 29, TITLE 22, IDAHO CODE, BY THE ADDITION
SECTION 22-2919, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEPOSIT
URSEMENT OF FUNDS OF THE COMMISSION; AND AMENDING SECTION
IDAHO CODE, TO STRIKE OBSOLETE REFERENCES •

~E BEAN
~NDING
~NDING

~

. by the Legislature of the State of Idabo:
That Section 22-2919, Idaho Code, be, and the same

is

.ed.
2.

.li'
II "
"f

That

Chapter

29,

Title 22, Idaho Code, be, and the

y amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be

ignated as Section 22-2919, Idaho Code, and

to

read

as

DEPOSIT AND DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS. (1) Immediately upon
moneys received by the commission shall be deposited in
eparate accounts in the name of the commission in one or
or trust companies approved under chapter 27, title 67,
s state depositories. The commission shall designate such
continu
t companies. All funds so deposited are
hereby continu-riated for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of
,riated
is can be withdrawn or paid out of such accounts only upon
orders upon such accounts signed by two (2) officers
y the commission.
right is reserved to the state of Idaho to audit the
commission at any time.
Or before January 15 of each year, the commission shall
agri
t~e senate agricultural affairs committee, the house agri~lr, committee, the legislative budget office,
~l~S
the state
. the division of financial management, a report showing
~er
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to such regulationa)
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,
irubaections (1)(3), (m)(3), and (m)(4) of this section,
"k'(17)
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}, include reasonable standards (which ahall
accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary,
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I. X:, XIV"or
XIV,. or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV of this ehapter,
ehapter. and
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arnmgeinents for joint planning and for development.of
development of alternate methods of
,~
..... ' .. , care, 8lT8lIgeIDents
arn.ngements providing
llB8UnJ1ce of immediate 'readmittance
readmittance tD
providUJg assuranee
to institll
institllt~t:;·~,
o{ care, and 1UT8Jlge
'" " tions where needed for individuals under alternate plans of
1UTIIJlge, :', menta providing for acceaa
access tD
to patientn and facilities, for ftmIiahing
furniahing information,
. ~~",. '.:'.
Im'~...
.... ~'
.. '.
.'
.:
.'
... and for making reports; :', J .' ..,."
"
~'
" '".
••"
~
-"m)"pnWide
usure that the
'''(B)'"pnWide for an individUal plan for eacIisiJch
eacJisiJch patient to assure
. ',;, ,! iristitlltional care provided tD
to him is ill
in his best interests, including, to that end,
,I',::
888lIl'lIJIce9 that there will be initial and periodic
.:: assurances
periodie review of his medical and
•
other needs, that he will be given appropriate medic:al
medical treatment within the
~'.' :.,:: ..
, ,institution;
-will be a periodic,
institution,· and that there
there·will
periodie, detennination of his need for
c:ontinued trea1ment in the institution; and :'
·f
f.
..
,
.,
::,,:,',
,,:,', ,.:- continued
'
',hl:. ,: ::i
(C) provide'for
::j (e)
provide' for the development of alternAte plana
plans of care, making maximum
Ii:,.• i.::"
i,.::·' utilization of available resources.
resources, {or
for recipients 65 years of age or older who
;: ,1
would otherwise need earein
care in such institutiODS,
institutions, including appropriate medical
'<J'!..-~
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Acijustment
or. •recoVery
of medical 888lstance' correctly paid under a State plan
-,
.... '-":'.
_'J.,!.'.~..:-"",~
I: • .....
',.
(1) No ad,ju.stIDent orniearery of any medical asaistaDce correctly. paid on behalf of
indMduaI under the State plan. may ,be made,·euept·that.the State shall seek
.V'II4:ljuartmlmt'· or recovery of any medical.8.IIIIiataDee" correctly, paid on behalf of an
IndiYiduiBl under the State plan in the case of the tallawiDg individuals:
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ease or au
aD individual-described in· subeeetion (a)(1XB) 01
of this section, ~ .
(A) In the eaae
.... the State shalt
leek adjustment or recovery from the Individual's esta~
Hta~ or upon sal~ ,
.. '.' ....the
lIhaIt aeek
of medicalllS8fatance
medicalllssfatance paid '011 .
':.;" of the property subject to 'alien imposed on account 01
!~.,.~~~l~~(~~~ ~~ :-.~,.~
:-.~ .. ~"~.. ~ :.; "~;
'''t'~I:I.~I.:\ ~."~''-;;' '.~~~"~.'
'.~~~:~.'
· ~~.'.~~~l~~(~~~
'.~; ~.~~:.~:~ ..~' ""t'~I:I.~I,:\
·.~~ri~ .r
'~.:·'·.,,:(B) In the ease-.ot.an.
ease·.ot.an. individual who was 66 years 01,
of, age OJ~
OI~ older when' ~H
., '~,:·:·.,,:(B)
.,;.1 :·iridiv1dual.
reeei'vednch :medical
'-medical lIlIllilItanee.
aaaiIItance. the State IIhalI
adjustment~_or
.,:.1
:·iridiv1dua1. reeeMldnch
IIha1I ~~,
~lk· adjustment~_or
.:.:
:""'~:reeoVeiy-!rom the individual's estAte,
Cor medical'assistance
medical-BBSiatance corisistmg or-~"
':': :""'~:reeoVeiy'!rom
l!Ilt8te, but only tor
··:....;
:.•. -, '.:.;'
D~: tacIlity
&erVices, 'home and co~unity-bssI!d
co~unity-twed seJ:vieeS,i
re1Ite.:!:l .
-.:.;' . (I)'
d)' D~:
taeI1ity BerVices,
seJ:vieeil,1 and re1Ite'
·.
hospita1aud
prescription drugeervi~, ~ .,
;: :.'''::.
.'
... .-l.~~.,~~
hospit.a1aDdpreseriptiondrugaervi~,~
_, ::
:,",,:'. "'.. ,1.
'"
,- .~.~,,,+.·'-l.~~
.. ~~
"... ".,
s:.~!.~ ~th~ State, ariy i~ or.eervl~.
or.servi~. under t.~~ ~~te pl~~~~;
"...
,'"
.. _~i~). a:.~!.~
'. ·' . (CHi>
(C)(i) In Uie Case ill'8niadividual whow received (or is entitled I to reeeive)
iaBurance policy in colllledion
colUledion with wfUCh
wfUC:b UlM!ta
uaeta 0:.'
, . ·,benefits
benefits under wag-term care iDBurance
. .· l"eBOID'l:e8
reaoun:ea are ctisreprded in the manner described in claUBe
clauae (if);ellcept 'as provideol
In such clause.
clause, the State IIhalI
lI(ijustment· Or recovery tl'IIJJI
tl'IIIJI .'the
the Ilndividual~
btdividual~.I
. : in
IIha1I seek lUijustment·
", ... :Jfty0n
;:!ifty0n ~tl~intermedicalasaiBtan~
~tl~intermedical aaaiBtan~ ~d.o~
~d,o~ behalf ~t
~f the individuall~or
individuali~or ~~:
"...,
· -' "'cmg.. . ~ sernces, ..
.• ,., " ....
.. : '.':' rl' ",,".TI
-",".TI ,
·-'
an ~ f!!. cmg-.
..[[ ...
,' .•_,, .•.
'
.... (Ii)
(II) Clause (i) abaD DOt apply in the eaae
ease 01
of an individual who received medleal
medical
,,.:,
.,'....

. ;'

+.,

a

I

plan 01
of a State which had sa State plaD
plan amendment
aaaiBtance under a State plaD
approved as ot Hay 14, 1993, which provided tor the disregard ot any assets or.

-OiJ .~:i
.~:'i ~!:~::".-'"
~!:~;-:".-'" ~1::~ ."
' ......
":'~~ ': .;
.. ; .:~~;r::~."
.:~~;r::~." ..... '.
~
"iJ
..... ":'~~.;
. •

:.. : II ~':":',::
~.:.':'.:! ~ .,.i:,.
..' :..:
!ong-l.en:D care inaurano~'
lnsurano~'
(I) to the extent that payments are made under a !ong-t.en:n
':... : .'.- polley;';or '::).,:"::"1'
: :",
• .:
-.I ';',"
':",:
_::' .. :"::"1' .,:.":
"',": ....
.. " :~ :,'
:.' :'J;. ,.; '.jj.....
.. , ..
';,." ..

;:l;i,
";:);i,

>.. ':

beeaaae an indiVidual haa
has received (or is entitled to lreceive) benefits
benefit.
(ID beeaase
~era'long-termC8leins~mlllC~~poliCY, ::'"
·jr·:
:. ~er"loDg-tenDClIle~~poliCY,
.",".' ",'
.
. .'
'jr':

I': .;

: .'
·....
(2)-Any··icu~~fcir·~~·~der paragraph (l):iDay
.... -(2)-Any··icu~~fcir·~~·~der
(l):may be'Dwlll
be'Dwl,! only ~ ..t1;:..
t1;:,'
.. ,.~ea~_~!~e.
in~~':':"':'B.~~ s~use~
!f ~y, an~_o~y at a
;:-:;c;,j(.
....
~ea~.~!~e. in~~':':"':'s.~~
8~use~ !t
;::;e:,j(.
:.- (A) "weD
hellait JiOt;~
not;~ 'Child
-Child who'fa 'imder age 2l,"or(wftJi .respect bl
b)
"when heliait
partidpate in the State prograni'
Wlder~ subchapter.
States eligible to participate
program"' established W1der~
of this chapter) iabJiDd or ~ntly
~ntly and totally disabled, or (with respect til "'.
XVI 01
Statel whieb areliontigibleto
areliot'etigibleto participate in such program) is blind or' dfaabled II(
'. . States
.:'. ;.,::.~e1!ned
m.~".~ 0I.~
of.~ title;
tRJe; and'
and', ,'I.:
,'4: :' ...• ~•. ~ > ....1.
.• :: ..
,~,
-"':IB'
::.~e1!ned m.~,.~
1. ,:
,:.•
",~,
"":IB'
'of a' Hei! on an liIdividlial's
lildividUaJ's home under subaei:tion (a)(l)(B) ot
oC this
thi.
. . ',". (B) in the ease '01
.
U;"'r:',
·"",1···..~ ....;:
" ~J:
.~
.'·;.~t:·~''Jtn
.,. '11 .~.'
" ~. '.~"L't'~~~'
,.
,,' .
"~f'.... ; 8e'etlo1l,
wb.m--=-. "I.ll;'.:;r...i.
.. - .I:i"'ul;,~:·~
J,. .
i.:;,..
"
Lt."M'.
':":'j.
'..
•• '-".
-.-..i;.8eetlo11,
·l'_~·.
_...'•.•
':"~:~h:
."
...
... - .-.\
.. .
__ . (i) DO sibUng
sihUng ot
at th.e Individual (who WII8
was residing in the individual's home tcf
.. .._'..,_.~
_.~ ....
inliividua;l's,
~ ":. ; < .a"per1od·of
.a.. per1od·oI at least one year immediately before the date of the' individua;l's,
'.:." , .'.-~'tIo
~e.,!IledIcallnstitutlon),:and ,,"
,,"." .'-'- ..."
... " '·-"·'·.·:r
,.- .... '. -:r
..::
,: '11.,
'.::'
.-~'tID ~e.,!J1edIcallnstitutlon),:and
.;
., • .. " ... '1,-1
••. r_ ..
'.. .~. I'..
.'
.•
..,
,,1"'6 \ .... ~: .' .'i'"
''i'"
.~J ....
.~:.!. ...
1,""6
. - -,.
.' ~~
'.
,(if)
individuar,(
. (if) no son or daughter ot the Individual (who was residing in the individu8I',(
yeara,ilr!mediately before ItI!ejdate 01
of .~f
home tor a period ot at least two years.in:!med!ately
individual's admission to the medical institution; and who establishes'to
establishes' to tin,"
:. ." individual'a
th!."
.... - . >i:atfst'ac:tioil:of
>i:atfst'ac:tioJi:of the State that he or she. provided care to such utdiVidaal
....iJtdiVidnaJ ,~cl!~·
!lnatitutioD),
. permitted such individual to reside at home rather than In an !lnatitutioDl,
. ',';'. fa 1aw1Ully
mllUch ,home ,who ~·.~~Y·resiQed·
~·.~~Y·reaiQed· ~',~:cls
~',~:cl. h~me 'o~~l:
.':';'.
1aw1UlJ¥ reSiding IDlIllch
date "of
..01 the· individual's admission 1;0 the mediCld
..,.:;'.'
:;'.' :·,·contlnuous·..
:·,·contlnuous· .. baaia sincet.he
since the...,date

time::-.. I.' .

or

.:'. ;.

when-=:

.1'1

.... d ••

.......

<..

1_,"• • •

,

.;

..:
.r ..:

••

•

..

' .... •1

I'..

.'

.,

,

I'

'

,.'

.

. ',';:;:.:; .....

lnatiblti~_ ':~;I.;:_-:?;
;~.~,:,.:~
~:!,~ ..~':::,.:::;,,;::
~':::,.:::;,,;::,.:
iJUltiblti~,
":~;I-;:_-:?; ,~::,",,~
.~::.".;~ . ;~.~.:
..:~ ~::,~
.. : . ',';'::.:; . ·.....:,i~;
i~;

:~~!-;
;:. :~~!.;

establfsh proeedares (in accordance with sl~dards
sl~dards 8J*li'
sl*li'
.. (3) The State agenc:j' shall' establish
Secretary), under.
under which the agency shaD waive the applic:ationol.
appJic:ationot. ~~:
fied by the Secretary)
(l)(C»)'oiC such
Buchapplication
\I/'Onld W'ork
w'ork an .."undl1~.
undIH .
. subsection (other·than : paragraph (l)(C»'>it
application III'Owd
..~~~~~~;. ~ ~t~~.estab.~~
",bardship~
bardship~,,~~~~~~!
~f~~,estab.~~ ~..t:b.e
.. ~.e Secretary.I.~.;,./
Secretary.I.~.;'.1 \~f~
piu,:iOBeS Of this" iiubsedloD,
iiubaedloD, .tlie
(4) For piu,:i08eS
the term .-"estate",
"estate", With respeet tol. s·
a' deceased
.. individual-.
.
.;'"~'C:;~
,:; .:_:.:.,
.:_:.:. - i·.,,;:~.·,1.:!.':n[··
.;'":·c;~ :::: :; ,':
i·'I;:~",1.:!.~.i[··
:,;.: '.~:: (A)"sh8Dincll1de
(A)"ah8Dinclllde all reaI'and peisonal property and other asaets
: :,::
BSBets included withiD
"'.....
,... :: the' Individual's
btdividual's estate, as defined fo~
Co~ purposes ot
oC State probate laW; l~"': )i\!!il!l
)iI!!il!l
include. at. the.
the.I?Ption
a.tJaIl !nclude, in th!! case ~()a;m
.
.' (B) may include,
C?ption of the State (and a.tJall
I • individual to Whom' paragraph' , (l)(C)(i) 'applies), any' other real and' peraoDl~
petlIODid .
andotber
assets in whidr·the individual had.any
had,any legal title or interest
Interest ~~ .
'.'. property and
other lISlIets
·'the
such ..interest).
interest), including'Such
s:c()DVI!yefiJ.l
"the time ot death (to the extent of
ot such..
ilu:luding'such aasoellt
aaselta.'conveyedJ~
aa SW"i'ivor.
SW"i'ivor, heir, or assign' of the 'deceased
tenancy, tenanCY."'
deceased individual through joint teUaDl:Y'
in common, 1JIU'Vivorship, lite estate, living trust.
trust, or othu an;mgement,:!:':':;Il,
acr.mgem.ent.: i:...:"",.~i!Ilt I
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lLlC· HEALTH
.. AND WELFARE
HEALTH..AND

"aJdJII',1nto
"aldIII'.1nto aeeoUDt adain tnuud'en.ot aueta ,.:'~!:q
,':'~!:q 'ro' ::,':
::' ': :':'.
:':" :.:, ,"
'(A)"uI'Ora~~to!inf~ttbe'ieqU:hi:iii8irti'ot
'(A)"uI'Ora~~to!inf~ttbe'ieqU:hi:iii8irti'ot tIii8"~cin'ror
tIii8"~cin'ror ~ ot seet!on
'(a)(18) ot thla UtIe, the State plan must provide that I( an lastltutlonalized
'(8)(18)
iaBtltutlonalized
idual
iduaJ or the spouse 01
of sw:h
IIUdl aD.1DdividuaI
aD ,1DdividuaI (or. ,at the option of _ S~te, _
a IIOJIinatltuIIOJIinatltu·
Uzed IndMduai or the spouse ot such an
811 Indfvfdual) dlapoaea
dlIIp0Be8 of assets tor leu than
narlcet
narket value 011
on or after the IDok-back date specl1!ed
Ipecl1!ed In IlUbparagraph
IIUbparagraph (BXO. the
'dual Ia
fa lneHgible tor medfeal ueistarice
UIistalice tor services described In subparagraph
(or,
(or. In the cue
CIIll8 of •a DOaiDstftatfonaJized
noaiDstftatfonaJized Individual,
1ndlvldua1, tor the services desc:ribed In
'ngraph (eXU»
(exu» cfuriDB
cfuriIlB the period begfmlfilg
begfmililli' on the date spec16ed in aubPlII'IIi1'8ph
aubPIII'IIi1'8Ph
,d equal to the number 01 mODtb8
mODtba apedfted !D mbpar88t8ph
,
mbpar8lt8ph CE).. ,
U)The
l00k.ij8clc'diie'~·iD!'Wi·~pii-8grBphfa_
l a_ date that fa'86 mOlltM
montM
(0
The l00k-ij8clc'diie'~'iD!'Wi'~pii-8grBpb
I the 0I8e ot.payinenta
ot.payinentB from." tni8t!ir pOrtIons of a tnJst ~t are treated as I88et8
lIlI8et8
led of by the IDd!vfdaal pur8WIlIt
1ed
purllWIllt to 'Jiarairaph (3)(A)(W)'or
(3)(A)(W) 'or (3)(BXiI)
(3)(BXif) ot subaec:t:ion
lUbaec:t:ion
this aec:tioJl,
.peeUied InClallBe
aec:tIon, 60
eo months) before the'date
the'datupeeUied
InClaWle (iI).
(ill. .,...
",.. :,'
:"
.

Th~·~'.~'~'~;cl~!;~,
Th~'~'8~'~'~;cl~!;~. ~.~~.:::~,\
~'~~,;::~,\ :.~,~;;;'::~'

I

..

I
~'

.......
'
......
-'.', :.;.
:.:.

I .'.:',-,, .

"',')
,)

","

.--~ ..... ~. '.i'

,':' .', '

(I) 811
&II Inst1tu~DAIi:Bd
Inst1tu~DAIi:ed

Individual ...
Ja.. the 1!m
1!nt date u 01 which the Individual both
an
lnat1tut1onalfzed indMduaI
811 1n.Bt1tut1onalfzed
in.di9idua1 aad
&lid hal _ppUed tor medlW
medlal II8IiItanc:e
aaaistanc:e under the
tate plaD. or .....
<111'..... ;,.' ....·•·
·•·
.. J ' r... : ._..~.
.
e ' - ""'1
"""1 ·r
·r.....
'_..~.
(D)
(0) a iIoiunatitudoD&llzed
iIoiunltitutloD&Iized '~uA1fa"the
'~uA1Ia"the date' on"whlch the Individuaiappiles
individual applies
r medfeal
medfea1 "ei.tance
"ei-tance azufar
lIZldsr the state:
state: Plan
P1an::or,
or. I( later"
later., ~e date on
011 whlch the
dlIIpoaea 0I8IIIIeta
of 8IIIIeta tor II!8I ~ ~.
~,~k.et
!8!,lJllo.... .;
.; ""
dfvidual dlapoaea
~ket !8l,IJI!o",.
.•'.'' "'he 1M!l'9ice.a
aemce.ll ..deaeribed
deseribed 'In thfs
this subparagraph with respeet to an
811 lnetltutfonaltzed
InatltutfoDaltzed
.
Ire
:~ :::'; ;, '~:.:,
..
lr'e the tollowing:
'~:,:, "~.! ,
"lm"NIU'lI1ng
lI8Z'Vflle8.
-- :' :';' ,
NIll'Iing taclllty II8Z'Vflles.
..;
(m A level ot eare~m
esre~m ,any'
,811)" fllsUtudim
fnsUtudim equivalent'to
equivalent· to that of nurinng ladlfty
ladllty
I"I'feeI.
·~-';
:..
l'V'feeI.
.
·~. . ....
. . . JC.~ ........
..... ... ,···~:.H
,···~:.lr " ••
••:..
(IlJ) Home or' CODImImfty-baiIed
CODlDDmfty·bailed lerrices
lerriees tumlahed under
Wider a waiver sranted UDder
under
beec:don
139& ofthia
b~ (e)
ee) or (d)
Cd) 01
of seetlDn
sectlDnl396n
otthia title. ";;,.~,:,
;.;"~'~;:4 ,:,1
::·t <,
'!.~. :J
:.t ,;'
.~.
The aemciis dac:ribed'!D'W8'lubparagraph
dac:ribed'!D'W...ubparagraph wfth respect to'S 1I0ninatitut10na!ized
noninatitutlonallzed
uaI are aeivIeee
aeivieeI (DOt lDcJudmg
lDeIudfq any
811)' serv1c:e8;
aerv1c:e8; desc:ribed In c:l8use (f)) that are
ad In paragraph (7), (22)i or'(24) at eec:tIon
aec:tIon 1S96d(a)
lS96d(a) of th1s
th1B title, and, at the option
tate, other long-term
,care .aarvices
long·term,care
.88r'Yices tor which. medical, ,aasistallee
,aasistanee fa otherwise
Ie under
Wider the State jUA to individuala requirfng
requirlng lang-tenD, care. •
rhedate-a~
I'hedate-a~ fD Wa'SubparBgraph
Ws'SubparBgraph fa the 1!nt
1!rat day ot the tIrst mOllth
month during
.'" which aaaete
birv8 been tnnaferred tor leaa than
IIDd which
aaaetB bIrv8
thaD lair market value
ValUll IIlId
t OCCIJJ'
IneUgibfPty under thia·
subeec:tfon. ; ::" .',
0«lJJ' in
In any other periods of
otlneUglbfPty
thiuubeec:don.
...." :
-~'.;tnstitiItfoD8lized IndMdu8('the: r nlimber ot months
DJOnths of
j wtt!i~fe8peet to '~'.:tnstit:iIdoD8lized
Wider th1a
th1I aubpariiraph tor'lD lndMduai shall be',equal ~
~ ,. '.,
:uty under
Il
"eumuladVV' uncom'
penS&ted ~aiiie
I> the tot8I,'
tot8I,"eumuIadVV'
uncom"pen8&ied
~aiiie ~
~ aD assets ,tranaterred by the
ivldual (or IndMduafs epouae) 011 or after· the' look-back' date aped15ed fD
.paragraph ~Xf); dfvfded by' i', ", '.' ,.'J,'::.:: .:,~':"'i~'· ": "~",": " " , ' In
m'the
m
'the avelaie
avei'aie monthly:eoet
DlOnth1y:eoet to .private patient 'of nUrsing tacilfty
tacillty aemcea
lIl!l'Yieea In
State (or, at the opdoll
opdoJl of the State, in the commwUt,y
communRy In which $e IndMdualla
Indivtdual fa
jtu~naUzed)
..
''
. i
itu~naUzed) at ~e time of application.
11th
to
.
a
DoiunstitutioDSll.zed
IndMduBl.·
the
number
.
of
months
of
lItb ,iespeCt"
,~"to
DoDinstitutionall.zed
indMduBJ,'
number.of
......F""w
lity under" thIa IlUbparagraph ,for, an' indMdua1 shall !lot be greater than a
1

ot

'ttf

I
I!'

I:t:

~ I,

P:

, .

i,l; .,
1I

1.
.
•.
•.
•.
••

"j t
:: .

semces

~

. '~' j ~
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~;,:~;:"',.;~ ..:'
.. :' ..•.•.
.. ",,!!
13612(a); lawred threshold age fD'
56 "'. ~~~ ~d~·cl. (~; ;"
•t 13612(1);
lD'56
Subeec.· (e)(2)(l»).
• '. Pub.L. ...
100-M,
Subeec..·
Ce)(2)(l).
•"lOO-M,
for iDdivIduaIs trom whom the State will
13611C&)(2')(D), pDenIly amended.lIIIended .. auhpar.
mhpar.
1dlaId
recoveries, and expanded t 13611(s)(2')(D),
1dlald estate recoveries.
CD) read ~
PrIor fD
lD -mment 1Ilbpir,
auIlpir. (Il)
medicaid aenlI:es
eenices for whlch I"l!CUYerY
recovery it

'!. I

H.'

, ,

378.

...... - .,'

-_18-

'~'."-

(I».

ought, IDcluding'estate
IDduding'estate reeovery' !rom
ougbt,
'\"Iea
'1"Ies of loq-term care ~ :.
". (b)(3)".
(b)(3)... Pub.L.. 103-M, • 13612(b).
l3612(b),
' : : '..
~:.(3).:. '::
._
...• (b)(4).
(b)(4), Pub.L. 1~.
l~. § 136l.2(c),
l36J.2(c),
(4),
~. (4).

.......

:

.

.

"_. (e)(I).. Pub.I.. l00-M,
"'.
lOO-M, § 13611(a)(l),
'y rniaed par. (l).
(1). Prior fD
lD the ameMameM
'1) read u foUowa:
.,,-""rder
requirements or
'1,.....I'rder fD
lD llleet the requ!rementa
1""'!reetioD (for P\IlJlC*I
~ of aectIon
1""'lrectioD
III!dlon
:-I)(B) of thla title),
plan must
tltJe). the State plm
for a period of ineligibility for IlllJ'llinr
1111J'11in(
IIId for a level of CIIll!
c:&n! In 1
I
avfcea 8Ild
. .adtutloll·
equivalent fD
nuraillg
.stitutloll·equivalent
lD that of nuraing
,meea
,Meea and for aervfI:es
IIeI'Ylcea under sect10D
of thia
thiI title in the eaae
caM! or an !nat1tudOJlo
lnatltudOD
d~ed in'
in -panagrap/l
.JiriduaI (u d~ed
panagrap/l (3»
(3))
IIpOII8e, at any time during' or
whose IlpolI8e,
, 3O-mODtb period Immediately before
the Indtridaal beeomes 8D
aD inldtutlonal
inldtutlonallD
'lidual . (II the individual fa entitled
"dual'
endtled fD

.aalstaMe
8I1eh
aMlstaMe ""der die State plan OD 8l1eh
lDdfvidual ia
II IlOt 10 endUed, the
II the lDdlVidual

individual appIfea
applies tor IUch
IIIIIIiIItanca
lOch lIIIIIiIItancIl
InIdtuUonallzed iIIdlvidual
individual cllspoeed
ciIspoeed of
InltituUollllllzed
less·thaD falr
fair market value. The
for leu·thaa
Ina/lgibility
iIIel/gibi1ity ih.aIl begin with the IDOllth
such rl!IIOI1l'l:etI
reaourc:etI were trNuIferred and
sueb
of '1IlOIlths
'IDOnths ill
lei' or
lD such period ahaIl
shall be
leaaer of' : ....,
.. , ','
he leaer

.. :, '.:, ..-,::
...,:: ::'.:: t ~~'i:: ~J
foDOWlI: :" '~.~ .... ": ;: '~.'..:,
W(D) the State determines that denial of e1igi
e1igiU(D)
hardahip.- . -" "': .
bility wvuId wwX aD UIIdIie
IIIIdlie hardahip."

(e)(S).
Pub. I..
Subeee.
(c)(S).
Pub.I..
100:00.
13611(a)(2)(E), generally amended par.(3).
par.(3),
• 13611(a)(2XE),
followa:
Prior fD
lD &meIIdJnent par. (3) read u follows:
"(3) 1D
'iDstitiitioD'
.1D this subsection, the term 'izistitlitioD"
bldMdual' meaDlI
meaDII 1111
IndMduaI who la aD
aIlzed IIldMdual'
aD individual
inpadeJIt in 8a lIursing
lIursing faeility,
facility, who Is an mpeinpatil!Jlt
izIpeo
dent
InlliludOll aDd
III1d with respect.lD
rspect. fD
deDt In & medieaI
medicIII lnltillldon
p&}'IIWI11s lIIIde
znade baled on a level
\e'Iel otCllll!
ofc:&n!
'·whom pIo}'llWl1ls
provided III
a.lJ1IJ'IIiD&. CI1l:iIity.
CI1I:ility, or .who. Is de
delD a.lJ1IJ'IIia&.
acNed In aec:tioII
l396alaXI0)(A)(ID(VIr 01 thla
IICNed
II8CtioD 1396aCaXI0)(A)(ID(VIr

~tJs:~;~-~- ~~)(~).~;<,·;·~h.L:·
~~)(~).~;<.·;·~h.L:· '>i~,
~tJS:~;~-~'

(a)(2)(F),: added provisIOIIB'
reIaIiDg fD
§ ·13611 (aX2)(F),:
provisIOIl8' relaIiIIi
lD
appa:rtloIImeIr of period of lDelllibility
iIIeJlBibility amonpt
IIDIOnpt
appartkIIlmeDt

apouaea.. ::'

'::'3.,',
':':'3•. ' .

(.n.'
suhaec. ( d ) . '
lIIIhaec.

~
~ ...

PIIh.L. loS-M,
.. Subeee. (.D,.! PlIh.L.
..
."

,

. • • ,.

.

.!

:.,:
I~·:.
,";"!'-:, ~.Il!
~.IJ!
:" : . I~'
:. ,-;-:'-:.

1361l(b), added
t' 13611(b),

,: ....
.:....

.:

"'''._~',
"'''._~',

_ J

IIB-66. f. 13811(e).
13811(e), added
Suheec. (e), . Pub.I.. 1lB-66.
·.i

subeec.
subsec. (e). ' .. "-- .

Daie. -",-;':

Efrectift Dai.;.

=:~

,. ;.
;.~~

.: - ....;-,.;.... .-:: .-

." ':-:.a..::'
":~,,.::, :

)_ ... -.:"~
_!"~ ••

)-

",1993 AcU,' Section 1S61I(e) 'of Puh.L.· 10l1-M
lOB-M
".1993
: . . ."!'.:-':.
. 1-.:-::.
....
pnmded that: ".
:..
....
iecIion
: "(I) The -mneata
-mnelll8 made by ·this iedion
[imendlcg IIlIbaee.
IIIIbaee. (e) III1d
eziiding 1ubaec:L' (d)
and eDiding
aDd (e) of this
thia sectiOil
sectiOll and amending 1eetf0Nl
leetfona
l396a and .139IiH or
of thla title]. abaII
abaIl apply,
1396&
So !IIOIIths;iIr
IIIOIItha;iIr
"., ,,:
tbiaaub.lectioA. fD
mept u provided In tbiasuhlectioA.
lD pay.
iil the total uncompensated lIlI1ue
lIlIlue
ii)
menta ander title XIX of the Social Security Act
menw
~ 80 tnDaferred.
tnDaferred, divided by (ii)
<IW'Cel!
beginJ'3jIe COIlt,
coat, fD
J'3llll
lD a private patienf at the· . [\hill. IUbehapter1 for olendar Cl.uarters begin
IIiJlg OD or after Oc:fDber
1993, without regard
IIiIli
Oc:lDbu 1,
I, 1993.
nW"lling facility
tacility serthe application, of tUlraini
Ber
fD
wh1rther
Dot
IIDaI
regulatioDl
fD
carry
lD
wh1rt.her
or
llot
lIDaI
lD
cutY
Out
the State.
St.at.e. or, at
at._State option,
option. in the
8IIch
ameodJnenta have beeD
promulgated by
IIIch ametll!Jllenw
heeD promulgat.ed
iIIdividuai ia inatitu
inatitu- . suclI
jty in wIticlt the lDdividuai
daSe.
• .-.•.
.•.
~.~ . ;-I.~T:
;-l.~T:•. •
"(2)
mleadmenta made by thia sec:tlon
aeetlon
"(%) The ameadlllellw
:,:
(c:)(2)(A). . Pub-I..
:, .. (c:)(2XA.l.
103-M,
subaee. (e) 8Dd
aDd enactiDg subsecs. (d)
Cd)
(amending subeee.
)(2)(A)" 8IIbsdtuted
."_ta" for ~
)(2)(A).,
BIIbsdtuted ."_w"
III1d amendlDg
_endlng sectioDl
and (e) of this section aDd
Ce)(2)(B)."
1~,' 1396& 8Dd
aDd I39IiH of ~ title] shall
sbalI not apply
applyPub.I..
1~.·
, ",. (e)(2)(B)."
~2XB), plleJ'lIIly
pneraIIy amended par. (2)(B).
W(A)' fD';'edieII
UIIia~';"pr<Wid~rror IIeI'
IIeI'~2XB).
', .. U(A)'
lD';'edieIl UlIiII~';"pr<Wid~rror
meadment par; (2)(B) read u follows:
..via!s
I~;';,:·.: .
mendment
"9ic:es ~be!!!re.~ I,
1. I~;';,:·.:

of

11.;" • . : .
11.;"•
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MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Jleport. community spouse, as defined in section
Nota and Legislative llepon.

Ad. Senate Report No. 97-494
House Conference Report No.
(97-760. see 1982 U.S.Code Congo and
(97-760,
. dm.News, p. 781.
•..• i983 Act. Senate Report No. 97-592
Jf~d House Conference Report No.
.'97-986,
U.S.Code
-'97-986. see 1982 U.S.
Code Cong. and
_Adm.News, p. 4149.
.Adm.News,
&:;i987
&::,J987 Act. House Report No. 100-391
T(j>8rts I and II) llJ\d Ho=
House Conference
T(j>arts
"... pOrt No. 100-495, see 1987 U.s.Code
",
· 'cOng.
'COng. and Adm.News, p.2313-1.
Report
No.
'. Y~"1988
Acts. House
05(1) (II)
d H
C nf
(~100-1
(\ol.;
100-1
,•
an
ouse 0 erence
,~~port 1~61,
1~61. see 1988 U.s.Code Congo
· l~~port
Adm.News, p. 803.
. 1and
".. Adm.News.
.
No. 100-377. House
;'. Senate Report No,
100-998. see
Conference Report No. 100-998,
.-,. 988 U.S.Code Cong,
Congo and Adm.News, p.
77,6.
7J~" - .
'~1989' Act. House Report No. 101-247.
101-247,
'~1989
conference Report No. 101-386,
101-386.
House Conference
and Statement by President, see 1989
. U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 1906.
I:i:l,:-.
I:i:l::'.
~catlODJI .'
~catlODJI
:Pub.I...
IV.
. :Pub.I100-203,
Title
. IV,
1987. 101 Stat.
'§i421l(h)(l2)(A). Dec. 22. 1987,
'§i4211(h)(l2)(A),
J33G-207,
provided
that
subsec.
'(<:)(2)(8)0) is amended by striking out
'(c)(2)(B)(i)
"skilled nursing facility, intermediate
facility" and inserting "nursing fa.
Jl!QlitY. intermediate care facility for the
'_ mentally retarded" in lieu thereof, and
--Wb.L.
100-203,
Title
IV;
~t4211(h)(12)(B), Dec. 22,
22. 1987,
1987. 101 Stat.
~t4211(h)(12)(B).
~133O-207, as amended Pub.
I- 100-360,
~133O-207,
Pub.L..
ti I IV § 4 1(/)(3)(1) J J 1 1988 102
l.lt e •
1
, u y,
--ASfjji.,.It
.
y.
., .
subsec
803,
provided that subsec.
(e)(2)(B)(ii). is amended by striking out
• (e)(2)(B)(ii),
appears. which
~ ~lIed" each place it appears,
-.amendments could not be executed in
-,amendments
subsec.
~iiew of complete amendment of subsec,
. e) by Pub_I.. 100-360, § 303(b).
.

· care

00

......
.....

-'-; .
j1
•

J:,.

endmenu . .
1989 Amendment. Subsec. (c)(l).
1989·
101-239. § 641l(e)(l)(A),
64ll(e)(1)(A), inserted
_fub.L. 101-239,
.=.zg~ whose spouse,"
spouse," following "an inslitu
insdtu-=-zgrwhose
~ona1ized individual (as defined in para·
para~oita1ized
_lVaph (3» who....
_~ph
~$'ubsec. (e)(2)(B)(i). Pub. I.. 101-239.
101-239,
~$'ubSec.
,.:~ll(e)(l)(B)(i), substituted "(i) to or
,f:64ll(e)(I)(B)(i),
~m (or to another for the sole benefit
~in
rIlllhe
~ rill
the individual's spouse, or" for "(i) to
to another for the sole benefit of) the
~)"J •

..lor:
..tor:
4ft, ~ ,

--','
--'" .

::::.~;.

42 § 1396p

1396r-5(h)(2) of this title
..".
title..".
Pub.I... 101-239,
101-239.
Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.I§ 6411(e)(l)(B)(ii). struck out d. (iii)
which contained material relating to
transfer of resources to person other
spouse for less than fair market
than a spo=
value.
1988 Amendment&. Subsec. (c)(l).
Pub.I.. 100-485, § 608(d)(l6)(B)(i),
608(d)(l6)(B)(i). sub
substitutcd "period of ineligibility for nursstituted
nurs
ing facility services and for a level of
instirution equivalent
care in a medical institution
to that of nursing facility services and
for services under section 1396n(c) of
this title in the case of an institutional.
ized individual (as defined in paragraph
_1:._
th
.
d
' or ,'.ncr
-"-time
unng
..ncr e
Urtng
3 w h0, at any lime
30-month period immediately before the
institudate the individual becomes llJ\ institu
tionalized individual (if the individual is
entitled to medical assistance under the
Or. if the indio
State plan on such date) Or,
\1 dual is not so entitled. the date the
\idual
individual applies for such assistance
while an institutionalized individual" for
"period of ineligibility in the case
ca.se of an
institutionalized individual (as defined
in paragraph (3» who, at any time duro
3O-month period immediately
ing the 3G-month
before the individual's application for
medical assistance under the State plan".

(»

303(b). substituted
Pub.t.. 100-360, § 303(b),
proviSions establishing a period of ineH
ineHprovisions
gibility for institutionalized individuals
who, at any time during the 3G-month
period immediately before the individu·
aI's application for medical assistance
under the State plan. disposed of reo
sources fer less than fair market value
asfor provisions. for denial of medical as
sistance for any individual who would
not be eligible for such assistance except
for such disposition.
Pub.I...
Subsec.
(c)(2). Pub.I100-360,
303(b). substituted provisions that an
§ 303(b),
individual shall not be ineligible for
medical assistllnce by reason of par. (I)
to the extent that the resources transfer
transfer..
red were a home and title to the home
was transferred to certain individuals.
individuals,
the resources were transferred to (or to
another for the sole benefit of) the com·
munity spouse. or the individual's child
who is blind or permanently and totally
disabled, a satisfactory showil18 was
made to the State that the individual
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intended to dispose of the resources d·
ther at fair market value or for other
valuable consideration,
consideration. or the resources
were transferred exclusively for a pur·
pose other than to qualify for medical
assistance, or the State determines that
denial of eligibility would work an un·
due hardship for provisions which em·
powered States to establish periods of
ineligibility in ell.cess
excess of 24 months in
any case in which the uncompensated
value of disposed of resources exceeded
SI2,OOO
$12,000 or the propeny was disposed of
for less than fair market value.
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(ii).
(c)(2)(A)(JJ). Pub.I- 1~8S.
ed
16)(B}(") d
§ 608(d)( 16)(BX")
II.
esignat
eltisting
1\.
prOvisions
provisions in part as subcls.
suhels. (1) and (lI),
(m,
respectively.
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iii). Pub.I- 1~8S.
1~8S.
§ 608(d)(I6)(B)(iii), substituted "the
Mthe inin.
dividual becomes an institutionalized inin
dividual" for "of the individual's admisadmis.
sion to the medical institution or nursnurs
ing facility".
facility",
Subset:.
I.. 1~85.
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iv). Pub.
Pub.I..
1~85,
§ 608(d)(16)(8)(iv).
608(d)(16)(8)(iv), substituted "the inin·
dividual becomes an institutionalized inin·
dividuaJ" for "of such individual's admisadmis·
sion 10 the medical institution or nursnurs
ing facility".
1~85,
Subsec. (c)(2)(8). Pub.I.. 1~85.
608(d)(I6)(B)(v), designated existing
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(v).
(il. added d. (ii).
(Ii),
provisions in pan as d. (0,
and struck out "or the individual's child
who is blind or permanently and totally
"section
disabled"
follOWing
-section
1396r-5(h)(2) of this Iititle....
tie.".
Subsec.
(c)(3). Pub.L.
100-485,
§ 608(d)(l6)(8)(vi), qualified definition
M
individual" to propro
of "institutionalized individual
institu
vide that inpatients in medical institutions must be those with respect to
whom payment is made based on a level
facilitY,
of care provided in a nursing facility.
and included within the definition per·
sons
described
in
section
1396a(a)(lO)(A)(ii)(VI)
1396a(a)(I0)(A)(ii)(VI) of this ride.
tide.
100-360, § 303(b), substituted
Pub. I- 100-360.
definition of the term "institutionalized
individual" for provision that in any case
where an individual was ineligible for
medical assistance under the State plan
solely because of the applicability to
provisions of secsec.
such individual of the proviSions
tion 1382b(c) of this title, the State plan
eligibilitY of such
could provide for the eligibility
individual for medical assistance under
the plan if such individual would have

been so eligible if the State plan require·
ments with respect to disposal of reo"
sources applicable under paragraphs '(I)
apand (2) of this subsection had been. ap
plied in lieu of the provisions of section
1382b(c) of this title.
-,
Pub.I100-360,
Subsec.
(c)(4). Pub.I
100-360.
§ 303(b).
303(b), added par. (4).
.,';,
,;.
1()()...48S, "'.
Subsec.
(c)(5). Pub.L.
1()()...48S.
608(d)(i6)(B)(vii), added par,
par. (5)., " ;:
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(vii).

=

~,

!I,.

,

'

I'
I

,
I

~
•

i
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. II

Ch. 7'

1987
Amendment.
Subsec:'
Pub. I..
(a)(I)(8)(0.
Pub.I..
100-203, .
4211(h)(12)(A), substituted "nursing
§ 4211(h)(12)(A).
facility. intermediate care facility for the
"skilled nursing'
mentally retarded" for ·skilled
facility, intermediate care facility".. , )
1983 Amendment. Subsec. (b)(2)(B).
309(b)(21), substituted
Pub.I.. 97-448. § 309(b)(21).
"who· for "and" preceding "has lawfully"
lawfully'·who·
resided'·.
~.(
97-448,:,
Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.I- 97-448.:,
§ 309(b)(22), substituted in subcl. (I)
"ean" for "cannot" and deleted from
"can"
subel. (IV) the introductory word
subet.
Fifectlve Dates
,_.
._.
1989 Act. Amendment by Pub. II(c)(1) and'
101-239 amending subsec. (c)(I)
(2)(BXi). Oi)
(ii) and striking subsec:.
(2)(BXi),
(c)(2)(8)(iii), applicable to transfers oc· .
curring after Dec. 19, 1989, see section
64ll(e)(4)
6411(e)(4) of Pub.I- 101-239.
101-239, set out as a .
note under section 1396a of this title;!
1988 Am.
Pub.r.:Acta. Amendment by Pub.r.:
1CJ0-485
100-485 effective as if included in the:
enactment of Pub.I- 100-360. see section'
608(g)(1) of Pub.L. lQ0-48S.
lQ0-48S, set out as a
note under section 704 of this title. ,\
Amendment by' section 303(b),
303(b)' of'
Pub.I- 100-360 applicable to resourceS .
disposed of on or after July I.
1. 1988,
except that such subsection. as' so
amended,
amended. shall not apply with respect to
inter·spousal transfers occurring before
October I.
I, 1989,
1989. and to payments Under'
this subchapter for calendar qUa.r1ers
quarters be- .,
I, 1988 (except
ginning on or after July I.
in certain situations requiring State leg
legislative action), without regard to wheth
whether or not final regulations to carry out .
such amendment have been promuJ·
promw·
gated by such date (with an exception
for resources disposed of before July 1,
I,
1988), see section 303(g)(2),
303(g)(2). (5) of Pub.I
Pub.I100-360,
100-360. set out as a note
nore under section
1396r-5 of this title.
1987 Act. Amendment by Pub.I..'
Pub.I..·
100-203 applicable to nursing facility
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".W::'

764

000235

IDAHO SESSION LAWS

107

, CHAPTER 61
(U.B. ,No. 111)
117)
AN ACT

ELICIbILITY FOR HARRIED PERSONS AND TO PENALTIES
,FER OF PROPERTY; AMENDrNG
AMENDING SECTIONS 56-20ge AND 56-214,
1, TO COHFORM WITH SECTION 303 OF PUBLlC
PUBLIC LAW 100-360.
-"':':AID
~~~AID

d by the Le&ialature
Leaiglature of the State of Idaho:
1. That Section 56-20ge, Idaho
IdahO Code, be, and the same
ded to read as follows: '

is

e. ELICIBILITY OF HARRIED COUPLES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
MEDICAID PROCRAM.
PROGRAM. (1) It is the intent of the legislature
ing thie
this section to reduce the number of situations in which
regulations as they apply to long term ~are
care costa,
costs, cause
~"~he
~"~he destitution of the entire family, or a dissolution of marmar
'ried out to prevent destitution. It is further the intent of
;rsration
;isration section'to protect the community and separate propprop
Its,
ltg, insQf8~ch
insQfa~ch rights are not specifically preempted by
la~,
of a married person whose spouse applies for medical
la~l
:e regardless of whether they are living together.
(a) In determinin3 the eligibility of an aged, blind or disdis
couple for medical a99iatan~e
assistance
I
married individual or of a ~ouple
, title XIX of the social security act, the amount of income
resources to be counted as available to such individual or
e ahall
shall be calculated in 8c~ordan~e
accordance with the community propprovlglon9
provisions of chapter 9. title 32. Idaho Code. or should
.hould it
•I the advantage of such individual or couple, in accordance
the methods utilized by the federal supplemental,security
~ program under title XVI of the social security act.
Where both spouses are applying or are covered by medical
tanct,
tance, the same methOd of counting income and resources shall
.plied
'plied to both spouaes
spouses and utili%ed
utilized to determine the liability
ach for the cost of medical care; hovever,
however, for any month for
either spouse receives a supplemental security
se~urity income. paypay
or a state supplement under section
se~tion
56-201, 56-208 or
9a, Idaho Code, or for which an application i,
is filed and subsub
approved, the methodology of the supplemental security
ntly approved.
.e
Ie pro&ram shsll
shall be applied.
The presumption of the availability of income under either
ommunity property or supplemental
supplementsl security income method may
butted by either spouse.
the department of health and welfare shall furnish to each
~ lIIedical
lIledical assistance a'pplicant who is aged, blind or disdia
, a clear and simple statement in writing advising them of
rovisions of this section.
(D
CD The provisions of paragraphs (a) through ,Cd) of this
~b8ection
~bsection shall continue to aeply on and after September 30,
l?89, to married couples who are living together.
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(3)
proyision of this section or the application t
to
circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity
not affect other provisions or applications of the section that
given effect without the invalid provisions or applications,
this end the provisions of this section are severable.
56-214, Idaho Code, be, and the
SECTION 2. That Section 56-21.4,
hereby amended to read as follows:

1

tt •-

same

56-214. AWARD OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE -- INELIGIBILITY UPON TRANSP
OF PROPERTY. Upon the completion of the tnvestigation, the st.
s
department shall determine whether the applicant is eligible for pu
lie assistance under the provisions of this act, the type and amou
of public assistance he shall receive, and the date upon which su
public assistance shall 'begin. Public assistance shall be paid in t
manner prescribed by the state department.
i!l Pub~~e-ass~stanee
Pub~~e-ass~stanee Ai4
Aid to dependent children shall not.
granted under this act to any person who within six (6) months rl
to applying for Or at any time during which such assistance'
reeeived l has either made an assignment or transfer of property
propert f
the'purpose
'purpose of rendering
ng himself eligible for assistance under th
act, or who ~ divestsed himself of any interest in property withO
wi
adequate consideration which interest or proceeds therefrom could re
Bonably be expected to contribute to the support and maintenance ,
such person and his family, except that any person who is ineligi~
ineligi
for public assistance due solely to Such
such assignment or transfer ssh~

t .'
t:

t .

I
t"
t'

.

"
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a showing that such person has caused such property
•, or transferred back to him; or
a showing that the person to whom such property is
transferred has, subsequent to such asslgnment Dr
e~clusive of
subsistence and medical care costs e~clusive
any
lr
Ir support, of such person or famity, according to the
equet to, or
Or in excess of, the
assistance standard, equat
of the property so assigned or transferred; or
sS a showing that the subsistence and medical care
assistance
ouch person, according to the department's a,sistance
'bsequent to such assignment or transfer, equat or
transmarket value of the property so assigned or trans
ility for old age assistance under section 56-207,
lr aid to the blind under section 56-208, Idaho Code, or
56-209•••
manently and totally disabled under section 56-209a
•all
•all be determined by continuing to consider as available
that was transferred prior to July 1, 1988, until such
.lly accounted for under the provisions of section
the social security act as such section read on June 30,
56-209b,
ibility for medical assistance under section 56-20gb,
hall continue to apply the regulations of the director of
DE property
nt of health and welfare concerning transfer of
ation, read on OctOber 29, 1988 to transfers that occur
ations
tne per
per1, 1989, to persons other than to the spouse of the
Or applying for medical assistance, and to interspousal
S or
t occur rior to October 1 1989.
sec~ion 1911 c
provisions of sec~ion

of the social security

act

public law
Law
by public law 100-360 and further amended by pUblic
s hereafter amended
amen~e~ shall apply as of July
I, 1989, to
1,
othe~
spouse, and as of October 1,
assets other
than to the spouae,
sfe~9 between
betveen spouses, e~cept
e~cept that such provisions
shall
sfers
her to transfers that occurred before Jul I, 1988
to
of
at have been fully accounted for under aubsectlon
nr provision of this section or the application thereof
ny
invalidity shall
on or circumstance is held invalid, such invatidity
her provisions or applications of the section that can be
provision8 or applications, and to
without the invalid provisions
provisions of this section are severable.
h 27, 1989.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

The issue presented in this case is whether the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare may recover Medicaid assistanCE!
from the estate of a recipient's spouse when the recipient died
possessing an estate.

The petitioner/appellant is the Idaho

Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department").

The

respondent is Barbara Jackman, the personal representative of the
estate of Lionel Malcolm Knudson (hereinafter "Jackman").
Jackmar. is the adult niece of Lionel and Hildor Knudson, both
deceased. '
Hildor L. Knudson (hereinafter "Hildor") received medical

'I,.,
ll'-'

assistance ("Medicaid") from the state of Idaho for about twenty
twentytwo months prior to her death in October, 1994.

The value of he!r

estate, after funeral expenses and legal fees, was paid to the
Department pursuant to Idaho Code

§

56-218, which permits the

Department to recover Medicaid payments from the estate of a
recipient.

Hildor's spouse, Lionel Malcolm Knudson (hereinafter

"Lionel"), died in November, 1994.

Unsatisfied with its recovery

from Hildor's estate, the Department is attempting to also
recover from Lionel's estate.

The Department's attempted

The Department is mistaken in identifying Jackman as
Lionel and Hildor's daughter. Compare Appellant's Brief, p. 1.
with R. p. 6.
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recovery is contrary to its regulations, state law, federal law
and federal regulations.
B.

Course of proceedinqs

The Department brought a Petition for Allowance of Claim
against the estate of Lionel Knudson for recovery of Medicaid
payments made on behalf of Lionel's spouse, Hildor Knudson.
pp. 19-20.

R.

Jackman objected that, because the Department had

already collected from Hildor's estate, its claim against
Lionel's estate exceeded its authority under state and federal
law.

After a hearing, william C. Hamlet, Magistrate of the

District Court of the second Judicial District in and for the
County of Latah, found the Department was not entitled to reCOVE!r
,_...,
.~"'"

from Lionel's estate.

R. p. 158.

The Department appealed to the

District Court, which reviewed the record and supplemental briefs
before hearing oral argument.

R. p. 175.

District Judge John R.

stegner affirmed the magistrate's Memorandum Decision.

R. p.

176.

c.

statement of the Facts

Hildor L. Knudson, wife of Lionel Malcolm Knudson, lived the
last few years of her life at the Moscow Care Center, Moscow,
Idaho.

In December 1992, an application for Medicaid was filed

on her behalf with the Department.

The eligibility process for a

married couple involves the reporting of income and resources tel
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 2
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the Department and complying with the Federal Spousal
Impoverishment Act (FSI).

Under FSI, the community spouse is

allowed to keep various items of exempt property (one's home,
car, and personal belongings) and a Department-determined portion
of the couple's assets.

42 U.S.C. § 1382(a} (1) (B).

The

noninstitutionalized spouse is allowed to keep only $2,000 of non
exempt resources.

Id.

Hildor was found eligible for Medicaid as of January 1,
1993.

Both state and federal rules required her, as the

institutionalized spouse, to transfer her interest in all but
$2,000 of her non-exempt resources including her interest in
community property to Lionel, the community spouse, through a
'tit"

separate property agreement entitled a "Marriage Settlement
Agreement
...
Agreement."

42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f} (1); IDAPA 03.05618.07.

Interspousal transfers of exempt resources are not required, but:
are expressly allowed.
16.03.05.693.01.

42 U.S.C. § 1396(p} (c) (2); IDAPA

Hildor and Lionel entered into a Marriage

Settlement Agreement on March, 1993.

R. pp. 63-66.

The

MOscow, Idaho and!
Agreement was recorded in the County of Latah, Moscow,
forwarded to the Department.

Hildor received Medicaid payments

for her nursing home care from January 1, 1993 until her death on
October 27, 1994.

R. p. 25-40.

In February 1993, Hildor was found to be an incapacitated
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 3
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~II""

and protected person in Latah County Case No. SP-93-0004.
48-49.

R. pp.

Barbara Jackman, Hildor's niece, was appointed guardian

of her person and conservator of her estate.

Id.

When Hildor

died, Jackman notified the Magistrate Court.

Then, pursuant to

Idaho's procedures for small estates, Idaho Code 15-3-1201,
Jackman collected Hildor's personal property by affidavit.
pp. 67-68.

R.

Jackman paid Hildor's funeral expenses and her legal

fees and then forwarded the remainder of the estate ($1,638.03)
to the Department.

R. pp. 70-71.

closing inventory.

R. pp. 58-59.

Finally, Jackman filed a

Lionel Knudson died on November 11, 1994.
not a recipient of Medicaid.
November 28, 1994.
representative.
$40, 798.35.

R. p. 149.

He was

Probate proceedings were begun on

R. pp. 10-12.

R. pp. 14-15.

R. p. 10.

Jackman was appointed personal

Lionel's estate was valued at

In January, 1995, the Department filed

a Petition for Allowance of Claim against Lionel's estate for
$41,600.55.

R. pp. 19-20.
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ISSUES PRESENTED

1.

Does Idaho Code §56-218 permit recovery for Medicaid

costs from the estate of a surviving spouse when the recipient
spouse dies possessed of an estate.

2.

Whether the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare

regulations allow for recovery of Medicaid costs from a surviving
spouse's estate when the recipient spouse dies possessed of an
estate.
3.

Does Federal Medicaid law allow the state to recover a

recipient's Medicaid costs from the estate of a surviving spouse
beyond a tracing of the recipient's assets owned at the time of
death.
~W'

4.

Whether Respondent's attorney fees and costs are to be

assessed against the Department.
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II •

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court
court makes an independent appellate review of the
magistrate's decision, but should give due regard to the district
court's ruling.
rUling.

Ausman v. state, 124 Idaho 839, 840, 864 P.2d

1126, 1127 (1993).

If the magistrate's findings of fact are

supported by substantial and competent evidence, the findings
should be upheld.
law.

Id.

This Court freely reviews questions of

Id.
The Department has not challenged any of the magistrate's

findings of fact.

Appellant's Brief, p. 7.

This matter presents

issues of federal and state law. 2

'1lI11t'
"lit'

II.
IDAHO CODE § 56-218 DOES NOT PERMIT RECOVERY FROM THE ESTATE
OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE WHEN THE RECIPIENT SPOUSE DIES POSSESSED
OF AN ESTATE.

A.
The Department has collected from Hildor's estate for
the Medicaid payments made on her behalf.

Jackman, as custodian of Hildor's estate, complied with
Idaho Code §

56-218 by paying to the state all
a11 funds remaining in

her estate at death following payment of funeral and estate

22
The Department asserts that Jackman may not raise the
federal question. Appellant's Brief, p. 7, n. 5. Jackman
prevailed before the magistrate and district court and seeks no
affirmative relief. Jackman argued the issue before both lower
IRAP
courts and may properly raise the issue before this Court.
W~lker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 739
§§ 11(f), 15(b); W~lker
P.2d 290 (1987).
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administration costs.

R. p. 149.

Idaho Code 56-218(1) states.:

[M]edical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf
of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or
older when the individual received such assistance may be
recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the
estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for
such aid paid to either or both ....
At death Hildor had an estate valued at $1,902.30.
59-59.

R. pp.

She had no interest in jointly owned property or property

subject
sUbject to a right of survivorship that would pass at death to
her husband or anyone else.

R. pp. 152-153.

Just prior to her

death she did not have an interest in any "life estate".

Id.

All of her estate, after funeral expenses and legal fees, was
paid to the Department of Health and Welfare within a reasonable
time following her death.
the Department.

R. p. 149.

R. pp. 70-71.

The funds were accepted by

Nothing of Hildor's estate passed

to Lionel or other successors or heirs.
Idaho Code

§

56-218 authorizes recovery "from the estate, or

if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse".
Hildor had an estate from which Idaho has recovered all that

remained following payment of her funeral costs.

Idaho is not

permitted under this statute to recover from the estate of the
surviving spouse since the recipient had an estate.

B.
The clear lanquaqe of Ie § 56-218 preconditions
recovery from the estate of a survivinq spouse on the
absence of a recipient's estate.
This case presents a simple issue of statutory
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 7
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interpretation, which always begins with an examination of the
literal words of the statute.

Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121

Idaho 819, 822, 828 P.2d 848,851 (1992);

Local 1494 of

th~

Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Couer d'Alene, 99 Idaho
630, 596 P.2d 1346 (1978).

As explained in Magistrate Hamlett's

thoughtful Memorandum Decision, the clear language of I.C. 56
56218(1) does not permit the Department to recover Medicaid
payments from the estate of the recipient's spouse when the
recipient died possessing an estate.

R. pp. 151-154.

Because

Hildor died possessing an estate of $1,638.00 which the Deparment
has already collected, it may not further collect from Lionel's
estate.
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) specifically limits the Department to
recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient unless there
is no such estate:
[M]edical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf
of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or
older when the individual received such assistance may be
recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the
estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for
such aid paid to either or both .•••
(emphasis added).

This language is also reflected in the

Department's own regulations which provide that "If the deceased
recipient has no estate, recovery shall be made from the estate
of his surviving spouse."

IDAPA 16.03.09.025.15.

This language

is unambiguous and, as held by the Magistrate and District Court:,
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does not allow for recovery of Medicaid payments from the estatE!
of the surviving spouse if the recipient spouse died possessing
an estate.

R. pp. 153-154, 176.

This Court has repeatedly held that it "must assume that the
legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute.
statute."II

~atter
~atter

of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 822, 828 P.2d at 851;
Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991).
The language of Idaho Code

§

56-218(1) may only be logically read

to allow the Department to recover from the estate of a surviving
spouse only if the recipient left no estate.
given to every word and clause of the statute.

Effect must be
Matter of

No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 823, 828 P.2d at 852; Wright v.

....1II••,,

111 Idaho 474, 725 P.2d 179 (1986).

Permi1~
Permi1~
Wille~,
Wille~,

Since the statute is

unambiguous, this Court must follow the law as written and

therE~
therE~

is no occasion for the application of the rules of construction.
State v. wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189, 191, 824 P.2d 120, 121 (1991);
Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 804 P.2d 308 (1990).
nc)
The Department argues that the language "or,
II or ,
if there be n()
estate," is archaic and does not have its clear meaning.
Appellant's
Appellantls Brief, p. 13-14.
for this proposition.

The Department cites no authority

The Department refers to similar

languag€~
languag€~

in various non-Medicaid statutes of New York and Pennsylvania,
but fails to recognize the clear meaning of the language in each
RESPONDENTIS
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example.

Id.

In all of the statutes, the language designates to

whom benefits would be paid upon the death of a covered
individual. See NY Vol. Amb. Ben. S10; NY Work. Compo S 15;

NY

V. Workers
Vol. Fire Ben. S10; United States Steel Corp. v.

Compensation Appeals Board, 536 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1988) (Appendix A).
All have nearly identical language.
language is exclusionary.
money goes to them.

~

In each example, the

If there are surviving dependents, the

If there are "no such dependents,
dependents,"II then the

money goes to the estate of the deceased and "if there be no
estate" to whomever pays the deceased's funeral expenses.
Contrary to the Department's assertions, none of these statutes
contemplate an "order of priority" in which part of the benefits
would be paid to the dependents, some to the estate, and some to
the payers of the funeral expenses.

All of these statutes

subsequently-named
condition the payment of benefits to each SUbsequently-named
party on the absence of the prior party.

Each is similar to IC

§

56-218's
56-218 1 s use of "if there be no estate" as a qualifier.
Even if the Department's interpretation of S Ie 56-218(1) is
plausible, it cannot be preferred to the clear meaning of the
statute:
A well-settled rule of construction is that the words of a
statute must be given their plain, usual and ordinary
meaning, in the absence of any ambiguity. Higgins v.
Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 51 (1979); Nagel v.
Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 408 P.2d 468 (1965). The plain,
obvious and rational meaning is always to be preferred to
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any curious, narrow, hidden sense.

Id.

Walker v. Hensley Trucking, 107 Idaho 572, 573, 691 P.2d 1187,
1188 (1984).

There is no ambiguity in IC § 56-218(1).

"A

statute is not ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise
more than one interpretation of it."

36Matter of Permit No. 36

7200, 121 Idaho at 823, 828 P.2d at 852.

The proper reading of

the language of IC § 56-218 is consistent with the Magistrate and
District Court's interpretation of IC § 56-218.

The Department

may not recover from Lionel's estate.

c.
Neither the history nor the purposes of Idaho's
Medicaid laws supports the recovery of Medicaid payments
from the estate of the survivinq spouse.
1.
Idaho has historically not authorized spousal
estate recovery.

''II''

The Department contends that the history of estate recovery
of old-age assistance payment in Idaho supports the ability of
the Department to collect from the estate of a Medicaid
recipient's spouse.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-10.

by the Department supports this contention.

Nothing cited

The o1d statutes

discussed by the Department are not Medicaid statutes.

See

Chapter 119, 1943 S.L. (Appellant's Appendix F).
Moreover, to the extent the authority cited by the
Department is analogous to Medicaid law, it refers only to
"recovery against the estates of recipients."

state ex rel.

Nielson v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009
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(1948) (Appellant's Appendix E).

All of the authority cited by

the Department indicates that it has never had the authority to
recover from the estates of recipient's spouses.

In Lindstrom,

the statute discussed by this Court
court provided that lion the death
of any recipient of old-age assistance, the total amount of
assistance paid such recipient • • • may . . • be allowed as a
claim against the estate of such person . . . "
191 P.2d at 1013.

68 Idaho at 230,

Similar language is used in the statute

reviewed in Newland v. Child, 73 Idaho 530, 535-36, 254 P.2d
1066, 1071-72 (1953) (Appellant's Appendix G), which led this
Court to hold that "our law limits recovery to the estate, or the
real property of the recipient."
1070-71.

73 Idaho at 539, 254 P.2d at

Jackman has never contested the ability of the

Department to collect from the estate of a Medicaid recipient.
The old cases and statutes also undermine two keystones of
the Department's arguments.

First,

the primary thrust of the

Department's arguments is that the recovery provisions would be
nonsensical if the Department might sometimes be unable to
recover Medicaid payments.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-18.

This

Court in Lindstrom made it clear that such provisions have never
created an expectation of recovery from every recipient, only an
ability to recover where authorized.
P.2d at 1015-16.

68 Idaho at 232-33;

191

Second, the Department has argued that the "if
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there be no estate" language is only a corollary to the
provisions requiring that the Department may not recover from the
home (or other exempt assets) of a deceased recipient while they
are still being used by the recipient's surviving spouse.
20-22.

R. pp

This analysis is belied by the existence of similar

delayed recovery provisions in the old statutes that make no
reference to recovery from a spouse's estate.
2.
The purpose of Idaho's spousal impoverishment statutes
is to protect the estate of the survivinq spouse.
Speculation about the intent of the legislature in enacting'
IC § 56-218 should not override the statute's clear language.
Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 824, 828 P.2d at 853;
unity Light & Power Co. v. Burley, 83 Idaho 285, 361 P.2d 788
(1961).

To the extent, however, that this Court considers the

purpose of the statute, it should affirm the holdings of the
Magistrate and District Court.
The Department asserts that the legislature specifically
passed Ie §

56-218 to allow recovery from the estates of

recipient's spouses, but the authorities the Department cites
support the contrary.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-12.

The

Department does not refer to any of the legislative history of IC
§ 56-218.

Id.

Neither of the session laws cited by the

Department refers to an intent to maximize the state's ability to
recover Medicaid payments or to allow recovery from the estates
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 13
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of surviving spouses.

Appellant's Appendixes H, J.

To the

contrary, both session laws explicitly state that the legislature
wished to protect spouses's estates:

"It is further the intent

of this legislation to protect the community and separate
property rights of a married person whose spouse applies for
medical assistance regardless of whether they are living
together."

S.L. 1988, ch.50,

§

1, p. 74; S.L. 1989, ch.67

1,

§

p. 107.

III. THE DEPARTMENT'S REGULATIONS DO NOT ALLOW FOR RECOVERY FROM
A SPOUSE'S ESTATE IF THE RECIPIENT DIES POSSESSED OF AN ESTATE.

The Department's own regulations adopted to enforce IC
218 explicitly forbid its recovery from Hildor's estate.
Idaho Administrative Code,

§

5656

In the

the Department has adopted provisions

for recovery of medical assistance "pursuant to sections 56-218
and 56-218A, Idaho Code " through "the filing of liens against
property of deceased persons, and the filing of liens against the
property of permanently

16.03.09.025.

institutiona~ized
institutiona~ized

recipients." IDAPA

These provisions are contrary to the Department's

position in this case in several respects.
First, the Department's regulations reflect the language of
IC

§

56-218 in placing a condition precedent to recovery from the

estate of the surviving spouse.

IDAPA 16.03.09.025.15 states:

"If the deceased recipient has no estate, recovery shall be made
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.......
from the estate of his surviving spouse."

If, as the Department

contends, the statutory language was poorly drafted and contrary
to legislative intent, surely the Department would not have
adopted essentially the same language.

Because Hildor had an

estate from which the Department recovered, it may not recover
from Lionel's estate.
Lest the Department claim any ambiguity in its regulation,
another provision is even more clear.

IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20

states:
Limits on the Department's claim against the assets of a
deceased recipient shall be subject
sUbject to sections 56-218 and
56-218A, Idaho Code. A claim aqainst the estate of a
survivinq spouse of a predeceased recipient is limited to
the value of the assets of the estate that were community
property, or the deceased recipient's share of the separate
be
property, and jointly owned property. Recovery shall not he
made until the deceased recipient no longer is survived by a
spouse . . .
(Emphasis added).

No part of Lionel's estate was community

property or jointly owned property or Hildor's share of separate!
property.

R. p. 152.

Judge
JUdge Hamlet found that "Hildor had no

'legal title or interest' in any part of Lionel's estate at the
time of her death.
to this finding.

Id.

The Department has explicitly acquiesce,d
acquiesce:d

Appellant's Brief, p. 7.

The Department is

barred from recovering from Lionel's estate by its own
regulation.

Further, this regulation reflects the Department's

understanding that it lacks the authority under IC § 56-218 to
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recover from Lionel's estate.
The Department's regulations highlight the important
difference between the tracing of assets from the recipient's
estate and a direct claim against the separate property of a
surviving spouse.

IDAPA 16.03.09025.03(c) and IC § 56-218(4) (b)

define the recipient's estate to include only that property and
assets "in which the recipient had any legal or beneficial title
or interest at the time of death."
death. 1I

IDAPA 16.03.09.025.18 defines

claims"ll to include only those assets
"assets in estate subject to claims
"the deceased recipient owned or in which he had an ownership
interest. II11

The Department is entitled to trace these assets that

the recipient owned at the time of her death into the estate of a
surviving spouse.

The Magistrate specifically held that Lionel's

estate contained no such assets of Hildor's.

R. p. 152.

The

Department cannot make claim to separate property of the
surviving spouse.

IV. FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW DOES NOT ALLOW IDAHO TO RECOVER
MEDICAID BENEFITS PAID TO THE DECEASED SPOUSE FROM THE ESTATE OF
THE SURVIVING SPOUSE.
A.
Idaho is required to comply with the federal
government's Medicaid requlations as a condition of
participating in the Medicaid program.

The Medicaid program is optional to the individual states.
seg.), states
Under the federal Medicaid Act (42 U.S.C. §1396, et seq.),
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that subsidize medical treatment of the poor are provided federal
funds to defray the costs.

As a condition of participating in

the program and receiving these funds, states are required by
federal law to promulgate legislation that complies with the
federal mandate.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (18);

McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).

Harris v.

This court
Court held in McCoy v.

state
State of Idaho,
Idaho. Department of Health and Welfare, 907 P.2d 110
(1995) at 112 that:
Each state's participation in Medicaid is optional, but once
a state voluntarily elects to participate in the program, it
must comply with the requirements imposed by the Act and
applicable regulations.
See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 n. I

(1985).

B.
Federal statutes and regulations allow states to
recover Medicaid only from the estates of Medicaid
recipients.
state
State medical assistance programs must comply with federal
Medicaid statutes in order to receive federal grants of money.
specifically,

42 U.S.C. §1396(a) (18) mandates that state

programs comply with the provisions of 42 U.S.C.

S1396p with

respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of Medicaid
correctly paid.

The relevant portion of 42 U.S.C.

§1396p(b) (1) (A) reads as follows:
(b) ADJUSTMENT OR RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORRECTLY
PAID UNDER A STATE PLAN.
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 17
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plan may be made, except that the state shall seek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the
case of the following individuals:
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection
(a) (1) (8), the state shall seek adjustment or recovery from
the individual's estate or upon sale of the property sUbject
subject
to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on
behalf of the individual.
(Emphasis added.)
The clear meaning of this federal statutory prov~s~on
provision is
buttressed further by federal regulations found at 42 C.F.R.
433.36 (h).

The relevant portion of these regulations reads as

follows:
(h) Adjustments and a recoveries.
(1) The agency may make
an adjustment or recover funds for Medicaid claims correctly
paid for an individual as follows:
(i)
From the estate of any individual who was 65 years or
older when he or she received Medicaid; and . • .
(Emphasis added.)
Neither 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) 's plain language nor that of
the regulations state that recovery may be made from the estate
of a surviving spouse.
u.s.C.
U.S.C.

§

To the contrary, the plain wording of 42

1396p(b) and 42 C.F.R. 433.36 (h) allow for recovery

only from the estate of the recipient (individual).

Congress

has provided that recovery of Medicaid costs can only be made
from the estate of the individual/recipient.
The united states Supreme Court in K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier.
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291-192 (1988) stated that
"[i]f the statute is clear and unambiguous, such language
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must be regarded as conclusive, and 'that is the end of the
matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress'"
(Quoting Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984)).

The federal statute expressly

limits the recovery authority of the Department.

Even if the

state
State of Idaho has authority not preempted by the federal
statute, IC § 56-218 should be interpreted to not conflict with
the clear language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b).
C.
Congress specifically rejected legislation that would
have allowed Idaho to recover from the estates of surviving
spouses of Medicaid recipients.
Congress specifically rejected a provision in the federal
law that would have allowed states to recover from the estate of
~~~

a surviving spouses.

This proposed legislation, which was

rejected, was part of the 1993 Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA)
which contained amendments to the Medicaid recovery statutes and
was passed in August 1993.

See, H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, 103rd

Cong., 1st Sess., 208 (May 15, 1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S. Code
Congo & Admin. News 535.
The language rejected read as follows:
•.• (c) (i) The program provides for the collection
consistent with paragraph (3) of the amount not to exceed
the amount described in clause (ii) from

(i) the estate of the individual;
(ii) in the case of an individual described in
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"---'

subparagraphs (B) (ii) from the estate of the surviving
spouse; or ...
Subparagraph (B) (ii) refers to an individual who receives
nursing home or other long term care services and is married at
the time of receipt of said care.

It reads as follows:

(ii) in the case of such an individual who was married at
the time of death, when the surviving spouse dies.
This statute would have clearly authorized states to recover
from the estate of a surviving spouse.

Congress could have made:

this authorization mandatory or optional.
knew the issue.

Congress obviously

Instead the final bill allows only for recovery

from the estate of the recipient of Medicaid.

'1111·'

Courts have limited states's ability to recover
D.
courts
Medicaid payments from the estates of surviving spouses to
the tracing of assets owned by the recipient at the time of
her death.

Federal statutes regarding recovery of Medicaid from estates
have been in place since 1965.

The vast majority of the language

these statutes have not changed since originally enacted.

l,ittle

litigation occurred in this area, however, because i t has only

been since OBRA 1993 that states have been required to have
recovery programs.

The 1993 amendments also expanded the ability

of states to trace assets of recipients that transfer to spouses
upon the death of the recipient.

In several recent decisions,

payme.nts
courts have held that states may only recover Medicaid payments
from the estates of recipients and traceable assets in which the
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recipient had an interest at the time of her death.
In the Matter of Estate of Budney, 541 N.W.2d 245 (Wis. App.
1995), the Department of Social and Health Services for the State
of Wisconsin made a claim to recover it's Medicaid costs from the
estate of the surviving spouse of a Medicaid recipient.
112-114.

R. pp.

The Court of Appeals held that the state statute

authorizing recovery of medical assistance benefits from the
surviving spouse's estate exceeded the authority provided
federal Medicaid statutes.

b~'

the,
the.

The Budney Court held:

Because the statute does not counter the initial blanket
state to recover
prohibition by specifically authorizing a State
medical assistance benefits paid on behalf of a recipient
from a surviving spouse's estate, we conclude that §
49.496(3) (a), STATS., which allows such recovery, exceeds
fed'eral statute. Accord
the authority provided by the federal
Matter of Estate of Craig, 82 N.Y. 2d 388, 604 N.Y.S. 2d
908, 624 N.E. 2d 1003 (1993) (Federal law does not expressly
provide for recovery of Medicaid payments on behalf of a
predeceased spouse from the secondarily dying spouse's
estate) .
R. p. 114.
The logic of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision i.s
supported by the united states Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit's holdings in Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923 (9th cir.
1997) and citizen's Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.3d 1003 (9th
Cir. 1989).

Although both cases concern the interpretation of

the term "estate" in the pre-1993 federal Medicaid statute, the
relevant portion of both decisions is not changed by the
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....

.,
.,-'

substance of the 1993 amendments.
The Ninth Circuit
circuit rulings make clear that "under 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b) (1), states • . . may not recover medical assistance
amounts 'correctly paid on behalf of an individual' except, as
relevant here,

'from bis estate.'"

(emphasis added).

Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925

Federal Medicaid law expressly limits "a

participating state's ability to recoup benefits."
F.2d at 1006.

Kizer, 887

To the extent a state statute "seeks to reach

further than § 1396p(b) (1), it cannot stand."

Bucholtz, 114 F.3d

at 925.
In both cases, the Ninth Circuit held that, under the then
existing definition of estate in the federal statute, the
"II~"

California Department of Health Services could not recover
Medicaid payments from recipient's property held in the form of
revocable inter vivos trusts.
887 F.2d at 1008.

Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 928; Kizer,

The 1993 amendments expanded the definition of

"estate" to allow states to recover a broader range of assets in
which the recipient had an ownership interest at the time of
death.

The 1993 amendments did not make any additional

provisions for recovery from the estates of surviving spouses,
except for the tracing of property interests of the recipient
which transferred to the spouse upon the recipient's death (i.e.
community property, joint tenancy, and property held as a tenant
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'1'--'"

'1,--",'

in common.)
Recent United States District Court opinions confirm that
states may trace assets the recipient owned at the time of her
death, but may not make any other recovery from the estates of
surviving spouses.

In Demille v. Belshe, 1994 WL 519457 (N.D.

Cal. 1994) (R. pp. 127-142), the United states District Court for
the North District of California explained:

'111101'"

The federal statute allows the state to recoup its expenses
only from those persons who are holding real or personal
property in which the deceased recipient held a legal
interest at the time of death. See [42 U.S.C. §]
1396p(b) (1) (requiring state to recover from decedent's
"estate") and § 1396p(b) (4) (defining "estate"). The amount
of expenses the state may recover from such persons is
capped by the amount of decedent's interest in the property.
§ 1396p(b) (4).
In other
otber words, the federal statute only
tbat the
tbe deceased recipient's assets will be
contemplates that
tbat other persons can become liable to pay over
traced, not that
tbeir own assets.
their
R. p. 133 (emphasis added).

V.
FAIRNESS AND REASON DENY THE DEPARTMENT'S CLAIM TO RECOVER
MEDICAID PAYMENTS FROM THE ESTATES OF BOTH RECIPIENTS AND
SURVIVING SPOUSES.

The Magistrate and District Court's holdings preserve the
ability of the Department to recover Medicaid payments from
recipient's estates, while preserving the integrity of the
surviving spouse's property rights.

The Departments objections,

even if persuasive, are almost purely policy arguments which are
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not so compelling as to overcome the language of the statute:
This Court has stated that when the language of a statute is
definite, courts must give effect to that meaning whether or
Uni1~
not the legislature anticipated the statute's result. Uni1~
Light & Power Co. v. Burley, 83 Idaho 285, 361 P.2d 788
(1961). Moreover, "the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute are questions for the Legislature
alone. . . . It is the duty of the courts to interpret the
meaning of legislative enactments without regard to the
possible results." Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 369 P.2d
1010 (1962).
B2B P.2d at 853.
Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 824, 828
A.
Jackman and the Knudsons have acted in qood faith and
in accordance with the law.

The Department's ad hominem attacks on Jackman and the
Knudsons should not credited.

16-1B.
Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-18.

The

insinuations are false and the arguments are newly raised on
.,,_.

appeal.

The Department has never previously questioned the

legality of the Marriage Settlement Agreement, Hildor's
application and eligibility for Medicaid, Jackman's management of
Hildor's estate, or Jackman's management of Lionel's estate.
Hildor and Lionel's estates have been managed in strict
accordance with state law and the Department's regulations.
The Department has admitted that the Marriage Settlement
Agreement between Hildor and Lionel was not only legal and
proper, but required by law.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-3.

and all interspousal transfers are permitted by Medicaid.
U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (2) (C).

Any
42

Further, federal and Idaho law require
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the institutionalized spouse to transfer her interest in all but:
$2,000 of non-exempt resources to the community spouse followinSr
the state's agency finding Medicaid eligibility or lose Medicaid
eligibility.

42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f) (1) and IDAPA 03.05618.07.

IDAPA 03.05618.07 reads in part:
... The long-term care spouse must state in writing, his
intent to transfer the resources to the community spouse,
within the protected period, before he can be Medicaid
eligible ..... Resources not transferred to the community
spouse by the end of the sixty (60) day protected period are
counted available to the long-term care spouse, toward the
two thousand dollar ($2,000) resource limit, effective the
date of entry into the facility.
The Department, having required Hildor and Lionel to enter into
the Marriage Settlement Agreement, should not now castigate them
for doing so.
The Department contradicts itself in casting aspersions on
Jackman's management of Hildor's estate after recognizing that
she acted ethically and legally.

Compare Appellant's Brief, pp.

2-4 with Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-17.

Jackman was legally

appointed Hildor's guardian and conservator prior to her death.

R. pp. 60-62.

The Magistrate specifically found that Jackman

properly and legally collected and distributed Hildor's estate.
R. p. 149.

It is absurd to suggest that Jackman was not acting

for Hildor's estate in reimbursing the Department for Medicaid
payments made on Hildor's behalf.

Payment was tendered to the

Department because it was entitled to recover from Hildor's
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estate under IC

§

56-218.

The Department's contention that Jackman "manipulated" the
Knudson's estates is irrelevant.

The Magistrate concluded that

Jackman was able to pay Hildor's debt to the Department because
she did not use the statutory allowances to drain the value of
Hildor's estate into Lionel's estate.

If the Department were not

set on collecting from Lionel's estate, it might commend, rather
than condemn, the actions of personal representatives that
provide for the reimbursement of Medicaid payments from the
estate of the recipient.

The United states Court of Appeals for

sinister ll
the Ninth Circuit recently held that there is "nothing
IInothing sinister"
in people lIutilizing the options that our sophisticate system of

"1'"
"IIIi"

property law" makes available to Medicaid recipients and their
spouses to protect their estates.

Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 928.

See also Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1008 ("Congress wanted to encourage"
the shielding of assets from recovery by use of joint tenancy
and, even if such action is taken "merely for reasons of
'shrewdness,' there is nothing improper or inappropriate.")
B.
The Department's ability to achieve reasonably expected
confiscatin~l
recovery of Medicaid payments does not require confiscatin~l
spousels estates.

Medicaid is a medical assistance program for low income
members of our community.

There is almost always a significant

spend down depleting both community and separate property
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resources prior to a spouse being found financially eligible for
Medicaid.

Potential recipients are required to private pay for

their care costs that arise during the spend down period.

Both

federal and state law require the transfer of assets to the
community spouse as a condition of the receipt of Medicaid.
The result of the eligibility process is that once Medicaid
eligibility is reached the state's expectation of there being an
estate of any substance to recover from is small.

is
The reality i.s

an expectation to recover from the recipient's personal needs
account (the up to $2,000 personal exemption) and any interest
the recipient retained in her home, if any.

There is really very

little else the recipient can legally possess and be eligible for
Medicaid.

The eligibility rules established by Congress and

the~

state purposefully and intentionally limit the value of the
recipient's estate.

Certainly Idahols
Idahors legislators anticipated

the de minimis nature and value of the recipient's estate and
enacted legislation with this in mind as reflected in I.C. § 56-
56-'
218 (1) .

The Department's arguments about the amount it could expect
to recover from a recipient's estate are contradictory and
confused.

The Department has argued that every recipient wi.ll
will

have an estate, but that it will be insignificant.
Brief, p. 13.

Appellant's

It has also argued that, because recipient's
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estates will normally "pass automatically to the surviving
spouse," there will never be a recipient's estate.
Brief, p. 15.

Appellant's

It has also argued that single recipients and

recipients without estate planning will leave substantial estates
for recovery.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-18.

Whichever of theSE!

arguments is accurate, if any are, the Department has given no
reason for this Court to conclude that the legislature did not
foresee and desire this result.
The Department's arguments about the potential for abuse of
the recovery provisions and the effect upon those who do not plan
their estates are similarly ineffectual.

The legislature in

passing the spousal impoverishment provisions enunciated a clear
'11"""
'11'"

preference for the preservation of recipients' marriages.
Although the Department worries that the proper interpretation of
IC

§

56-218 may encourage fraudulent marriages, it overlooks the

impact that its interpretation of the statute may have in
encouraging divorces to protect the separate estates of spouses
from recovery.

similarly, many state laws, including the areas

of probate and taxation, have different effects on those who do
or do not plan their estates.

The Ninth Circuit recognized this

fact and dismissed its importance in Bucholtz:
[PJeople who engage in proper estate planning often achieve
results different from, and better than, those obtained by
those unwilling or unable to do so. Those results often
flow from the form of holding title to property.
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114 F.3d at 928.
C.
The vast majority of Idaho's sister states do not
attempt to recover Medicaid payments from the estates of
surviving spouses.
The premise of the Department's arguments is that a Medicaid
recovery statute is absurd if it does not provide for recovery
from the estates of surviving spouses.

Not only is this premiSE!

unfounded and contrary to the clear language of the statute, but.
it is also contrary to the judgment of the overwhelming number clf
Idaho's sister states that do include surviving spouse I s

est~ates

in their Medicaid recovery scheme.
All states participating in the Medicaid program have some
type of program to recover Medicaid payments from recipient's
estates.

The overwhelming majority of these states make no

provision for recovery from the estate of the recipients
spouse. 3

Alaska stat.

§

47.07.055 (1996); Ark. Code Ann.

Supp. 1995); Colo. Rev. stat. Ann.
76-436 (Michie SUPPA
Supp. 1996); Conn. Gen. stat. Ann.
(West SUppa
Del. Code Ann. Liens

§

§

§

§

20
20-

26-4-403.3

17-83g (West 1992);

5003 (Supp. 1996); Fla. stat. Ann.

Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann.
414.28 (West SUppa

§

§

49-4-147.1 (1994); Haw.

Rev. stat. § 346-37 (Supp. 1996); Iowa Code Ann. § 249A.5 (West

3

Respondent was unable to locate the Medicaid estate
recovery provisions for the states of Alabama, Arizona, Kentucky,
Michigan, and Vermont. Of the 44 state statutes reviewed, 33
3.3
limit recovery to the estate of the recipient of Medicaid.
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Supp. 1997); La. Rev. stat. Ann. S
46:153 (G)
S 46:153(G)
Rev. Stat. Ann. Human services 22
Code Ann., Health-General
118E,
lISE,

(Supp. 1997); Me.

S 14 (west Supp. 1996); Md.

S 15-121 (1994); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.

S 31 (Supp. 1997); Miss. Code Ann. S 43-13-120 (1993); Mo.

Ann. Stat.

S 473.398
53-6473.39S (Vernon Supp. 1997); Mont. Code Ann. S 53-6

143 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat.

S 68-1036.02
6S-1036.02 (1996); N.J. Stat. Ann.

S 30:40-7.2 (West 1997); N. M. Stat. Ann. S 27-2A-4 (Michie
1997); N.Y. Social Services Law

S 369 (McKinney 1997); N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 108A-70.5
10SA-70.5 (1994); N.D. Cent. Code
1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.

(supp.
S 50-24.1-07 (Supp.

S 5111.11 (Page 1996); Okla. Stat.

Ann. Public Health and Safety 63 S 5051.3 (West 1997); Pa. Stat.
Ann. Public Welfare Code,
Iq-r
'....

S 1412 (1996); R.I. Gen. Laws.

§

40-840-S

S.C.
S 43-7-460 (Law Co-op Supp.
15 (Supp. 1996); S.
C. Code Ann. S
1996); Tenn. Code Ann.
§

S 71-5-116 (1995); Texas Probate Code Ann.

322 (West
(west Supp. 1997); Utah Code Ann.

Va. Code Ann.

S 26-19-13 (Supp. 1997);

S 32.1-327; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. S 43.20B.OSO
43.20B.080 (West

Supp. 1997); W. Va. Code

S 9-5-11c (Supp. 1996).

Of the few states that make any reference to collection of
Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient's spouse, most
limit recovery to the tracing of assets owned by the recipient at
the time of her death.

Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code §

14009.5 (West Supp. 1997); Ind. Code Ann. S 12-15-9-5 (Burns
Supp. 1997); Minn. Stat. Ann.

S 256B.15 (west Supp. 1997); Nev.
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Rev. stat. Ann. § 422.2935 (Michie 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
414.105 (Supp. 1996); Wyo. Stat. § 42-4-206 (1997).

The

remaining statutes are ambiguous, may not provide recovery in a
case such as this, or exceed the authority granted to the states
under federal law.

Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 35, para 3-9 (Smith-Hurd

Supp. 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-709(g)

(Supp. 1995); N.H. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 167:16-a (Supp. 1996); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 28
286-23 (Supp. 1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 49.496 (West 1997).
Wisconsin's statute, one of the handful that clearly provided for
spousal estate recovery, was invalidated by the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals in Budney.
VI.

(R. pp. 127-142).

JACKMAN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS.

As a personal representative defending the interests of
Lionel's estate, Jackman is entitled to attorney's fees and cost:s
from the estate whether she prevails or not.

IC § 15-3-720.

The

Department, even if it prevails is not entitled to attorney's
fees because Jackman's defense is not frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation.

IC § 12-121.

Because the Department's

position is contrary to the clear language of state and federal
law and the Department's own regulations, Jackman should be
awarded reasonable attorney's fees and expenses.

IC § 12-117(1).

A.
Jackman is entitled to attorney's fees and costs from
Lionel's estate.
Idaho Code § 15-3-720 provides that a personal
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representative who "defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good
faith, whether successful or not, . . . is entitled to receive
from the estate [her] necessary expenses and disbursements
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred."

Jackman is the

personal representative of Lionel's estate and any expenses and
attorney's fees incurred in this action are incurred in good
faith.

The Department's insinuations of a lack of good faith are

newly raised and have not been reviewed by a fact-finder.

The

record as it stands, however, contains copious, uncontested
evidence of Jackman's good faith.
Jackman has defended Lionel Knudson's estate against the
Department's claim in fulfillment of her fiduciary duty to the
estate.

Jackman's opposition to the Department's claim is in the

interests of the estate.

Unlike instances where Idaho courts

have denied reimbursement of expenses to a personal
representative, Jackman is not litigating any issues to her
personal benefit to the detriment of the estate or any other heir
or devisee.

The Department's suggestion that Jackman would best:

fulfill her duties to the estate by forfeiting the entire value
of the estate to the Department's claim is absurd.

Regardless elf

the ultimate outcome of this litigation, Jackman is entitled to
her expenses and attorney's fees from the estate.
B.
The Department, even if it prevails, is not entitled t:o
attorney's fees and costs from Jackman.
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The Department may only recover attorney's fees if Jackman
has opposed its claim unreasonably and without foundation.
12-121.

IC

§

As discussed earlier, Jackman's actions in this matter

(and the actions of the Knudsons) were intended to comply with
state law and the Department's regulations.

The Department has

not challenged the Magistrate's findings as to the propriety of
the Marriage Settlement Agreement or Jackman's management of
Hildor or Lionel's estates.

The Department has only challenged

the denial of its claim against Lionel's estate.

Jackman's

denial of the Department's claim is based on the clear language
of Idaho statutes, the Department's regulations, and federal law
and regulations.

Jackman has prevailed on this issue before the

Magistrate and the District court.
Court.

Jackman's claim cannot be

held to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation and the
Department cannot recover its attorney's fees.

c.
Jackman is entitled to an award of attorney's fees
aqainst the Department.
Idaho Code

§

12-117(1) provides that a citizen prevailing in

a civil proceeding against a state agency is entitled to costs
and attorney's fees if the state agency "acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law."

The Department admits that

there are no factual disputes in this appeal.
p. 7.

Appellant's Brief,
Brief',

The Department's pursuit of its claim against Lionel's

estate is contrary to the clear language of state and federal law
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and the Department's own regulations.

The Department's position

was completely rejected by the Magistrate and District Court.
Because the Department has acted without a reasonable basis in
law, Jackman is entitled to an award of her attorney's fees.
CONCLOSION
CONCLUSION

Based upon the above, the decision of the Magistrate and
District Court denying the Department's claim should be upheld.
The language of IC

§

56-218 is clear and unambiguous and allows

the Department to recover Medicaid payments only from the estate
of the recipient if the recipient dies possessed of an estate.
Under federal law and regulations, the Department may only
recover Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient.

The

Department's Petition for Allowance should be denied.
DATED this 4th day of October, 1997.

~

Wil~.:Kir;:h
Wil~.:Kir;:h

Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the __ day of October, 1997 two
true and correct copies of the foregoing document were mailed,
Postage prepaid, to the following:

w. Corey Cartwright
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
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APPENDICES
N. Y. Vol. Amb. Ben. § 10
N. Y. Work. Compo § 15 (Supp. 1995)

N. Y. Vol. Fire Ben § 10
united states Steel Corp. v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board,
536 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1988).
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ror
to'

curring between July 1,
I, 1990 and June 30,
aD,
1991. July 1,
34), 1992, and
1991,
I, 19111 and.June 30,
on or
01' after July J,
J. 1992.
Amendment.. LI989, c. 604, § 3,
1989 Amendmenl
~enacir
substituted "effective date" for ~enacir
menL date",
date".

'.-- Legislative Histories

CroIl8 Refe~nces
Refe~nces .

,,_

Inlut1~R Clccurl'lnll
IIccurl'lnll on or .R.tJr
,",,-,1' thn ol1'nclJve
of1'ncUve
InlUt1~R
ur thll chapter.
chapter, Hnd
and added pl"llYilllonl
pJ"llYilllonl
diLlA! uf
compenaation for
tor l!\Jurles oc
oc..
relating to compensation

L.I989. Co 604': .,For
For memorand~
memorand~or
of the Worker'll; CompensatiOn
Comperu;auOn Board, see McKiMey'S'
McKinney's'
1989 Session Laws or
of New York, p. 2223.
L.1988, Co 24: For memorandum ot
of the Department at
of State, 88Il
ll8Il MrKinney's
McKinney's 1988
Sellllion LaWli
'
LaWII or
of New York.
York, p. 1934.

of particular political subdivision ror
for payment·
payment - of benefiLB,
benefits,
Liability or
'
Ambulance Worken;'
Workel1l' Benefit Law § 3 0 . '

~IUI"""k''''oW

\

•

It. more than one phalange of a digit shall be lost, the period .shall. be .thr ~e
~,'ee
III
as for the loss of the entire digit. If only the fll'St phalange shall be
1 Fe
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."" ...........
""'
__ .. ................ - .. .s~. ~e
period shall
be (lne-half the period for 1088 of the entire digit. The period for
loss or .I~s~
loss"cif
use of tWo
.. ~.f ~se.of
two or. more digits, or One or more phalanges of two
more digitii;'on:
digits, of a nand or foot; may be proportioned to the period for the loss 0'(
use of thehiihd 'or foot occasioned thereby, but shall not exceed the period for
Hand' or foot. If an ann or leg shall be amputated at or above the
the loss 'ora Haild'or
wrist or ankle.
ankle, the period for
such loss shall be in proportion to the period for
rorsuch
10ss.oC,the.lUTO..or leg.; In .the
the 10ss.oC,the,arro..or
the case of loss of binocular vision or of eighty
cenWm.or ,JJl9re,
,~9re. of the vision of an eye, the period shall be .the
per cenwm,or
the same as fOJ:
IOssDHh~.eye,
the IOssDHh~,eye,
b. Loss of hearing. In the case of the complete loss of the hearing of one
ear,'sixty weeks; for the loss of hearing of both ears,
ears. one hundre~ flfty
fifty weeks.
ear..sixty
c. TC!tal loSS" of use. In the case of permanent total loss of use of ~
member;·the"compensation'shaU be the same as for the 'loss
'Ioss of the membet.
member';'the"compensation'shaU
ParUa!. loss Or partial,
partial loss of use. Except as above provided in this
d. ParUaI,
subdiviSiori;''in',the'
in' the' case of permanent partial loss
loss· or loss of use of a member
subdiviSiori;
member,
membei':
the periOd shall be for the proportionate loss or loss of use of the membet.
CompeiisaUon' COr pennanent Part:ialloss
parl:.;ialloss of use of
eye shall be awarded oh
the
basls'of ut\eorrected
~t1eorrec~ loss of vision or
o~ corrected
co~cted loss:of vision resulting from
the. b~ls'of
lIIJurywhich ever 18
I
an injurywhich
is greater.···
greater. ,,'
:'.' ., '
I ,. . .
DiSfigurl!l11ent. .In
,In the caSe of' ;~~us 'caciai' o~ head disfilurement,
;_ e. .~~~e~~nt.
disfiiurem~nt,
including's
Includmg a ilisIigiirement
rusIigurement continuous in length which is partly in the facial area
and also extends into the neck region as deScribed in this 'paragraph; the
volunteet-itirtbulance worker:
worke.'r: shlillbe
sh.!i.llbe 'paid' in,
in. a lump ·sum·
volunteet'lUrtbulance
'sum' a proper and
equitabllqmtO\Jh~ which shall be determined by the workers' compensation
equitabllqmto\lh~
board. If the earning capacity of the volunteer ambulance worker shall have
~n
imp~ed,.or.
impaired,·.. by'
by, any serious disfigurement
or. may in the fublre be impaired
been inJ,ps,ired•.
in
In the region'above
~gton' above the ilterno
st:e~o clavicular
clavicul:u- articulationS' anterior to and including
regton of the~terno
the~terno 'cleido'
clado' mastoid muscles on either side. the volunteer
the region
am~u1ance worker'"8hall
worker1lhall be paid.in a,lump
a.lump suill
sum a proper and equitable amount
ambulance
,which shaU-·be·determined
disfigul"t!
.whlch
shal1-:l>e:dete~ed by such··board.
such'·h?ard .. 'Two or more serious disfigul"t!ments. . not .e'9ntinuous
in length, resulting from
mm the same injury.
ments,
-e~n!iJtuous In
injury, if partially in
faela! area,
area· aoopartiaUy in such neck region, ·shall
the facial
,shall be deemed to be a facial
disfigmeinent.
disfigmemant. .. , An award, or the aggregate of the awards; to a volunteer
ambulance worker under this paragraph shall not exceed twenty ·thousand
'thousand
dollars. ___....
,... .,
'
dollars._
-or .partial loss or
.loss of. use ,of
of more than one member.' In any
'):'ota~·-or·partialloss
or,loss
ff... '):'otaJ.
case In
a loss or loss of use of more than one member or
in which there shall be a'ioss
parts .o.~
of..more
than one
member set forth above in paragraphs
~o~e ~~
O?~ !",ember
p:u-agraphs a to e, both
mclUSlve, or Uiis subdiVISion, but not amounting to permanent
pernlanent total disability
inclusive,"oT"Uiis'subdivision,
disability,
shali
the periods for loss or loss of use of each such member'or part thereof shall
run consecUtively.,
, :. .
~ses, In all
. 'g, Qt!tieT
"g,
~ ~ses.
aU other cases of permanent ·partial disability the
volunteer ambulance worker shall be paid for each week,
week. during the continu
continuance thereof,. as follows:
(1) !tOle
Itthe percentage of loss of earning capacity is seventy-five per centum,
or &:ea.tl!J:
grea,tl!J:,J.l.e.
~he shall
shaU be paid one hundred flf'ty
•. b.e. Qr )lhe
fifty dollars for each week,
proVlde4,)\9.W~~r.....that
..... that the volunteer ambulance worker is injured inthe line
provide4,.1I9.W~~r
of
9r:....~ the effective date of this
this chapter to and
Of. duty'..0!:1..
d~ty'..0!:l.:9r:
~nd including JUru:i
thirtie~l.!!1!le_~~_I!.~undred ninety, provided.
provided, however; 'that when the volunteer
thirtie~l.!!¥te_~~_I!.~undred
ambul~ncE!.~<?r~!!!.is injured in the line of duty on.or:
a.nerJuly.flrs~nineteen
ambul~ncE!~<.>r~!!.!'.is
on ,or: a.nerJulYfJrst,nineteen
hundre_~~eo/.~and
hundre_~~eo/.~ .and including June thirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety-one
~uch p2~'!!!!!nt
be two h!!!!d!'~d
Ijollar!! for ~,,~h w,?",k, 'Inti prnviclerl
~7~;-;~n~~ shall
5~~~ be
h!!!!d!-~d ~ighty dollar!!
further. .!:I:i!l~
Uiit 'when'the
,,::~~n. the volunteer ambuIarlce
ambulance worker is injured in the line of
\ on or arter JUly first,
flrs~ nineteen hundred ~ety~'ne
rUnety~'ne to and including June
}'orioiart.erJ'U1y

..

i,hlrtieth.· nineteen hUndred ninety-tWo such'
such· payment shall be,~,
be.~ .hund.red
hunru-ed
i,hirtieth.·
voblnteer
('lfty dollars for each; week; and provided further that when the volunteer
('illy
ambulance wo~er is injured in the line of duty on or atter
after July tint, nineteen
hundred' ninety-two such payments shaIl
shall be four hundred dollars for each
....
,. jj
week.
,,:,,'
." ,,'
"
.•
'.- (2) If the pereentage of los8 of earning capacity is fifty per,'
per·· centum, or
lesS~an: seventy-five per centum, he or she slWl
slUill be Paid. one
greater, but lesS~an:
,for, each week, provide<1;
provide<i; however,'thilt
however,' that the voliiiiteer
voliiilteer ambu
ambuhundred dollars .for·
iiijured in the line of duty on or after the effective date of this
klnce worker is ii\jui'ed
mnety, provided,
chapter to and, including June' thirtieth, nineteen hundred irinety,
however, that when:~ volUnteer ambu~ce worker is injured in the line of
after~uly first,
firs~ 'nineteen hun~ ninety to;andinchiding
to; andinchidmg June
duty on or aft.er~uly
thirtieth, nineteen hundred ~ety.:one,
~ety.:one. sUCh' .payinj!nt
thirtieth.
,paYmj!nt shall be one hundred
provided, hOwever, that
eighty-six dollars and Seventy-8ix cents Cor each week, provided.
volun~r. arn.buIaii~e
am,buIaii~e wbrker is. injured in the line of duty ori6r after
when the volun~r.
July' first,
nine
flrS~ nineteeii,hundred~ninety~ne
nineteeii,hundred~ninety~ne to and including Jiine thirtieth, nineteen hundred.niriety'-!?No,
hundredniriety'-t?No. .such
,such payment ~ be two hWidred··thii'ty-four
Cor. each, weeki·.)roVided,
weeki'.)roVided. however, thaLwhen
that ..when the
land fUty
fUlY cents Cor,
doUars .and
volunteer ambulance worker is injUred iii'
iiI'the
the line of duty on or after July first,
firs~
ninety-two. such payment 'Bhan
'Bha.u be two hWidi-td
hWidrtd sixty-eight
nineteen hundred ninety-two,
dollars for,eaclt.week..:
,'. ".,
·'1. .'
,'
for,eaclt·week..: ,',',...'' ,',
.
;'. . . . . . ....

or

an

.

..

. , , , . '
,~

.

~.

,
.'.

. I I•
"
..
.•
.

I,'

•

. '

.' ..
.:
,. .

'.'

perCentage of los8
twenty.-~ve.wcentum, or
(3) If the pen:entage
IOS8 of earning capacity is twenty.-~ve,wcentum,

C!!Dt.um; he .or she BhalJ
BhaU be paid. thirtY.
greater, but less than fifty per C!!Dtum;
thirty' dollars
for each week. n,
,"
.• ' '.''
.' ;'.'
;,;
,'.
n.
..,
.•...
".'
:,; .. ;'~. .
.
.
percen~ge O(lOS8
b(Joss' eBining capacity is leu
le88 tlulri tWe'nty-five per,
(4) if the percen~ge
centum, he or she'sluiJ1
she·slui.ll not pe. paid any ~eekl1 benefit.
....
-'. '.'
,.,' ., :.:. .,.'.. -',
centum.

or

..
Pennanent partial disability;, within the 'ine~g of this,
this. paragraph, shall
. 'Permanent
of the:volunteer ambulance.worker.has been
exist only if the earning eapacity oC
injury...The workers'
permanently and partially lost as the result of the injury...
such disability and such
compensation board shall detennine' the :degree oC BUch
board may reconsider such, degree on its own motion or upon application of
.'
. .
.
., . :.'
: .. , ., ....
. ...
' ':,
,'.
any party in interest.
shall in case of death
2. An aWard'made to a claimaht under this section shaU
arising from c:ause8 other than the irijury 00 payable to and Cor the benefit of
the persons f
o l l o w i n g : ,.
.. ..
following:
surviving ~pOuse'
~pouse' and:~~'
and'~~' clwd of the deCeaSed' under the
a. If there be a 8urviving
,'.'. ......
.' .,.,.
.'" , .. :• .....
age'of
eightren yearil;'to such spouse;' l .'.'
.. ."..
:.
.
.•..•..

run

,

-

,
"

...

"

b. If there be a surviving spouse and surviving child or: children of the
deceased under the age (If: eighteen ,y~.,
,be.: payable to the
.y~,. ~ne:ha1f
~ne:half shaU, .be.:
surviving spo.use and the other
other.,,~alf.!lto.
..~aIf.! Ito . ~e s~ving.clilld
s~ving, clilld".. or .children.
c. ., If there be a surviving child or children of the deceased under the age of
eighteen,
,surviving spouse,'
eighteen. years, but no .surviving
spouse,· ,then to such child or' children.
8~ving spouse and 'n~ surviving clwd '~r children of the
d. If th~ be n~ s~ving
deceased ilnder ·the age of eighteen ,yellrll,'
,years,' then to such de~ndenf
de~iidenf or depen
dependefined· in section Seven:of
Seven: of ,this'article,
,this' article, as directed: hy' 'tlle
'Ole workers'
dents as defmed,
benolBuch
'deperident8;"iJieii to the
compensation'b6ard;:'and if there shall be
no' Buch 'deperident8;"i1ieii
am,ount not exceeding'" reasonable funeral
estate of such deceased in an am.ount
expenses sa'provided in subdivision one of sectioriseven otthls3iticle.
oHhls3iticle, or, if
e5i.aie,"w t.hi: ~-DVii"'u~
~-DV,,"U~ pc..~on~ 'p~~"_~g
·p~yi..~g thle;~infi."_J"~n~
th[e;~infi."_J·~n~ or
there be no e5i.aie.·"w
amoUnt'. riot exc~g .reasonable ~~ra). ~nses as
such dece~din an amoUnt',riot
orovided inSuchsubdiVisioll o n e . "
'orovided
'
)
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION lAW
Art.

:z

cand~date
cand~date

for rehabilitation; such rehabilitation shall constitute
~ treatment and care as provided in this chapter.
w. Other cases. In all other cases in this class of disability, the
compensation shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the
difference between his average weekly wages and his wage-earning
capacity thereafter in the same employment or otherwise, payable
during the continuance of such partial disability, but subject to
reconsideration of the degree of such impairment by the board on
its own motion or upon application of any party in interest.
subdi4. Effect of award. An award made to a claimant under subdi
vision three shall in case of death arising from causes other than
the injury be payable to and for the benefit of the persons followfollow
ing;
a. If there be a surviving spouse and no child of the deceased
under the age of eighteen years, to such spouse.
b. If there be a surviving spouse and surviving child or children
one· half shall be
of the deceased under the age of eighteen years, one-half
payable to the surviving spouse and the other half to the surviving
child or children.
The board may in its discretion require the appointment of a
guardian for the purpose of receiving the compensation of the
minor child. In the absence of such a requirement by the board the
appointment for such a purpose shall not be necessary.
c. If there be a surviving child or children of the deceased under
the age of eighteen years, but no surviving spouse then to such child
or children.
d. If there be no surviving spouse and no surviving child or
children of the deceased under the age of eighteen years, then to
such dependent or dependents as defined in section sixteen of this .
chapter, as directed by the board; and if there be no such dependepen
dents, then to the estate of such deceased in an amount not
exceeding reasonable funeral expenses as provided in subdivision
one of section sixteen of this chapter, or, if there be no estate, to the
person or persons paying the funeral expenses of such deceased in
an amount not exceeding reasonable funeral expenses as provided
in subdivision one of section sixteen of this chapter.
An award for disability· may be made after the death of the
injured employee.

4-a. Protracted temporary total disability in connection with
!empcr~-y :otal
total disabiiity
uisabiiity
permanent partial disability. In case of !empcr~-y
and.,· )anent partial disability both resulting from the same
T

fl

COMPENSATION
Art. :z
2

§IS

c~>ntinues for
for, a longer
injw-y, if the temporary total disability continues
period than the number of weeks set forth in
m the following
folloWlng schedsched
ule, the period of temporary total disability in
i~ excess
exce.:s of such
su~h
penod provid
proVldnumber of weeks shall be added to the compensation period
ed in subdivision three of this section: Arm, thirty-two weeks; leg,
forty weeks; hand, thirty-two weeks; foot, thirty-two weeks; ear,
eye, twenty weeks; thumb.
thumb, twenty.four
twenty-four weeks;
~eeks;
twenty-five weeks; eye.
first finger, eighteen weeks; great toe, twelve weeks; second finger,
twelve weeks; third finger,
finger. eight weeks; fourth finger, eight weeks;
toe other than great toe, eight weeks.
In any case resulting in loss or partial loss of use of arm. leg,
tempo~ary total
hand, foot.
foot, ear, eye.
eye, thumb.
thumb, finger or toe, where the temporary
disability does not extend beyond the periods above mentioned for
consuch injury, compensation shall be limited to the schedule con·
tained in subdivision three.
In. case of ,temporary
5. Temporary partial disability. In
temporary partial
disability resulting in decrease of earnmg
earning capacity.
capaCity, the compensa
co~~nsa
tion shall be two-thirds of the difference between the injured
lion
mJured
, employee's average weekly wages before the accident and his wage
, earning capacity after the accident in the same or other employ
employment.
5-a.
5-3. Determination of wage earning capacity. The wage earning
capacity of an injured employee in cases of
~f partial disability shall
~hall
be determined by his actual earnings,
earnings. provided,
he
proVlded, however,
h~wever, that
tha.t if
If .he
has no such actual earnings the board may in the interest
justice
mterest of Justl~e
fIX
fIX such wage earning capacity as shall be reasonable,
reasonable. but not 10
in
excess of seventy-five per centum of his fonner
fonne~ full
~U. time actual
act~l
lDJury and his
hIS
earnings, having due regard to the nature of his injury
physical impairment.
pro5-b. Non-schedule adjustments. Notwithstanding any other pro
vision of this chapter, in any case coming within the provis~ons
provisions of
subdivisions three or five of this section, in which the right
nght to
compensation has been established and compensation
c~mpensation. has been
paid for not less than three months.
of
months, in which the continuance
contu~uance .of
disability and of future earning capacity cannot
with
~annot be
~ ascertained
ascerta1O~d "':lth
justice.
reasonable certainty. the board may, in
m the interest
mterest of J~shce,
approve a non-schedule adjustment agreed
a~eed to between the claimant
c1aJm~nt
and the employer or his insurance carner.
carrier. The board shall require,
r~qu~re,
before approving any such agree,ment,
agreement. that
t~at there
t~ere be an examination
e~m1OatlOn
sectIOn nineteen
mneteen of this
thls chapter.
chapter,
of the claimant in accordance With
with section
'It Ie fn ..... ,l .l.~ • • 1._
' n when
and such approval
shall
is ---:-............
found that ;he~
approvaI s
oonly
y
g1~e
w hen it
--nl be given
hall
adjustment is tair and in the best interest
mterest of the claimant.
claJmant. The
may,
in
case.
order
all
future
compensation
tf) ¥ TO"")
T" .... )
such
case,
d

,r
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VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTERS' BENEFIT lAW

COVERAGE AND BENEFITS

Art. 2

conseculoss of use of each such member or part thereof shall run consecu
tively.

3. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is twenty-five
greater. but less than fifty per centum,
centum. he shall be
centum, or greater,
per centum.
paid thirty dollars for each week;

(g) Other cases. In all other cases of permanent partial disability
the volunteer fireman shall be paid for each week during the
continuance thereof.
thereof, as follows:

4. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is less than
centum. he shall not be paid any weekly benefit.
twenty-five per centum,

1. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is seventy-five
greater. he shall be paid ninety-five dollars for
per centum, Or greater,
each week,
week. provided,
provided. however,
however. that when the volunteer fireman is
first. nineteen
injured in the line of duty on or after January first,
thirtieth. nineteen
hundred seventy-eight to and including June thirlieth,
eighty-three. such payment shall be one hundred five
hundred eighty-three,
provided. however.
dollars for each week provided,
however, that when the volunteer
fireman is injured in the line of duty on or after July first,
thirtieth,
nineteen hundred eighty-three to and including June thirtieth.
eighty-four. such payment shall be one hundred
nineteen hundred eighty-four,
provided, however.
however, that when
twenty-five dollan for each week provided.
the volunteer fireman is injured in the line of duty on or after
July first,
first. nineteen hundred eighty-four
eighty·four to and including June
thirtieth,
thirtieth. nineteen hundred eighty-five such payment shall be one
hundred thirty-five dollars for each week,
week. provided, however,
however. that
when the volunteer fireman is injured in the line of duty on or
after July first,
first. nineteen hundred eighty-five such payment shall
be one hundred fifty dollars for each week;

2. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is fifty per
centum,
greater. but less than seventy·five per centum, he shall
centum. or greater,
week.
be paid sixty-three dollars and thirty-three cents for each week,
provided, however.
however, that when the volunteer fireman is injured in
provided.
first, nineteen hundred
the line of duty on or after January first.
thirtieth. nineteen hundred
seventy-eight to and including June thirtieth,
eighty-three, such payment shall be seventy dollars for each week,
week.
eighty-three.
provided,
however, that when the volunteer fireman is injured in
provided. however.
the line of duty on or after July first,
first. nineteen hundred eighty
eightythree to and including June thirtieth,
thirtieth. nineteen hundred eighty
eightyfour such payment shall be eighty-three dollars and thirty-three
cents for each week,
week. provided,
provided. however,
however. that when the volunteer
fireman is injured in the line of duty on or after July first,
first.
nineteen hundred eighty-four,
thirtieth.
eighty-four. to and including June thirtieth,
nineteen hundred eighty-five,
eighty-five. such payment shall be ninety dol
dollars for each week,
week. provided,
provided. however,
however. that when the volunteer
fireman is injured in ihc Hile: of duty on or :lfter July first,
nine ) hundred eighty-five such payment shall be one hundred

, '..

:- '........'........
'........'........ or.'·.
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Art. 2

disability. within the meaning of this paragraph,
paragraph.
Permanent partial disability,
shall exist only if the earning capacity of the volunteer fireman has
been permanently and partially lost as the result of the injury. The
workmen's compensation board shall determine the degree of such
disability and such board may reconsider such degree on its own
motion or upon application of any party in interest.
2. An award made to a claimant under this section shall in case
of death arising from causes other than the injury be payable to and
foHowing:
for the benefit of the persons follOWing:
(a) If there be a ~urviving spouse and no child of the deceased
years, to such spouse.
under the age of eighteen years.
(b) If there be a surviving spouse and surviving child or children
of the deceased under the age of eighteen years, one-half shall be
payable to the surviving spouse and the other half to the surviving
child or children.
(c) If there be a surviving child or children of the deceased under
the age of eighteen years,
spouse, then to such
years. but 110 surviving spouse.
child or children.
(d) If there be no surviving spouse and no surviving child or
children of the'deceased
the ·deceased under the age of eighteen years,
years. then to
such dependent or dependents as defined in section seven of this
chapter,
chapter. as directed by the workmen's compensation board; and if
there shall be no such dependents,
dependents. then to the estate of such
deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable funeral expenses
chapter, or,
or. if
as provided in subdivision one of section seven of this chapter.
there be no estate, to the person or persons paying the funeral
expenses of such deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable
funeral expenses as provided in such subdivision one.

,

3. An award for disability may be made after the death of the
vol unteer fireman.

~
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(L.J956.
L.1956, c. 697, §§ 2,3;
(L.l956, c. 696; amended L.1956.
2.3; L.1958.
L.1958, c,
c. 9, § 2; L.1959.
L.1959,
c. 502, §§ 5,6; L.1960, c. 781,
781. §§ 4.
4, 5; L.1962.
L.1962, c. 175,
175. § 4; L.196S.
L.196S, c. 311.
311,
c,
~§ 4.
4, S; L.1968,
L.1968. c. 833,
833. § 4; L.!97Q,
L.!97(!. c. 2!!3, §§ 4: S; L_1Q74,
L_1Q74: c. ~~4, §§ 4,
4: 5;
L.1977, c. 675,
675. §§ 84, 85; L.1978,
L.l978, c. 597,
597. §§ 4,
4. 5; L.1982,
L.1982. c. 34b \ 2;
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L.1983, c. 654. ~~ 4. 5,)
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things, that damages for wrongful death
are not recoverable against DOT as a mat·
of
ter of law. The Court of Common Pleas 01
preMontgomery County BUStained DOT'B pre
liminary objections, and, for the reasons
.frlml.
below, we aeflml.

or

Appellant.. argue that the trial court
AppellantB
elftd in ita anaIYBis
anaIYlis of the sections of the
el'ftd
Judicial Code pertaining to sovereign im·
munity (Code), 42 PLC.S. Ii 8521-8528.
appellant.. all8ert
aAlert that future
Specifically, appellantB
eapacity and
loss of earnings and earning capacity
lou of consortium are recoverable in a
wrongful death aetion.
Seetion 8628(c) of the Code provides:
(c)

7Wu

of damagu

recowrable.
recowrab/e.

Damages shall be recoverable only for.
DamageB
Past and future 10IIII
lou of earnings and
(I) PlI8t
(1)
eapacity.
earning capacity.
(2) Pain and Buffering.
dental ellpellBes
expenses includ
includ(8) Medical and denial
ing the reuonable value of reasonable
and neceaaary medical and dental servic·
es, prosthetic devices and necessary am·
bulance, hospital, professional nursing,
and phYBical therapy expenses accrued
and anticipated in the diag1lOlis,
diag1lOBis, care and
recovery of the claimanL
claimanl
Los. of COllBortium.
consortium.
(4) LosB
losaes, except that property
(6) Property l0S8es,
claims
loases ahalI not be recoverable in clailll3
brought PIUIIU8llt to section 8522(b)(5)
(relating to potholes and other dangerous
dangerouB
conditional.
conditions).
The Superior Court of Penllllylvania stat·
Btat·
ed in McClinton II. White, 285 Pa.Superior
Ct. 271, 277-78, 427 A.2d 218, 221 (I981):
(1981):
In a survival action, the eause
cause ariBes out
of the injury, not out of the death. The
estate is substituted for the deeedent,
and it..
itB recovery is baaed upon the rights
of sction which were posBessed by the
deeedent at his death. The estate may
recover
rec:over for the I08a
Io8a of deeedent'B past
and future earning power, for
lor the decedece
dent'.
dent's pain and suffering
Buffering prior to death,
and for the coat
cost of medical aervices,
serviceB,
nlUlling and hospital
hOBpital care provided to
decedenl
decedenL The estate may not, however,
recover iUIIi:i'Qt
iuui:i'Ql C.ii'C'~
C.ii'C'~ :;:n:e, ~h1!~t!!
~h1!~t!!..
Iy,
fecedent eould
ly,
could not have brought

U.S. STEEL CORP. v. W.e.A.B.
Pa. 615
cu...
cu... SJ6 A.Zd
o\.Zd SIS (Pa.CalwI....,..,
an action for wrongful death."
death." (Emphasis were not identical in initial action in which
added.)
claimant waa detennined to be entitled to
Accordingly, we aftlrll1
aftlrlll the order of the diBfigurement
disfigurement benefits on weekly basis
basil and
trial court and remand the case to the in sUbsequent proceeding in which claim
claimCourt of Common Plell8
Pleas of Montgomery ant'.
ant', estate aought unpaid disfigurement
County for further proeeedinp
benefitll,
proceedings Oli the J'eo
J"eo
benefits, 110
110 that doctrine of res
rea judicata
maining countB.
was inapplicable.
count...

'Pa.ea.w,....,..,

an action for these expenses at the time
of his death. (Citations omitted.)

McClillton cowt
In footnote No.6, the McClillllm
atated, in comparison:
IWcoverable damages under the Wrong·
ful Death Act have been held to include
'the present worth of the deceased'.
probable earnings during the probable
duration of the deceased'l
deceased's life, which
could have gone for the benefit of the
children, parent, husband or wife 118
as the
children.
cue may be; the value of BUch services
aervkea
case
as the deceaaed
deceased would have rendered to
B8
the named beneficiaries, and 8uch
such gifta
deceased would have been reason
reason·
aa the deeeaaed
bener,..
ably expeeted to have given the benef,.
ciaries. The Wrongful Death Ad itself
alao apecifically provides for the recov
recov·
also
ex·
ery of medical expenses and funeral ex
penses.
penles. The cost of the tombstone and
the cost of administration of the estate
have also been held to be proper items of
damage.' (citations omitted.)

Reveraed and remanded.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of January,
1988, the order of the Court of Common
Pless of Montgomery County in the above
abovePleaa
captioned matter is affirmed and the Ol.lIe
OllIe
is remanded to that court for proeeedings
eollJliatent with thia
tha opinion.
COllJliatent

relinqllished.
Jllriadiction relinquished.

p.s.

z.

The damages which appellants seek in
Count 1. paragraph 34, of their complaint,
complaint.
which would be included in a wrongful
death action, are not enumerated in 42 Pa.
C.s. § 8528(c) of the Code.

UNITED STATES STEEL

CORPORATION,
CORPORATION.
PeUtloner,
v.

Therefore, Judge Albert Subera in the
instant case correctly stated, "we conclude
instanl
Section 8528(c) clearly is limited in
that Seetion
scope to the type of damages properly rere
coverable in a Survival Action, not s
Wrongful Death Action." The types of
damages which an: recoverable in Seetion
8528(c) of the Code are recoverable by the
decedent's estate because
beause they an: clearly
expenses incurred by the decedent, for
which the decedent could bring suit had the
decedent survived.
Burvived.

Finally, appellants ineorrectly
incorrectly state that
loss of consortium is "an item of damage
recoverable under its Wrongful Death Stat·
ute. . .... The Superior Court of Pennsyl·
vania recently held in Liftebaugh v.
351 Pa.superior Cl
CL 135, 139, 605 A.2d 303,
305 (19&3),
(19813), "a surviving spouse cannot
maintain a separate cauBe
cause of action for 108s
loss
of consortium resulting from the death of a
amuse but must iru;tead
ill&tead recover damages
for loss of the decealled spoue's
spouse's lOCietym

1. Worbrs' CompenaaUon *"606
Estate of workerll'
workers' compensation c1aim
daimant, who waa not survived by dependent
8PO-U~
spou~ or child at time of death, was
bal'ftd
balftd by Btatute
8tatute from receiving previously
awarded compensation benefits for disfig
disfig·
urement in exceas
exeeaa of reaaonable funeral
expenses, which are limited by atatute to
$1,600. 77 P.s. ft 618(22), 641, 641(7),
661(7).

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AP.
PEAL BOARD (KAMINSKY),
Respondents.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
OcL 6, 1987.
Argued Ocl
Decided Jan. 28, 1988.

uh,.,

~~

)

,

Elltate of worlce/"ll'
workers' compensation claim·
Eatate
WII8 awarded benefits for facial disfig·
ant was
urement sustained by claimant during
course of employment. The Workmen's
affinned the
Compensation Appeal Board sffinned
referee'B
referee's order, and the employer appealed.
The Commonwealth Court, No. 1671 C.D.
ColinB, J., held that: (I)
(1) estate of
1984, Colina,
claimant, who Waa
was not survived by depend.
claimant.
ent spouse or child at time of death, was
WII8
barred by statute
BtatUte from receiving previously
awarded compensation
compenlJltion benefits for disfig.
urement in excess
ellcess of reasonable
rell80nable funeral
llrement
12) lIubject
8ubject matter, parties,
expenaea. and /2)
expenses.
suing or being sued
and capacity of parties luing

Worken' Colllpenaation
ColOpenaaUon $:>1789
Subject matter, parties, 8Ild
8IId capacity of
parties BUing or being aued
IIUed were DOt
not identi
iden\.i.
cal in initial action in which workera' corn
compellBation
pensation claimant was determined to be
entitled to diafiguremen t benefits on week·
ly
Iy basis and in 8ubsequent proceeding in
which claimant'B estate, after claimant'a
death for nonwork·related reasons, sought
award of unpaid disfiguremeDt
disfigurement beDefits,
benefits, 80
inapplica
that doctrine of rea judicata was inapplica·
§f S13,
513, 641.
ble. 77 p.s. If

8. Worken' CompenaaUon $:>1791
question regarding entitlement of
Any que8tion
claimant', estate
e8tate to
workers' compensation claimant's
award of disfigurement benefits waa not
ripe for consideration during time of initial
proceeding in which claimant had sought
8Oughtto
to
ben
establish entitlement to disfigurement benbll8is. 77 P.S. it
It 613, 641.
efits on weekly basis.

Paul A. Robb, Robert C. Jonea, Pitta·
burgh, for petitioner.
William Lowman,
Lowman. Ronald Zera, Ada Guy·
ton, Daniel D. Harshman, United Mine
DiaL # 6, Belle Ver·
Work era of America, Dial
respondents.
non, for re8pondents.
snd COIJNS,
COUNS, JJ.,
Before MacPHAIL and
and KALiSH, Senior Judge.
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UNS,
llNS, Judge.
ited States
Statel Steel Corporation (employ(employ
're appeala an order of the Workmen's
Workmen'!
oenaation
oelll8tion Appeal BoanI (Board) which
oed the order of a Referee awarding
IDI!n's
IDl!n'l mmpe!ll!8tion benefita \.0 the ellell
of ita fonner employee, John
Jolm C. KaKa
(f (Kaminsky) lor
for a facial disfiguredilfigure
suatained
luatained by Kaminsky during the
'.e 01
of his employment..
employment.
February 8, 1979, a Referee iasued an
,. awardiJIg
awardiDg Kaminsky 200 weeki of
enaation
I!DI&tion for a Iacial
facial disfigurement
dilfigurement
I reeuJted from a depreaaecl
depreued fracture
e skull
JllJIe 7,
7.
Ikull which he sustained on JlUle
while in the course
COUl'Be of his employment..
employment.
iDiky
iDSky was receiving workmen's
workmen'l mm·
loon
IDon benefita for total disability for
iea
il!l he had sustained
lustained in the same acc"
which resulted
dilfigurement.
reBulted in the disfigurement..
!fore, the Referee's order deferred the
aOOn
aDon of the employer to make payol
of the disfigurement benefita to the
,ant..I
,ant.I An appeal was taken by the
oyer challenging only the amount of
oeDBaDon awarded. [n
oeDlaOOn
In that appeal, the
suspeDBion
oyer did not challenge the suspellJlion
ltigurement benefita for 80
BO long as the
lfigurement
compen
WIt was receiving workmen's compen·
Q benefits for total diaability, the fact
the injury had in fact oeeurred or that
tigurement had been sustained
lustained by the
figurement
WIt. On July 26, 1979, the Board
WIt..
fJed the amount of compensation
fled
WlL8 awarded for the disfigurement
h was
ZOO weeks
weeb to 180 weeki. The dee
dec..
200
..
.mnned in all
of the Referee W&ll aWnned
respecta. Neither party appealed the
r reapeeta.
BoanI.
.ion of the Board.
uninBky died on November 14. 1981
uninaky
eauaea unrelated to his work·related
work-related
to eaUlell
'Y. He had received weekly benefita
total disability from the date of his
'Yon June 7, 1972 until the date of his
re
h. Because he had mntinued to reoncurrenl paymenl
pay"",nl of be""fil. for 101A1 di
di..
OncurTall
..
dlofil\1remenl benen"
benen•• is
i. pn:>ll:1"ibed
pn:>K1"ibed
lily and dlofi",remenl
SeI:llon lO6(d)
J06(d) of The Pennsylvania
Penn.ylvania Wor"·
Worll.·
SectIon
n't Compenullon Act (Act). Act of
or June
JullC 2.
0'.
15.
736. lU
IU amouUJ. n p.s. I 513.
IS. P.L 7]6.
«lion lO6(c)
306(c) of lhe ""I provides:
provideo:

)

Section 306(g) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 541(7),
541(7).
provides
providea that payment of such benefits.
after the death of the claimant shall be
made as follows:
Should the employe die from BOme
some other
eauae than the injury,
injury. paym!!!lt
paym!!!!t of eom
enmpenastion
peDlation to which the deceased would
have been entiUed to under aection
section
foJ.
306(c)(l) to (26) shall be paid to the fol
lowing periODS
peraoDi who at the time of the
death of the deceased were dependents
dependenta
clause (71
(7) of see
seewithin the definition of claWle
3O'l and in the following
follOwing order and
tion 307
amounta: (footnotel
(footnotes omitted)

ceive workmen's compenaation benefits for
total disability until his death, Kaminsky
never received payment of disfigurement
benefits purauant to the Referee's
Referee'l aWan!,
awant.
as modified by the Board.
The instant matter was initiated by the
filing of a claim petition on or about April
28, 1982,
1982. by Kaminsky'a estate. The ettate
e.tate
asserted
auerted that it was entitled to the payment
of the 180 weeks
weeb of compelllllltion
compeD&lltion awarded
for Kaminsky's disfigurement
dilfigurement which he did
not receive during his lifetime. The Ref·
eree'a
WILB circulated
eree's decision on the matter WILB
on December 12.
12, 1982. The Referee
awarded the estate payment of 180 weeks
weeb
of mmpelllllltion
mmpeD&lltion and denied payment of
statutory funeral expenaes.
expeDles. On appeal, the
Board afflrllled
arfJnlled the decision of the Referee,
dismissed the appeal and ordered payment
to the estate. The Order of the Board is
now before this Court for our review.

dependentB eligible
(7) If there be no dependenlB
to receive payments under this section
seetion
then the payments shall be made to the
estate of the deceased but'in amount not
exceeding reasonable funeral elJleDBes
tipelllles
as provided in this act
set or if there be no
estate,
person or perlons
persons paying
estate. to the perlon
the funeral expenses of such dee:eaaed
dec:eaaed in
8JI amount not uc:eeding
exeeeding reasonable fu
funeral expenses as provided in this act.

Our scope of review is limited to a deterdeter
mination of whether constitutional rights
were violated, an error of law was commitcommit
necesllary" fmdinga of fact
ted, or whether necessary"
lubstantial evidence.
are supported by substantial
Section 704 of the Administrative Agency
Law, 2 Pa.C.s. I 704.

lICriOUl and permanenl diofigurediofigure
(22) For ocnous

At the time of his death, KamiDaky was a
no lurviving
surviving dependenta.
widower and had DO
Seetion 306(g)
Therefore, lIubsection
subsection (7) of Section
applies in this caae.
case. Thst
That sub
subof the Act appliea
aeetion limits any amount payable to an
estate, of previously awarded disfigure
disfigurement benefits,
benefits. to reasonable funel'1ll
funel'lll ell:
ell:penses. As indieated in Section 307(9) of
the Act, 77 P.S. I 561(7). reasonable fu
funeral expenses are limited to One 'Thousand
($1,600.00). The
Five Hundred Dollan 1$l,600.00).
clear language of the statute diClBtes
dictBtes that
the estate of Kaminsky should receive an
amount not in ell:Ct!ss
ell:cess of reasonable funeral
eJtpenaes in an amount of One 'Thousand
eJtpenses
Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00). We are
guided in our decision
deeision by our rules of statu
statu·
tory mnatruction
construction which dictate that when
the language of a statute is clear and un
unambiguous we may not disregard the letter
of the law in pursuance of i18
its spirit
apirit See
Section 1921(b)
19211b) of the Statutory Construc
Construction Act of 1972, II Pa.C.S. I 1921(b). The
tiOD

or face.
menl of Ihe
f.ce. of such a•
chan,elcr U 10 produce an urWllhlly appear·
tppear·
characler
is nOl usually
Ulually Incldenl
(neldenl 10
anee. and such u Is
ance.

lhe employmc:nl.
employmenl. li.ly-oir.
lir.ly·"; .. and lW<>lhirds per
pcr
<:enlurn of waaes nol 10 cr.aed lwo "undred
hundrrd
cenlum

raiaea two issues on
(I) The employer raises
addreSIi them aeriatim.
appeal. We shall address
First, the employer avera that the Boan!
Boant
Firat,
awanting pay.
pay
erred as a matter of law in awan!ing
ment of compensation benefita in excess of
upenaes to the estate
reasonable funeral eIpenaes
of Kaminsky, where Kaminsky was not
llpouae Or child at
survived by a dependent spouse
death. We agree.
the time of desth.
queation of law,
Before this Court is a question
namely, whether Section 306(g) of the Act,
nsmely,
precludell an award of benebene
77 p.s. I 541, precludes
exceu of rearea
Kaminsky'a estate in exceSB
fits to Kaminsky's
sonable funeral eltpenses.
eltpensea. During his lifelife
aonable
time. Kaminsky was awarded benefits purpur
IU8JIt to Section 806(c). 77 P.S. § 618(22).1
SU8JIt
di..bili.y rcsullilll
rcoullilll from pcnTlllnenl
pennancnl
For .11 dioabililY
injuries of Ihe followilll classes. the com pen.
oalion
"lion shall
.hall be exclllSively
exchwvely u folloW1l:

.

.
.
head.
"e&<!. neck

.

.

~ r
~

,-

Pa.
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muat
language of the Act is clear and we must
follow its mandate.

We further note that this Court in the
ease of Bl4ck
Black y. BiU,
BiU" Penn Cot-poraticm,
Cot-poraticm.
72 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 628, 467 A.2d 192
!I06(g1 of the Act
(l983), discussed Section 806(g1
and the amendmenta thereto, with particu.
Iarity. The Court noted:
larity.
Prior to the 1972 Amendmenta to this
statute, the death of the e1aimant
elaimant from a
ltatute,
compeDl8bIe inju
injueauae unrelated to the mmpenaable
reaponsibility for the
ry, terminated all responsibility
continuation of payment. . • .
11M!
mntinuation
certain stat
stat·
amendments here eited gave eertain
utorily-defmed dependents the right to
receive the payments, and, if none of
these dependenta lurvive,
survive, then the estate
theae
how·
may make a claim. The legislature, bow
. ever, has dearly and unambiguously cht>
chI).ever,
eatate's
sen to limit the amount of the estate's
claim.
Id. at 632, 467 A.2d at 198-94 (citations
omitted).
The Court in Blade, went on to cite the
language of the Act whJch
whlch limited the es·
tate's
tate'a awant
awan! to reasonable funeral u
expenses. We adopt the reasoning set forth
in Black and reverse
reverae and remand this mat-
mat.ter for the eomputation
computation of reasonable
reuonable fu·
neral expenses.
(2) The second iBBue
iaaue addreaaed by the
employer involves the applieability
applicability of
01 the
doctrine
doetrine of rei
res judicata to the instant pI'()
pre>ceeding. The estate daima that the em
employer ill
is barred by res judicalA
judiealA from wl
ehal!enging
lenging the ngh t of the estate to receive
Kaminsky's dilfigurement
disfigurement benefits. The
estate, in ita
its brief to this Court, asserts
that the Decision
Deeision and Order of the Referee
cireulated on February 21, 1979,
1979. awarded
compensation
compenastion benefita to Kaminsky's rep
representatives in the event that he did not
survive. Therefore, the estate mneludea
concludell
that the employer, by its failure to appeal
that Decision
Deeision and Order, despite the fact
that the award may have been contrary to
the Act, resul18
results in the employer being
bound by that awant.
awan!. We disagree.
oevenlY.flve Wftks.
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I.
IT IS NOT THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO GRANT
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO GIVE A
WINDFALL TO A RECIPIENT'S HEIRS.
It is basic to the policies underlying Idaho's public assistance laws that each

person is, to the extent possible, responsible for his or her own needs, including
medical care:

Declaration of policy. - It is the policy of this state that each
person, to the maximum extent possible, is responsible for his or her own
medical care ....
Idaho Code § 31-3501. Therefore, il must be presumed that, absent a clear intent to
the contrary, the legislature does not intend to provide taxpayer funded medical care to
a person, while that person preserves his or her assets for the benefit of relatives or
heirs.

II.

JACKMAN'S ERRONEOUS AND DISTORTED
REFERENCES AND ARGUMENTS DO NOT

SUPPORT HER STRAINED INTERPRETATION OF
TIlE STATUTE.
Jackman has raised many minor arguments without support, or with strained
lackman
interpretations of statute and rule. Even if lhese arguments had merit, which they do
not, they entirely miss the central issue which is whether the spousal recovery
provisions of Idaho Code § 56-218 are to be given effect. Jackman's
lackman's arguments are
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briefly discussed in the order presented:
A.

Hjldo[ Knudson to Convey Her Properly
Property to Ljonel.
Lionel.
No One "Required" Hjldor
Jackman repeatedly states that the Department "required" Hildor Knudson to

Brief, pp. 7.
7, 24, 25.
25, 27 etc. Jackman
convey her assets to her Lionel. Respondent's Brief.
then asserts that since the Department forced Hildor to convey her property to Lionel.
Lionel,
characterization,
it cannot now complain that she had no property at her death. This characterization.
however, is a distortion. Idaho's Medicaid program is entirely voluntary. No one may
however.
force another to apply for or receive Medicaid. Indeed.
Indeed, some families choose to fund
nursing care for their loved ones on their own rather than incur the estate
reimbursement obligations that accompany Medicaid benefits.
No one "required" the Knudson's to obtain Medicaid benefits. Rather, the law
permits couples to obtain Medicaid benefits for the spouse needing nursing care while
the at-home spouse keeps the couple's assets for his or her own support.
Furthermore, real property is an excluded resource for a Medicaid applicant who
1382b(a)(l). Even for those choosing
states an intention to return home. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(1).
to make a spouse eligible for Medicaid benefits, there is no requirement that the
applicant convey away the family home, which is normally the couple's primary asset.
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Jackman's Partial Payment, Which Came after Lionel's Death.
Death, Was Not
B
lackman's
Accepted as Full Payment by the Department.
Jackman contends the Department received and accepted the balance of Hildor's
estate. Respondent's Brief, p. 7. This is incorrect:
Hildor Knudson died October 27, 1994. R. p. 67. Lionel died just two weeks
later on November 11, 1994. About June 30, 1995, nearly eight months after Li.onel's
death, Jackman offered to disburse $1,861.30 upon affidavit from the Department. See
Exhibit A to Affidavit of Willard Abbot. R. p. 146. This offer was rejected by the
Department, although by return mail on July 7, 1995, the Department did say it would
accept the sum as partial payment. R. pp. 143-147. About August 22, 1995, the
Department issued a receipt to Jackman's attorney for receipt of the sum of $1 ,638.03.
R. p. 70. At no time has the Department accepted payment from Jackman in
satisfaction of its claim against Lionel's estate.
C.
The Department Airees That the Legislature Intended to Protect the Survhing
Spouse, but this Doesn't Extend to Heirs.
Jackman contends that the legislature intended to protect the estates of the
spouses of Medicaid recipients and cites the following:

It is further the intent of this legislation to protect the community and
separate property rights of a married person whose spouse applies for
medical assistance regardless of whether they are living together.
Respondent's brief, p. 14 (quotillg S.L. 1988, ch. 50, § I, p. 74). The Department is
in complete agreement that this statute was intended to protect the assets of the spouse
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remaining at home. Nothing in this statutory language, however, manifests any intent
to protect a deceased spouse's e.s.la1e, so that it can be gifted to relatives, after the
taxpayers have shouldered the cost of the other's nursing care. The statute protects the
healthy spouse - it doesn't grant a windfall to the heirs.
D.
The Assets from Which the Department Seeks to Recover
Property.

Were Community

Jackman quotes the language of IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 contending that ..he
.. he
Department's rules prohibit recovery from the spouse's estate (Respondent's Brief, p.
15):

20.
Limitations on Estate Claims. Limits on the Department's claim
against the assets of a deceased recipient shall be subject to Sections 56-218 and
56-2I8A, Idaho Code. A claim against lhe
the estate of a surviyjng spouse of a
predeceased recipjent
recipient is limited to the yalue of the assets of the estate that were
community property, or the deceased recipient's share of the separate property,
and jointly owned property. Recovery shall not be made until the deceased
recipient no longer is survived by a spouse ....
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 (underline added). Jackman contends that since the marriage
settlement agreement made all of the couple's property Lionel's separate property, the
Department has no claim to his estate. Respondent's Brief, p. 15. This argument,
however, is disingenuous and carefully ignores the context of this section and another
section of the same rule that follows by only a few paragraphs.
All of the assets in Lionel Knudson's estate ~ the community property of the
couple - until they were transferred through the marriage settlement agreement to
facilitate Medicaid eligibility. Section 24 of the same rule states:
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24.
Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets
couple does nQt
not eliminate the debt against the estate of
Qf the
for a married cQuple
deceased recipient or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement
agreement or other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate
consideration.
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.24 (underline added); see also IDAPA 16.03.05.620.04 (Rules
governing countable property for eligibility for aid to the aged, blind and disabled [which is
the basis for Medicaid eligibility in cases such as this] pennit a marriage settlement agreement,
but the Department's rights to the transferred property are retained).
Subsection 20, quoted by Jackman, is merely intended to protect a spouse who marries
later in life bringing substantial separate property into the marriage. The Department only
pursues its spousal estate claim against property that had been the couple's community
property or separate property in which the nursing home spouse had an interest.
Does Not Permit Spousal
E.
Jackman's Incorrectly Argues That Federal Law DQes
Spousal Recoyery.
Recoyery When in Reality.
Reality, the Law Merely Does Not Require SpQusal
AJthQugh
effQrt claiming that Idaho's
IdahQ's spousa.1
spQusa.1
A1though Jackman spends considerable effort
reCQvery
shQuld not be an issue here.
recovery law is pre-empted by federal law, pre-emption should
section IV (beginning on
Respondent's Brief, sectiQn
Qn page 16). Initially, this was Jackman's
sole claim. R. p. 49. This argument was rejected by the magistrate (R. pp. 150-151)
sQle
and was nQt
tQ the District Court. Contrary tQ
not appealed to
to Jackman's arguments that pre··
emption is merely an alternative basis for decision and they are nQt
not seeking affirmative
emptiQn
decision based on
Qn this claim changes the entire nature of
Qf this dispute. The
relief, a decisiQn
Idaho law is not
magistrate held that IdahQ
nQt pre-empted, but under these particular
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.........
,.,.

circumstances, does not apply. Jackman is asking the court to nullify an act of the
legislature on the basis of federal pre-emption. Such remedy is far greater in scope
than that afforded by the lower courts. It should not be in issue here.
To the extent that federal pre-emption is in issue in this matter, the Department
incorporates by reference and adopts its briefing and argument on this issue presented
to the magistrate division and found in the record at pages 72-89. To summarize that
argument, while federal law does not clearly require spousal estate recovery, nothing in
the law forbids it.
F.
lackman's Argument That Congress R«jected
Rejected Language That Would Haye
"Allowed" Spousal Recoyery Is a Clear Distortion.
Djstortion.
As part of her pre-emption argument, Jackman contends that Congress
specificaJly
specifically rejected language that would have "allowed" spousal estate recovery.
Respondent's Brief, p. 19. This same argument was made to the magistrate and was
shown to be a distortion of language taken out of context. R. pp. 85-86. Despite clear
error, Jackman repeats
repeals the same argument here. again without
knowledge of her error.
including language plainly needed to give meaning to the quoted language. The full
Congressional language rejected, is quoted below. Those few portions quoted by
Jackman are in bold italics. The essential contextual language has been underlined for
emphasis:
(2) REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTATE RECOVERY
PROGRAMS.-Section 1917(b) (42 U.S.C. 1396p(b) is amended
amended(1).
(A) in paragraph (1)-
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(i) by striking "(b)(l)" and inserting "(2)",
U(2)", and
(ii) by striking "(a)(I)(B)" and inserting "(a)(I)(B)(i)";
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking "(2) Any adjustment or recovery under"

and inserting "(3) Any adjustment or recovery under an estate recovery program
under"; and
(C) by inserting before paragraph (2), as designated by subparagraph
(A), the followjng:
following:
U(b)(I) For purposes of section 1902(a)(5J)an.
1902(a)(51)03l. the requirements for an
estate recovery program of a State are as follows:
"(A) The program provides for identifying and tracking (and, at the
option of the State, preserving) resources (whether excluded or not) of
individuals who are furnished any of the following long-tern) care services for
this title:
which medical assistance is provided under tltis
"(i) Nursing facility services.
"(li) Home and community-based services (as defined in section
1915(d)(5)(C)(i».
905 (a) (I 4) (relating to services in an
"(iii) Services described in section I905(a)(I
institution for mental diseases).
"(iv) Home and community care provided under section 1929.
"(v) Community supported living arrangements services provided under
section 1930.
"(B) The program provides for promptly ascertaining
ascertainingu(i) when such an individual dies;
"(i)
U(;;) ill tl.e
tl.e time 0/
"(ii)
tire case 0/ sllcll
sIIch all
a" illdividllal wllo was married aJ tile
deaJl.,
deaJl" wl.ell
wire" tile
tire sllrvivillg
sllrvivi"g spollse dies; and
"(iii) at the option of the State, cases in which adjustment or recovery
the application of paragraph
may not be made at the
tlte time of death because of tlte
(3)(A) or paragraph (3)(B).
"(C)(i) n.e
collectioll cOluistellt
cOluistelll witl,
witl.
n,e program provides/or tIle
tire collectio"
tire al1lolllll described ill clallse
c1allse
paragraplr (3) 0/ lU.
paragrapll
all al1lolll11
amoll"t (Ilot
("ot to exceed the
(ii)
(ii» /rom/rom
"(1) the estaJe 0/ tl.e
tl'e ;,.dividllal,·
iI,dividllal,'
"(11)
slIbparagraph (B)(ii),
"(II) in tl,e
tl'e case 0/ all
a" it,dividllal
;,'dividllal described ill sIIbparagraplr
from ll.e
estate
o/tl.e
sllrviV;Ilg
spollse;
or
ll,e
o/tl'e sllrvivi"g
"(Ill) at the option of the State, in a case described in subparagraph
(B)(ili), from the appropriate person.
U(ii) The amount described in this clause is the amount of medical
"(ii)
assistance correctly paid under this title for long-tenn care services described in
subparagraph (A) furnished on behalf of the individual.
individual.".
".
139 Congo Rec. H2997-01.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 7

C:IWOOTEMl'lREPL VB. WPD
C:\WCC\TEMl'lREPLVB.WPD

000299

When read in the proper context, it is obvious that the rejected language would
have required all states to perform spousal recovery. Nothing in the language suggests
that states are not already permitted to engage in spousal estate recovery.
G.

Spousal Estate Recoyery Does Not Encourage Diyorces.
Jackman contends that spousal estate recovery encourages divorces to protect

separate estate assets. She, however, offers absolutely no support for her argument.
Idaho has been doing spousal estate recovery since 1988 and there is no evidence to
support a claim that it has encouraged divorces.
As noted above, IDAPA 16.03.09.025.020 protects the separate property a
spouse marrying late in life brings into the marriage. Therefore, no divorce is
required. Only those assets which

~

the community property of the couple are

subject to the spousal estate claim. Since the at-home spouse retains the couple's
property for his own support, there is no motive to divorce to protect that property.
Should a couple divorce and split their property unevenly, for the sole purpose of
avoiding the Department's claim, the Department would view the transfer as voidable
pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218(1).1
Just as in this case, it is after the death of both spouses that the dispute arises,
J Undersigned counsel is aware of one case in which this did happen. In a First District case, the
spouse in the nursing home, apparently upon advice of counsel, stipulated to a decree ofdivorce
of divorce vesting all
the couple's property in the at-home spouse, approximately six weeks before his demise. The Department
contended the transfer was not for adequate consideration and imposed liens on the real property in question.
Because a disabled (adult) child survives (delaying recovery under Idaho Code § 56-lIS(
56-2IS( I), no recov<:ry
recov(:ry has
yet been made.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 8

C:\WCClmMPIIUlPLYB.
C:\WCClmMPIIU!PL YB. wPJ)
wPI)

000300

llIiItit·''''J·...-..._
__
_llillit
..........-..._

_.·~
_ _ '.'''····''·.__'';''''''''i_L_
-.·~--'.'''····''·.--''';''''''''i_L

---,-_.~-

---'--'~-

and the dispute is between the Department and the heirs, not between the Department
and the benefitted couple.
III.

JACKMAN'S INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE §
56-218 IS ONLY POSSIBLE BECAUSE SHE
IMPROPERLY MANIPULATED KNUDSON'S
ESTATES.
A.
The Present Circumstance Could Not Haye Arisen Without Ignoring Established
procedures and Priorities in the Idaho Code.
Jackman states that she collected Hildor's personal property by
b'y
In her brief, lackman
affidavit, paid expenses and forwarded the remainder to the Department. Respondent's
Brief, p. 4. The facts in the record show that this is possible only if she acted outside
the authority granted her, and in violation of her fiduciary duty to Lionel's estate.
While often repeated, the sequence of events is important: Jackman signed a
settlement agreement for both Hildor and Lionel Knudson on March 8, 1993.
marriage seUlement
HHdor died October 27, 1994. R. p. 67. Lionel died two weeks later on November
11, 1994. About two weeks after Lionel's death, on November 28, 1994, Jackman
obtained appointment as personal representative of Lionel's estate. About June 30,
1995, nearly eight months after Lionel's death, Jackman offered to disburse $1,861.30
upon affidavit from the Department. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Willard Abbot. R.
p. 146. This offer was rejected by the Department. R. pp. 143-147. About August
22, 1995, the Department issued a receipt to lackman's
Jackman's attorney for receipt of the sum
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of $1 ,638.03. R. p. 70. On August 29, 1995, Jackman filed an inventory with the
court showing $1,861.30 in the conservator estate. R. p. 58. Jackman's signature on
the document is dated two months prior to the date of filing. R. p. 58.
The rights and powers of a conservator, after the death of the protected person,
are very limited. Idaho Code § 15-5-425(e) provides as foHows:
(e) If a protected person dies, the conservator shall deJiver
deliver to the
court for safekeeping any will of the deceased protected person which
may have come into his possession, inform the executor or beneficiary
thai. he has done so, and retain the estate for delivery to a
named therein thai
duly appointed personal representatjve of the decedent or other persons
entitled thereto. If after forly (40) days from the death of the protected
person no other person has been appointed personal representative and no
application or petition for appointment is before the court, the conservator
e~ercise the powers and duties of a personal representalive
representative
may apply to e~ercise
distribute lhe
the decedent's estate
so that he may proceed to administer and dislribute
without additional or further appoinlment.
withoul
Idaho Code § 15-5-425(e) (underline added). Therefore, once Hildor had passed away,
Jackman had no power to deal with her property, other than to retain it for delivery to a
duly appointment personal representative. After forty days, she could petition to
become the personal representative, which was never done.
Jackman did, however, obtain appointment as· personal representative of Lionel's
estate. Thereafter, she had a fiduciary obligation toward Lionel's estate. Idaho Code §
15-3-703(a). When Jackman, in August, 1995, obtained Hildor's bank account by
affidavit, she could do so only as a "successor" to the estate. Idaho Code § 15-3
15-3) 20 I (a). A successor is a person, other than a creditor. entitled to possession of estate
)20
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property by will or pursuant to the probate code. Idaho Code § 15-1-201(46).
Therefore, Jackman could obtain the money as heir under a will or through intestate
succession. or she could obtain the money as the personal representative of Lionel's
succession,
estate. As conservator for Hildor, she had no rights other than to retain the money for
the personal representati
ve.
representative.
Pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 15-2-401 and 402, Lionel had the right to at least the
first $7,500 from Hildor's estate. Since Jackman had a fiduciary obligation towa.rd
Jackman's estate, she had a duty to apply any sums she obtained from Hildor's estate to
Lionel's estate. Unless she violated this fiduciary duty, she had no right to deliver
Hildor's money to the Department. 2 In fact, by operation of Jaw, the money Jackman's
attorney sent the Department in August, 1995, was Lionel's money, not Hildor's . 3
matter in the present posture, then, Jackman had to ignore or
In order to put this malter
5-5-425 (e) , 15-3-703(a), 15-2-40], 15-2-402,
15-2-402. and 15-2-801.
violate Idaho Code §§ ] 5-5-425(e),
Had Jackman abided by t.hese laws, this case would never have come before the court.
In point of fact, Hildor had no estate from which any recovery could have been made

representative of Lionel's eSlale,
estate, Jackman had the obligalion
obligation lo
to maximize the value of
2As personal represenlalive
the eslale
estate - whether lhe
the eslale
estate would laler
later be paid lo
to credilors
creditors or heirs. Her personal slake
stake as an heir could
lhe
not play inlo
into this obligalion.
obligation.
nol
probate code permits renuncialion
renunciation and lhe
the homeslead
homestead and exempl
exempt property allowances
3While the probale
subject to renuncialion,
renunciation. such renuncialion
renunciation musl
must be in \\Tiling
\\Titing and musl
must be done wilhin
within nine months of
may be subjecllo
the dealh
death of lhe
the decedent
decedent. Idaho Code § 15-2-80 I. There was never any renuneialion
renunciation here. Even had Lionel
lhe
least the $3,500 exempl
exempt property allowance would have gone lo
to one of Lionel and Hildor's
renounced. at
alleasllhe
the Department's claim.
subject to lhe
children before being subjecllo
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by the Department.
It's Not Okay to Manipulate the System in an Attempt to Reap a Windfall at
Taxpayer Expense.
B.

irrelevant"
Ilmanipulated" the system is "irrelevant"
Jackman contends that the fact that she "manipulated"
II

because there is nothing wrong with
wilh shrewd estate planning. Respondent's brief, p. 26.
This case, however, is not a case of shrewd estate planning. This is a case where the
personal representative manipulated the estate to make it appear that money was being
sole purpose
paid from Hildor's estate, when in fact, it was not. This was done for the soJe
of taking assets that had belonged to Hildor and Lionel Knudson and passing them to
others, while leaving the public holding the bag for HiJdor's
Hildor's nursing care. Nothing in
the law makes such an action morally or legally proper.

IV.
CONCLUSION
Under Idaho's probate code and Idaho Code § 56-218(1), all estate and property
of a deceased Medicaid recipient passes to the surviving spouse. Those funds are
intended for that spouse's support and use. After both spouses have passed away, the
law anticipates the public. will be repaid, to the extent possible, from the remaining
manipulation should not be rewarded.
estate. Jackman's manipUlation
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I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing document were
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William C. Kirsch
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9384
Moscow, 10 83843-9384
DATED this Q~ day of October, 1997.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The issue presented by this case is whether there is any
limit on the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's recovery of
Medicaid payments.
28, 1992.

Hildor Knudson was institutionalized on June

She received $41,600.55 in Medicaid between January 1,

1993 and her death on October 27, 1994.

The value of Hildor's

estate, minus funeral expenses and her legal fees (a net
$1,683.03), was paid to the Department.

Lionel Knudson, Hildor's

spouse, died in November 1994 without having received any
Medicaid.

His estate was valued at $40,798.35.

In January 1995, the Department filed a claim against
Lionel's estate for the unrecovered balance of the Medicaid
payments to Hildor.
Hilder.
_lII'

Barbara Jackman, the personal representative

of Lionel's estate, objected that the Department's claim exceeded
its authority under state and federal law.

The Department's

claim against Lionel's estate was denied by the magistrate·
magistrate- jUdge
judge
as contrary to state law.
district judge,

l~ho
l~ho

The Department appealed to the

affirmed the magistrate judge's decision.

The Department appealed.

The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the

order denying the Department's claim.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Court'!1 holding is based upon a misunderstanding of the
The Court'!l
Medicaid system and will lead to unforseen, inequitable, and
absurd results.

II.

prohibThe Court erred in ho1ding that federa1 1aw does not prohib
it the Department from recovering Medicaid payments :Erom the
estate of t~he recipient's surviving spouse.

III. The Court erred in ho1ding that state 1aw authorizes the
Department to recover Medicaid payments from the estate of
the recipient's surviving spouse.
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ARGUM:ENT
ARGlJM:ENT

I.

The Court's holding is based upon a misunderstanding of the
Medicaid system and will lead to unforseen, inequitable, and
absurd restLlts.
The Court's;
Court's: decision to allow the Department's claim is

based on a misunderstanding of the Medicaid system, particularly
as laid out by federal law.

With all due respect, the Court

misperceived how the system currently works and did not
adequately consi.der how the Court's holding will disrupt the
system in the future.
It is easy to see how such confusion arose.
system is extremely complex.

The Medicaid

The United states Supreme Court

described the Medicaid statutes as "among the most intricate ever
drafted by Congress" and stated that their "Byzantine
construction . . . makes [them] almost unintelligible to the
uninitiated."

Schweiker v. Grey Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981)

(citations omitted).

Because the magistrate and district court

decisions focused upon state law, both parties emphasized state
law in the briefs submitted to the Court and neither part}' set
out an overall picture of the Medicaid system at the federal or
state level.

Where the parties referred to the federal system,

Jackman relied on specific technical arguments and the Department
made several misrepresentations.

Both parties also ignore:d the

fact that both the federal and state law have independently
changed in signi:ficant ways over time and that federal
regulations, state laws, and state regulations have often not
RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - Page 3
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....,
....,

kept up with changes in federal law.
Before interpreting Medicaid statutes and regulations, one
institutionmust understand the Medicaid system as it works for institution
alized individuals in Idaho.

Medicaid payments are not a loan

and couples do not cheat the system simply because the State may
not fully recover Medicaid payments made to one spouse.

The

federal law ensures that a married couple will spend most of
institheir assets on the needy spouse's medical care before an insti
tutionalized spouse receives any Medicaid.

Further, states may

later recover Medicaid payments from whatever assets are retained
by the recipient.

Thus, even without a provision for states to

recover from the limited assets a community spouse is allowed to
retain, Medicaid statutes already require a couple to expend a
substantial portion of their assets on an institutionalized
spouse's medical expenses:
Middle-class individuals in need of long-term care must
dispose of their assets exceeding poverty limits either to
pay for their care or, in the alternative, to qualify for
public assistance. Thus, unlike the affluent (who can
pUblic
provide for their own health-care needs) and low-income
public assistance), middle
middleindividuals (who qualify for pUblic
class individuals must forfeit any wealth accumulated.
longthrough a lifetime of hard work and savings to pay for long
inditerm care. This forfeiture is a harsh result for an indi
vidual who has saved for a lifetime to provide for the
future and ,~ho has paid taxes to support government programs
like Medicaid.
Amber R. Cook, Estate Planning with Medicaid: Qualification and
Planning for the Elderly, 99 W. VA. L.
A.

REV.

155 (1996).

How Medicaid eligibility currently works.

Federal Medicaid eligibility laws are complex but generally
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1~

work in a straight-forward way.

In 1998, the institutionalized

spouse must have a monthly income below $1,502 and non-exempt
assets below $2,000 to receive Medicaid.
(10).

42 U.S.C.

1396a{a)

§

In determining how much assets an applicant has for

eligibility, the process ignores actual ownership (as

bet~reen
bet~reen

the

spouses) of the .assets (though the institutionalized spouse will
ultimate have to transfer actual ownership of all but $2,000
worth of the non-exempt assets). 42 U.S.C.

§

1396r-5{c) (1) (A).
1396r-5(c)

Instead a "snap-shot" is taken of all assets owned by either
Instead,
l

spouse, jointly or separately, on the date the spouse is a.dmitted
to an institution (the "snap-shot" date).
5 (c) (I) (B).
(E) .
S{c)

.."

'

§

139Sr139Sr

The question is then how much of the "snap-shot"

assets are "attributed" to each spouse.
S(c)
S{c) (2).

42 U.S.C.

42 U.S.C.

§

139Sr139Sr

The community spouse is attributed a "community spouse

allowance" which is equal to one-half the total assets or $87,350
(in 1998), whichE:!ver is lower {but not to be below $16,200 (in
1998».
1998»).

42 U.S.C.

§

1396r-S{f).

"Snap-shot" assets beyond" the

institutionalcommunity spouse allowance are attributed to the institutional
ized spouse.

42 U.S.C.

§

J.395r-5(c) (2).
J.395r-5(C)

This complex system is easily illustrated.

For example,

assume one member of a married couple is institutionalized and
applies for Medicaid.

If the couple has non-exempt assets worth

$20,000, $16,200 will be attributed to the community spouse
(i.e., the Community Spouse Allowance (CSA»

and the remaining

$3,800 will be attributed to the institutionalized spouse.
REP.

No. 36(I),
36{I), 10sth Cong., 1st Sess. 360-361 (1997).

S.

Thus, the
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institutionalized spouse "has" assets exceeding the eligibility
limit by $1,800. Id.

If the couple has non-exempt assets worth

$50,0010 will be attributed to each the community spouse
$100,000, $50,000
CSA will be one
oneand the institutionalized spouse (because the eSA
half of the total and the remainder be the other half). Id:.

If

the couple has non-exempt assets worth $200,000, $87,350 will be
attributed to

thf~
thl~

CSA) and the
·community spouse (as the maximum eSA)

remaining $112,000 to the institutionalized spouse (as the
remainder).

Id.

Again, the institutionalized spouse's non-exempt assets must
be below $2,000 before he or she is eligible for Medicaid.
"snapIndividuals who E:!xceed the resource limitations on the "snap
shot" date typically "spend-down" their assets.

Applicants

generally spend-down assets by paying for their own medical care
until they

becomE~
becomE~

eligible for Medicaid, meeting current ongoing

expenses of the community spouse, investing in exempt assets
home,t buying a cart
car, or purchas
purchas(i.e., making improvements to the home
ing funeral plans), paying of one's mortgage or other debts, and
making gifts.
gifts,t
Applicants can, and do,
dOt dispose of assets by making gifts
but they do so at: a price.

Disposal of assets (except for

transfers between spouses) for less than fair market value during
pel:iod is penalized by a delay in Medicaid eligi
eligithe look-back peJ:iod
bility. 42 U.S.C.
u.s.e.

§

1396p(c) (1) (B) (i).

The look-back period is

defined as the 36 months prior to the first day when an

individindivid

ual is both institutionalized and has applied for benefits. Id.
RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF -. Page (i
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(For certain trusts, the look-back period is 60 months.)

Id.

The number of months of delay is determined by the value of the
transferred ass€!ts divided by the average state nursing home rate
determined by the Department, approximating the value of a.
month's institut.ionalized care.

42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(c) (1) (E).

Thus, the penalt.y is a delay which is about equal to the amount
of time the individual could have paid for his own care w:i th the
transferred assets.

There is no penalty, however, for transfers

to the individual's spouse (or for the transfer of one's home to
one's child who is under 21, blind or disabled).

42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(c) (2).
B.

How the current eligibility laws, estate recovery, and
asset transfer penalties evolved.

Before moving from the current eligibility system to the
-w

current estate recovery system, it is helpful to examine how the
federal provisions as to eligibility, estate recovery, and asset
transfer penalti,es were developed in reaction to these provi
provision's interaction over time.
From Medicaid's creation in 1965 until changes were made in
1988, the attribution of income and resources for Medicaid
eligibility purposes was simpler than the current system.

When

one spouse enterl3d
enterl:!d a nursing home, each spouse was treated (for
eligibility purposes) as a separate household.
105 (II), 100th
lOath Cc:mg., 2nd Sess.
U.S.C.C.A.N. 889.
whose name was

011

I

H.R. REP. No.

66 (1988) reprinted in 1988

Income was considered to belong to the spouse
the instrument conveying the funds.

Id.
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'1_'

Similarly, resources held solely by the institutionalized spouse
were attributed to him/her.

Id.

Resources that were jointly

held were also considered to belong entirely to the institution
institutionalized spouse, em the theory that he or she had an unrestricted
right to use them.
community

SpOUSE~,
SPOUSE~,

Id.

If assets were held solely by th,e

however, they were considered to belong solely

to him/her and there was no obligation on the part of the
community SPOUSE! to contribute any amount toward the COsti3
COstl3 of the
care of institut.ionalized spouse.

Id. at 889-890.

When Congre,ss created the Medicaid program in 1965, it
included a strict restriction on the ability of states to pursue
recovery of Medicaid payments:
A State plan for medical assistance must (18) provide that . . . there shall be no adjustment or recov
recovery (except, in the case of an individual who was 65 years of
age or older, from his estate, and then only after the death
of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when he
has no surviving child who is under age 21 or is blind or
permanently and totally disabled) of any medical assistance
correctly paid on behalf of such individual under the plan.
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97,
79 stat.

347

§:

1902,

(1965).

Originally, Congress allowed states to deny Medicaid eligi
eligibility to applic,:mts who, within the previous 24 months, grive
away non-exempt assets, but did not allow states to penalize the
transfer of exempt assets.'

S. REP. No.

494 (I), 97th Cong,., 2nd.

Sess., 38 (1982) reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 814.

Thus,

an elderly individual who needed nursing home care could give
his/her home

awa~{

(whether to a family member, friend, or
RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - Page 8
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,,~....

complete strangE!r) and "assure that the home will not be part of
his/her estate

l

and therefore will not be sUbject
subject to any recovery

action initiated by the state after the individual/s
individual's death."
at 815.

Also,
Also the penalty for transfer of non-exempt
1

a 24 month delay in Medicaid payments
the assets.
In 1982

1

Id.

assE~ts
assE~ts

was

regardless of the value of

1

Id.
Congress changed the law to penalize the transfers of

any assets (whether exempt or not for eligibility purposeB)
except where an individual transfers title to his/her home to a
spouse or a minor or handicapped child.
Responsibility Act
Act, Pub. L. 97-248,
l

§

Tax Equity & Financial

132,

96 stat. 324 (1982).

Congress also replaced the old estate recovery provision with the
following language codified in 42 U.S.C.

..,
...,

§

1396p(b) (1)

(19~12):

(b) ADJUSTMENT OR RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORRECTLY
PAID UNDER A STATE PLAN .
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the state
plan may be made, except -
(A) in the
(a) (1) (B),
subj ect to
tance pai.d

case of an individual described in subsection
from his estate or upon sale of the property
a lien imposed on account of medical as::ds
aSl:Jison behalf of the individual, and

(B) In th.e case of an individual who was 6S years ()f age
or older when the individual received such medical assis
assistance
tance, from his estate.
l

rd.

The House Committee that wrote these provisions made it

clear they were intended to ensure that all resources of "an
individual will be used to defray the public costs of supporting
that individual in a long-term medical institution" while
protecting "the legitimate rights of the recipient
recipient, the reci
reci1
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pient's spouse cmd his/her dependent children."
children. liS.
S. REP. No.
494 (I) .
The normal effect of these provisions was that an individual
incli vidual
would have to spend-down all of his non-exempt assets and any
gift of his assets would be penalized by a delay in Medica.id
benefits (which would mean the individual would have to spend on
nursing home ca:re during the delay an amount equal to the value
of the gifts).

H.R. REP. No. l05(II).
lOS (II) .

The individual could retain

exempt assets and the state could recover their value from the
individual's estate - except for the family home which the
individual was free to transfer to his/her spouse or minor or
disabled child.

Id.

Because the home is the primary exempt
exen~t

asset and married individuals could be expected to use the
opportunity to preserve the home for their family, the Health
~...,

Care Financing Administration assumed its regulations implement
implementing the 1982 statutes would only result in estate recovery from
unmarried recipients.

See 47 Fed. Reg. 43644, 43646 (1982).

In 1988, Congress recognized that "the
lithe leading cause of
financial catastrophe among the elderly is the need for long-term
care n because "the expense of nursing home care [$2,000 - $3,000
per month in 1988] has the potential for rapidly depleting the
lifetime savings of all but wealthiest."

H.R. REP. No. lOS(II),

6S (1988) reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
loath Cong., 2nd Sess., 65
888.

Because Medicare does not cover the costs of long-term

insti'tutionalization and "private insurance for nursing home
costs is not

genE~rally
genE~rally

available,
available,"II Congress concluded that the
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Medicaid progranl is the only viable source of payment for nursing
home care for most of the elderly.

Id.

Congress further recognized that the old resource and income
attribution rule:s were leading to unintended and unwanted
results.

For example, it was quite common for the bulk o:E the

couple's income and resources to be jointly-owned or owned by the
institutionalized spouse so that they were attributed to t.he
institutionalized spouse and had to be spent-down before he/she
received any Medicaid.

See H.R. REP. lOS (II) .

circumUnder such. circum

stances, the community spouse (usually an elderly woman) could
keep the couple's house but was otherwise "unjustly
(i.e., left with little or no income and resources).

..,

900.

impovE~rished"
impovE~rished"

899Id. at 899

On the other hand, if the bulk of a couple's income and

resources were solely owned by the community spouse, the insti.tu
institutionalized spouse would immediately qualify for Medicaid .. no
matter how wealthy the couple had been - and the community spouse
would retain all the couple's income and assets without contrib
contributing anything to the costs of his/her spouse's medical caLre.
Id.

Congress responded to these problems by passing the lVledicare
Catastrophic Cov1erage Act (MCCA) which (among other things)
amended the Medicaid statutes to essentially create the current
eligibility and asset transfer regime described earlier hE~rein.
he:rein.
The primary relevant changes were replacing the original method
of resource attribution with the current model of piling together
all the assets and then taking out the Community Spouse Resource
RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - Page 11
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Allowance

beforE~
beforl~

requiring a spend-down.

Medicare Catastrophic

Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360,
683, 756 (1988)"
penalty for

assE~t
assE~t

§

303(a), 102 Stat.

MCCA also replaced the 24-month look-back and
transfers with a 30-month look-back and a

penalty proportionate to the amount transferred with a 30-month
cap on the penalty.

rd. at
Id.

§

303(b), 102 stat. at 761.

Finally,

thei:r home
MCCA expanded the ability of individuals to transfer their
to the community spouse without penalty to include the ability to
transfer all assets without penalty (which made sense because who
was the actual owner of the assets no longer mattered for
eligibility attribution purposes).
759; H.R. REP. 105(11) at 896.

Id. at

§

303(a), 102 stat. at

cha.nge the
MCCA did not, however, change

estate recovery provisions.

Congress again dealt with these issues in August 1993.

Based

on concerns that individuals were hiding assets for eligibility
purposes, Congress passed broader definitions of assets, E!xtended
the look-back period to 36 months, and lifted the 30-month cap on
transfer penalties.
Pub.

L.

No.

~03-66,
~03-66,

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
§§

~366~-~36~2,
~366~-~36~2,

~07

Stat.

3~2,
3~2,

To

622-6251 .•
'

reCOV1E!ry provisions, Congress added a mandatory
the estate recovery
mandatory' and an
optional definition of "estate ll and changed the language to read:
(b) ADJUSTMENT' OR RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORRECTLY
PAID UNDER A STATE PLAN.
adjul;Jtment or recovery of any medical assistance
(1) No adjul;Jbnent
correctly pilid on behalf of an individual under the State
adjustplan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjust
ment or recc)very of any medical assistance correctly paid on

behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of
the following individuals:
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subsec(A) In the case of an individual described in subsec
recovtion (a) (1) (B), the state shall seek adjustment or recov
ery from the individual's estate.
Id. at §13612(a & c), 107 Stat. at 627-628 (1993) (emphasis
10..
added) .
As Congressman Henry Waxman has noted, "once you wade
through the maze of Medicaid eligibility rules and trust a.nd
estate law, the issue goes to some very fundamental questions"
()f the
about who should pay for the long-term health care costs of
elderly.

Medicaid and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation: Hearings

before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1993)
(1993)[hereinafter Hearings].

The answers to these questions must come

first from Congress and second from the legislature.
The preceding history of the Medicaid statute reveals some! of
.!iII'
•."

these answers.
First, Congress knows and accepts that Medicaid is the
primary payer for the long-term care costs of the elderly.
REP.

105 (II).

H. R.

The vast majority of the institutionalized ,elderly

- no matter how publicly responsible - have no choice but to rely
on Medicaid unle:3s they simply forgo medical care.

Id.

Congress

consistenthas thus provided Medicaid for such individuals while consistent
sUbstantial personal
ly seeking to ensure "that individuals with substantial
assets pay a fair share for nursing horne care and certain other
medical services before they qualify for Medicaid."

Hearings at

19 (statement of William Toby, Jr., Acting Administrator, Health
Care Financing Administration) (emphasis in original).

This is
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'I'.~·

achieved through the asset attribution process, the spend-down
provisions, and asset transfer restrictions.
On the

othE~r
othE~r

Id.

hand, Congress has decided it is unfair to

require a spouse to contribute all of his or her assets to pay
for the medical care of an institutionalized individual.

It is

fair for them to contribute some assets (unless the couple is too
poor to do so).

Thus, Congress enacted the MCCA allowing un
un-

penalized spousal transfers, attributing assets without regard to
ownership for eligibility purposes, and requiring a spend-down
while protectinsr the community spouse resource allowance.
Further, Congress has never passed any provision allowing states
to recover payments from the estate of a recipient's spouse ("nor
made any exception to the general prohibition against state
Medicaid recovery except from recipient's estates).
C.

The uu.forseen,
un.forseen, inequitable and absurd results of the
Court's holding.

The above-mentioned goals of the federal Medicaid system are
generally realized in the system's day-to-day application (though
there are always anomalies).

The system anticipates (even

expects) that many elderly individuals will engage in estate
planning to maximize the extent they benefit from the system
while minimizing their costs.

Further, the system pursues:

fairness by maximizing the amount an individual must pay for
his/her own care, but limiting the extent others (spouses and the
public) must pay.

The Court's decision upsets this balance and

creates unfair, even absurd, results without adding to the
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~I_~

furtherance of the system's goals.

Consider the followin9

hypotheticals:
Example 1:

Spouse receives Medicaid.

Kelvin farms :Eor a living. He inherited the family farm from
his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000.
He, wife, and
work(3d the farm until Kelvin retired. At that point
daughter worke3d
diaghe leased the land to his daughter to farm.
Wife is diag
nosed with Al:2:heimer's disease and is required to enter a care
Kel v:ln and wife private pay for care at roughly
center. Kelv:ln
$4,000 per month.
A year later wife applies for Medicaid and
is found eligible. Wife lives in the care center for an
additional ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a
month).
At wife's death her estate is valued at less than
$2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules.
Kelvin
lives an additional ten years and at his death his estate
consists of his farm. Kelvin's heir is his daughter who has
continued to lease the farm.
The Department seeks recovery
$300,000 for wife's care from Kelvin's estate (the
of the $300/000
farm) .
Result:

Undel~
Undel~

the Court's decision, the Department will be

allowed to recover the $300,000 from Kelvin's estate under state

Example 2:

Gift of farm to daughter, spouse receives Medicaid.

Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm
from his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000.
He, wife,
and daughter \\rorked the farm until Kelvin retired. At that
Wif(;! is
point he leased the land to his daughter to farm.
Wife;:
diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease and is required to enter a
care center.

At that point Kelvin gifts the farm to h:ls

daughter. This gift of Kelvin's separate property carries
with it a period of Medicaid ineligibility from 36 months to
88 months depending on when Kelvin and his wife apply for
Medicaid.
Kelvin and wife pay for 36 months of long term
$144,000) depleting their cash resources.
care (roughly $144/000)
MedicThirty-seven months post-gift Kelvin's wife applies for Medic
aid and is found eligible.
Wife lives in the care center for
an additional eight years (at a Medicaid cost of $240,000
($2,500 a month).
At wife's death her estate is valued at
less than $2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules.
Kelvin lives an additional ten years and at his death his
estate consists of his personal effects.
Result:

The Department is unable to obtain recovery of the
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$240,000 for wife's care from the farm but can recoup minimally
from Kelvin's estate.
J.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c).

See also Peter

Strauss, Medi,caid Revisions in 1993 Budget Act, N. Y. L. ~r., Sept.

30, 1993, at 3, 7.

The very wealthy can afford to get around the

asset transfer and estate recovery provisions, but poor and
middle-class individuals cannot.
Example 4:

Formal post-nuptial agreement.

Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm from
his parents.
The farm is valued at $300,000.
He, first
wife, and dau9hter worked the farm until Kelvin retired. At
that point he leased the land to his daughter to farm.
First
wife dies. A year later Kelvin remarries. He and second wife"
enter into a j:ormal post nuptial agreement preserving the
separate natul~e
natul~e of each spouse's estate.
within a few years
se~cond wife is diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease
of marriage se~cond
require~d to enter a care center . Kelvin and second wife
and is require~d
private pay for care at roughly $4,000 per month. A year
later second wife applies for Medicaid for second wife ,and is
eligible~.
found eligible~.
Second wife lives in the care center for an
additional ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a
month) .
At second wife's death her estate is valued at less
than $2,000 ael
aEI required by Medicaid eligibility rules.
Kelvin lives em additional ten years and at his death his
estate consists of his farm.
Kelvin's heir is his daughter
who has continued to lease the farm.
The Department sl:eks
s-:eks
recovery of the $300,000 for second wife's care from Kelvin's
estate (the farm).
Result:

Under the Court's decision, the Department will be

allowed to recover the $300,000 from Kelvin's estate.

The

Court's decision ignores treasured principles of community'
property law by Inaking Kelvin's separate property liable for his
second wife's Medicaid payments.
Example 5:

Kelvin divorces second wife.

Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm
from his parents.
The farm is valued at $300,000.
He,
first wife, and daughter worked the farm until Kelvin retired.
At that point he leased the land to his daughter to farm.
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First wife dies. A year later Kelvin remarries. He and
presecond wife enter into a formal post nuptial agreement pre
serving the separate nature of each spouse's estate.
within
lUza few years of marriage second wife is diagnosed with lUz
heimer's disease and is required to enter a care center.
Kelvin and second wife private pay for care at roughly $4,000
per month. A year later Kelvin divorces second wife and their
property is divided according to the post nuptial agree:ment.
second wife, now ex-wife, applies for Medicaid and is found
addieligible.
Second wife lives in the care center for an
all addi
tional ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a
At second wife's death her estate is valued a.t less
month) .
than $2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules. Kelvin
lives an additional ten years and at his death his estate
consists of h:is farm. Kelvin's heir is his daughter who has
continued to lease the farm.
Medicaid seeks recovery of the
$300,000 for ex-second wife's care from Kelvin's estate (the
farm) .
Result:

Under this Court's decision, state law would preclude

recovery other than from second wife's estate for her Medicaid
costs.

diHasn't the Court created a powerful incentive for di

vorce?
Example 6:

Kelvin predeceases second wife.

Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm
from his parents.
The farm is valued at $300,000.
He,
first wife, and daughter worked the farm until Kelvin retired.
At that point he leased the land to his daughter to farm.
die~s.
First wife die~s.
A year later Kelvin remarries. He and
presecond wife enter into a formal post nuptial agreement pre
serving the SE!parate nature of each spouse's estate.
Within
Alza few years of: marriage second wife is diagnosed with Alz
heimer's disecLse and is required to enter a care center.
Kelvin and second wife private pay for care at roughly ;$4,000
per month. A year later Kelvin dies.
His estate is probated
according to his Will (reflecting separate nature of each
spouse's property) with the farm passing to Kelvin's daughter
and second wife, now widow, receiving her statutory spousal
eligishare.
Second wife applies for Medicaid and is found eligi
ble.
Second wife lives in the care center for an additional
ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a month) .
At second wife's death her estate is valued at less than
$2,000 as requ.ired by Medicaid eligibility rules.
Result:

Under this Court's decision, state law would preclude
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recovery other than from second wife's estate for her Medicaid
costs.

Why should whether Kelvin's daughter inherits the farm

depend upon who - Kelvin or his wife - dies first?
Example 9: The second wife's inheritance
Kelvin farms for a living.
He and his wife lease a farm
from Kelvin's parents. Wife is diagnosed with early Alzheime
Alzheimer's disease and is required to enter a care center. Kelvin
and wife private pay for care at roughly $4,000 per month. A
year later wife applies for Medicaid for wife and is found
eligible. Wife lives in the care center for an additional ten
years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a month).
At
wife's death her estate is valued at less than $2,000 as
required by MI:!dicaid
Ml:!dicaid eligibility rules.
Kelvin remarries and
he and his second wife live together for twenty-five years.
The second wi:Ee and Kelvin accumulate an estate valued at
$500,000 due to second wife's inheritance of a family farm
from her parents a year before she dies. Second wife has a
son who leased the inherited farm from second wife and second
wife's parentB. At Kelvin's death his estate consists of this
farm. The Department seeks recovery of the $300,000 for first
wife's care from Kelvin's estate (the farm).
Result:

Under the Court's decision, the family farm of the

second wife is liable for Kelvin's first wife's care costs.
Again, how can this be reconciled with Idaho's community property
laws?
In conclusion, the issues raised in these hypotheticals do
not make the Court's decision erroneous by themselves.

They do,

however, counter any notion that spousal estate recovery 1.s
i.s a
moral imperative or follows logically from Idaho's probate: law or
the Medicaid sch4:!me.
schl:!me.

There are just as many, if not more, good

policy reasons to prohibit spousal estate recovery as there are
reasons to allow it.

If Congress and the state legislature has

made a clear policy choice in favor of spousal estate recovery it
would not be for the Court to deny it.

If, however, federal or
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state law is contrary to, or ambiguous in regard to, spou,sal
estate recovery, the Court should have no qualms about prohibit
prohibiting it.

At the very least, it should be clear that Medicaid is

not a loan and couples do not cheat the system simply because the
state may not fully recover Medicaid payments made to one spouse.
II.

The Court Elrred in holding that federal law does not prohib
prohibit the Depa~rtment
Depa~rtment from recovering Medicaid payments from the
estate of t:he recipient's surviving spouse.

Federal la'YOr provides the parameters for state recovery of
Medicaid payments.

42 U.S.C.

§

1396a(a) (18) (state Medicaid

programs must comply with the provisions of 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p

with respect to liens, adjustments, and recoveries of Medicaid
correctly paid).

This Court held in McCoy v. state of Idaho,

Department of Health and Welfare, 907 P.2d 110, 112 (1995):
Each state's participation in Medicaid is optional, but once
a state voluntarily elects to participate in the pro9ram, it
must comply with the requirements imposed by the Act and
applicable regulations.
Hildor Knudson received Medicaid payments from Janualy
JanualY I,
1993 until her d,eath on October 27, 1994.

The payments for

I, 1993 are
medical services Hildor received prior to October 1,
covered by 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) (A) (1992) which prohibits

states from reco'iTery Medicaid payments made to a recipient who is
institutionalized except "from his estate."

The payments for

medical services Hildor received after October I, 1993 are
covered by 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1998) which also

prohibits states from recovery of payments made to an individual
institutionalized except from "the individual's estate."
who is instituti()nalized
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Thus, the Department is prohibited by federal law from recovering
any of the paymEmts made to Hildor except from her estate.

The

Department cannot recover from Lionel's estate.
The Court finds two reasons why 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) (A)

does not limit a state's recovery of Medicaid payments to the
estate of the rElcipient.
recipient.

First, the Court concludes that the

statute is only a limitation on the types of medical assi:stance
which can be recovered and does not limit from whom these pay
payments may be recovered.

Second, the Court concludes that the

definition of an individual's estate includes the income a.nd
resources of the individual's spouse - thus recovery from an
individual's estate includes recovery from the spouse's estate.
A.

Federal law does limit from whom Medicaid payments may
be recovered - a state may only recover from the reci
recipient's estate.
1.

The language and history of the federal statute
demonstrate the illegality of spousal estat:e re
recovery.

Since the Medicaid program was created in 1965, fedeI:al law
has consistently prohibited recovery of properly paid Medi.caid
Medicaid
payments except from the estate of the recipient individua.1.

The

original 1965 statute specified that "a
Ita State plan for medical
assistance must . . . provide that

. there shall be no

adjustment or recovery (except, in the case of an individu.al who
was 65 years of age or older, from his estate . .
97 at

§

1902, 79 Stat at 347 (1965).

"

II

89Pub. L. 89

summaIn 1982, Congress summa

rized the state of the law as follows:
Under current law, States are barred from imposing any lien
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against any recipient's property prior to his death because
of Medicaid claims paid or to be paid on his behalf unless
placed as a result of a court judgment. In the case of
recoveri·es can
individuals under age 65, no adjustments or recoveri,es
be made for Medicaid claims correctly paid. In the case of
correctindividuals over 65, adjustments and recoveries for correct
ly paid claims can only be made from his/her estate after
the individual's death and only (1) after the death of his
surviving spouse; and (2) where there are no surviving
children who are under 21, blind, or disabled.
S.

REP.

No.

494 (I), 97th Cong., 2nd. Sess., 38 (1982) reprinted

in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 814.

Remember that Congress also

summarized the law as allowing an elderly individual to give
his/her house to his/her spouse and "by doing so, the individual
assures that the: home will not be part of his/her estate .md
imd
therefore will not be subject to any recovery action initiated by
the state after the individual's death."

Id. at 815.

It could

not be clearer, that at least as of 1982, states could not
..

recover Medicaid payments from the estate of a recipient'

f3

spouse.
When did CongJ:ess change this language to allow recovery from
the estate of the recipient's spouse?

Never.

In 1982, Congress

changed the relevant provision to read:
c:orrectNo adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance c:orrect
bellalf of an individual under the State plan may be
ly paid on behalf
made,
made I except ..
tl:le case of an
all. individual [who is an inpati,ent
inpati.ent in
(A) in tl:Le
a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for the
mentally retarded or other medical institution, if such
individual is required, as a condition of receiving s:ervices
in such institution under the state plan, to spend for costs
of medical care all but a minimal amount· of his income
fo:[' personal needs], from his estate or upon sale
required fo:r
subject to a lien imposed on account of
of the property SUbject
medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual, and
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 65 years of age
or older when the individual received such medical assis
assistance, from his estate.
Tax Equity & Financial Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 97-248,

§

132,

96 Stat. 324 (1982) (bracketed portion reflects incorporation of
referenced language from

§

132(a) (1)).
(1».

Congress also reworded,

but retained the limitations on when recovery could be made only after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse and only
when there was no surviving child under 21, blind, or disabled.

As codified. in 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) (1992), the above

language was the law of the land until October 1st, 1993.

Note

that Hildor received Medicaid payments from January 1993 through
October 1994, so about half of her payments are covered by this
language.

R. pp. 25-40.

After October 1, 1993, the applicable

language as codified in 42 U.S.C.

§

1396(b) (1) (Supp. 1998) reads:

No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correct
correctbellalf of an individual under the state plan may be
ly paid on beJlalf
made, except t;hat the state shall seek adjustment or re,covery
of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual
indi
vidual under the State plan in the case of the folll::>wing
foll~::>wing
individuals:
(A) In the case of an individual [who is an inpa.tient
in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility :Eor the
mentally retarded or other medical institution, if such
. individuall is required, as a condition of receivin9
services in such institution under the State plan, to
spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount
of his income required for personal needs], the state
shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's
estate or upon sale of the property subject to a lien
imposed on account of medical assistance paid on behalf
of the in.dividual.
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of
age or older when the individual received such medical
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assistance, the state shall seek adjustment or recovery
assisfrom the individual's estate, but only for medical assis
tance consisting of (i) nursing facility services, home and community-based
services, and related hospital and prescription drug
services, or
(ii) at the option of the state, any items or services
under the state plan.
(C) (i)In the case of an individual who has received (or
is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-tertrl care
insurancla policy in connection with which assets or
resources are disregarded in the manner described in
clause (:ii) , except as provided in such clause, the State
shall selak adjustment or recovery from the individual's
estate on account of medical assistance paid on behalf of
the indi'ridual for nursing facility and other long-term
care services.
(ii) Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of an
individual who received medical assistance under a State
plan of a state which had a state plan amendment approved
as of May 14, 1993, which provided for the disregard of
any assets or resources (I) to the extent that payments are made under a
long-term care insurance policy; or
(II) because an individual has received (or is enti
entitled to
toO receive) benefits under a long term care! insur
insurance policy."

Omnibus Budget R1econciliation
R,econciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103 -66,
§1361.2 (a) , 1.07 Stat. 627-628

(1.993).

The 1.993 amendments did not

change the limit on when recovery could be made (only where there
is no surviving spouse or dependent) and added a requirement for
states to waive recovery where it would "work an undue hardship."
42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1-3) (Supp. 1998).

As will be discussed

later, a definition
definit:Lon of the term "estate" was also added.
U.s.C.

§

42

1396p(b} (4) (Supp. 1998).

Again, as oj: September 30, 1982, federal law unequivocally
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prohibited spouHal estate recovery.

S.

REP.

No.

494(1) a.t 814.

Where in the lesrislation since then is there any change allowing
states to recover Medicaid payments from the recipient's :spouse?
Nowhere.

The change on October 1, 1982 did nothing more than

amend the generall prohibition against any recovery of Medicaid
payments to add an exception to allow recovery from the estate of
individuals who receive benefits prior to age 65 if they received
such benefits because they were institutionalized.

42 U.S.C.

§

1396p (b) (1) (A) (1992) .
The effect of the 1993 amendments is bit more complex, but
similar.

The law still retains the general prohibition asrainst

any recovery of properly-made Medicaid payments.
1396p(b} (1) (Supp. 1998).

42 U.S.C.

§

As to individuals who received fl'ledicaid

permisprior to age 5S because they were institutionalized, the permis
sive exception is changed to a mandatory requirement (i.e.,
states are required to recover the payments from the individual's
estate or through use of a lien).
(Supp. 1998).
were

55,

42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b} (1) (A)

As to individuals who received Medicaid after they

states may recover all payments from the individual's

estate and are

n~quired
n~quired

to recover some types of payments (those

for long-term care) from the individual's estate.
1396p (b) (1) (B) (i··ii) (Supp. 1998).

42 U.S.C.

§

As to individuals who receive

Medicaid under special state provisions that coordinate eligibil
eligibility with

long-te]~
long-te]~

care insurance policies, states must recover

payments for long-term care services (except where the state plan
was approved before May 14, 1993) from the estate of the individi:ndividRESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - .Page 24
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ual.

42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) (C) (i-ii) (Supp. 1998).

Thus, states are prohibited - with no qualifiers - from
recovery of Medicaid payments except from certain recipients'
estates in ever)r version of the Medicaid statute that has ever
existed.

It is difficult to conceive how the statute's language

could more expli.citly limit from whom (and by what means) a state
may recover Medi.caid payments.
2.

'l'he
'I'he federal statute's l.imitation upon from whom
(and how) states may recover Medicaid payments is
z:'eflected
J:'eflected in the case l.aw.

Case law from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and other courts is premised upon the conclusion
that the federal statutory language limits from where a state may
recover Medicaid payments.

In Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923

(9th Cir. 1997), and Citizens Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d
1003 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit held that, prior to being
amended in 1993, 42 U.S.C.
recipient's estate.

§

1396p(b) (1) limited recovery to the

The issue in each case was what assets are

included in the :recipient's estate.

In Kizer, the court held

that a recipient's estate did not include property the recipient

owned in joint b:mancy and that a state could not seek to recover
Medicaid benefits from any person who succeeded by survivorship
to such property.

887 F.2d at 1006-1008.

In Bucholtz, the court

held that a recipient's estate did include an ownership interest
at the time of

dE~ath
dE~ath

in community property or property held as a

tenant in common,. but did not include property in an inter vivos
trust.

114 F.3d at 925-927.

To the extent a state statute
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·....,.

"seeks to reach further than

§

(1) it cannot stand."
1396p (b) (1),
stand. II
I

Id. at 925.
One might, of course, distinguish these cases on the ground
that the statute was amended in 1993, but such a distinction
distincti.on is
without merit.

First, a large portion of Hildor's Medicaid

payments were made prior to the effective date of the 1993
amendments.

Second, the key language ("No recovery . . . except

. . . in the caSte of an individual . . . from his estate
II )
relied
estate")
upon by the Ninth Circuit in Bucholtz

remained essentially

r.ecovery . . . except . . . in the case of an
unchanged ("No r1ecovery
individual.
amendments.
U.S.C.

§

. from the individual's estate) by the 1993
Co~)are
Co~)are

42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) (A) (1992) with 42

1396p(b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1998).

Cases after the 1993 amendments also hold that the language
of 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) prohibits states from collecting

Medicaid paymentf; except from the estate of the recipient.
Demille v.

BelshE~,
BelshE~,

In

1994 WL 519457 (N.D. Cal. Sept.16, 1994), the

United States District Court for the North District of California
recovnoted that the general rule created by the statute was no recov
ery except from individual's estates and held:
e~penses
The federal statute allows the state to recoup its e~penses
only from those persons who are holding real or personal
interproperty in which the deceased recipient held a legal inter
(1)est at the time of death. See [42 U.S.C. §] 1396p(b) (1)
(requiring eltate
Eltate to recover from decedent's "estate") and §
expens1es the
1396p (b) (4) (defining "estate"). The amount of expens'es
state may re!cover from such persons is capped by the .amount
of decedent's interest in the property. § 1396p(b) (4). In
th,at the
other words, the federal statute only contemplates th,:it
deceased recipient's assets will be traced, not that other
persons can become liable to pay over their own asset:3.
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1994 WL at *7.

similarly, in Matter of Estate of Budney, 541

N.W.2d 245 (Wis. App. 1995), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held
that a state stcltute authorizing recovery of medical assistance
benefits from the surviving spouse's estate exceeded the authori
authority provided by the federal Medicaid statutes.

541 N.W. at 246.

There appea.rs to be only one case even vaguely supportive of
the Court's conclusion that 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b} (1) does not

limit a state's recovery of Medicaid payments to the estate of
the recipient.

Ironically, Matter of Estate of Imburgia, 130

A.D.2d 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987), was decided prior to both the
1988 and the 1993 amendments to the statute and considers mainly
the deeming of assets between spouses.

Further, the Imbul:gia

analysis was explicitly rejected by a higher court, the NE!W
NElW York
Court of Appeals, in Matter of Estate of Craig, 624 N.E.2d 1003
(N.Y. 1993).

In Craig, the court held that federal law generally

prohibited recovery of Medicaid, made a narrow exception f'or the
recovery from the estate of the recipient, but did not "provide
for recovery of lYIedicaid payments on behalf of a predeceased
spouse from the l3econdari1y
estate. n
lsecondari1y dying spouse's estate."
1006.

N. E. at
624 N.E.

The court also noted that the 1993 amendments to the

statute "gives
IIgives the states, at their option, the power to recover
against a spouse"s estate, but only against the recipient's
assets that were conveyed through joint tenancy and other speci
specified forms of sUJ::-vi
vorship.
sUJ:,vivorship.
B.

...,
...,

.

n

Id.

The Court erred by combining 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (l)'s
definit~ion with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (4)'s definition of
definition
estate"
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The Court's second basis for holding that the Department's
claim against Lionel's estate does not violate 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b) (1) is the Court's conclusion that an individual's estate
(as defined by the statute) includes all income and resources
owned by the individual and his/her spouse, including any income
or resources that the individual and spouse were entitled to but
did not receive because of action by them on their behalf.
plugging the 42 U.S.C.
the 42 U.S.C.

§

§

By

1396p(e) (1) definition of assets into

1396p(b) (4) definition of estate, the Court

reasons that recovery from Hildor's estate includes all of
Lionel's estate, particularly resources he acquired from the
marriage settlement agreement.

This analysis is faulty in

several respects.
T:b.e Court's analysis of the definitions ignores
t:b.e effective dates of the statute.
the

1.

The 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(e) (1) definition of assets does not

apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before
of the enactment of this Act" (August 10, 1993).
13612(e) (2) (B).

the~

date

P.L. 103-66,

§

Hildor transferred all of her interest in the

Knudson's assets to Lionel on March 8, 1993.

R. pp. 63-66.

Thus, the (e) (1) definition of assets explicitly does not include
any of Lionel's estate.

Additionally, both the 42 U.S.C.

1396p(e) (1) definition of assets and the 42 U.S.C.

§

§

1396p(b) (4)

calendefinition of estate only apply to Medicaid payments "for calen
dar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993."
66,

§

13612(e)

(2:~

(A).

103P.L. 103

Thus, even if the Court's analysis of the

RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - Page 28

000338

definitions of E!state and assets is correct, it cannot be applied
to Lionel's estate and, even if it could, it would only apply to
those payments made on Hildor's behalf after October 1, 1993.
2•

'l~he

c:>f 42
Court's analysis defies the structure (:>f

u. s. C.

139 6p.

§

Subsection (b) (4) 's definition of "estate" is specific to
subsection" (i.e.
"this sUbsection"

I

subsection 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p(b»

,r

whereas subsection (e) (l)'s definition applies generally to "this
section" (i.e., all of 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p).

When interpreting

statutory definitions, as with statutory provisions in general,
general definitions are superseded by specific definitions.
State v. Jones, 34 Idaho 83, 199 P. 645 (1921); Herrick

v.~

Gallet, 35 Idaho 13, 204 P. 477 (1922); In re Drainage Dist. No.
1, 40 Idaho 549, 235 P. 895 (1925).
'.1"","

definiSubsection (e) (4) 's defini

tion of "assets" applies to that word's use in section 1396p as a
whole.

This broad definition is displaced, for purposes of

subsection (b),
(b) r by SUbsection
subsection (b) (4) 's very specific definition.
3.

hisThe Court's analysis ignores the legislatiV'e his
t10ry of the definitions.

"esThe structu:ral wall between the (b) (4) definition of "es
technitate" and the (e) (1) definition of assets is not a mere techni
cality.

The two provisions were distinguished throughout their

legislative history.
section 13612

Subsection (b) (4) was enacted as part of

"ME~dical
"Ml~dical

Estate Recoveries" of the Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation A<::t of 1993.
628.

627P. L. No. 103-66; 107 Stat. at 627

nTransfers
Subsection (e) (1) was enacted as section 13611 "Transfers
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of Assets; Treatments of Certain Trusts" of the Act.

Id.

Congress intended subsection (b) (4) (B) to allow states the option
of recovering assets in which the recipient had a legal title or
interest at the time of death, including assets held through
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust,

0:('

other arrangement.

213, 103rd
H. R. CON. REP. No. 213
1

Cong., 1st Sess. 835 (1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N . 1524.
This was an explicit response to Kizer and other cases denying
state recovery of such assets.

Patricia Nemore et aI,

OB1~-93
DBllA-93

Provisions Concerning Medicaid Transfers of Assets, Treatment of
Certain Trusts, and Estate Recoveries, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1199, 1206

(Feb. 1994).

Congress had an altogether different intent in

enacting subsection (e) (1). H.R. CON. REP. No. 213 at 1523.

SubsecSubsec

tion (e) (1) was intended to effect how assets of an individual
and his/her spouse are treated for the purpose of Medicaid
eligibility.

rd.
Id.

Nowhere in the legislative history of t.hese

subsections is an expressed intent that the asset definition
sUbsections
would expand the range of estate recovery.
4.

The Court's combination of the two definiti,ons
~eads
~eads

to absurd

resu~ts.
resu~ts.

The cooperation, without the combination, of the two defini
definitions results in a logical scheme.

As Congress intended, the

broad definition of assets in (e) (1) works to prevent the hiding
of income and

re:~ources
re:~ources

for the eligibility purposes - applicable

at the time of the "snap-shot" - and ensures that individuals are
penalized for the improper transfer of such assets.

Patricia
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RBHEARING BRIEF - Page 30

000340

Nemore et aI, OElRA-93 Provisions Concerning Medicaid Transfers of
Assets, Treatme.nt
Treatme.l:lt of Certain Trusts, and Estate Recoveries,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1199, 1200 (Feb. 1994) (the definition was also a
direct response to recent caselaw).i
caselaw).; H.R. REP. No. 111, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess., 206-208 (1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
533-535.

The expanded definition of·estate
of estate in (b) (4) was intend
intend-

ed by Congress to prevent an individual from making an otherwise
prohibited transfer of an exempt asset (upon death of the indi
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship,
life estate, or other arrangement) without the individual being
penalized or the state being able to recover the value of the
asset.

Id.

The Court's combination of the definitions adds little to
the meaning of the statute and leads to absurd results.
(I)
ging in" (e) (1)

';s

"Plug"Plug

definition of "assets" to (b) (4) 's definition

of "estate" would make 42 U.S.C.

§

l396p{b) (4) (A) read as fol
fol-

lows:
. "estate," with respect to a deceased individual (A) shall include all real and personal property and
other [income and resources of the individual and of
the individual's spouse] included within the indivi
individual's estate as defined for purposes of state probate

law.

{Emphasis
added.]!
(Emphasis added.)!

What income and resources of an individual's

spouse are included in the individual's estate as defined for
purposes of Idaho probate law?

At most, the individual's one-

half interest ill any community property.

Not the spouse's half

of the community property, and certainly not the surviving
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spouse's separate property.
The (e) (1) definition of assets also includes "any income or
resources which the individual or the individual's spouse is
entitled to but does not receive because of action" by the
individual, the individual's spouse, or anyone (including a court
of l the
or administrative body) acting on behalf of, in place ofl
direction of, or upon the request of the individual or the
spouse.

42 U.S.C.

§

1936p(e) (i)
(1) (Supp. 1998).

Under Idaho

law, what
what, if any, "income or resources which the indi
indiprobate law
I

l

individual's spouse is entitled to but does not
vidual or the individual/s
receive .

" are included in the individual's estate?

HesponHespon

dent hesitates to suggest an answer because the question itself
unfortunately, the question will have to be an
anseems absurd; unfortunatelYI
swered in the implementation
i~plementation of the Court's decision.
Idaho, of course, has adopted the option in 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p{b) (4) (B) which would, under the Court's analysis, define
1396p(b)
estate as:
any other real and personal property and other [income and
resources o:f the individual and the individual's spou.se} in
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the
time of dea't:.h (to the extent of such interest)

(Emphasis added.)

Again what is the extent of the recipient's
recipientls
Again,
I

legal title or interest in the surviving spouse's half of their
former community property or the spouse's separate property?
There is no such interest.

Again, it seems absurd but becomes

necessary to ask: what is the extent of an individual's legal
title or interest at the time of the individual's death in income
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or resources thE! individual or the individual was entitled to but
never received?
The structure of the statute, the legislative history of the
statute, and

thE~

absurdities that result from combining the

Ib) (4) definition of estate and the (e) (1) definition of assets
demonstrate that the definitions were intended to be and must be
kept distinct.

Thus, an "individual's estate" cannot include the

individual's sUI:viving spouse's estate - even in the confusing
world of federal Medicaid law.

Moreover, because of the date of

effecthe transfer of assets between Hildor and Lionel and the effec
tive dates of the 1993 amendments, Hildor's estate cannot include, for the purposes of 42 U.S.C.
elude,

§

1396(b) (1) (A), Lionel's

estate.
In conclusion, the language of the federal law is clear.
has been clear for 33 years.

It

states may only recover Medicaid

payments from the estate of the recipient.

States may not

recover from the estate of the recipient's spouse.

with elll due

respect, the Court erred in holding otherwise.
hol.ding that state l.aw
III. The Court e:rred in hoJ.ding
J.aw authorizes the
Department t.o recover Medicaid payments from the esta.te of
the recipient's surviving spouse.
A.

The C01llrt erred in interpreting Idaho Code

§

56-218.

Under Idaho law, the Department must seek recovery of
Medicaid payment:;; from the estate of the recipient "or if there
be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse. IDAHO CODE

§

218.

Hildor had an estate (and the Department recovered part of the
payments to Hildc)r from it).

Thus, the Department cannot recover
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Medicaid paid to Hildor from the estate of her surviving spouse,
Lionel.
I.C.

§

The Court appears to concede that the plain meaning of
56-218(1) would prohibit the Department from recovering

Medicaid payments paid on behalf of Hildor from Lionel's
because Hildor had an estate.

The Court concludes,

E~state
E~state

howevE~r,
howevE~r,

that

the plain meaning of the statute is not controlling because it
would be contrary to clearly expressed legislative intent and
would lead to absurd results.
1.

The plain meaning of I.C.

§

56~218

is not absurd.

The primary premise of these arguments is that, because
Medicaid recipients will almost never have "no estate," the
provision for recovery from the spouse's estate would be rendered
meaningless by a literal reading of the statute.

Although it

would be highly unusual for an individual to die without an
estate, it is not theoretically impossible - particularly if the
individual has institutionalized for a very long time.

Further,

because, until the statute was amended in 1995, an individual's
dlefined by the statute, property that transferred
estate was not djefined
automatically to another's ownership upon an individual's death

at least arguably would not be included in the individual's
estate.

It is at least rational, therefore, that the legislature

could have

enactl~d
enactl~d

surviving spouse

III

II if
the "if
there be no estate, the estate of the

language on the premise that such circumstances

could, in fact, arise.

It should be noted that the Department

itself argued at various points in this litigation that, for the
purposes of the statute, Hildor had no estate - so at least the
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Department did not think such a concept was absurd.

App. Br. 15i

R. pp. 87 - 88,
8 8, .
practicalEven if the legislature expected that it would be practical
ly (if not theoretically) impossible for an individual to die
without an estate, it does not automatically follow that provid
providing for such circumstances in I.C.

§

56-218(1) would be absurd.

At a' time when the legislature was enacting other new provisions
regarding the attribution of assets between spouses and

rE~garding
rE~garding

transfers between spouses (i.e., spousal impoverishment provi
provisions), the legislature could well have intended the "if there be
no estate" catch-all to provide a deterrent from artificial
creation of such circumstances (or even a deterrent from attempts
to create such circumstances).

This may not be the most l:easonI:eason

able interpretation of the statute, but this does not make it an
absurd interpretation.
2.

T:he legislative intent of § 56-218 was not to
allow Medicaid recovery from the estate of the
recipient's surviving spouse.

The Court r·efers to the "legislative intent to recover from
the estate of a

surviving spouse" without clarifying where, such

intent is clearly expressed.

In fact, the only clearly expressed

legislative intent was that stated in the companion bill to the
bill that created I.C.

§

56-218(1):

It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this section
regulato reduce the number of situations in which medicaid regula
tions as thj=y apply to long term care costs, cause either
the destitution of the entire family, or a dissolution of
marriage carried out to prevent destitution. It is further
the intent of this legislation to protect the community and
separate property rights of a married person whose spouse
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applies for medical assistance regardless of whether they
are living together.
1988 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. SO,
20ge)i

§

I, p.74 (creating I.C.

1988 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 49., p.73.

§

5656

Given this c:xplicit

language of the legislature, it is at least as, if not more,
reasonable to conclude that the legislature wished to narrowly
restrict or prevent, rather than facilitate, recovery from the
estate of a surviving spouse.

The plain language of the statute

and the expressed concerns of the legislature should not be
overwhelmed by a merely implied
If, when I.C.

§

legislative intent.

56-218 (1) was enacted, the legislature had

intended that the Department freely recover Medicaid from the
estate of the recipient and the estate of the surviving spouse,
the legislature could have easily so stated.
'1iIIjj1ll'
'lIIIIjlll'

amended I.C.

§

56-218 (1) in 1998).

(As it did \orhen it

During oral argument before

the Court, the Department expressed a belief that the legislature
borrowed the language it used from a similar statute in Oregon.
This only reinforces the point that, if the legislature ha,d
intended the statute to mean that the Department could first
collect Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient and
then recover the balance from the estate of the surviving spouse,
the legislature could have enacted language clearly expressing
such an intent.

At the time I.C.

§

56-218(1) was enacted,

Oregon's statutes provided for the recovery of general assistance
from "the estate of the deceased recipient or if there be no
estate or the estate does not have sufficient assets to satisfy
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the claim, the e'state of the surviving spouse."

OR.

REV.

STAT.

§

411.795 (1987)1
It is the Court's construction of I.e.

§

56-218(1), rather

than the plain meaning of the statute, that is contrary to clear
legislative intent.

First, the Court effectively nullifies the

"or if there be no estate" language.

construcUnder the Court's construc

tion, the only time the Department will not seek recovery of
Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient's surviving
spouse is when the Department's claim is fully satisfied f:rom the
recipient's estate.

When the Department can fully recover from

makE! a
the estate of the recipient, the Department would not make
claim against the surviving spouse's estate even without the "if
there be no estate" language.
Further, the spousal impoverishment law was intended to
avoid the necessity for couples to divorce in order to protect
the community and separate property rights of the community
spouse.

By exposing all of the assets of a surviving spou.se to

encourpotential recovery, the Court's interpretation once again encour
assets.22
ages divorce to protect such assets.
Although at the time I. C. § 56-218(1} was enacted Oregon law
provided for recovery of Medicaid payments using the same "from the estate, or
if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse" language, Oregon law
now allows for recoyery of Medicaid Itfrom the estate of the individual or from
any recipient of property or other assets held by the individual at the time
of death including t.he estate of the surviving spouse" and limits such
recovery from persons other than the recipient to the extent and valuE: of the
asset~1
Medicaid recipient's: legal title or interest in the property or asset~l
transferred. OR REv. STAT. § 414.105 (Supp. 1996}.
a<I
Ironically, the Department has denied that there would be an
incentive to divorce under the Court's interpretation of I.C. § 56-2HI (1),
(1) but
concedes that at lea,st one such divorce (although apparently executed clumsily
and perhaps unsuccessfully) has already occurred. App. Reply Br., p. 8.
I
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'h
....
'h....

B.

The Cc>urt erred in ignoring the Department' s
limitC!ltions
limitcltions upon estate recovery.

re~;ula tory
re~g'ula

The Court' 1:1 holding does not address the effect of the
Department's regulations upon its ability to recover Medicaid
payments from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse.
These regulations are relevant both as aids to the interp:retation
of I.C.

§

56-218(1) and as independent barriers to the Depart
Depart-

ment's recovery.
In the Idaho Administrative Code, the Department has adopted
provisions for recovery of medical assistance "pursuant to
sections 56-218 and 56-218A, Idaho Code" through "the filing of
liens against property of deceased persons, and the filin9 of
liens against the property of permanently
recipients. "
II

.•~

IDAPA 16.03.09.025.

institutionalizE~d
institutionalizE~d

The regulations providE! for

recovery of Medicaid payments from the recipient's estate, or
upon the sale of property subject to a lien, but makes only a
limited provision for recovery from the estate of a surviving
spouse.

IDAPA 16.03.09.025.09; IDAPA 16.03.09.025.15.

IDAPA

Ir~PA

16.03.09.025.15 states: "If the deceased recipient has no estate,
bl= made from the estate of his surviving spouse."
recovery shall b~=
Under this regulation, because Hildor had an estate from \\'hich
the Department

rt:~covered,
rt:~covered,

it may not recover from Lionel's

r~=gulatory
r~=gulatory

reference to recovery from the estate

estate.
The other

of a recipient's surviving spouse further limits, rather than
expands, the Department's authority to recover from the estate of
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.,....,
.,"-'

a surviving spouse.

IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 states:

Limits on the Department's claim against the assets of a
deceased rE!cipient shall be sUbject
subject to sections 56-218 and
56-218A, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of ia. sur
surviving spouse of a predeceased recipient is limited t.o
'1:.0 the
value of the assets of the estate that were community prop
property, or the deceased recipient's share of the separ.a.te
property, aLnd jointly owned property. Recovery shall not be
made until the deceased recipient no longer is survived by a
spouse . . .
(Emphasis added).

Even if one accepts the Department's argument

that this regula.tion still allows recovery of assets in the
estate of the su.rviving spouse in which the recipient ever had a
community prope:rty interest, this does not expand the Depart
Department's recovery from a surviving spouse's estate beyond c:lrcum
c:lrcumstances where the recipient had no estate.
The Department's regulations explicitly refute any attempt
to use broad definitions of estate and assets to make resources
of the surviving spouse part of the estate of the recipient.
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.03(c) defines the recipient's estate to
include only that property and assets "in which the recipient had
any legal or beneficial title or interest at the time of death.
death."II
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.18 extensively defines "assets in estate

subject
sUbject to claims," but includes only those assets "the deceased
recipient owned .or
or in which he had an ownership interest.

1I

Thus, although the Court does not address the issue, state
regulations impose an independent barrier on spousal estat.e
recovery in Idaho, even if it is otherwise allowed by

fedE~ral
fedE~ral

and

state law.· Also, it seems highly unusual, if as the Court held
the state law only creates an order of priority between recipient
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and spousal estate recovery that the Department's regulations do
not reflect this meaning.
the Department

~/ould
~lould

stran<ge that
Similarly, it also seems stran'g'e

have adopted regulations that not only do

incorporate but also directly contradict, federal la''''
la'", as
not incorporate,
I

interpreted by the Court.

regul.ations
Perhaps the Department's regul,ations

demonstrate that the Court erred.
C.

The CClurt's holding will cause undesirable results.
1.

'1~he

Court's interpretation of federal and state
l.aw creates unnecessary conflicts between t:he two.

Read together, as properly constructed, the federal and
state statutes a.nd regulations would allow the Department to
recover Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient, which
would include the tracing of assets in which the recipient had a
legal title or interest at the time of her death.
.~

All

thE~

applicable law can be consistently and reasonably read to limit
recovery from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse to
such tracing.

undisThe Medicaid system would continue to work undis

turbed without spousal estate recovery, though the Departnlent
would obviously be denied some revenue.
On the other hand, to allow the Department's claim a9ainst
Lionel's estate requires defiance of the plain meaning of federal
and state statutes and regulations.

unintenThe Court's holding uninten

tionally disrupts community property and probate

principIE~S.
principIE~S.

Court's holding leads to absurd and unfair results.

The

Finally, the

Court's holding creates direct conflicts between state and
federal law that could have been avoided.
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example!,
For eXamplE!,

42 U.S.C.

§

Depart1396p(b) (1) requires the Depart

recipiment to recover Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipi
ent.

Court interprets 42 U.S.C.
As the court

tion of "estate" and 42 U.S.C.

§

§

defini1396p(b) (4)'s defini

1396p(e) (l)'s definition of

"assets", the estate of a recipient includes "all income and
resources of the individual and of the individual' s

SPOUSE~"

including income or resources which the individual or spouse is
entitled to but does not receive because of actions by or for
them.

Although Idaho has adopted (as of 1995) the 42 U.S . C.

§

purpos1396p(b) (4)'s definition of "estate" for estate recovery purpos
es, neither Idaho's statutes or regulations include within such
estate the broad definition of assets from 42 U.S.C.
(1).

§

1396p(e)1396p(e)

To the contrary, the Department's extensive and detailed

definition of
16.03.09.025.18

"assets in estate subject
sUbject to claims" in

IDJ~~PA
IDJ~PA

does not include all income and resources of a

recipient's spouse or all income and resources to which the
individual or spouse is entitled to but does not receive because
of actions by or for them; rather the regulatory definition
th.:>se assets "the deceased recipient owned or in
includes only th.:;>se
which he had an ownership interest."

Thus, if the Court's

interpretation o:E the relevant federal law is correct, the
Department is in violation of 42 U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§

§

1396a(a) (18) and 42

1396p(b) (1) by under-seeking estate recovery.

Similarly,
similarly, the IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20's limitation of claims
against the estate of a surviving spouse to "the value of the
assets of the estate that were community property, or the deRESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - Page 41
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ceased recipient's share of the separate property, and jointly
owned propertyn
interpretaproperty" would also conflict with the Court's interpreta
tion of federal law.

As the Court construes 42 U.S.C.

§

1396p1396p

(b) (1), the Department is required by federal law to seek recov
recovery of Medicaid payments from all income and resources of the
individual and the individual's spouse.
Of course, Respondent's point is not that the Department
should be more a.ggressive in pursuing estate recovery.

To the

extent, however, that the Court's interpretation of federal and
state statutes allowing recovery from surviving spouse' s

~~states

bring the Department into violation of those statutes, those
interpretations should at least be reconsidered.
2.

The Court's holding upsets traditional precepts of
community property and probate law.

It has already been explained how the Court's holdin9
disregards distinctions between community and separate property
and creates an incentive for married couples to divorce.

It is

not uncommon for elderly couples to get married late in li.fe
life and
it is particularly unfair in those circumstances that the commu
community spouse, married only for a short time to the institutional
institutionalized spouse, should be expected not only to contribute assets for
the support of the spouse in the nursing home, but also deprive
the heirs of any expectation of receiving property from his or
her will.

After all, there is no taxation upon estates un.less

the estate is worth more than $625,000 and other types of public
assistance an individual may receive, even if recoverable from
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the recipients Elstate, are not recoverable from the estatl9 of the
survi
ving SPOUSE!.
surviving
SpOUSE!.

Ken Coughlin &
& Harry S. Margolis, Congress
Cong.ress

Gags Attorneys, Provides Capital Gains and Estate Tax Rel.ief,
Re1.ief, and
Tweaks Medicare, ELDER

LAW REP.

3

(Sept. 1997); I.C.

§ 56-224.

To

require that thet
subjected to in
ther community spouse's estate be sUbjected
essence 100 percent taxation from the state for the illnel:;s
illne!:;s of
the spouse is cClntrary to the cherished role of inheritance
elsewhere in Idaho's law:
Older people expect that the money they have saved all their
lives will have value in funding their retirement and in
securing the lives of their children and grandchildren.
People will not save for a lifetime in order to see those
savings go down the drain in a matter of a few months or a
few years, just to save the government some Medicaid dol
dollars. It denies the essence of the middle class view of
American life and the American dream.
Joel C. Dobris, ,Medicaid Estate Planning by the Elderly: Jl Policy
'• .,

View of Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 24

REAL

PROP.,

PROB. & TR. J. 19-20 (1989).

3.

Implementation of the Court's holding wil.l. be di.fficul.t
at best.

Enforcement of the Court's decision will cause chaos.

The

tracking of asset:s over decades of time will easily consume the

Department and create it's own inequities with some surviving
spouse estates el3caping estate recovery with others not.

TrackTrack

ing of surviving spouse situations would be a nightmare.

As an

example assume that the surviving spouse remarries and takes her
husbands name.

Or the surviving spouse moves out of state and

takes these resources with her.

What resources will be used and

how will the State of Idaho track this individual's life and

.....
....
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death?

Then there is the problem of enforcing Idaho's surviving

spouse estate rE!COvery rules that most certainly clash with the
estate recovery and probate rules of every other state in the
nation.

Of COUl:se,
cou:rse, the Department could simply not follm.,-up on

the full range of spousal estate recovery authorized by the
Court, but that would be contrary to the policies that purport to
justify any spousal estate recovery.
Conspicuous consumption and an unforeseen increase ill
Medicaid costs could result from the Court's holding.

It is not

too far fetched for the surviving spouse, once realizing that the
assets of the recipient as well as his separate property assets
in existence at his death will pass to the state for repa)rment of
the recipient's Medicaid costs, to intentionally leave little for

...

recovery.

There would be little incentive to save or spend these

funds in a reasonable manner.

Realizing that you can spend your

estate but not pass it to your heirs will result in the dE!pletion
of savings and in many instances result in earlier eligibi.lity
eligibility to
Medicaid.

Just how will the Department determine, track, and

recoup the numer,ous gifts and transfers for less than fair market

value remains to be seen.
'''''here a recipient's Medicaid debt exists i.n
In estates '""here
conjunction with the surviving spouse's estate and closely
consumes the suriTiving spouse's estate the Department will
increasingly be :required to determine whether or not a Will
exists, file the probate, assume the duties and responsibilities
of personal representative, collect, manage, and close the estate
RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - Page 44
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of the survivin9 spouse.

There would be few reasons for a

relative to assume the responsibilities of a personal representa
representative and endure the hassles of probating the surviving spouse's
will solely for the state's benefit.
In conclusion, the Court erred in holding that under state
law the Department may recover Medicaid payments from the estate
of the recipient's surviving spouse.

conThe" Court's holding con

flicts with the plain meaning of the statute, is contrary to
legislative intemt
intemt, conflicts with the Department's own
I

n~gula-

tions, and will lead to undesirable results.
CONCLUSION

Respondent respectfully requests that the majority opinion
be withdrawn and a sUbstitute opinion issued that affirms the
Magistrate's order denying the Department's claim or that a
rehearing be granted upon the relevant questions.
DATED this 20th day of July, 1998.

Wil~r~
Wil~r~

Attorney for Respondent
CERTIF~
CERTIF~OF

MAILING

I hereby certify that on th~'
th~' ~ay of July, 1998 two trUE! and
correct copies of the forego1ng document were mailed, Postage
prepaid, to the following:
W.
w. Corey Cartwright
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
P.O.
P.o. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 8372 -00

---.----
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section are severable. [1941, ch. 181, § 14, p. 379; am. 1943, ch. 119, § 1, p.
228; am. 1951, ch. 246, § 4, p. 520; am. 1974, ch. 233, § 8, p. 1590; am. 1978,
1981, ch. 121, § 1,p.
1, p. 207; am. 1989,ch.
1989, ch. 67, §
§ 2,p.
2, p.
ch. 74, §§ 1, p. 148; am. 1981,ch.
107; am. 1995, ch. 214, § 4, p. 742; am. 1996, ch. 50, § 8, p. 147.J
Compiler's notes. Sections 1613(c) and
1917(c) and (d) of the Social Security Act,
referred to in this section, are compiled as 42
U.S.C., § 1382b and 1396p, respectively.

be

iii

56-218

Section 3 of S.L. 1995, ch. 214 is compiled
as § 15-5-409a.
. Section 7 of S.L. 1996, ch. 50 is compiled as
§ 56-210.
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56·218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effe<:tive
[Effedive until
July 1, 1998.1 - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with
federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on hehalf of an
individual :Nho was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual
rec.eived such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there be no
estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid
paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim for su,:h medical
assistance correctly paid to the indiv:idual may be established against the
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of ag€~ or is blind
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c. Transfers
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district
court.
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving child who is
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally
disabled as defined in 42 U,S.C.
U.S.C. 1382c, the amount of any medical assistance
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55)
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and
may be paid from the estate.
.
(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient.
.
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent'
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
assign. of the deceased individual through joint
jOint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code.
(6) The department may file a lien against the property of any estate
subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against real
property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days after the depart.
ment is notified in writing of the death of the individual for whom medical
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assistance was paid under this chapter, file the lien in the same general form
and manner as provided in section 56-2l8A(3Xa),
56-218A(3Xa), Idaho Code, in the office of
the recorder of the county in which the property of the estate is located. The
lien shall be recorded, indexed, and extended in the manner provided in
sections 56-218A(3)(a) and 56·2l8A(5),
56-218A(5), Idaho Code. In order to perfect a
security interest in personal property, the department shall, within ninety
(90) days after the department is notified in writing of the death of the
individual for whom medical assistance was paid under this chapter, file the'
security interest in accordance with chapter 9, title 28, Idaho Code. Failure
to file a lien or a security interest does not affect the validity of claims made
pursuant to this section.
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple
implement this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
hardship waivers for the following circumstances:
(a) The' oniy asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for
other family members; or
'
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the
deceased individual to public assistance. [I.C., § 56-218,
56~218, as added by
1988,
ch. 49, § 1,
p. 73; am. 1994,ch.329,§
1994, ch. 329, § 1,
p. 1059; am. 1995,ch.
1995, ch. 105,
1988,ch.49,§
l,p.
l,p.
§ 1, p. 336.]
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Compiler's Dotes. For this section as ef
effective July 1, 1998, see the following section
also numbered § 56-218.
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56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective July 1,
1998.] - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance withfed~ral
law medical assistance pursuant to,
to. this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual
jf there' he no
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate; or if
ofthe
estate the estate of
the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid
paid. to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the .'
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the in(j.ividual
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C.1382c. TranSfers
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district
court.
'.
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surViving child who is
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally
l382c, the amount ofany
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.c-.
U.S.C-. 1382c,
of any medical ,assistance
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55)'
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance
assistarice is a claim
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and
may be paid from the estate.
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(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient.
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
..-. individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent
of such interest), including sueh assets conveyed to Ii survivor, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a
..
15-3-805(5), Idaho Code
Code..
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-B05(5),
(6) The department may file a notice of lien against the property of any
estate. subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against
estate
real or personal property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days
after the department is notified in writing of the death of the individual for
whom medical assistance was paid under this chapter, file a notice of lien in
the same general form and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3) (a),
Idaho Code, in the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to section
45-1904, Idaho Code. Failure to file a notice of lien does not affect the
validity of claims made pursuant to this section.
imple(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple
ment this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue
hardship waivers for the following circumstances:
(a) The only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for
other family members; or
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the

a

,II
'II

deceased individual to public assistance. [I.e., § 56-218, as added by.
198B, ch. 49, § 1,p.
1, p. 73; am. 1994,ch.329,§
1994, ch. 329, § 1,
p. 1059; am. 1995,ch.
1995, ch. 105:
198B,ch.49,§
l,p.
§ 1, p. 336; am. 1997, ch. 205, § 2, p. 607.]
efCompiler's notes. For this section as ef
fective until July 1, 1998, see the preceding
section also numbered § 56-218.
Section 10 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 read: "Not
"Notwithstanding the effective dates specified in
section 1 through 9 ofthis act, nothing in this
act shall take effect unless the secretary of
Comm.isstate shall certify to the Idaho Code Comm.is
sion that he has received a sufficient appro
appropriation to provide for the development of the
prlJvitechnology required to implement the prlJvi·

sions of this act. If the certification is not
admade by the twenty-first day after the ad
Sesjournment sine die of the First Regular Ses
sion of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, this
void,"
act shall be null and void,"
The Secretary of State has so certified to
the Idaho Code Commission and thus the
Chapter 205 became effective as prescribed
herein.·
..
Section 1 of S.L. 1997, ell.
ch. 205 is compiled
as §§ 45-1901 through 45-1910.

56·218A. Medical assistancle liens during life of recipient. [Effec
[Effec.
56-218A.
JUly ·1, 1998.] - (1) The department may recover and may
tive until July
impose a lien aga,inst the real property of any individual prior to his death
for medical assistance' paid or about to be paid under this chapter on behalf
of an individual:

'-,
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MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
03.09022 -- 03.09024
03.09025.

(RESERVED) ,

LIE~S
LIE~S

AND ESTATE RECOVERY. Pursuant to sections 56-218
and 56-218A , Idaho Code; this SUbsection sets forth the
prOV1S10ns for recovery of MA. the filing oj: liens
provisions
personS t and the! filing
against the property of dece(j.sed persons;
~iEms
of ~iEms
against
the property of
permanently
institutionalized recipients.
(7-1-95)T
01.

MAIncorrectly Paid. The Department may, pursuant
court) file a lien against the
to a judgment of a court/
property of a living or deceased person of any age
to recover the costs of MA incorrectly paid.
(7-1-95)T

02.

Appeals~
Administrative
Appeals~
Permanent
institutionalization
determination
and
undue
~overned by the
hardship waiver hearings shall be ~overned
provisioris of IDAPA 16;
16 t Title 05
fair hearing provisions
Chapter 03,
IIRules Governing Contested Case
"Rules
Proceedings and Declaratory RUlings",
(7-1-95)T
I

.

03.

Definitions. The following. termeare.applicable to
Subsection 025 of these rules:
..
(7-1-95)T
a.

Authorized
representative.
The
person
appointed by· the court as the personal
representative in a probate proceeding or, if
none; the person identified by the recipient
to receive notice and make decisions on estate
matters.
(7-1-95)T

b.

Any equity
Equity interest in a home.
interest in real property recognized under
Idaho law.
(7-1-95)T
(7-~-95)T

c.

Estate.
All real and personal property and
other assets indluding those in which the
recipient had any legal or beneficial title or
deathtt to the extent
ihterest at the time of death
Alssets
of such ihterest, including stich Aissets
assi9nee of
conveyed to.a survivor; heir; or assi90ee
bmancy I
the deceased recipient throUgh joint bmancy,
common, survivorship; iife estate,
E~state,
tenancy in common;
living trust; or other arrangement.
(7··1-95) T

d.

recipil~nt has
Home. The dwelling in which the recipif:mt
an ownership interest; and which the recipient
occupied as his primary dwelling prior to, or
subsequent to. his admission to a medical
(?··1-95)T
institution.
(7··1-95)T

e.

Institutionalized recipient. An inpatient in a
(NF)/
nursing facility
(NF).
intermediate care
facility for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR),
000361
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or other thedical institution, who is a
recd.pisht sUbject to post-eligibility
Medicaid redipisht
IDAPAi6. 03. OS; Rules
treatment of income in IDAPA16.
RUles
Eligib:l.l:l.ty for Aid to the Aged;
Governing Eligibility
and Disabled
Disab1ed (AABD).
Blind ahd
(~7-i- 95) T

~

.1·

f.

Lawfully residing; . Residing 1n
in a mantb-r
manr&r not
contrary to or forbidden by law t and \ld th the
recipiehtis knowledge and consent.
recipient's
(7-1-9S)T

g.

:l.rtstitutionalized.
Permanehtiy
institutionalized.
An
institutiona1ized recipient of any age who the
institutionalized
Department has determined cannot reasollably be
expected to be discharged from the inst:itution
(7-1-9S)T
and return home.
(7-1-95)T

h.

Personal property;
Any property not real
including cash, jewelry,
jewelryt household
goods, tools; life insurance policies; boats
(7-l-9S)T
and wheeled vehicles.
(7-l-95)T
property,
property~

land l including buildings
Real property. Any land,
or immovable objects attached permanently to
the land.
(7-l-95)T
j .

Residing in the home on a continuous basis.
Occupying the home as the primary dwelling and
continuing to occupy stich dwelling as the
primary residence.
(7-l-9S)T

k.

Termination of a lien.
The rele,ase or
dissolution of a lien from property.
{7-1-95)T
(7-1-95)T

1.

Undue

hardship.

Conditions

that

:justify

waiver of all or a part of the Department's

claim against
art estate,
described
in
subsections 025.25 throtigh 025.29 of these
rules.
(7··l-9S)T
m.

decis:l.on made by the
Undue hardship waiver. A decision
relinquish or limit its claim to
Department to relinqUish
any or all estate aSsets of a deceased
recipient based on good caUse.
(7-l-95)T

04.

notif:i.cation
Notification to Department.
All notifi.cation
reg-arding liens and estate claims shall be directed
regarding
to the Department of Health and
artd Welfare; Estate
Recovery unit,
unit~ TowerS Building
Bui1ding t Sixth Floor; P.O.
83720~
Boisej
Box 83720~
450 W. State St. Boise;
Idaho,
83720-0036.
(7-t-95)T

05.

Lien Imposed During Lifetime of Recipient. During
the lifetime of the permanently institutionalized
recipient ~ and subj ect to the restric'tions set
recipient,
rules, the
forth in Subsection 025. OB of. these rUles,
Department may impose a lien against the real
r
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03 i 09025.05

property of the redipieht
recfp!eht ,for·MA cbrtect1y paid on
behalf: The lien ~h.l1
~h.l1 be filed Within ninety
(90) days of the Departinentis
final determi.nation,
Departinent# S fincH
~ft~t
~ft~t notice and bppbrttihity' fot· i hearing, that
the recipient is permanehtly Ihstittitiona1i~:ed.
Ihstittitiona1i~:ed. The
lien shall be effective ftoftt .the .·b~~ii1ning
.·b~~ii1ning of the
most recent continuoUs period, of the reclpient
recipient 's
IS
institutiona1izationj bUt hoI:·
hoi:· before July 1. j 1995.
Any
lien
imposed ~ha1l
~ha1l
upott the
tHssoive
Upot!
recipientis discharge from the medical institution
and return home~
home~
(7-1-95)T
hi~

06.

01.

Determination of Permanent Institutionalization.
The Department must determine that the recipient is
permanently ihstitutiona1ized.
institutionalized. prior to the lien
being imposed. An expectation or plan that the
recipient
reclpient will return home with the support of Home
and Community Based Services .shal~
.shal~ ~ot;
~oti in and of
itself.
itself; justify a decision that he is reasonably
expected to be discharged to retUrh
return hoine.
horne. The
following factors shall be cortsidered when making
the determination of permanent institutiona1
institutiona1ization~
ization~
(7-1-95)T
a.

The recipient must meet the criteria for NF or
ICF/MR level of care and services as set forth
in Subsections
Subsectioh~ 180,03 and 190~08of:
190~08of these
(7-1-95)T
rUles; and

b.
h.

The medical records, including information set
forth in Subsections 180:02
180,02 and 180.01 of
these rules; shall be reviewed to determine if
to
the recipient's condition is e~pected
e~pected
improve to the extent that he will not :require
(7-1-95)T
NF or ICF/MR level of care: and

c.

Where the prognosis indicated in the medical
records is uncertain or inconclusive, the
Department may request additional medical
lnformatiottl or may delay the determ:ination
informatiottl
until the next utilization control review or
of
Care
review,
as
annual
Inspection
(7,-1-95) T
appropriate.

HQJ:ice

of

Determination
of
Pet'manent
Determin.tion
and Hearing Rights.
The
Department must notify the recipient ()r his
representativ~j in
writing;
authorized representativ~j
writing, of its
intention to make a determination that the
recipient.:i.s
recipient.
is permanently institutionalized; and
that he has the right to· a fair hear:lng in
accordance with SUbsection 025:02 of these rules.
inclUde
the
foJ!&owing
This
notice
shall
(7··1-95)T
informationt
(7·-1-95)T
Im~tituti.ona1ization
Im~titutiona1ization
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The notice shall ihfo:bn th~ re!c!pient
recipient t:hat the
deci~ibhc. that
csnnot
deci~ibhc.
he
cannot
reasonably be.expected to
tdbe
be discharged from
the tnecHcal inst1tutibrt
institutibrt to return home is
based upon a review of the medical records.artd
plan of care; but that this does not preclude
him from returning home with Elervices
necessary to support Nt:'. or IeF
/MR l'E!vel of
reF IMR
care; and
(7-1-95)T
De~.tt~ehtts
De~.tt~eht's

08.

b.

The notice shall inform the recipient that he
or his authorized representative may request a
fair hearing prior to the D~partmentis
D~partmentis final
determination
that
he·· is . permanently
institutionalized. The notice shall include'
information that a pre-heari~g conference may
be scheduled prior to a fair
fait hearing~,
hesring~,
The
notice shall inciude the ti~e limi~s
limi~s and
instructions for requesting a· fair hearing;
and
(7-1-95)T

c.

The notice shall inform the recipient that
-that if
he or his authorized tepresentative does not
request a fair hearing withih the time limits
specified. hie! real property! ihcluding
ihcludi.ng his
home; may be subject to a lien, cont:ingent
upon the restrictions in subsection
Subsection 02!5.0a of
these rUles.
(7,-1(7
'-1- 9S) T

Restrictions on Imposing Lien During Lifetime of
imposed on the
Recipient.
A lien may be
recipientis real property; however, no lien may be
reC!ipientis
imposed on the recipient I s home if any of the
following is lawfUlly residing in such home!
(7-,1-95)T
(7-'1-95)T
a;

recipient:
The spouse of the recipient;

b.

The recipientis
recipient's child who is under age
twenty-one (2i), or who is blind or disabled
as defined in 42 U.S.C.
U,S.C; 13B2c as amended; or
(7-1-9S)T

c.

09.

(7-1-95)T

A sibling of the recipient who has an equity
interest in the recipient's home and who was
residing in such home for a period of at least
one (1) year immediately before the date of
the recipient; s admission to the m,edical
m'edical
instittition, and who
instittltion,
Who has been residing .in the
(7-1-95)T
home on a continUous
~ontihtiou~ basis;
(7-1-9~)T

Rest:r1ctions on Recovery on Lien tmposed During
Rest:rictions
of Recipient. Recovery shall be made on
the lien from the recipient's estate, or at any
timE! upon the sale of the property subj ect t:o the
lieni but only after th~ death of the recipient's
lient

LifE~time
LifE~time
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surviving spouse,
whent

:l.f any;

16.0:30
16
0:30 09025.09
l

and only at. a time
(1-1-95)T

a~

sUr"i ving dhild who is
The recipient has ho' sur"i
twetlty~one (21);
tinder age twet1ty~one
(1-1-95) T

b.

slirvi ving child of any
The reciplertt has no slirviving
age who is blind
blihd or disabled as defined in 42
U.S,C. 1382c as amended: and
U.S.C.
(1-1-95)T

c.

In the baSe ot i lien on a re~ipientls home,
fol10wing is lawfully
when none of the fol1owing
lawfUlly :resided
residing in such
~Uch home who has lawfully
in the home btl a continuous basis sihce the
date of the recipient's admission to the
ihstitution!
medical institution!
. (7-1-95)T
i.

recipient i who waS
A sibH.ng of the recipient;
residing in the recipient's home for a
(1)
period of at least one
(1)
year
immediately before the date of the
recipient ~ s admission
adntiss.!on to the medical
me.dical
recipient's
institutionj or
(7-t-95)T

ii.

A son or daughter of the recipient; \tiho
was residing. irtthe rebiplent;s
rebipleht's home for
a period of at least two (2) years
immediately before the date of. the
recipientis admission to the medical
institution; and who establishes: by a
preponderance of the e'V"idence
e"V"idence that he
provided necessary care.
care" to the reci.pient,
reclpient,
and the care he provided allow~:!d
allow~:!d the
recipient to remain at home rather than
in a medical institution.

(7-1-95}T

10.

11.

Recovery upon Sale
sale of Property Subject to Lien
Imposed During Lifetime of Recipient. ShoUld the
property upon which a lien is imposed be sold prior
to "l:he
"recipient.' S deathj
-I:he ·recipient.'
deathl the Department
bepartment shall seek
recovery of all MA paid on behalf of the recipient,
subject to the restrictions in Subsection
SUbsection 025.09 of
these rUles.
rules. Recovery of the MA paid bn behalf of
the recipient from tne
the proceeds from the scale of
the property does not preclude the Department from
recovering additiortai MA paid from the recipient's
est~te
est~te as described in Subsedtion 025.14 of these
rult::!s.
(7-1-95)T
Filing of Lien During Lifetime of Recipient. When
appropriate; the Department shall file, in the
off:lce of the Recorder of the county in which the
real property of the recipient is locat'ed,
locat,ed, a
verified statement, irt ~riting,
~riting, setting forth the
following~
(7-1-95)T
following!
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a,
a.
\

····::.1
::011

The··

ham~.

and
recipient}
recipientJ ~hd
~i1d

knoWl1
last . known

address

of the
('7-1-95)T

The name
adciress of the official or agent
tia~e and address
of t.he
fiiing the lien1
lienj and
the bepatttnent
bepartment fiiirtg
...
(7-1-95)T
,
. .
('7-1-95)T
c.

A brief descript.ion
description of the MA received by the
recipierltland
.
(7-1-95)T

d.

The amount paid by the Department; as of a.
given .date} ahdi i f . applicable, a st:atement
that the amo~nt
inc~eaBe as
amo~nt bf the lien ~ill inc~eaBe
long aEi
as MA beriefits
benefits are paid ort behalf of the
recipi~ntl
recipi~ntl
(7-i-9S)T

12~

Renewal of Lien !mposed DurlnQ
DUrinq Lifetime of
Recipient ~
The. lieni
eJtt¥nsion thereof I
lien, or any ext¥nsion
shall be reill:!wed every five (5), years by filing a
neW verified statemetlt as required in sUbs.ection
025.11 of these rules,'
rUles,' or as required byvIdaho
law.
(7-1-95)T
(7-1·95)T

13,

Termination of Li~n
During Lifetime of
Lien Imposed buring
Recipient. The lien shall be released as provided
by
Idaho
Code~
e~t!sfadt.ioh
Code~
upon
e~t!sfadtioh
of
the
Departmentis
Department;s dlai~;
dlai~; The lien shall dissolve in the
event of the recipiehtis
recipient's discharge from the medical
institution al1d
and :returri'
returri' home; such dissolution of
the lien does not discharge the Uhderlying debt and
the estate remaihs
remains subject to recovery under estate
recovery provisions in subsections 025.14 I:hrough
025.30 of these rulesi A
A request for release of the
lien shall be directed to the Department of Health
and Welfare; gstate Reco",ery unit, tr'owers gu:Llding,
Sixth
sixth Floor, P.O. BoJt 83720, 450 W~ state st.,
Boiset
Boise; Idaho, 83720-0036.
(7-1-9S)T

14.

Estate Recovery.
Pursuant to Sect!orts 56-218 and
56-218A
requ.i.red to
56-218A; Idaho code I the Department is requi.red
recover the following:
(7-1-95)T

./.,.
.,.'.
~~.:.

j

a.

The costs of all MA correctly paid on or after
July 1, 1995;
1995 on behalf of a recipient who was
permanently institutionaiized:
institutionalized: and (7-1-95)T
j

b.

The costs 6£ MA correctiy paid on behalf of a
recipient who received MA at age fifty-five
(55) or older on or after JUly 1, 1994t and
(7-1-95)T

c.

The costs of MA correctly paid on behalf of a
recipient Who received MA at age. sixtY'-five
(65) or older on or after July 1, 1988.
(7-:l-95)T
(7-:L-95)T
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RE!COvery from tsstate of Spouse.
If'the>deceased
If'the"deceased
:tE~cipient,
eEttate, recoverY· shall be made
t'E!cipient, 'ha~ 'hd
'tid,, efitate,
hi~stirVlving spoUsel
spdUsel '(7-1-95)T
froM the ~~tatibf
~~tatibf hi~stirVlving
,',;

\.--,
\.-",

.'
"

16; ,

Lj.en
Li.et1 Imposed Aqciihst
AqcHhst Estate of beceased Recd.pient.
The Department htay
.~gaitlst
inay impose a lien .~gaiilst
all
p:J.:'operty
.of an applicable re~cipient
re~cipient
p:roperty of the estate of
to .secUre
~gain~t the estate; To perfect
,secUre it~ cl~i~
c1~i~ ~gain~t
a lien the Department shallj within ninety (90)
days,after
writingl
days, after the Department isnotified l in writingj
of the death of the MA recipient~
recipient~ file a lien in
the same getteral
manner as provided in
gettera1 forril and inai'ttier
Subsection 025~11
Fai1Ure to file a
025~11 of these rules. FailUre
lien does not affect the va1idity
validity of claims made
against the estatel
for release of the
estatei A request forre1ease
lien shall be directed to the Department of Health
and Weifare, EsbitE!
Esteite! Recovery Unit; Towers Building,
sbd:.h Floor
FloorJI P.O.
P.o. Box 83720, 450 W. state SL,
Bolsej
Boisel Idaho
Idaho~I S3720-0036.
(7-1-95)T

1'7.;

Nol:ice of Estate, c1afirL
clafirL , The bepartment c, shall
notify the author~zed
author~zed representative of the amount
of the estate c1aim
elaim after the death of the
recipient, or after the death of the surviving
spoUsel .,The
The notice shall irtclude instructions for
applying for an undue hardship wed. vet"
ver ~
(7-1-9S)T

18.

ASElets in Estate Subject to Cla.lms.
Clalms. The authorized
representative
shall
be
notified
of
the
Departmentis
a ,deceased
Department;s claim against the assets of a.deceased
recipient. ASsets in the estate from which the
claim can be satisfied ~ha1l
~ha11 inclUde all real or
personal property that the deceased recipient:'
recipient:" owned
or in which he had an ownership
intereBt~ including
~wnership intereBt~
the following:
(7-1-95)T
a.

b.

Payments to the recipient under an installment
conttact shall be included among the ass:ets of
the deceased recipient. This includes,
includes' an
inatallmeht
installmeht contract on any real or personal
property to which the deceased recipient had a
property right. The value of a promissory
, notei
property agreement 1.8
note; loan or propetty
is its
outstanding principal balance at the date of
death of the recipient I1 ~heh
~hen a promissory
note, loanl or property agreement is secured
by a Deed of Trust
ri~quest
TrUst i the Department may ri:!quest
evidence of a reaeonabie and just Underlying
debti
(7-1-95)T
The deceased recipient· s ownership interf:!st
interf::!st in
an estate;. probated or not probated, is an
asset
aSset of his estate wheti!
(7-i-95)T
,-t
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. boCtimerttf3'
bdcumerttf3' show the deceased recipient is
~rt~1i~lbie
de~ise~ br doriei'd~'ptbperty
doriei'd~'ptbperty
~rt~1i~lbie de~ise~
of another
persoI1jbr.'
t1-1~9S) T
deceased
persoI1jbr,'
t1-1~9S)
. '
...
.
"

19.

"

ii ~

The
red.pieht redel 'Jed
'.ted income
The''decet:ised
decet:ised recipient
from property of another person; ,or
(7,;.1-95)T
(7,;,1-95)T

iii.

State intestacy laws award the deceased
recipient a share irl the di~ttibution
di~ttibution of
the property of another estate. ,
(7-1-"9S)T

c.

My trust 1ns,ttume11-t
1ns,trume11-t which is designed to hold

d.

Life insurance is considered art asset when it
has reverted to the estate.
estate~
{7-1-95)T

e.

Buriai insurance is considered an asset when a
benefic.i.ary or
furteral home i~ the primary benefic.tary
fUi1eral
when there are tinspent. fUnds
funds in the burial
contract. The ftirtds
ftii1ds remaining after payment to
the funeral
fUneral home shall be considered assets of
the estate; provided no contingent bene:Eiciary
is designated.
(7·4-95) T
. (7·4-95)T

f.

Checking and sa~ings
sa~ings aCdounts
acdounts which hold and
accumUlate
accumulate funds designated for the deceased
reCipient;
recipient; are assets of the estate, including
joint accounts whieih
whicih accUmulate
accUmUlate funds for the
benefit of the recipient I
(7-1-95)T

g.
9·

In . a conservatorship s:U:uation, if a court
order under state laW specifically re!quires
funds be made clvai1ab1e
civaiiabie for the care and
maintenance of a recipient prior to his death;
absent evidence to the contrary,
contrary; Stich
stich funds
are an asset of the deceased recipient's
estatei even if cta court has to approve release
of the funds.
(7-1-95)T

h.

ShareS of stocks. bonds and mutual funds to
the benefit of the deceased recipient are
assets of the estate. The current market.
market, value
of all stocks; betids and mutUal furtds Must be
proved as of .the month preceding settlement of
the estate cl~im~
claim~
(7-1-9S)T

or td distribute funds or property, real or
personalj ih which the deceased recipient has
a beneficial interest is art asset of the
estate.
~
(7-1-95)T

value of Estate Assets~
Assets~
bepartment shall use
The Department
fair market value as the value of the estate
assets.
{7-1-95)T
000368
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L.imH::at.!oris ·on • Estate claitns i "Ll~~ts on the
L.im!t::at.!oris
ass~tsbf a deceased
Department's claiM against the ass~tsbf
rI:!cipient shall be subje,ct to SectibriS56-218 and
rI:!c!pient
~6-21aA, Idahd Cdd~~
Cdd~~ A dlaim l~airi~t
~state of
~6-21aA,
l~airi~t ~hE! ~state
predeceasedtecipient is
a surviving SpoUse of a predeceasedtec!pient
~alue of th~ ~sSE!t§,bf
~sSE!t§,bf the estate
limited to ~he ~alue
that were community property.' or the deceased
t'E!cipient's share of the. separate property j and
:tE!cipient's
Recd~ery shall not be made
jointly. owned property. Recd~ery
:t:ecipien~ hd longer is survived
until the deceased :t:ecipien~
bi a spouse, a child who is tinder age twenty-one
(~!l) j or a blind or disabled child, as defined in
(21),
42 U.B.C. 13B2c as amertded ahcl. when appiicable, as
provided in SUbsection 025 ~ 09 of' these :rules. No
therecipi~ht received MA
recovery shall be made if therecipi~ht
aSI the result of a crime committed against the
re~c.:i.pient.
..,'
re~c.ipient.
..'
(7-1 .. 95) T
Ex:penses Deducted from Estate.
Estate;
The following
Expenses
expenses shall be deducted from the available
avaiiable to satisfy
assets to determine the amount available
(7.:.1-95)T
the Department's claim:

a.

Surial expenses; which shall i.nclt.tde only
those reasonably necessary for embalming,
transportation of
the ,body,
cremation,
flowerS,
c1othing; and services of the funeral
flowers, ciothing;
director and staff shall be deducted.
(7-1-95)T

b.

Other legally enforceable
enforce.able arid
and necessary debts
with priority shall
be "'. deducted.
The
Departmentis claim is classified and paid as a
debt with preference as defined in Section
15-03-e05~
15-03-e05~ Id~ho
Id~ho Cod~i
Cod~i Debts of the deceased
recipient Which
which may be deducted from the
estate
prior
to
satisfaction
of
the
Depart:mentis
Departmentis claim must be legally enforceable
debts given preference over the bepar~ent;s
bepartenent; s
claim tmde:t
tmder Section
section 15-03.:..8051 Idaho Code.
(7-1-95)T

22.
22 .

Interest on Claim.
claim. Ths Departmentts
Department t s claim does not
bear interest except as otherwise provided by
statute
(7-1-95}T
st~tute or agreement.

23.

Excluded Land. Restricted allotted land i owned by
a deceased recipient who was an enrolled
enrolied member of
a !'ederally
!'edera,lly recognized American Indian tribe i or
eligible for tribal membership, which cannot be
soid or transferred without permission from the
Indian tribe or an agency of the Federal
Gov·ernmenti
will riot be SUbject
Gov'ernment;
subject to estate
recovery.
(7-1-95)T
000369
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24;

Marriage·.s~tt:.1emsnt
... .Agreement,
.Agreement· ·or
Marriage·.S~tt:.1emsnt,
'or other Such
Agreement I,;.",.
trtarriage sett,lement·
sett.lement . 'agreement or
;"',' A .
,trtarriage
other suchag:teement which eeparat(:!SI
eepa.rat(:!1:1 aSSets
assets for a
incl:tried
hot elitrlirtatethedebt against
Inclrried cotitslE! does not
the estat~
recip.i~t1t :·or the spouse.
estat~ bf the deceased recip.i~t1t
Trahsferi9 Uhd~t'
s~ttH!trleht. agreerp:ent or
UhdM: a tttarria~e s~t:tH!trleht.
ot~her
ot~her sudh t:igr~emEH1t·
t:igr~emEH1t' may be' voided if nlSt for
adequate cotisideratiotL
cotisideratiorL
'.
(7-1-95)T

25.

Reilease
The OE!partment Shall
Re!lease of Estate Claims.
reilease
Department; s claim has
re!lease a clcHm
dlcHm when the Departmertt;
been fully scitisfil!!d
t3citisfi~d and,
and. melY release its claim,
claim.
under the following conditions:'
conditions:·
(7-1-95)T

J

i' : . '
i·:.'

a;

When an undue hardship waiver as defined in
Subsection 025.26 of these rUles has been
granted; or
(7-1-95)T

b.

When a written agreement with the authorized
representative to pay the Department t;8
t;9 claim
in thirty-six (36)' monthlY
monthly pctyntents or less
has been achieved I
'.
(1-1-95)T

26.

PU*pose
Pu*pose of the Undue Hardship Exception. The undue
ha:rdship .,exception
exception is intended to avo:i.d
avoid the
impoverishment of the deceased recipientts family
due to the Department exercising its estate
recovery right. The faet
fact that family Inembers
anticipate or expect art
an inheritance, or will be
in(:!onveniencecl ecotlomicaily
economically by the' lack of an
in(:!onvenienced
inheritance. is hot caUse for the Department to
inheritancef
hardship.
(7··1-95)T
dec:,lare an Undue hardship;

27,
27.

An
AQplication for Undue Hardship Waiver.
Wai ver.
applicartt for an Undue
undue hardship waiver must have a
applicarlt

beneficial. interest in the estate and must apply

fo:t the waiver withih hlhety (90) days bf thE! death
of the recipient or Within thirty (30) days of
receivihg notic~
hotic~
of th~
Dep4rt~~rt~fs
claim,
receiving
~h~
Dep4rt~~rt~~s
whicheve~ is later. The filirtg
whicheve~
filing of a elaim
claim by the
Dep~rtment itl
itt a probate proceeding shall constitute
Dep~rtment
heir~.
(7-1-95)T
notice to all heir~.
2iL

Basis for Undue Hardship waiver.
Waiver. . Undue ha.rdship
waivers shall be cOhsidered
considered in ~he following
(7-1-95)T
(7-1-9S)T
circumstances!
a.

is thl~ sole
The estate subject to recovery :i.s
income-producihg asset of the survivors where
(7-i~95)T
such income is limited;
limitedJ or
(7-i~95)T

h.
b.

Payment of the Depa:t~mertt·s
Depa:t~mertt·s clai~
clai~ would· calise
heirs of the deceased recipient to be eligible
pUblic assistartcel
(7~1-95)T
for public
assist~t1ce, or
(7~1-95)T
000370
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The. Oepartment
Department's,
IS. d1~~m:;':U.s'
d1~~nr .1s· ie~s ,than
. than five
hundred do1lars ($500) or' the total assets of
the entire estate are les~ thah five hundred
dollar~
~xdltidirt~·~ttist account~
account~ or
dollar~ {$~OO)J
{$~OO)J ~xdltidirt~'~ttist
'other bahk acdoUhbh
,',.' ..'.'.,",
,'.....
acdotihbh ,',,',
(7-1-9S)T
:.

:

~

,......
.....

d;

',,1
·,,1

The recipient received MA. as the resUlt
resUlt:: of a
against.·the
t-ecipient.
c:d.me
c:d.tne committed against
,'the i:'ecipient.

( 7 ~'>1- 95 ) T
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29.

.'

Littd.tclt:l.otiS
. waiver.
Limitations on
oli Undue Hardship ,waiver.
Any
beheficiaty of the esta.t.e of a' deceased r,ecipierit
r·ecipiertt
inay appiy for wai vet'
vel:' of the estat~'
estat~· reco1ti:.ty
l:'eC01te±y claim
based on Undue hardship
ved by
hardship.,•. Arty claiin htay
t11ay be wed "ed
the Department::
becaUSe of
Department i partially or. fUlly j because
undue hardship_
hardshii' does hot
hot:: exist
l!!xist if
hardship. An undue hardshi~
acti6ri
t~cipiertt prior to his adeath,
actiorl taken by the t~cipiertt
or by his legal representativer,
represent::ativer. divested or
di
verted assets from the esb:l.tE!
esbltE! The Department
diverted
shall graht undue hardship waivers on a case by
case basis upon review of
ali
facts
and
circumstances; includihg any action taken
ta.ken to
diminish assets available for estate recovery or to
d.rctlmvent estate recovery.
(7-1-- 95) T
j

,.,-..,
..

30.

Transfers of real or
Set Aside of Transfers.
personal property of the recipient without adequate
a.dequate
consideration are voidable and may be set a,side
a.side by
(7-1-9S)T
the district court.
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res.ldents in.,~
in.·~ '2.'.
COpayamollDt·
,;:, :,':.. ':- : '; .',:: \ '.' .
woma, residents
'2,', Copay
amollDt" ...",;:,
MecIic:aId regulation establisbiDg
es~lisbiDg ~um
coof Office at
of Mental Retar-,·, .,.
'." Medic:aId
maximum co

to'lEroIIJ_f)l'ellm8lat
fgroup&--pregnant
_1IWll1W
n!Sid'enC<1!II
......1IWlJ.
itY residences

~0I'Iice ,of
_of Mental Health, and thOBe"
those _>, paymeDt
payment for iD-patieat hospital senices.at
aenices at 50%
t~Il' ~.,OI'Iice
state' lIIlIkes
inakes for
fOl' 1Irst
111%' Unable to pay; note from pregDIIDt
pregnant WOIll8l1's'
WOIll8l1'S
of payment state
1IrBt claY of 1II
,":'''~~
: •..,,-.......,.1." WlI8
was sufficient
pharmacist and
and oth·
oth·
patient. h06pital
h06pital care,
care, did not
not violate
violate Medieaid
Medieaid
suflicient for
for pharmacist
patient.
. providers, residents were Identified by' statute requirlIIg
requiriIIg c:opaymentB
c:opaymenta to be ."nomL...J 1II
III
·····~·~'·~eommunlty
residences, and statement of
of.''' 1IIIIOIIDt";'CoI!gress
reen:/ ", ·of community residenl!eli,
lIIIIOlIDt";'CoI!gress adopted by legislative reen
r'~ty
raWieation,. regulatory definiuon
::':~IIII.!Il.u"l' to pay WlI8
was sufficient. Sweeney v.' ., aetmeDt
actmeDt and raWieation.
.,. ,. , C.A.2 (N.YJ 1998, 996 F.2d 1384.
..
promulgated by Secretary
Secretal'y of Health and HlUI\lllI
HIUIIIIlI

f '.. _

. , , ' ." , ",
,' ... Services. .'Kansai
Kansai Hosp.'
Hoap.· Ass'n v. WhIteman,
, " ..,. , . ."
'
Nel'l'IIIika'B
caleulation of flat-rate copayment· D.Kan.I9lH,
D.Kan.I99t, 861 F.supp.
F.supp. 401.
401 ..."
ebraaka's caleulatlon
recipienta' prescription,
preseription. " Hosplta1B
H........••• established
~·..."-... ed that
tha·...
uI be fr.
" . ",far" Medicaid recipienti
would
averagfnlS method'used excluded.' .. ....1"...... eD...........
t they
Wley 'WO
d be II"':l~,
1II which aversg!nll
meth~ ~ excluded,' reparably hanned if proposed Increase 1II Medic
::~irroar~'
Cldcullatlo'n. Medicaid
Medicaid J'IICIplentB
recipients not
not I'&r&reparably
harmed
ifofproposed
increase
III MedicJ,~~~' calculation.
'aid
copay
i1Dount
lIIpatient
hospital
Cl)nayment, constituted. violation. .aid copat ilDount of lllpatient hospital services
services
.•:•.~cjali'ed to make Cll~yment,COIlIItituted
violation' ,. were allowed to take effeet, aa required for
,...
.:':~fI.."egUlau('n
rett:ain!ng order:
order, hosplts1s
hospitals C!OUId
I!OuId not
:·:~4f.,resuJation requiring state to determine aver~
tanpol'V'1 restralnlng
for .a 8t!1'Vice;
semces to eligible
elueto
C~,or typical payment fora
~ce; . inclusion
~uaIon deny serrices
e1lgIble beneficiaries eluelo
oopay amount, but
~:llli!tuIl ~ of persons recelving
receiving Medicaid pretheir inabUity
inabU1ty to pay requlred copayamoWlt,
asalstsnce was required 1II
III determlninr,
determininr. would,
would. be ban'ed
barTed from SlIing
suing state from damages
,:~iCrlptjon asalstance
Pharmacists Ass'n, Inc. v. .' If it
tamed 'out that proposed
propoeed l:O]llly
eopay requlrement
requj1'ement
Nebraska PhannacistB
ittllrDed
ServiIl8l, D.Neb.l994,'
D.Neb.I994,· WlI8
was excessive. Xanaas
WhItelibraska :Dept. of Soda! Servicea,
Xansas H06P..Asa'n
H06P. ,Ass'n v. WhIte
F;Supp, 1087. ."-., ..:
.."
..: '
.._ man, D.Kan.199l1.8S6
D.Kan.l993.8S6 F.Supp. 1548..
1548. ..,"" .:,;
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pl&.': _, rm9r.'t~.!J~:_.
, . :':';('
'
'. 88118tance
881istance'rendered
reru.terl!Ci
.
.~ .., .• ~
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. - . , ' . , .' ,!,.",j; (I", ~r.,t!".J&.\
~(
of· any Individual prior to his death
):~~: (l) No lien may be imposed against the property.
property'of·any
:",!"••. ,...·w_w. of medical assistance paid.
paid Dr to be paid
paid on
his behalf JUlderthe
under the State plan,
~pn"account
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judgment ~
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.'(1)
(1) who is an inpatient In a nursing
nll1'8ing facility(lntermediate
iacility(intermediate care facility for the
institution. if
web individual is required,
required. 88
mentally retarded, or other medical instituaoll,
ihucll
as
institu1io~. under the State plan, to
a condition of receiving services in such institu1io~,
spend for costs of medical care
cmre all but Iialilinimalam<iuDt.¢his
Ji:linim81'am<iuDt.¢his income .required
,required
, ~or~onalne,eds,and,
~or ~ona1 ne.edB, and .....
,.. ',
' ',".,"
'. ','..'
~., ..• :."
..
" .....
. .,'
",.~.",.:."
"
., ,(ii~ with resPect.
respect to whom the Stated~termines,
Stated~termines, after notice and opportunity
for a hearing (In accordance With procedures estaPlished by the State), that he
to be discharged froin
mediCal institution
cannot reasonably be expected
~~~. to.
from. the
the, me¥

~~/r~ :::dh~me. ,~,':';ph':.~'(.~).:' ...~: ,~, :'~ ·;·;::;."'-b;j~~:;;~;o;:·; ';:~~"
~•·. ~~e;r~1:=(t;~~~i2j:"";~,,<":~,
·::'::;~;!~l~~~~;::'~~;;i . ;L::
. p ." p
. ~~.~.
".':"~'::,.: ",",. ".f.'.'·.~,:;-.:·t:"L.~O:';t"·""·H,,;',;tt'~'lJ·'~
to

if-·.
2) · No lien maybe imposed under paragraph (l)(B).on
(l)(B),on 8UCh individual's home If-,
". (A) the'spouse of such individualt;,'
individualt;·· '. ..
,. Ii,:'" '.IL,~j
·,ILl~j··i'._""
, ..... ~~,.,:,,~
••. :,.~
r:<,
.. i'._"" ,',",

such 'individual's child who is under age 21,·or (with'respeet
;;" (B) such'lndividual's
(with'respellt UiStates eligible
';· to participate in
In the State' program established under subchapter XVI of this
respeetto
chapter) is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or (with respect
to States
which are not eligible to participate In such program) is blind, or disabled ~ defined
.. in
In section 1382c oftIUS title, or ,'.~.:,,:
'j':::':":~" ...
.'.~,:.,: .:,
,:,",. ,','
.'" "'. :,,".~,: 'j':::':"::"
' ...." '. "': .
ohuch
indiviciuld (:;Vh~ h'iIs M
Meq~tY:~terestlnsu~cl!'ii~~e
.I'i.'.,
,',' (C) a sibling of
such individuld
eq~tY:~terestlnsu~cldi~~e 8nd~ho
, • was residing In such individual's·home
Individual's,home for a period of at least one year .edia~y
.edia~y
, '. before the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution),
"
., .'
·
.
.
.'
.
-.;,'}.
" , ' ',iJ\
("
••
lawfully residing In such home.
. . - ':...._", .. "
(3) iu1y lien imposed .with reapeet to an individual pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) shall
institu~n and return home.
Udlssolve upon that individual's discharge from the medical institu~n
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88sfstancircioiTectly
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SUlte
rn..(b), ~ ..Adjustment
of..~~ medical
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assistarice correct1ypaid
correctlypaid on behalf of
No adjll8tment
adjU8tment or·recovery
or,recovery of any medical assista.rice
Individual under the State plan may be made,' except·tbat.
excepttbat the State shall seek
:Wan·. Individual'under
'fRacljw~tment· or recovery of any medical,
medical. assistance correctly.
correctly, paid on behalf of an
~adjustment·
individlual under·the State plan In the case of the following individuals:
~ individual
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(A) In the ease of an individual -described in aublle\,'tion
aubBe\..gon (a)(1)(B) of this;
this. section,,,,
II_",On,,:\• ' •...'I·the
'i. the State shaD seek adjustment or rerovery from the individual's estate or upon sale}:
,;
''.,. :,:. ::: ()f the prop¢y subject to alien imposed on account l)f
I,f medical assistance paid.'on'i;
.':~'.::"i,~ha!f:.,oftf~
';';"':':;";;~~'I~'~~ ~~~~.:
,:,~":."",:,,,: ';'6'" ~;~~~,,~
. ~.:;. ';~;':~;(:~:::~~'i
.. :~:~:~;1: ';:~':~,~.'~/;:';
in~~~: <·:,··,:·:','-i
:~~~.::':;'
"~;':~:I~/::~'i ·~~;·;r~
':;;r:,::~;~;;,:,:,
-:::~~.'~i;: '~.~~:~~.
'. :.;.~::·'",(B)
oCt . lIp 9rplder
9rplder.,When "~e\
:.;.~::·",(B) In the case .of
of an individual who was 55 years oc.·.aP
,:.;;,:
State·shall seek adjustmentiJ:.orZ~
adj1IU1ttaenkol~:~
,:.;;.: .'individual reffivedsuchinedieal assistance, the State'shall
.'::;''''~:recoViel'yfrom
::;';:'~:recoViel'yfrom the individual's estate, but only f'or medical'88Bistance
medical-88Bistance consisting',qf"';':'X
coll~is1~~"qt~:;
'(1)" n~g facility ~,'home and co~unity.baSed
. " . : ',:;'
co~unity-baSed 8ervi~;and
8ervi~;and rel8¥ed\';.'

. :,

',.,....:'..
.. ",',' .':..

h~~~~~:;:~;e~:te~;;;or,~~:~:~~;~~~~~;;;~~~~
h~~~~~:;:~;e~:te~;;;;or.~~:~:~~;~~~~~;;;~~~~
entitledcto"reeeive)'
an Individual who has received (or. Is. entitlecLto"reeeive)'

, ._.' (C)(i) In the case of'
.

!.
I.

.

has

. benefits under a long-tenn care insurance policy in connection with which assets or :.
. l'I!SOUl'ee8
c:lause (il); except as provided"
I'eSOUl'eeS are disregarded in the manner described in c1ause
in such clause, the State shall seek adjustment Or recovery from the mdivi~s:
mdivi~B:
estate on account of mediCal assistance paid on behalf of' the individual for nursing ..•.
,' :..,.:
.... ~ ..'! .... :,C:,!~
.. ':::;::.~.~"'{)~
':.: facility and other JODg-term
Joilg-term care services..;
services.,; ..
",'
:";:.",~,,,!
:;C:,!~ ;~
;~',.':::;::.~,~",{):
".. . ' (ii)
ahaJl not apply in the case of an individual who received medicil
mediciI :,';,'
(ij) Clause (i) shaJl
assistance WIder a State plan of'
of a State which had a State plan amendment \.
approved as of May 14, 1993, which provided for the disregard of any assets or,
resources--:.

,~

,.. ,~.~. "":~
. ,...

';:r,;. ",
";:r,;.

"': :'.:'~#:
:·.:'~/: ~ ~ ....... ~ ".:;•.':fr::;·'i;:i"t
·.:;•..:!'r::;"ii:i·,t
~ ":

~..i..'.~ .."
•• :
~.l.'.~

.;;--'~:~~

*}:~}t

undeJ' a long·tenn
long-tenn care insuranCe
to the extent that payments are made under
.', ... t :~"',
'~"' ..... '" :';" :.>'.
:,>'. <: ''''.:'
. "',:: ;::.!~,.:::::.\·,(,:·,..;;J,~<i
;::'!~,.:::::.\',(,:,,..;;J;~<i
. policy; or ",. .·;"t
,mtitled to· receive) benefits :
(D) because an indiVidual has received' (or is 'I!JItitled
a long-term care insurance policy..
poUcy.. .i,'
.i,'.;.,.'
'; ,~, ,:-:.
,:-:, ~.
~,
.: ii'$
ii.';:;
under along-term
..; . , . ' .,
",~,
.:
'(2)-Any'3djW;triieJt'~
be"IDade ontY'8fter:'fb~"'1
ontY:8fter:'fb~;;l
'(2)-Any'3djW;t:riieJt'~ ~()\i~rrimdei- 'paragraph (l)rnay be':IDade
death of
the individual's surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time.',.
,"'~X!:t.'i~Y
of'the
.
. •. ,"'~'G.'i~Y
..,. :.,.'t.\>'
:····fA>" when he ~.
~;L
",.
~- ll~i:~viiig
lI~i:~viiig chiii Who: is \inder.:~
\inder,:~ 2i;:.~r}Nitli
2i;:,~r}Nitli ''respeCt U;;L
States eligible to participate in the. State program' establiilhed under
unaer subchapter,::
XVI of'this
of this chapter) is blind or permanently arid totally disabled, or (withrespedto}
(with respect to}
. States which are Dot'eligible'to
noteligible'i:.o participate in such program).is blind or disableda(':
.~.
in.secti~n l382c of this title; and.·.~!:
and.', ~!::!. ! ~:'~<:.~'-';:;
~:.~<: .~.-.;:; >-..
>'.. ':.r,:~.~y~ .~·!~.~·I:.~jr~'~
.~·!~.~·I:. ~jr~'~
'1;·;;~W::
,~. 'defined
·definedin.secti~nl382cofthistitle;
'l;·;;~t{
~.::,;.; (B) in the
of'
an iildividliaI's
..,-~,~ ~,::';';
individuars bome
home under
under subsection (a)(I)(B)
(a}(l)(B) of
or this":
(I)
(1)

·.'....
~··Section,
...1I~-·Section,

case alien
on ~
alien.t··r:~u!H;~

when-

,,'.1.' ·H:':',.-.l.'·H:':'-

:' :';"<:...~~~r:-!:.~'~.~.
~ ~~ r:- !:.~.~.~ .
..... .,... :.:.;..<:...

:z.~ .•'
,0' :'~:'.~:~'"l.
:'~:.•~:~."l.'
'r:z'~

...1::' "r
.N·.j .. ...l::..

·:~j!,ct~i~
':~j!'ct~i~

of the ~dividual (who was residing in the indMdual's
individual's home ~;:
no sibling of
· , .'" "",,'
,,' .a
.a period of at least one year iinmediately bef'ore
Wore the date the individual:~
individua1:~ ..
. admisSion to the medical institution), and
~Ji
.-: ..
~~;
·'admission
and
.. "'.
"" -- ,, "" ,.;.
,.:. ~".'",
~.",", ".
". _~'l""
' .~~;
:!,_
.. , ':.
':'._~~ ..
,.,, ''....
. .'" . ..;,
,~•... \1·····' ..•. : '.' "".": , .... I._.,.~'l""
~!i::
. '". :!l"
,.,
, ... ' .
;,
.~
~!i:~
of the individual (who \Wll
\WI! residing in th~ individuar!Li'
individuar'!.,i·
. (0) no son or daughter of'the
for a peri~.of at least ~ rea:rs.~e<Ji.!'.tely
rea:rs.~et:Ji.!'.tely befo~'~fda~, oCth!,;:
oOh!,;:
~o~~ f'or
institution,' and who establishes to the.:.
the,:.
.' individual's admissIon to the medical institutiOD,'
·.·satisfaction or
-.;. ,,.' ·.-satisfaction
at the State that he. or she providl!d.
provided. care to such individual ,yhich.>
pernrltted such individual to reside. at
rath.er
than
. in an .;...
institutioit),~.
pennitted
home
rather
than.
institutioir),~
.
... ' ... ..•.
.
• "....
"l'" ..
.; .. ,
"';'J>!":"
- , ",
...'
.
' . "l"
"'. "';'J>!":'.
. ·,·,;·is lawfully residing in such ,home
.·",;·is
_home .w:ho haslawfu1ly
has lawfully lI!siQed
lI!siged in ,such:~ome
,such:~ome OD,,!>}
on,;}
.,;:. continuous'
,.basis since the .,date
to, the medi~l
continuous·.basis
date ;;of the individual's admission to.
..:",:
: . : . ins.tiwtion
._. :,;., ':.: .
'. [:~'~;j.~~ ~;·~~ii".~I~!
~;·~~ii".~I~!. ~~':"
~~.:·.;H;~.···"·:
"...~~ :~H~
:~fr~ ~;! ~>.::~ ,:,:~:'i;.'~~'~~~
.:,:~:'-i;.'~~'~~~ .'.';',...:~~';:,f
:f'~';:,f
ins.tiwtion.. '.,:'''.,
~:L ,,[:~'~;j.~~
;H;~ w'" ." .: ".••
""(3) The State ag~Cysh~ establish}iioceduriS
establish PiOceduriS '(in accordance with standards s~;
lied by the Secretary) under.
WIder. which the agency shaD· waive the application,ot.,~,
applieation,ot.,~.
· subsection (other than paragraph (1)(0»·
(l)(C», if suchappHcation
suchappHc:ation would
wouldworkaD.un~~,
work .BJi.un~~,
~, hardship as determined on the basis of'
of criteria established by
by the Secretary. '""
'" •. :~ '''1':~H
'''1':~H
(4) For p~es';;f'this;~~bs~on',,·th~·~"~te",'With~
(4)
p~es';;f' this'~~bs~on',"th~' ~"~te",'With ~ n;specttci"i:dec~:
n;specttci"i:dec~:
"individual-:'.'~:O,' '.:.:~!';
'.:.:::'; L'! :·}:.i:;:b,";
:·}:.i:;!b"; ,:lbrH~1
':lbrH~1 ~~~:i.
.. individual-- .
"
. ".'~:O.'
.' 'c' >·.(A)
(A) shilllinclude
shiillinclude all realBndpeisonal
real8ndpei-sonal property and other·assetsincluded.wit1:liJ1
other'assetsinc1uded,wit1:ljJ1
.,:~'.'r:
~":~!ru~:tll:
.. :~'.'r: the
the Individual's estate, as defined for-purposes of State probate laW; and· ~":~!ci~:tl1:
".' . (B) may include, at the t?P1;ion.
t?P1;ion, of'the
of the State (ands~aJ]I!nclude,
(ands~a]]I!nclude, in
m~e ca.se ~~l&:n.
~~lll:'!
llBl ,
( . individual to whomparagraph"(l)(C)(iYapplies),
whom paragraph I (l)(C)(i}'applies). iuiy'otherreal'lind
any' . other real 'lind 'perso
'per.sOJlBl
..;' property and other assets in whiehthe individual had-any legal .titJe
.title- or interest.~t.·,:."
.the extent or
nterest), including'such .assets,conveyecMe.,.
,. ..'the
'the time of death (to
(to·the
at such..
BUell ..iinterest),
.lWlets'COJlvelfe4l.fIL~·
.
Ii. survivor, heir, or assign of'
of the deceased individual through joint tenaDc;y,
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other: arrangemeJ1t.::!..!;:;J):
arrangement.::!..!: . ·'
',.' .,,
.. (i)
".___.. ,.

••

or .
or.

\1····'1

'F

~,',
~

;.J•.:
;.J•.:

..•. :

'.'

"".",

, ....

I._ ••

~...
~....

.

:.

>· .
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account cenain transtemof asseta.'·~:-~':?-=i.
asseta,·~:-~,:?.::j 'tV'
'tV'i:,
:~,j!,;.~!. i ;', ..
"(e) Taldnginto aeeountcenain
.i:,:~,j!,;.~!.:

. , ''(Ix,A)" 'In
"order to' m'~tthereqUirements
'In"orderto'
m'~tthereqUlrements of thiJ"~n;to,tptu:po8es'
thiJ"'~n;to,tptu:po8es' or liectfon
sectfon
., 139&(a)(18) of this title,
tltJe, the State plan must provide thilt l1' an inatitutionalized
'/,individual'or the spouse of such an,indiyjdual(or"at,~e:option
an,individual(or"at,~e:option of a State, a nonillBtftunonillBtftu
tfonalizedindividual
tlonalizedindividual or the spouse of such an Individual) disposes ofasseta
ofll88eta for less than
fair market value on or after the look-back date speciffed
specified in aubparagraph (lJ)(i), the
indlvidual is ineligible for medical assistance for services deac:r:ibed
dell4l':ibed in subparagraph
(C)(i)
In
(O)(i) (or, in the case of a noninstltutionalized individual, for the services described
desaibed in
subparagraph (C)(ii» during the period beginning OD the date specl2ied In
in subparagraph
(D)
CD) and equal to the number of months specified in subparagraph (E)., ..'' '.
,
'18'36 months
(B){I)The
(B){!lThe look-backdate Specmt!d
SpecuIt!d ii{thii1sUbp~ph
ii{thii1sUbp~ph Ii a ~ that
that'18'36
,(or,
,\(or, In the case of.paymenta
of. payments from a trustor portioDS
porttoDS of a trust tltat
t1Iat are treated as assets
1disposed of by the individual purSuant to paragraph (3)(A)(!ii)' or (S)(B)(fl)
(S)(B){fi) of subsection
(d) of this section, 60 months) before the date speclfted In
{iI)."";'" .'.: ';;,
in 'claUSe {iI).""""":

.. ;....., ..
"

....
. . .'.',.,'
..
~

'

.

"','

\\"" (it>'ihedatl!speclfied
(iijTheda~speclfied ~tbiailiUt;;.
~thiailiUt;;. with;~8~Ctto+:'.:1;~:";~;;:~~":;.'~:;,~,,
with;~8peCtto+:',:J;~:";~;;:~~":;.'~:;,~,,, '

::'
,,' (1) an institutionalized IndMdu8I
indMdu8I iSj,he
is',the fu.St dataaa of Wbieh~~eh1dividual
WhieU~eh1dividual both
is an institutlonsllzed
inetiwtlonallzed Individual and has appUed tor medical assistance under the
,Stateplan,~ .... ,,, ,'''''<'(7'''''':'-:
,·.. ·','(7...'·":·-: ;;;::;" ""'C"':)
""'C"';; "':-.'.",,,,,
"':'.'.",,,,, ,"•.,,:'.'"
,,
,Statep1an,~
,:'.'"
" (0) a noninstitutionalized
nonillstitutionalized individual !sthe date on.which
bn.which theindiVldual
theindivldual applies
applles
for medlcal assistance .Wlder
.under the State,
State. plan' or, ·It later, the date on which the
indMduai dlspol!l!S of assets for leas tbaIi~.market
thali~.market !al.uei~:;.
!al.ue"~:;. 1:1 ;.,:.;,
;,,:.;,
servteea described In thfs subparagraph with respect; to an lnstltutionali1.ed
InstltutionaJized
(C)(1) The servfeea
llI1 are the following:
>.. . ~;.-;
~;..; :: •·
•·....;;:.::~;,'.I:.!
;;:.;:~;,'.I:..: <"
<r ,,,:,'
,,,i.'
'p
UIl
>
fac:i1lty services.
'----:.; !~.;.
!~.;,
i 'I..-tn Nursing fac:illty
.-.-<.,
.
.' ...
,.';,;, (~) A IeveJ ot care: lIT any'inatltutibn eqniva!ent<tothat
eqlliva!ent<tothat of
of· mlng facility
facllity

\

.,.:..!,,~):
.,.:..!,,~):

servIceS.
servlC8S.

,'.
I"

"~" ~·.1:

i.H
I

,'~:;<:;"::
~;,) "~::':!;"::

community·baiedsenices funUshed
furuished 11I1dera
under-a waiver granted under
Home or commWlity-baiedsenices
(c) or (d) ofseetion 1396n ofthia
of this title. ,.;:.,),;;iv;i
,.;;.,l,;;iv;i ,?~;;'j
'?'~;;'j .•;
,,.,
_.;,,.,
\ subsection (e)
(U)'The
Zloninsiitutionallzed
(B)'The services described In
in tbIs
this subparagraph,wIth
subparagraph· with respect
DOninstitutionallzed
inclil.use
(i» that are
individual are services (not including any services; desCribed in
clause (i»)
'eseribed in paragraph (7), (22), or (24) of section 1396d(a) of this title, and, at the option
'escribed
.senices for whichmediC!ll·.assistance
whiehmediC!l1·.asslstance is
ia otherwise
~ a State, other long-term care .services
..~ailable under the State plan to individuals requiring long~tern:1,cat'13.
long~tern:1,eat'Iil. :,,; ,.f::
...f:: f,f .
(D) Tbe'date&pecltled
.(D)
The'date8pecltled In tbfs subparagrapills
ilubparagrapl1ls the'nfst day·of.thefJrst
day·of.thefh'st month during
less,than;fairmarket'l81ue
; after which assets have bee~ ~ for less.thaI1;fairmarket
.'I81\1e and which
lea no~ oceur,1n
meligibility ~der thilI
~On.li:;:J..\;: .::.(
oceur,in ~other.l)I!r1Dds
~other,pl!1'1Dds of
ofmellgibl!ity
tbia~On.li:;:J..\;:·::'(
(E)m With
Wlth'respect
an institUtionallzed
institUtionaHzed indMdti81/thet')iumber':of
indMdti81/the(')'lumber':of months of
(E)(I)
'respect to an
subparagn,phfor
indivldualshall
be',equal ~, ::. ",
.', "
neligibillty under
under. this subparagraph
Cor an individual
shall be;,equal
tat8I,"eumulatiVe
vai.k ot allassetS.traMtmTed
allassetS,tranatmTed by the
.' . en the tat8I."eumulatiVe
vallie
individual (or individual's spouse) on tYr after·
after' the' look-back' date specified
speclfied in
;.' Individual
"'subparagrap1i(BrID;dividedby';, '.' ,,:1.',;'
,.:1,',;' <':"':":"":~;.",""::;'
"'subparagrap1i(Br(f);dividedby';,
,."(D)'the
,."(DFthe iverage montbly'coatto a private patient of numngfadlltyservlees
numngfadlityservlces in
!,'
the State (or, at the option of the State,
',' ..the
Stete, in the community in which the lndivijiualls
indivijiualls
''''',-...,',
Institutionalized) at the time of application.
• institutionalized)
.. -""'.
I., .
..,
,..
.',
I.·
-"
,,,
.,
.
'",
... '
.~spect·to a noninBtltutionalfzed
i1oninstltutlonalfzedihdfridUaJ"
number ,of months of
(11) With ,~spect'to
IildfridUal" the number.of
leliilbility under' this subparagrapb
8ubparagrapb .for an individual shall, not be greater than
than':'; a
leligIbility
!i.;: (lD)
(ID)
. l:.;:

to'a.

'uncompenSated

<':"':":""::',".""::" ;""',', .

e~I~~ ~:~~tJveuDJ;;m~;ici~";~~~:,,~~,·~
~:~~tJveuDJ;;m~;ici~";~~~:.·~~··~ ··~~~~;~·:~e
"~~~~:~':~e

aller the .lOOk-back date)pedfied in
J individual (or individual's 'spouse) on or atler
lNbparagraph (BXI),
(BX1), divided
dMded by
..''';
. INbparagraph
. '.,
"
.... -"-', ...
": .
monthly; coBt
caRt to a private patient of limimig
limirin'g facility' Services in
<;~: CD) the'average monthly:
;the
Stete (or, the option of the State,
State,ln
In'which
indlvldualls
In the community in
'which the. indlvfdualls
the State
iinstltutionaHzed)atthetimeofapplieatlon;
",'".,.
,','i.::,':':,.. c····;,
:'.,':. ,,'
iinstltutionaHzed)
at the time oiapplieatloJ); .. ".'
'" •. ,','I.:::':,:,

.

at

":

,

I.~

,

,'; .'

',;"

.:
,,; . .
:.,

,~":
.' ,~":

",

',1 .,·.: .. ··r~-·:

'J
',1

i'l

;-'~
;-'~

.,

Dumber of months of ineligibility otherwise deteiIiiliied
deteimiiied under clause, (i) ,or
or
Ull) "'\e Zlumber

r~e::O!::~:!o~a:r~:t=;
r~e::O:::~=o~a:r~:t=; =t{~ij'::~~:i:b~;'~e

the individual under elauseJIi} as a
. lnumber' of months of ineligibility applicable to the.
cBsp08al, and
'.;'., '
" .' ."
'.;'"
.'
result of such cfisp08al,

·:259
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e&IIe of periods..of ineligibility detennined under .c1ause,(ii),: by .
. (ll) in the e&Ile
<;:IJ~JlUJDber of !l10n~:of.~~
!I10ntba.of.~iliiy applicable
to .~iJllfu.'j.~!1al.~~~
the individual Wld~ ,~:(i)
clause (i)
.,;:I~~JlUJDber
IlJlplicable JO
...
,....." result ......
ofsueh disposaL
dispOsaL
',.,
.•[:"':¥' ...:tiil~~
..".~"
..--!.
,',. ;,:!,
:~..
:". ".._
.
·.·..!:\;·;~sult9~!JUch.
J~:':[~\j
<J:..';<.:1
:,1:;.'\.~:-.' '('~',
(~,l;(.c;:;::;;
.
... .. ';:f~:
.•'I ~
,',..I,!
" ...
.: (Z)An individua1shaU
individual shall Dot be ineligible for medical assistlinee
assist8nee by reaBOn
reason of PIl1'1!gnlpJ
Par8gra .
. (l)totheextenttbat-=- ·',·'"i)
",'.',,:) ,:.;!;;J''\'HlI':I::;:
',;i::·... tl;!;,:·;.:.,y~;.':s:ti~~.(lff'
tl;!;,>.:.,y·.·,·<"'<~o'n.
':.;i;;J'':'HlI':I;:;: ~H;~ "., • c,,···. ',;i::·...
~~'::
.. : '::~(A)
~
';:~(A) tiie'a8set.S traimfehed 'weref'a:ii~e"and
'weref'a:ii~e"and iitIii·'t,O·thll
Wii"tO'tha home'
tJ:"m'
iIsf~~
~.,.

-'~I·""'\I

~

~

~

.J

was

..,

. ,-

:;J.::~l~~;:;ii::~~~~~;~}i~~~;~~;~~~.:~~;.~~;~·:':'~~:;:'~,.:~. ~7:;~:··;;~~·f;;;';~~!~·'
:;j.::~l~~;:;ii::~~~~~;~}i~~~;~~;~~~.:~~;.~~;~·!':;~~.::'~,.:~·,:~:;~:·';;~~'f;;;:1i~a~~~:
age

ehildofsw:bJndividualwho(l) is'under age 21, or
(II) (with respeet::to.:.H;~
....
· '~"""o/-+n
(ii) a ehildOfsncllindividualwlio(l)
Or (lI)
, . , ."
..... ". States eligibI.!
e!ltab~ed Ullder
WIder subcbalpter':F
."
e1igibI~ to participate ,in.
In. the.
tb~. State program estab~ed
subchapter ':Y

"XVI .oi..tJrls ~ter~
~ter) ill
isbl¥!t~or"permanently
andtt)~y disabled,
..·'~'.'::
;·.;·:,::~.ot.this
b~~~or)enoanently :md~)~y

or.
or.<W}th'.~)

:'.: "'.
., ..."' '.:i-eSpeet
IIIlCh program) is bliJid;":"i'
..
.,i'espeet to'
to Statea.whichilre:not
States,which are.not eligible to par,tjdpate in
In IIllCh
1382c: of
ofthiB
title'
.... '.' ·-:..·',···.
'-::, ". . "... :'·!,'lY';
'"......,;,.,.
.. or disabled as defined iii section 1382c
thiS
title·
:'.... ........
"., ••.• ~~.. ._,jr
'" • ..,~~
,~~ ~~,._._.
~~,. __ .
't :'" :.,-:'::,
,.:·~'~'r':',
~,~':,' ~v~ .. ,':,!'-,'
.!~,
.J.
"."•.•
",-'",
,.:·~'~·r.:·,
~,~':,'
indivi~ual who has an equity interest in sucll
ot such lndivi~ual
sucli home and. ',> '
WlI8 residing in ilUch fndfridua!'s
fndfridual'a home' for a' period of at least one'
omi year
year'~~'r
:.
~~f/,
: . who Wll8
. Immediately before the date the l'ndividual beeomes III
institutionalized iDdivid·
iDdivid·~i
.• .. ,,;,
'.;, .Immediately
an instltutionalized
;~i

....
.

,

;, ••
.... ;,••

• . (ill) a sibling

'_a.....
... ·:aal;~or;.·:..:
'_~i.:. ::~~&::~!&-"":aal;~or;":":

·.~·~;L~.:n
·.~·~;L~.:r!.. ~u..~
~u.~ ....~·~~.1~
!:·~~·1~

,... :":..
;.' ~·,::-::""~t.';.
..,~",~,,,,;"~·.~.:..::.:~~~
.. ~!;. ·.~~:s ,.l.•
,.l"~ •...
~'.;.'
~·':;'::"'~t.:::..<'o!~"·';.:':'·'~,~::.:~~~

-:'
-:

.• ,.~~:~;~:
;~~:~;~:

in '':;:
':;;a son or daughter of such individual (other tban a child desenbed
de~!n
::eJaUse·(h1).who.'Wa8"resi~g·in ~Ch indivi~ua!'8
home'(ora'perio;d of at,least::0
at.least::t,
".. ::eJause·(h·)).who"Wa8-resi~g·in
indivi~U!'8 home'rora'perio;d
two years munedlately
.,.. ..two
munedlate1y before the· date the 1I1dividual
lIldividual becOInes an illatftutional-.i"
inat!tutio~·l. '·
wh~ (lis:'deteririined by the: State) provided care to sUch;y,
ized individual, and wh~
lIllChe
....
iudivi~ ~~ ~ BUChindividual to reside athomeratlter.
at. home .ratlter. than in)\
in
...
iudivi~~~
mstitution or facility;
. ' ...,~,~ .::.:
.:i.: ,:,.,
such an ll1!Ititution
,:,.; .'." .;i:;' :'['01(';.;.£('
:;[,,1(';.:.)[,:'
&8Bets'".; '-~;:-,>:.,""
,.~;: ._~ -c.;'
:'J
(B) the ll8llets' "";
,.. "
"J
.
.
transt'erred to theindividuai'aapouse
tbeindividual'aapouse or' to another
fo~. the sole,):
: ::::. (I) were transferred
~other fo~,
spouse, .
' . .. ... :.)'"
:-r" ~~.)_)
'.;c'
benefit of the Individual's spouse.
',,"
,: .'7,(0)
Were·,transferred:.fl'om the individual's.
individual's' apouscdo another for the 60I~J
soI~J
.:
-'7·(0) Were·.transferred:.ftom
benetitortheindividual'a.spouse,.
".;:l.:~'.;·:
<. ':;':;;
':;',;; ,!_;'"i.:.,_·(~:':·,(li
,!.;,.. i.:.,-·(~:·:·,(li
benefit
ortJ1e individual'a.spouse,. :,:,... :'.;:l
-: ~'.;': ...• <,
'''';5'',;,
;:. (ill) were. transferred,
tranat'ezi.ed.. to.·:or.;to,a
to,., or.;to ,a ,trust (including'
(including·a.j:rust
''''';5 ..:: :.... ;;
aJ:rust dese:ribed in)
in,::'
':.: ";;:.',
·eubaection ..(dX4)-.of"thiasection)established:'sole!J'
(dX4)·.of;,tbia section) established:· solely .t'or·thebenefit;~'Jt!le:€
.i'or·thebenefit;~'Jt!le:€
".:
";;;:.:' ·llUbaection
.:~ ,'...
W<ii)(l1), or .:.
" ... individual's ~ described in subparagraph· (A)(ii)(l1),
.:" ;••".
;."". ~ :, .':(,,·C&·.,o
.':C,·C&·.,o ;:~;
tru.st (including a trnE.t
subseetion~
'.'. cC (iv) were transferred' to a tru.et
trnEIt described in subseetion~.
tbissect!on)"established' solely (or
benefi'~ of an
an. individual WIder 65.:
(d)(4) of tbissectlon)"eetablished'
for the beDefi'~
65 .,;
.:.-'
;" :...!~yearufage.wg,l1,)
!~yearufage.wg"\J.) ia:.·~!ed
is:.·~led (a;t
~ ,in ~oD.~c(a)(~>.;p~
~oD.~c(a)(~>.;p~..:..~JitIe}tf.
.:..~,JitIe}if.
:":"
(8;'l.. ~.in
."'., (C),
(C)· a satistaetory.tmowing·ia;made
satistactoIT-tmowing'ia;made to the State (m
(In aecordance with.regulationid
."'.'
promulgated'
tIu¢..(i) the individual i;atended.
dil!poae or the:
the:;
promulgated· by the' Seaetary) thl¢..(i)
tatended. to· dillpoae
,~_ .•;,888ets
market value,
>
;,888ets either ali'air
at,fah;.~k.et
~u~, or .fllr
,ill! other
othe:, valuable
!Biuab~e etlllSideI:at;ion..
et~id~o~..(ii)
(~) the
th~ u.se~
u.s;e~,~
W1U'e transferred
exclU81V$y [or .. a...
a~ pUrpose~
purpose ·o~er~::tban
other,than .. to.
qualifY. 'for.
for... medical;
•. WlU'e
tran8femi~ ~cl~~y'!~r
to.' quillPY.
medic&,~
assistariee, . or (in)
(iii) an assets ~erreq
~eiTeq for less
less' tb8ri.
'lIlIIrketvwue
.."..' '.. assistaIlee,
tb8ri fair "lIIIIrket
value have bt!en~~
been.,
~~.
.. :;~:,.:::,l::~~.' :'.",~~
~~' ~;:~~edJ0the:~~~aa1,~~or~~,~.
~;:~~edJ~the:~~~aa1,;,~.or;;;: ':~":':;:;:':'
';~":':;:;:':' ":~\)"
"-,~\), ~,~,~::;
~,~,~:;;,,:;~~,.:::,;::~~.'
.".'.~~ ~:~.;,';1i
~:~';";1i
(D) the'
the State detennines,
~tabllsll,ed by the.
the, State (iIi:
(m:accor,;;
determiries. under
Wider proCedures ~tab1lsJled
aceor,);
,•. dan~ with
withetan~-epecified
of eligibility would
! . ,•.
etan~·specified by th'il Secretary), ~at the denial of
...:.,' work ali'1iiIdlie'bardship'8&
ali'liiIdue'hardship'8& deterinined
deterin1ned on the basis of crItemEistabUshed
critemestabUshed by tne::
...:.,'
.

. (iv)

of

i

i

1'II1II#
)
'"

~.~"

., ,.-,-- .., ::;~,;~. '::'::'~~:'~'~;~-l;;~
:,':,,~:'.4.~;~_~:~~::.;"J.
; ',.,'::. "~'. '::,.::..
~~",',:~~::;~~':'~~~~~
':~~:~~~;':,::-~~~·,~;_~\:rl~.:·
7~
,. :.:' ";;
~;_~//:.~' .'.?~

:I~··Secretary~·
:I~··Secretary~·· ..'... ~.~. I~~
I~~ .~,
.~ t.·, •••.•••• ' -

.. ,

::

by"an

For purposes of this 6ubsection,
we of
~ an
~ ,asset
'ass~theii:l
.. (3) for
l!Iubsecti!lD, ~.
in the ease
bell;!. by an 'iiidiVidual'~
inciividual in.
.eommon with another p~r5on'
'joint'1;ell3ll(y,.'tenaney in common,oi
cioInmon,or
., "common
perSon' orjiersons
oi~ons in
in:~aa 'jolnt"terlancy•.'tenii'iiey
arrangement, the'asset
'asset (or theaffecte<tportion
Of stic:!i
sb~ be considere.d·
.similar
similar ari-angement,
tbeaffected"portionOf
sUeb: asset) shaD
considered'
bY such' individUal
to be ~erred
~erred by such individual when any action is
Is taken. either- by
-::or bY: anY,,'lJiher
8ny.~ther person, that reduces'
reduceS' or-elIminates
orelIminatea saeh
each individual's iJwnershipor
invnershipor control
'::or
.,t'ots\icli
t10tstiCli .3sA(~~~~"
.3sA(~~~~" '.J ....•:.,, •.•. ' "l·~•• , ..:: '.~ '~,;~~ '; ~\...:~~~ ; -;.~~': :'r~~·\!,~~.:~'.:.~·~::;":~':~:~\ ~r:~·;~~;:~~:~!:.~:.~
~r:~·;~~;:~~:~!:.~:·~ ,::,:~{~
,:.,:~{~
,:,; ,(4) A State (including a State
$tate which has elected treBbnellt Ullder
under section
seCtion 1396a(!) of
,thiatitlejp!llY n~t,provide'
n~t.provide· for i.riy JlUiod.
fora-l1 iq~vidual
iq~vidual d~ to'ttansCel
tii t).:ansCei'
;thlatitle)plllY
j!eriod. of Ineligibility fora-ll
market value' eiteept. in aCeordailce.
aecordailce. With· thiS
this Subsection.
of resources for less than ·fair inarket
In. the case of a transfer by the spouSe' of an individual which re8U1b
re8UIb .ina-period of
In
"meligibility
niedie3J'iiSSiStanee Under a State pIan
shall,
"Ineligibility for medie3l'iiSSiStanee
plan for Sulch
Suleh individual,
individual. a State shall.
using a reasonable methodology (as specified by the Secretm:y), apportion such period of
any, portionot BUch
,the'.individual
individual and the individual's
. ineligibility (or any.
such period). among .the
otberwise'-becomes ~llle
~Dle for medicallassistance
:·spouse if the spouse otberwise'-beoomes
medicaJlassiatance under.the State

the

• • • .::

pIan..
plan.'

. ..... :.
......

..
...

';

...

;

'_ .. ,~.

."" , ...

·;.S;iW..:r.~7"t..! ri'::"; . ~,:,',;;i';'."!.
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imbEleliiion.:tlie:term.: "resources".
"resources", has the meaning ,given such ,term in
fq5);· In this imbEleliiion.:tIie:term.:

,0~~~,tJe,,~WitJ1oat ~:w,the excl~~;d~~in
excl~~,d-;S~in sub~on (a)(!)
~=L 11382
382bb ,0~~~.tJe,.~WitJJoat
!

iiD.:rieabneii:~;~~::~:~;'~~;::!\:~:~:,;~C':,;;~'~:,~ J":~~"";:'~~{:'(;:~;;'~'.::';:'
J'.:~~"";:'~~{:'(;:~;;'~;-::';:' J:,: ,"~,
"'~,
iiD.:rieabneii:~;~~::~:~;'~~;;:!\:~:~:,;~C':,;;~'~:,~

.

purpa8ei~f d~~iiii6gjiU{iD.~~uliI·8eug:iliilitY'rcir\' :>r~iimoWit
:;r~iimoWit of, ill!nefita
benefita
j(1!For purpo8ei~fd~:Siiii6gjiU{iD.~~uiiI'seug:iliilitY'rcir\'
plaiiWider this'~pteiriiubjeet
this'~pteiriiubjeet to'paragraph (4), the rules specified in
under, Ii State plaiiundei'
:i par3graph'(S}
par3graph'(S) sh81l
sli81} app!y"w'a,b1J8t
apply"w'a.b1J8t established by such~ individual. .' >"."
'-"." ... .;•,.'. .... .,
;·,·ti't..'!·.\.JC.~-·J{I'·':'
;·,·ti't..'!·.\.JC.~··J{I'·':'
(~)(A) Fo.I' PIJl'i:>oseil"of
puri)(iseil"of 'thiS' SiIlisectiori;
SiIliaectiori; .an individual Shall
ShaIJ be' eorisiden!d to have
I (~}(A)
,stabIisheda
trUSt· if' ii.iSetB 'OftJieindividUal were used to: form'all or part of the corpu8
trUSt'itii.iSetB
. of the trust lind ifaiiy 'Of the (ollowing-individuals
following'individuals estabJisljed
estabJisl:ied such trust.other
trust .other than by
: willi .<:.
,.,.1 '-'!.::'~'(":~~;','.-~::'::':'
'-'!.::'~'("':~~;','.-~::'::;:' ::":'i'~~"
::":'i'~~"
....
'.~.:(:;·ri,,::
.,:
.,": ....
... ,',
.<: . .,.:
.: "'J
'''';, '.~.:(:;·ri,:::
.. :
..',:
'.
. (i): The']jl(Hvfdu:.L·; , .
.
<.;:j':·.·.~.,;.f! \',' ,.·~?;·:r ..:··,..·.: , . :<0..
:.'::(ii) Th~"fii'dMihW'sspo'"Wiii>;'~Jl" ;;,; .' :'~':,.':: '.: :.:I!.
.. :.:: ;,' ..... .'"....
. .
. , (iii)'A peri6~;·%~diDg'a;~iUt:or~e~y.diePI
peri6~;'%~diDg'a;~iUt:or~e~y,diePI aauthority
uthority to
act in place of or behaJfof the' lndividualor the individual's spouse. '
(iv)···A person; bicluding any court or administrative body.·8cting
'(iv)···A
body,'8cting at the direetlon
direetfon
i,.
request. of. the individual or the individual·s,Bpouseo'
.•,.:
i ,. ','01'
'·'01' upon the request
individual's,BpoUBe•.•
,,: ,; : ' .
(B) In the' .case cif'. ~ I:rciBt
l:rciBt the· cOrpus of which includeil asseta of individual (as
i!Ubpanagriph CA»)'iuid asseta of any other pe1'!KIJl
persons, the
-lletermiried under sUb)ia'nlgriph
pe1'lKIJ1 or persons.
'apply-ito the portion of the trust attributable to the
~On8 of,this·.liubseetion ~ 'apply-:to
IIIM!tiI of the mdividuaL '/'.' .:':11,;".".'::,:::[
.:':11,;),.". '::,;::[ ::'.::", ' ...;.
... ;. ".;
:.'" ::,':
;::"~
...
1IlM!ti1
, .. ; :.:;r :.-.:
::,'" C',c·: '"'" ;:;
.. ~ .
(4). this subsection
subsectian shall apply without regard 00.:..:
(C) Subject to paragraph (4),
~
1
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'''-l'AP.A7'f''I-:r'·4
'''-l'AP.'7'f''I-:r'·4
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}D~~:~·r~r~~a)~:~~:.~e.sta!?~ed;;.:'~~::::,,:;~:~·:'
}D~~'~'r~r~~a)~:~~:.~e_staI?~ed;;.:'~~::::,,:;~:~·:·

':" ...

••,-" Jii) w~ether
w~ether. t:b~
t:h~ ~ ~ve o~ ~~ ~ ~ti.~n~der
~ti.~n~der the trust,
•_'-'.
~ctions on .:when.
.:when, or whether. distribJ?,t;ians
may!>e,.~e from the
'. ;··(ili}- any ~ctions
distribJ?,t;ions may!>e,.~e
. ;~;,.~ .·.'~i:;';'·
, trust, or ,.:.....
'":. ."'~~ _
"", .
.·.'~i:;":'·...•~~·,,~ ... ":~'i~' '~jbrYU l~;;:.it;.
I~;;:.it;.

l;(~;(~~~~~~~~~~~:;;;~~~::~~~;:.~;~':;:',:r;·;··. :'':' ,':;:.:.
l;(~;(~~~~~~~~~~~:;~;~:~::~~~;~~;~':;:·,:r;·;··.
", ~t

"oorpUsOf ih"li
ih"ii tniat'8halJ'be
tniat'8hall'be corisidared resources available to the individu
individu(I); the 'oorpUsOf

<"'!~"il;.. ;~;.,: ~.;.l..;~).:';{~'
~.;.I..;~).:,;{~' ;~c;·.·~)o£.;:)Lr::~"!~·.\~:~tt
;!C;-.·~)o£.!.:)Lr::~"!~·.\~:!tt .j:.!'
:.o.:i.;),'-/~~:.~.i ';':: ':1 :!:.,;
·~i·~.~;~~i\rl .~(. ;f'I,.:':
<"'!~"il;..
.j:.!" :.o.:i.;),"'/7~:.~.i
:1:.,; ·~i·~.~;~~i\rl

~.

:":..
:":.,

~ ',~

(ij) paymimts from the trust to,
to· or for the benefit"
benefit' of'the individual shall be
I . (ii)
..; ,.,i;;;;~::.'
'i"..;-~',-::
,. ',:.:
',:.~ :~
. l;·:COosid~lncome.~the~dual,.~~:
l;·:COosid~income.~the~dual,.~~: :;:;W:):
:;:;W:)! '~'~,,;
".i;:;;~::.' ';;.0..;-..;'
.,-::,'

'.;."~": (W"'ahy'otherpliymenis
(W)"'ahy'otherpliymeDis frlnn-thetrust
fr'inn-thetrust shallbe considered'888eta
considenid'88Seta disposed of by
""~":
mdividualfor pUrpOseii.of
piupOseii,of silbaection (c) oithia section.
..i::::',:·
; . tb~ illdividualfor
' " ·'.,..
j::,:', "

II(B)
(D) In'the aise of
I,

•

•.

. ,;,

•

an irrevOCable t:niSt",,'

•

•

•
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:

• • . . •'
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•

•

•

:
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i"
"

'.~'

"
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~~'
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I
cin:umstances under which payment from the trust could be
' :.
' (I) if there are any cin:mnstances
eOrpus from which, or
. made to or fOJ: the benefit of' the fndivi~ the portiQllof the cOrpus
inco.m,e.p'~ ~~~~.from
~~~~.from whicll'
whicll. pa~-;n~
pa~-;n~ to ~eindiy.!dual
~eindiy.!dual co,uld. be made s~all
"'..: the irlco.m,e.p'~

"be COn81d~~urce8
COnBld~~urce8 available to the mdiVldiJal.
mdiVldUa1. and paymenta from .that
,that portion
portian
I .,be

!1 ::.ofthe,~
;..afthe.~ .._qrJ~c9rn~1~
qr,~c9rn~i~ /:
.~': ;,/:hi:rU";;
;,/:hi;rU';; ,:,;!;.~,
,:);!;.~, ,~i;~!'.::.~·;;;:~J:·l:;i~;
'~i;~r,::.~';;;:~J:·l:;i~; ;::::;:~,;;::~:<;:.',:,
;:::;;:~,;;::~:<;:.',:,

sha1l be .consi~ income. of the
to or for the benefitoi
benefit of the individual, shall
.:~~:b:··o:.!f. t!:~LF~;··!-t
t!::,.LF~;··!-t \.:.:' . ~:.£.: ~ ..'..' ~.:'"~·if)./jj(rt
~.-:'"~·if)./jj.(rt ';.<-:: ·.'1
-"1,'"... · (( ''..
.:~~:t,:,:"o:.!f.
~. ,:;'::'
,~;'::' (u)foranyother,puiopose.
(u)foraDyother,puiopose. shall be considered a tranSfer:
of asseta by the
tranSter:of
I,.';
siibjeet:tOSUbseetion (c) of this
thissectian;'
'J," .....
'.'. .
l ..'; ; '.:
-.: individual siibjeet:tOStlbseetion
section;' arid \ . ~ 'J:'
,..... :~,...
..•:~·~I.~
:~·!I.~ .. ·..
·...•
·,.:.•
"'~Ai ,"
.:';";" .:
••
!.J~iJ.·~,.i .• ,'o1"1
1 ·\~";o7"'~\\"!"'~
·\~··;o7"'~\\"!"·:
,.....
.. ~.', .••
~.·,.:.
(.;l;. "'~A;:'
.:';;";"
,: •
. ,....
. !'J~iJ.·~,.i
,
which,. or any fricome
the ~orpU8
~orpU8 from which,
.. (n) lilly portion of the trust from which,
lricome on tIie
,ntl, payment ,could Ulidei3:by
Ulideiimy circumstances be made to themdiVidual shall be
,ntl.
establislm1entof the trUSt (or, if later, the date on
i . considered,;'ils:of thedai20f est8blislm1entof
~·wbiclipayri1ent·tO~ the indiViduillw1is forecloSed) to be"assem-disposed
~'wbicllpayri1ent'tO~
be··asseta.disposed by the
of~on,(c) of this section.,andthe
section•. andthe ~ue.of.the trust
I. ':individual,for purposes of~on.(c)
far purposes of such subsection by including the amount ~f any
shaD be determiiled for
portiallof
I" paymentamade.from such portiollof
the
trust aftel:
~
such
date.
. ." .:.a;
"
"-'r'
_...._._' ....
··....
··J·;d.••.••,
Lu;""
......
...
,n-,r.:.!! I.:;'
I....
.
,.--r' .... .. ... _......_'....
··J·;d.••.•
••
Lu;""......
,n.-,r.:..
8U~OD! sh8D.
sh8D, not apply f;o;any
to;any otthe foUowilig
foUowiDg trusts:"-;i.~;:
trusts::'-;i,~;: ~l ',j;;
!(4); ,This 8U~OiJ!
'!j;; : .. ' .
'. ;;",; (A); AtfUst'COD~
AtfUst'COD~ the assets'Of
assets 'Of ail iii.diVidual·under·
tndiVidual'under' age 65 who.
who- is disabled
definediri 'section' 1382c(a)(3);
1382c(a)(3): of this title} and 'which,
''1& defimidiJi
'which- is E!i!tablished'ror
E!i!tablished .for the
indmdaal bY8'parent;:grandparent,
bya'parent;:graruiparent, legalguardian,of
legal guardian. of the individual,
Jiefit of such, individual
,. . 8a court if the State will receive an amounts remaining ~ #letrust. upon the.,death
,.
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mdividaal,
mdividual, and..
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. : of such individual "up to an' amounteqaal to the total, medical assisbmce
,I
., ..:of
assisbUlce. paid on'
on :;:;:

.,,";
, "; behalf of the:individualunder
the :individualundei" a State plan under this subchapter.
~~.:> ',.; ,": '. ,;.:,
,;.:,:".'JJ!{,'i\:",
...JJ!{,'i\:....
sl1bchapter.~~.)·.·;,,':
t.l'Ust established in aa State for the benefit of an
an Individual if- ",.,:,.,'..' "ld!:!
'r:it!
(B) A t.1'UBt
(1) the trust is composed onlY otpenilion. Social ~ty, "and. othermco~F
othermco~F
""00
accumulated
income inJhe
in the
.' .,',1" .'"
"',.,
to, "the
individual
(and" aceumulated
,income
trust), "'.,:~~ ";)'-:.::,.:
'. "",~, ';';'J~"
:,':;
"
"
..
'.~'"
. '. "".'-:'; ," .. ;. "i':',. :~;.,,'~
:~; .. ,'~.. : .:~~\.' ;:~~
',""", <'~,
.,}~-.
~,.,
.. ~~o::.o·~
receive ,all amounts l'!!mainlng iii the trust upon the death:.
'.
~~,::.o'~ (ii) the State will receive.aU
individ~ up to an amount ~. too
t.o the .total zriedf~ ~tan~_~~
~tan~_~~
. of such individ~
individaal
::.\
,· .behalf. of,':the indiYidaal
under a State plan under this subchapter, and'.(~ :.. ::,\
... "', .",. ~',-'~; .,:~ .. "",",,~,~.:;: ":' I~
. ,(iii) the State makes medical asBistance
assistance' available to individuals described in'
iii
.1396a(a)(lO)(A)(i1)(V) of this .title;' but OOes' not'uiake
not' uiake such
section .1396a(a)(lO)(A)(ll)(V)
available to individuals for .nursing'
.nursing' facility' &erVices
serVices under sectlOli·
sect.lOli.
1396a{a)(lO)(C) of this title. .'
.
, ..
.
.
'·0
.:~~;
.· 1396a{a)(10)(C)
'0
.
.
'"f\
.
,.
(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who is disabled (as defined in
section 1382c(a)(3) of this title) that meets the following ~onS:
~onS: . ' "
'.
," (i) 'Theb-ust is established and
nonFo'fit·~~o;;:"·.· ,., ".>,
"."
a no~Fo'fit'~~o;;::'.'
,""
(ll) A separate account Is maintained tor esch beneficla1jr
beneficlaljr of the trust, but,
numagement ol~ funds, the trust pools these
for purposes ot investment and management
accounts. .,'"',','''
... '... '" ,..;
... ;
,".
".,',
,.. ; .t';'.,;
.
, , ,.
., .
" .. ', ;".,\'.':"':
;'c.':,'':''':
AcCounts.in the trust are established solely tor the benefit of individuals
(III) Aeeountain
who are disabled (as detined in section 13B2c(a)(3) of this title) by the pareDt,
grandparent, or legal guardiBn of such lndlvidualB, by such individuals, orby.ii
··court. .. :".
". : ,_
,'.
c';'·.,
'·court..:".
' , ' .,
",
'. ....
".,' ".
'" c,;'·.,
(tv)
the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account upon
8l"e not retained by the trust,
trust. the trust paY!
paya to the
the death. of the beneficiary are
State from such
sucll rernalning
remaining amounts in the account an amount equal to the total
'~ amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary undertbe State
plan under this Bubchapter.,
.
-.
.,'
Bubchapter.· '.
"

,""
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,'

•.

' •. '.'-:';

,',.;.

":;"

.. :

";)'-:.::,.:
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.~
':

,,-",
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"",",,~,~':;:

"

0'0
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"

"
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0

:

-

'.'

assistance'

\.,~_
\.,~-

,•

'.

;, '~I

' ~,

'''(\

0

and manage.:t by

0"

~ .-."
. ..
. ,,

.(

0

,.

' .

,,'

To

'(5) The State ~;;j ~ ~b&h p~tidures (ht 'lICC<irdan~e
~rdan~e 'With staDdJU.da
staridm-ds sPecl~
fled by the Secretary) under which the agency waNes the application ot
of thfssubsectlon
this .subsection

(bt'

with respect to' an .Individual
.Individual if the indiYidaal
individaal establishes.·
establishes that such, application would
._work
work an undue hardship on the individual as determined on the basis of eriterJa
estabUshed, by theSec:retary. ,.",;.:
:;';tl>' "\
c,
estsbUshed.
,."';': ",':;';tl>'
"i ',,·."f;
":."" ',';'
'..';' ,.;,;,
•.;,;.;
e, ''''l';:,',
'.' 'i';:li i;; I" . , :::'
(6) The tenD. "trust" includes any legal ilistruJnent
ilistruinent cir' deviCe that is ~'to a trust
lIIcludeslul'BDnuity onlY'
om· in such manner 118
but lDcludeslul'BDnuity
only. to such extent .m·
as,' the Secretar,y
specifies.
;:;:"):.i::;:;T;.
.):';::::;;;. :: (,(, '"',
" , ~ ':~"~C~(~
,'." ,.
,;.~~
speeiBes.
,:~..~C~(~ ie_
ie. .,)~
)~ ":":,'."
.';,~~
',n

..
.

.

~IU~':"Wt'" ":"/~:..:.~
~IU~';'"!~t",'
":"/~:. . :.~ ':":"\;L,,;~;~;~:;~~:~;~~:~::"-:·:.~.l,"~
':":"\;L,,;~;~;~:;~~:~;~~:~::"":':,~,l,"~ ;"",,. ~'~:

:(e)
'(e)

:.,v".

I

"

:In this section,.thetoDowIngdeflnitiODB·shall
section,.thetoDowIngdeflnitioDB·shall app!y:,,:
appiy:,,: ',.,;".,.,
II""··.·.··.. ":
,,': "..,.,:
" ....•.. : ';:~';
';:~.';
.1:(1) The·ter~l'''a88etli
.., with respect to 'an iril&7idual.
. ':; ';:(1)
The'.""wet&",
iri!&7idual. includea'iill income and
.'~., resoUreeB
i'esoUreeB of the individUal and:cit·t:!1e
.'~..
and:cit·t:he Individual's spouse; including-'any income 'or
re80urces whic:h the individual or such
resources
BUch individual's spouse is entitled to but'doeB
but 'does no;

.....',

receive'becausebfaction-',
;:;/;';:or~~
receive'because
bf action-', ;:;;:;
';:or~~

~d;.·:~
~d;. ':~

:;{:."
:;{:. " -::
': :

.::~~
'::~ ~ '~'.
.~ '.

':·I,_I,."I}
':./ '_ I,. ! J J

.' . (A) by the individual or 8uch
such individual's spouse.
apoWJe. ,;:'::;.
i.c,;;,;';':!H:
,':c;. i.c':;':';':'H:
' I "','
•

I

"'.'

;.;:.,~~~
;.;:"~~~

, ....,"\:.::.'"'".
"

'--."\:.::.

,,' • •

~ • •..
•
~,
'' ,,"' " ' ....'

'.,'"

'.,'"

".q~:,,".q~?'

," ' .,'...
,
' <~.

"
l' .
.,,;..
'.
•. ,
_ :
:
",i--'

'.

~.
~",

,.

. '(B) bya peraon, . inchidlng.'
a court or administrative body, .with lega
'"..'.··(B)
inchidlng.·&caurl
...
_.. ; ;' ~"authorjty
~"authorjty ~,aetilip1ace
~.actilip1ace of or O,D, ~ehalfof
~ehalfof th~,
th~. individ~
individ~ or B~ individual';
;;::~po~
~~;~;'~:"
_:>,',
.', .
;;::~po~ . ~~r:~':oo,.,--:;::;.'
r:~':"",":;::;,' ~;. ~~;~;'~:"
:<,', .',.
, .;;.',
.;;,', :.,~.;(C)
.. C
:,,~.;(C) by'any
bY'any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at th
,-,-upon the .request.,of
".;.: ,;~direction.
,;~directlon. or
or,.:,uponthe
,request .. of the individual or such,
such. indiYidual'sspouat
individual'sspouat
"(Z)'The terDi'"income"
., "(ZfThe
terDi'"fncome" has the meaning given 8!l1ch
8!llch term.in 8eeti~~'I88ia
8ecti~~'J.88ia of tIi
::"(
~ title:'" '.T~ .."'"j"
.. ~·, -:' :. '..' .. :.:~.,,:
.(:',~; :-:":
;i~T. ~',~"
;;.
~; ,rr::,:":];:.:;, ,~,\J
i;~ ,.
::'(~~ ~title:"·-·T~(
,.,;j" '>~J.~'i:i":~F:
·>~J.~'i:i::~F: "'.: ~i}r,~,:,'
:-!,}r,~':"'''~·,<·:.
:.:~.-: ..•
.....1'r.(:.,~:
"':":;i~r
;;·~;,r!":r:":J::.:;·
.~.\J ;::~~.:
;::~~.:i;~
. (3) The term "iriiItitUtioil8ilieCi'indivfdLlaJ"
"iriiititUtioil8ilieCi'indivfdLlaI" mew an individual 'W
Whohoisis '·ttan inp
tientin a nursing facility; who is an inpatient ·iIl a medical institution and wi'
'. respect- to who
whof]l
Dl payment is .made pased. on a level of care provided in a nursll
.". facility, or who is described in,section
''',
in· section 1396a{a)(lO)(A)(ii)(VI)
1396a(a)(lO)(A)(ii)(VI) of this title.
title•.,:: '.' .
'''~;;:(4)The'temt·~oiliniltitutio~alized individual":~~eaitsan individual ~~ 3l
'''~i;:(4)The'temt'~oiliniltitutio~a1ized
"'ofthEi
L. ':'of
the sei'vfces'speCified
sei'vfees 'speCified in subsection (c)(l)(C)(ii)
(c)(I)(C)(ii) of'this section.;.l..
seetion.;.l.. '!i ~Ie.;,,,,, .l''''
.l'"

' . :':;
;':.; ';'"
';'"...
. . ,', .....
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.;!~.: ~"{5)
~·'{5) 'The tenn "resources" has the meaning given such term in section 1382b of
! ,;,~':
. '.,..!.r.
tJUstitle;'
l.r. this
title;' without· regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to the
the'
:i ':~"exclusioii desCribed in subsection (a)(l) of such section.'
"', ""~'( .', :.':

I (Allg. 14, 1~'~. 58tTW;
58t~ ~;.§
~;,§

1iIl7,'~'~ded
3,'i982;Pu'b;i.;·;r;~, ~e ~:.~:, § 1~(b),
I~(b), 96
1917,'~'~ded
3,'i982;Pu'b;i.:·;r;~,
Jan. 12, 1983, Pub.L.
PubL. &7~ Title nIt §'309(b)(2l),
§'309(b)(21), (22)'
Stat. 370, and amended' JlIIL
(22), 96 Stat. 2410; Dee.
I~203. Title
ntle IV, § 42ll(h)(12)(A), 101 Stat. 1330-20'1;
1330-20'1: Dee. 22;'1981, Pub.L.
PubL.
I 22, 1987, Pnb.L.· 1~203.
ntle IV;·§ 421l(h)(12)(B),
421l(h)(I2)(B), as amended July 1, 19B8,
19138, Pub.L. lr0.300,
Ir0.36O, TitlaIV,
ntlaIV, § 411(0(3)(1),
, 100--203, Title
100-000, Title
ntle III, § 303(1),
3OS(b), 102.Stat. 7.60'.Oct.13,1988,
i "1 102 Stat. 803; July 1,
I, 1988. Pub.L. 100-&10,
7.60•. Oct.13. 1988, Pub.L.
loo-l86,ntle :,Vk § 608(d)(I6)(B),
2417: Dec. :19. 1989, Pnb.L.IOI-239.
Pnb.L.IOI-239, Title VI,
6Oll(d)(I6)(B), 102 Stat. 2417;
10Q-l86,Title
64l1(e)(I), 103 Stat. 2271; .AlIg.
§§136l1(a)to (c).
(e). 13612(a) tA)
I § 64ll(e)(I),
.A1lg. 10, 1998, Pub.L. 103--66, Title XIII, §§136ll(a)to

sePL

I

"(C~,,!:~::~;:!~·;;~~;:'~~~I(:AL'~
(C~ !:~::~;:!~. ;;~~;:'~~~I(:AL'~ STA~:r'~~~~:::,,:;···::~:;~:~~;~;:~{:::Y·:~;~:.~
STA~:r'~~~~:~:,':;" ·::~:;~:~~;~i~{:::Y·:~;~:.~
"

..

LegfaliltfveReport8
IReVision Notes and LegfaliltiveReport8

..-' .. ';·"(B) the'resources were'\I'anlifen'ed
were'\ranIiferred (I) to or
from (or to another for the sole benefit of) the
indlvidilal's spouse, or (II). to the lDdividual's
House Conference Report No. 103-213, see 1998 indlvldilal's
ehild deeen1led
!!.... . U.s. Code Congo and Adm. News; p. m
desenDed in subparagraph (AXii)(Il);".
(AXii){Il);".
":'::~:.::,\.'.' ,
(c)(2)(C).'
AmendmentB ;:' .,'.::~:::.\'.'
. ·!·Subsee..
'!·SubseC. ,."
•. " (e)(2)(C).·
Pub.L.. '103-36,
.
. " ,
~_ts" 'for "re
"Joe.
.
§ 13611(a)(2)(C), substituted .~assets"
]
Amendme.nt&· Sub8ee."(b)(l)..
Sub8ee."(b)(1).. Pub.L.·
Pub,L.· sou~"
sou~" andadded'cl. (iii)." """": .' .
. ..
1993 Amendme.nts.·
threshold age to'66
to'56 .. .
....._.,, .... ...•,
..... ;;1·,','~!~
•., .",~!~ ,.",
103--66, § 13612(a), lowered tJlreshold
,.:" '"
individuals from whom the State wiD
will
. Subsee.·, (c)(2)(D)•..
(c)(2)(D)•.. ·.'. ·.Pnb-L.
·.Pnb.L. ·103--66,
• ..103--66,
from 66 for indlvidualstl'Om
!seek. medicaidesta~
§ 1:S61I(a)(2)(D),
medicaidesta~ ~~, and expanded
1:S611(a)(2)(D), generally ameDded
amended ,.subpar.
~.8Ilbpar.

Ho;;&e' 'Report No. 103-111 and
I 1993 Acta; Ho;;se'

~:cait!m~~~~whl!ovr:;~~ ~~?,:,,~,~e~~~~;~~:,-~~,~
~~?,:;,~.~e~~~~;~~:,-~~,~
I::~ ~:cai~~~~~whl~r:;~~

. .
,~

r

e1igibeneficiaries of long·term care Insurance. .
. "(D): the State determines that denial of eligi103--66. § 136l2(b),
bilit:y would work an undUe hardship." .'
Subsee. (b)(3)",.
(1)(3)",. Pnb.L. 103--66,
bilit;y
ladded~•.(S).:.:;
(S).:,:; .,.,:,." ........ '.' ..... ::
,:
Sqbsec.
(.:)(S).
ladded~
Subsec.
(I:)(S).
Pub.L.
103-36,
t:1611(a)(2)(E), generally amended par.(3).
paI'.(3).
" Subsee. (b)(4). Pub.L. 103-66, § 13612(c),
§ V1611(a)(2)(E),
'added par. (4)•..
.. "
.
Prior to amendment par. (3) read 88'(4)•.. ".
'" , ,', "
".
.
as: follows:
Subsec:.. (e)(1).·
"(3) hi
ID this. subsection, the term 'iDstitution.
(e)(l).· Pub.i: 103-66, '§ 13611(a)(I),
alizI~ individual'
indMdWJl' means lUI
,.,letely
alizI!d
llJI lDdividual wbo ill
is an
'"letely revised par. (1). Prior to the amend·
par. (1) read as
.
nursing facility, who is an lDpa·
lDpa
aa foUOWII:
inpatient iII a D1lJ'5ing
',...rI) In order to meet the requirements of tlent
. ',...rl)
tient in a medical institution and with respect to
this subsection. (for purposes of section '. whom payment is made based on· a level ohare
ofcare
1396a(a)(51)(B) of
this title),
titJe), the State plsn
plan must
1396s(a)(5IXB)
otthis
provided iII :a.nurslDg,faci]ity,
.a.nurslllg.facility, or who is deprovide for a period of Ineligibility for nllJ'Sing
scribed iII section 1396a(a)(lO)(A)(ii)(VI)
nUJ'Sing
1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(Vl) of this
:CaciIlty services li!I
~~e'"''-I;'''':' :.: :,.;;; ii.e:'
...:' . i
I ~ .. ;:1: ',.
':>.
tor a level of care in
lI!Id for
lD a
;medIcal
llUJ'5ing . SlibBeco;:. ,"'(c)(4).
,o'(e)(4). "
Pub.L.·.·· 103-66,
;medlcal institution equivalent to that of Il1lJ'5ing
fscility
facility serviCes and for services under section
1396n(e)
1396n(c) of this title iII
in the'case of an institution. § -I1l611(a)(2XF),:
-18611(a)(2)(F),: added provisions. relating to .
~ .iIldividual
apportionment of period of ineligibility
Ineligibility amongst
.iIldividual (as defined iII 'paragraph (3»
(3»
!'JlOUlI8, st
at any time during' or
spousee..:,' . !n~
!n~,,',.
',;, ....
...' ":;
":: '..,:-.,",",
' .. ,,,.,",,,, ,..•
, ..•if.
rho, or whose !'JlOUll8,
spouses..:,·
.. ' . .
. ',:,
lifter the 3O-month period immediately before
, . SUb~
!Ifter
Sub~ (d);' ,~~L.
.~~L. 1~,
1~. §: 1361I(b};
13611(b}; added
~~~~:~~~=:uanis~~~
•...::.:'
~~~~:~~~=:uanis~~~ subsee,.(d):, ;~".: """~ ,: ..;.. ;.'::.:'
llI
State plan on such
s~ (e). ;_~.L. 10lHi6,§'
10:Hi6.§' 13611(c),
;nedica1
asillst.anee under the Stateplsn
S~
13611(41), added
edica1 asS!stance
,late)
BUbaee. (e)_ .~.~'..:::~.
...:::~. ,
"T,
i ;
.Jate) or, if the individual is not. 80 entitled,. the
'-T,
.•. :~;!

·s

means

:.: :,.;;;

an

I ..

~~:!~~~~~: Effective~' .~1"·';
.~1""; ,,:'~,;:;; ,;. ';:;'~i~:c"'
·;:;'~i~:.c".
i:e~ ~~:=~~~~~:

":,:1993 Aetid!ectitin 13611(e)"of PubL.I0S-66
:;:a~=;~~~:ua:~~~v:s.mo~~~=J:i:~~l361I(e)O~
pioov:ided that: '.: ,,~ ::.
_"~~:
' . . 1~
.

resources forleas·than·rair market value. The
')eriod of ineligibility 8hall begin with the month
fI whlch such' resources were transferred and
,he'number of'months
sba1l be
of'monthS in such period shall
t!qual to the leaser
o1
fcO
.!qual
teaser 0
-:
:"
" .,»
'''(AfSOmonths,'ilr
. '. ",\
,,"
'"(AfSOmonths,';,r ".'
"(B): Ii) the total uncompensated value' of
i, the resGU1'C8S'
resources· so transferred, divided by (ii)
!l the average cost,
cost. to a private patient :at the',
the",
time of the application,
application. of nllJ'Sing
nUJ'Sing facility seraervices.in the S~. or, at.Stateoption, iII the
i community in :Rhlch
:-"hlch ~e lDdividuai i8 instituinstitu.
i tionalized.'~ :·',':'i....
'".:~ ::.".......
,:."".:... .. ,,':, __.;;
,..
:·"':'i,:.",,:~
__ ';;:..
,Subsee. ",: (c)(2)(A). " ..Pnb.L.
"Pnb.L. . I~,
l~,
§ 1361l(a)~)(A),. substituted "a.ssets".
"assets". for "re"Joe.
sources"., ;", .. :.' ...,...
...:;:; '....'
... ,. ... ,~,....
' . ',.' .... ,'....
Subsec..
. · PnbL. . 103-$.
Subsec.. ",:
".; (c)(2)(13).,:
(c)(2)(13)•. ,:,'
10S-$.
. 1361l(a)(2)(B);
136U(a)(2)(B); generally amended par. (2)(13).
(2)<B).
_Mor to amendment par. (2)(13) read as foUows:
.. _Mor

til

I

.,.:

~ . "(:I)
"(:l) The. amendments made' by this Section
[amending
eubsecs..(d)
[limending aubsec.(c)and eMcting
eMeting subsees..(d)
and (e) of this Bectlon
Beetlon and amendiDg
amendlDg Bect:ions
8ect:ions
l396a and·,l396r-6
1396a
and·,I396r-6 of this titJe)..shall
titJejsball apply,
excellt ,88 provided iII· this .subseetion,
eJ[cellt
.subseetioll, to payments under title XIX of the Social Security Act
Jthla.,
Jthla.. subchapter] foj- caJendar quarters beginbegin.
niDg on' Or after October 1, 1993, without regard
to whether or not final regulations
regulatiollll to canyOut
.'such
such amendments have been 'promUlgated by
such date.
.., .
.' "'.
• "(2) The amendments lIIIIde
made by this section
[amending
[ameJlding subsec. (e) and enacting subsecs.
subeecs. (d)
and· (e) of this section and amending sections
. 189&,
189&. and 1395r-5
13961'-5 of tIP title]
title} shall
sha1l nat apply
apply. . i·,':'(Ai
aer
i'" .:'(Ai to{i;eweaJ
to{i;.!dical a8sistan~
a8aistan~ Provtdecffor aer... vW!S·.furnished.before
victlS.furnished.before October 1, 1993,.,",
1993,.,_,
..
263'"
,......
. .. '..".
. . ................
' .. ,'.
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HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

R.eports
Notell and Legislative Reports
'~~': . ~:~: 1'182 Act. Senate Report No. 97-494
~;;g:(;f 'and House Conference Report No.
.97-760, see 1982 U.S.Cooe
U_5.Code CoI1!:. and
~)~,97-760,
',' ,Adm.News, p. 781.
i:r;WAdm.News,
" ".. 1'183 Act. Senate Report No. !>7-592
·:~r$.~;'··1'183
t~lL ,and House Conference Report No.
.~~'1\97-986, see 1982 U.S.Code Congo and
,,"Ulll.I''':;W''. p. 4149.
ittt?;'Adm.News.
1f;j.:~:1987 Act. House Report No. 100-391
"lw.t/(Parls I and II) and House Conference
~~K:Report No. 100-495, see 1987 U.S.Code
~~,:.r . Cong. and Adm.News, p. 2313-1.
:~~~!i'188 Acts. House Report No.
,)1*0;, 100-105(1). (II) and House Conference
_. . Report 1(){Hi61,
988 USC
~
.vv-VU'~. see 1
1988
U.S.Code
Congo
;1:';:.,
. . 0 de !.,;ong.
\"')'"
d Adm.News. p. 8
'.
803.
::t~,·i..,.an Adm.News,
03.
i!I~"X'
Report No.
No. 100-377,
100-377, House
House
1iJ'&(,i':. Senate Report
C'.n1nf"r"r,r.l' Report No. 100-998, see
:f;\~iConference
~~~.j1988 U.S.Code Congo and Adm.News, p.

;;~Jij!. ~776.

. "':7:;1'189
1'189 Act. House Report No,
No. 101-247,
101--386,
Report ,No. 101-·386,
House Conference Repon
and Statement by President, see 1989
U.S. Code Cong. and Adm.News,
Adm.News. p. 1906.
U.S.Code
b;:.
iL
CodlficatlO1l1l
CodlficaU01l1l ..

Pub.I..
100-203,
Title
IV,
~~, Pub.I..
100-203.
Title
IV.
4211
Dec. 22, 1987.
1987, 101 Stat.
§ 421l(h)(12)(A),
provided
that
subsec.
.:133~207,,
provided
that
subsec.
amended by
by striking
striking out
out
.'{c)(2)(B)(i)
{c)(2)(B)(i) is amended
"skilled nursing facility, intermediate
.care facility" and inserting "nursing fa.
facility, intermediate care facility for the
""entally retarded" in lieu thereof, and
;:~:::::~:!.lj'
IV,'
Pub.L.
100-203,
Title
IV,
§ 4211(h)(12)(B),
(h)(12)(B), Dec. 22,1987,
22, 1987. 101 Stat.
13:ID-207.
l""'~.L'oJl, as amended Pub.L. 100-360,
·tl IV
I 11, 1988
102
IV. § 411(1)(3)(1)
411(1)(3)(1). JJuly
Ie,
y. 1988,
•
subsec.
stat.
803. provided• U that
by striking out
(c)(2)(B)(ii),
r.li'·",'
..",,,,, is amended oy
killed" each place it appears, which
. ndments could not be executed in
~,enclmEmts
. of complete amendment of sub~ec.
sub~ec.
by Pub.L. 100-360, § 303(b).
",.'

endments
198'1 Amendment. Subsec. (c)(l).
Pub,L. 101-239, § 6411(e)(I)(A),
6411(e)(1)(A), inserted
-.Ol"Wlno.:e
~or'whose spouse," following "an institu·
p.oIlaltzea
,'onallzed individual
Individual (as defined in parapara·
. ph (3)). who,".
··;bsec. (c)(2)(B)(i). Pub.L. 101-239,
1(e)(1)(B)(i), substituted "(i) to or
411(e)(1)(B)(i).
in (or to another for the sole benefit
or" for "(i)"to
the individual's spouse, or"
"(i) 'to
. to another for the sole benefit of) the

community spouse, as defined in section
1396r-5(h)(2) of this title,,".
Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.L. 101-239,
§ 6411(e)(1)(B)(ii).
6411(e)(l)(B)(ii), struck out d. (iii)
which contained materia!
material relating to
transfer of resources to person other
than a spouse for less than fair market
value.
1988 Amelldments. Subsec. (c)(I).
(c)(1).
Pub.L. 100-485, § 608(d)(l6)(B)(i),sub.
608(d)(l6)(B)(i),subnursstituted "period of ineligibility for nurs
ing facility services and for a level of
care in a medical institution equivalent
to that of nursing facility services and
for services under section 1396n(c) of
institutionalthis title in the case of an institutional
ized
(as defined in paragraph
() individual
h
(3»
who,
3)w
o. at any time during or after the
30-month period immediately before the
date the individual becomes an institu.
institutionalized individual (if the individual is
entitled to medical assistance under the
indio
or, if the indiState plan on such date) or.
vidual is not so entitled, the date the
individual applies for such assistance
while an institutionalized individual" for
"period of ineligibility in the case of an
institutionalized individual (as defined
in paragraph (3»
dur
(3» who, at any time during the 30-month
3~month period immediately
before the individual's application for
medical assistance under the State plan".
Pub.I.. 100-360. § 303(b). substituted
ineliprOvisions establishing a period of ineli·
provisions
gibility for institutionalized individuals
who, at any time during the 3D-month
individu·
period immediately before the individu
aI's application for medical assistance
ai's
under the State plan.
reo
plan, disposed of resources for less than fair market value
asfor provisions for denial of medical as·
sistance for any individual who would
not be eligible for such assistance except
for such disposition.
100-.360,
Puh.L. . 100-360,
Subsec.
(c)(2). Pub.L.
§ 303(b).
303(b), substituted provisions that an
individual shall not be ineligible for
medical assistance by reason of par. (1)
to the extent that the resources transfer
transferred were a home and title to the home
was transferred to certain individuals,
individuals.
the resources were transferred to (or
(.or to
another for the sole benefit of) the comcom
spouse, or the individual's child
munity spouse.
who is blind or permanently and totally
disabled, a satisfactory showing was
made to the State that the individual
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intended to dispose of the resources ei·
ther at fair market value or for other
consideration, or the resources
valuable consideration.
were transferred exclusively for a pur,
purpose other than to qualify for medical
assistance. or the State determines that
undenial of eligibility would work an un
due hardship for provisions which em
empowered States to establish periods of
, I' 'b'l'ty in
. excess off 24
ths 'in
months
ineligibility
me 19I 1 1 In
excess 0 24 mon
In
any case in which the uncompensated
value of disposed of resources exceeded
$12.000 or the property was disposed of
value.
for less than fair market value,
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(ii).
(c)(2)(A)(ii). Pub,L.
Subsec.
Pub.L. 100-485,
100-485.
608(d)(16)(B)(ii). designated
§§ 608(d)(16)(B)(ii).
designated existing
existing
provisions
in
part
as
subcls.
(l)
and
(II).
provisions in part as subcls. (l) and (II),
respectively.
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iii).
(c)(2)(A)(iii). Pub.L
Subsec.
Pub.L 100-485,
100-485.
608(d)(I6)(B)(iii), substituted
§§ 608(d)(I6)(B)(iii),
substituted "the
"the in
individual becomes an institutionalized in
individual" for "of the individual's admis
admisnurs·
sion to the medical institution or nurs
facility",
ing facility".
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iv).
(c)(2)(A)(iv). Pub.L
Pub.L 100-485,
100-485,
Subsec.
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(iv).
in608(d)(16)(B)(iv), substituted "the in
institutionalize<! in
individual becomes an institutionalize<l
dividual" for "of such individual's admis
admisnurssion to the medical institution or nurs
ing facility".
Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub.L. 100-485,
100-485.
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(v).
608(d)(l6)(B)(v). designated existing
provisions in part as d. (0.
(I). adde<l
adde<! cl.
d. (ii),
(ii),
and struck out "or the individual's child
who is blind or permanently and totally
disable<!"
following
disable<l"
Nsection
1396r-5(h)(2)
IJ96r-5(h)(2) of this
Ihis title,".
Subsec.
(c)(J). Pub.I..
100-485,
Subsec.
(c)(3).
Pub.L
100-485.
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(vi).
qualifie<! definition
608(d)(l6)(B)(vi), qualifie<l
of "institutionalized indIvidual" to pro
provide that inpatients in medical institu
institutions must be those with respect to
whom payment is made based on a level
of care provided in a nursing facility,
facility.
and included within the definition per
perin
section
sons
described
1396a(a)(lO)(A)(ii)(VI) of this title.
1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VI)
Pub.I.. 100-360,
100-360. § 303(b),
Pub.L
303(b). substituted
definition of the term "institutionalized
individual" for provision that in any case
where an individual was ineligible for
plan
medical assistance under the State pian
solely because of the applicability to
such individual of the provisions of sec
sec·
tion 1382b(c) of this title. the State plan
could provide for the eligibility of such
individual for medical assistance under
the plan if such individual would have

requirebeen so eligible if the State plan require
re·' ,
ments with respect to disposal of re,"
sources applicable under paragraphs '(1)
subsc<:tion had been ap
apand (2) of this subse<:tion
plied in lieu of the provisions of section:
.. ,
1382b(c) of this title.
Subsec.
(c)(4). l'ub.L.
l>Ub.L.
100-360•.'
100-360,
§§ 303(b).
303(b). added
added par,
par. (4).
(4).
.""
~i •
J'uh.L.
100-485.·.'
Subsec.
(c)(5). J'ub.L.
100-485,·.·
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(vii),
608(d)(16}(B}(vii). added par. (5).
"::"""~l
"'::"""'~I
1987
Amendment.
Subsec:
(a)(l)(B)(i).
Pub.L.
100-203, .
§ 4211(h)(I2)(A),
4211(h)(12)(A). suhstituted "nursing
facility. intermediate
intermediate cure
cure facility
facility for
for the
the
facility,
mentally retarded"
retarded" for
fof' "skilled
"skilled nursing"
nursing"'
mentally
,:)
facility. intermediate
intermediate care
care facility"..
facility'· .. :.' .... ,:)
facility,
1983 Amendment. Subsec. (b)(2)(B).
309(b)(21). substituted
substituted
Pub.L. 97-448,
97-448. §§ 309(b)(21),
Pub,L.
"who" for
for "and"
"and" preceding
preceding "has
"has lawfullY
lawfullY"who"
re
es
si
id
de
ed
d.
..
..
.·
·:
: ',,,
',,, 't't
r
Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.L. 97-448; ,',<':
§ 309(b)(22).
309(b)(22), substituted in subcl. (1)"
(1),
"can" for "cannot" and deleted from'
subd. (IV)
(IV) the
the introdu,c;tory
introdu·c;tory word
word "if~:
"if~::
subd.
"l
EffecUve Dates
,~.~
,":,~
Pub.Lo'
1989 Act. Amendment by Pub.I..'
101-239 amending subsec. (c)(1) and'
(2)(B)(i),
(2)(B)(I), (ii) and striking subsed .
(c)(2)(B)(iii),
(c)(2)(B)(iii). applicable to transfers oc-,
oe-, :,
19. 1989, see section :.
curring after Dec. 19,
101-239. set out asa .'
6411(e)(4) of Pub.L. 101-239,
139(;a of this title;
title.;
note under section 139tia
1988 Ae:ts.
Ac:ts. Amendment by Pub.L:
100-485 effective as if included in the'
enactment of Pub.I..
Pub.L 100-360,
100-360. see section .;.~
608(g)(I)
608(g)(1) of Pub.I..
Pub.L 100-485. set out as'
title. ' ,:: ~
note under section 704 of this title...
secti,)n 30J(b)
303(b) ','of'
'··of'
Amendment by' secti"n
Pub.L. 100-360 applicable to resourceS: .'
disposed of on or after July 1.
I. 1988",.,
1988., .. '
except tbat such subsection,
subsection. as' so
amended, shall not apply with respect to
inter·spousal
inter-spousal transfers occurring befor~
befor~
October 1. 1989,
1989. and to payments under:
this subchapter for calendlU' quarters be- .:
ginning on or after July 1.
I, 1988 (except
in certain situations requiring State leg
legislative action),
action). without re!lard to wheth
whether or not final regulations to carry out'
such amendment have heen promul.
gated by such date (with an exception
for resources disposed of before July 1.
I,
1988),
1988). see section 303(g)(2), (5) of Pub.L.
100-360, set out as a note under section
1396r-5 of this t i t l e . - - :
1987 Act. Amendment: by Pub.t.·
Pub.L.·
100-203 applicable to nw'sing
nW'sing facility

a

764

000381

APPENDIX - D

000382

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HOUSE REPORT NO.

10~105(II)
10~105(II)

[page 65]

:;:.
'.'~

...
, .. ,

:'::.
:'::,

,,",'" 1
..,''''
,."
.:J
•• " ,:J
·:C~:.;
':C~:.;

.,.:~ 'f
.":,
,''
.,...-.' "'
.".,-".

..

.""
,"" ....

"

~1.': ~ .::
l1.':~

,

encompass a range of issues with respect to access, quality, financfinanc
ing, and other aspects of long-term care.
Protection of income and resources of couple for maintenance of
community spouse (section 214)
among the elderly is
The leading cause of financial catastrophe aniong
especiaUy the need for nursing home
the need for long-term care, especially
rangeplacement. The expense of nursing home care-which can range
from $2,000 to $3,000 per month or more-has the potential for
rapidly depleting the lifetime savings of all but the wealthiest.
nursEven under the Committee's bill, Medicare's expanded skilled nurs
ing facility benefits will not protect the elderly against the costs of
long-term institutionalization. Private insurance coverage for nursnurs·
ing home costs is not ~enerally
~enerally available. For most of the elderly,
the Medicaid program 18 the only third party source of payment for
nursing home care.
Medicaid, a means-tested entitlement program, requires that the
qualelderly or disabled nursl~ngoine resident be poor in order to qual
li its the income that an institutionalized
ify for coverage. It also Ii
comspouse may make avail Ie for the spouse remaining in the com
munity. If the instituti nalized spouse receives the pension and
other income in his name, this limit may have the effect of impovimpov
erishing the spouse in the community. The purpose of the Commit·
communitee bill is to end this pauperization by assuring that the communi
ty spouse has a sufficient-but not excessive-amount of income
and resources available to her while her spouse is in a nursing
home at Medicaid expense. This will be of particular benefit to
older women, who, in the current generation at risk of nursing
famihome care, have often worked at home all their lives raising fami
lies and have limited income other than their husbands' pension
checks.
Current law.-To determine how much is available for the com~
munity spouse to live on when her elderly spouse in the nursing
whethhome applies for Medicaid, it is necessary first to determine wheth
er the institutionalized spouse is eligible for Medicaid based on
necesincome and resources. If eligibility is established, it is then neces
sary to determine how much of the institutionalized spouse's
monthly income is to be applied to the cost of nursing home care,
and how much is to be available to the community spouse.
MedicEligibility standards.-ln general, in order to qualify for Medic
aid, an individual must be categorically related-that is, be aged,
blind, disabled, or a member of a family with dependent children
childrenand must meet certain income and resources standards.
assistIn most States, elderly or disabled people receiving cash assist
ance under the Supplemental Security Income (SS!) program are
automatically eligible for Medicaid. Aged or disabled individuals
may receive SSI benefits if their countable income and countable
resources do not exceed specified standards. The basic SSl income
standard for an individual in 1987 is $340 per month, but many
States have elected to supplement this benefit with their own
funds. ThE~ basic SSI resource standard for an individual in 1987 is
$1,800. In determining countable resources, a number of items are
excluded, including the individual's home (of any value), household
goods and personal effects worth less than $2,000, an automobile
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with a market value of $4,500 or less, and up to $1,500 in life insur
insurance or burial funds.
Not all States automatically extend Medicaid coverage to SSI
beneficiaries. In about 14 States, known as "209(b)" States, eligibil·
eligibility standards, 'jarticularly
'jarticularlY resource rules, more restrictive than
those under S8 are applied to the elderly or disabled. In about 35
States, elderly individuals who are not poor enough to qualify for
S81,
expenses. such as nurs
nurslarge, recurring medical expenses,
881, but who have large.
ing home bills, qualify for Medicaid as "medically needy." Finally,
abo!1t 30 States offer coverage, on· an "optional categorically
abo!lt
needy" basis.
basis, to nursing home residents whose incomes faIl below a
State-establi:3hed
State-establi:shed special income level no higher than 300 percent
of the basic SSI
881 benefit level ($1,020 per month in 1987).
There are roughly 1.5 million Medicaid beneficiaries in nursing
homes, whether skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) or intermediate
aCFs). Less than one-fourth of those are poor enough
care facilities (lCFs).
to qualify for S8I
581 cash assistance. The remaining three-fourths are
eligible either as "medically needy" or "optional categorically
needy." Individuals who qualify for Medicaid in nursing homes on
either of thl~se
thl~se bases must apply a certain portion of their income
toward the eost
post-eligibilcost of their nursing home care. It is these post-eligibil
ity rules, in combination with the rules for attributing income and
resources, that give rise to the problem of "spousal impoverish
impoverishment."
.
ment."
Attribution of incom.e.-When one spouse enters a nursing home
(or other institution) and applies for Medicaid, the following rule
determines the amount of that spouse's income for eligibility pur
purposes. Shortly after institutionalization,each spouse is treated as a
penseparate household. Income-generally Social Security checks, pen
sions, and interest or dividends from investments-is considered to
belong to the spouse whose name is on the instrument conveying
the funds (in the case of Social Security checks, the amount attrib
attribbeneuted to each spouse is the individual's share of the couple's bene
fit). Thus, in a case where a couple's pension check is made out to
the husband, if the husband enters a nursing home, all of the
income is considered his for purposes of determining eligibility. If
the wife in this case enters the nursing home, however, none of the
income is considered hers, and the husband is under no obligation
under Federal law to contribute any of his income toward the cost·
of her care. (However, some States do impose spousal contribution
requirements in these circumstances).
......:The rule for attributing resources is
Attribution of resources
resources......:The
basically the same as that for attributing income. Of course, the
only resources that are~ttributed
comare~ttributed are countable resources, com
investmonly liquid assets like savings accounts, mutual fund invest
followments, certificates of depo ~t, etc.
ete. Generally, in the month follow
ing institutionalization, resources to which a spouse has unrestrict·
unrestricted access, including joint savings accounts, are considered available
to that spouse for eligibility purposes. Thus, if resources are held
solely by the institu,tionalized
institu.tionalized spouse, they are attributed to him
for eligibility purposes. If the resources are jointly held, they are
also consid,ered to belong entirely to the institutionalized spouse, on
the theory that he or she has an unrestricted right to use them. If
the assets :are held solely by the community spouse, however, they

889

000384

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HOUSE REPORT NO. 100-105(II)
100--105(II)

[page 67]

are considf1red, after the first month, to belong to her. There is no
obIigati,...
obligati"', under Federal law on the part of the community spouse
to cont'.ibute
cont·.ibute any amounts of resources toward the costs of care of
th~
lllstitutionalized spouse. In the view of the Department, these
thtl !l1stitutionalized
attribution rules apply in all States, including those with communi
community property laws: this Departmental interpretation 'is currently the
subject of liti~ation.
liti~ation.
Transfer
resources. -States have the option of denying Medic
Medicreaid eli!pbility to individuals who have transferred countable ra-
applysources for less than fair market value within two years of apply
ing for Medicaid. In the SSI
881 program, the uncompensated value of
the resource is counted for 24 months from the month the resource
was disposed of, regardless of the amount at issue. States can be
less restrictive than 881, but they can also be more restrictive as
well. Where the value of the resorces
resOl"Ces for which no compensation
was received exceeds $12,000, the State may deny eligibility for
more than 24 months, beginning with the date of the transfer.
States may waive this penalty in cases where undue hardship
would result. In the case of transfers of an individual's home to
someone other than a spouse or minor or disabled child, the period
for which eligibility is denied, if any, must be based on the rela
relationship between the value of the home for which no compensation
was received and the average Medicaid expenditure for' nursing
home care. States cannot deny eligibility if the individual intended
to dispose of the home at fair market value or if denial would
cause undue hardship.
hardship.
Post-eligibility application of income.-Once an institutionalized
applispouse has established eligibility for Medicaid by meeting the appli·
cable income and resource standards, some of his monthly income
is reserved for his use and that of his spouse, and the rest is ap
appost-eUgibility income
plied to the cost of nursing home care. These post-eligibility
"medirules apply whether the spouse qualifies for Medicaid as a "medi·
cally needy" or "optional categorically needy" individual. From the
gross monthly income of the institutionalized spouse are deducted
the following amounts, in the following order. First, there is ra-
reserved fc:rr the institutionalized spouse a persona! needs allowance
for clothing and other expenses of at least $25. Second, there is set
aside an allowance for the maintenance needs of the communit,Y
spouse. This amount, combined with the community spouse s
income, if any, allows the community spouse a certain amount of
income, or maintenance needs level. Third, if the institutionalized
spouse has a family' at home, an amount is set aside for the mainte-
maintenance of the family. Finally, an amount is allowed for expenses in
incurred for medical care that is not covered by the State's Medicaid
plan or by Medicare or other third party. Any income remaining
after these deductions is used to reduce the~mount
the~mount that the Medic
Medicaid program pays to the nursing home for the care of the institu
institutionalized spouse.
Under current regulations, the mainten ce needs level for the
community spouse, may not exceed the hig est of the SSI, State
supplemEmtation, or "medically needy" income standard in the
State. As the follQwing table, based on a March 1987, survey con
conducted by the American Association of Retired Persons, indicates,
these' community spouse maintenance needs levels vary greatly
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Community spowse maintenatlCe
maintena1lCe needs lerJe18

...

e-

State:
.II=~
-U.kveJ
$340
Alabama .............................................................................................................
Alaska.................................................................................................................
682
Alaska
682
(1)
Arirona ...............................................................................................................
Arirona
Arkansas.............................................................................................................
188
Arkansas
188
Cali~ornia ......................................................;... _................................................
534
Colorado...............................................................................................................
Colorado
229
Connecticut ......................................................................................................-_ 375-450
Dels·ware............................................................................................................
Dela·wllre
..
164
District of Columbia .........................................................................................
362
340
Florida ................................................................................................................
Georgia......................................................................
..........................................
Georgia.
340
Hawaii.................................................................................................................
300
Hawaii
Idaho ....... ,..........................................................................................................
Up to 393
393
,
. Up
illinois
Dlinois .................................................................................................................
267
Indilma............................,,...................................................................................
340
Iowa....................................................................................................................
Iowa
..
340
Kansas ......................... .......................................................................................
..
341
192
187
Maine...................................................................................................................
350
Maine
·Maryland
.
·Maryland...........................................................................................................
325
Massachusetts.....................................................................................................
354
Massachusetts
Michigan.............................................................................................................. 358-370
Michigan
Minnesota...........................................................................................................
Minnesota
397
JlaintenaACl!
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340

New Jersey
Jersey..........................................................................................................
New Mexico ........................................................................................................

New York
york............................................................................................................

North Carolina.................................................................................................
Carolina
.
North Dakota .....................................................................................................
Ohi.o
.
Ohlo....................................................................................................................
OkJahoma
OkJahoma...........................................................................................................
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~:~;i'.;~i;·:::::::::::::::=::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
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Montana .............................................................................................................
Nebraska
Nebraska.............................................................................................................
Neyada ................................................................................................................
New Hampshire .................................................................................................
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from S te to State. The maintenance needs level is the total of the
amount of the community spouse's income and the amount set
aside from the income of the institutionalized spouse. Thus, in a
State with a maintenance needs level of $340, if the community
contrispouse receives a monthly Social Security check of $150, the contri
bution from the institutionalized spouse is $190, not $340.
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South Carolina ............................................................................. ,.....................
South Dakota
Dakota......................................................................................................

Tennessee ............................................................................................................
Tennessee
Texas
.
Texas..................................................................................................................

'J

'j:

,

~!g

340

340
375
173
354
372
872
340
417
233

345
258
258

·0o

342

M~

373

475
340

257
257

150

340
340

Utah .............................................. ~~.....................................................................

289
398
217-325

;=o~rt~~~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

!~
442
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State
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W:roming
Wyoming ..................................:........................................................................

200

195

operates, under demonstration authority. 8a Medicaid program that does not cover
Amona operaleol.
nursing home or other long.term care benefit8.
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Court-ordered support. -In some cases, courts have issued orders
against institutionalized spouses requiring them to make monthly
comsupport payments in certain amounts to their spouses in the com
munity. The policy of the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) is that, notwithstanding such an order, the income of the
institutionalized spouse is to be considered available to him for pur
purposes of determining the amount of his contribution toward the
cost of nursing home care. The only part of his income which
HCFA policy acknowledges as available to the community spouse is
the specified maintenance needs allowance. This interpretation is
the subject of litigation.
Committee bill. -The improvement of individuals whose spouses
justifireside in nursing homes and receive Medicaid benefits is not justifi·
able. The current maintenance needs levels for community spouses,
which are limited by current Federal regulation, are inadequate. In
some cases, they have forced community spouses, in desperation, to
sue their husbands for support. The financial duress that these low
maintenancE~ needs levels impose on the community spouse may, in
certain cases, even force the premature institutionalization of that
spouse.
The Committee bill would end spousal impoverishment. It revises
the current Federal requirements relating to attribution of income,
attribution of resources, transfer of resources, and post-eligibility
application of income. These revisions are limited to the context of
rea couple with one spouse in an institution who applies for or re
ceives Medicaid. The purpose of these revisions is to assure that
the community spouse in these circumstances has income and re
resources sufficient .to live with independence and dignity.
This bill establishes a uniform national spousal protection f-0licy
~olicy
that applies in all States, whether they are "SSI," "209(b),"
"209(b)," I medi
medically needy," or "special income level" States, and whether or not
they are community property jurisdictions. Should Arizona at some
demonstrapoint offer nursing home coverage through its Medicaid demonstra
tion, these rules would ~pply to it as well.
The bill allows an institutionalized spouse to elect to be governed
by the rules that were in effect in his State as of March 1, 1987,
regarding the treatment of income, the protection of income for the
community spouse, the transfer of resources to the community
spouse. The purpose of this election is to assure that the bill does
not inadvertently make a community spouse worse off than under
current law with respect to protected income of with respect to the
minimum protected resource level of $12,000. This election could be
used by the institutionalized spouse either to increase the amount
of income or resources available to the community spouse or to
reduce it, thereby allowing the community spouse· to qualify for
Medicaid or other public assistance benefits herself. However, the
bill does not permit either the institutionalized spouse or the com
community spouse to opt out of the rules regarding the treatment of
countable resources at the time of initial eligibility determination,
which impose, in effect, a maximum protected countable resource
limit of $48,000 on the 'community spouse.
Eligibility standards.-The bill does not alter income or resource
standards for MedicaId eligibility of the institutionalized spouse.
Thus, if the current resource standard is $1,800, it would remain
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$1,800 under this bill. Similarly, the bill generally does not alter
current law as to what income or resources are countable, and
princiwhich are not, or how income or resources are valued. The princi
pal exception to this relates to the exemption for household goods
and personal effects for the limited purpose of attributing resources
at the time of institutionalization. The spousal protection rules in
this bill apply regardless of whether the institutionalized spouse
has qualified for Medicaid by meeting the eligibility standards as a
categorically needy, optional categorically needy, or medically
needy individual.
Attribution of income.-During any month that a spouse enters a
nursing home, hospital, or other institution, the following attribu
attribution rules apply for purposes of determining eligibility. Income paid
solely in the name of one spouse or the other is considered to
belong to that respective spouse. Thus, no income paid solely to the
community spouse is considered available to the institutionalized
spouse for eligibility purposes,
purposes. If the income is paid in the names of
both spouses, half is considered available to the community spouse,
and half to the institutionalized spouse. If income is paid in the
name of either spouse and another person or persons, the income is
considered available to each individual names in equal proportionproportion
al shares, unless the instrument controlling the income specifically
otherwise provides. The same principles apply in the case of
income from trust property. In the case of income from a trust
where there is no instrument establishing ownership, half of the
income is attributed to the institutionalized spouse and half to the
community spouse. These attribution rules are subject to rebuttal
by the institutionalized spouse upon a showing, by preponderance
of the evidence, that ownership interests are otherwise.
deAttribution of resources.-The following rules would apply in de
termining the amount of countable resources at the time of appliappli
cation for Medicaid benefits by the institutionalized spouse. First, a
determination would be made of the total value of all the countable
communiresources held by either the institutionalized spouse, the communi
ty spouse, or both, on the day the institutionalized spouse began
the continuous period of institutionalization during which he apap
plies for Medicaid benefits. Any countable resources belonging to
either or both spouses would be included in this detennination, in
including resources from inheritance or previous marriages. For this
purpose only, the current limit of $2,000 on the equity value of the
inapexemption for household goods and personal effects would be inap
plicable. Thus, all household goods and personal effects, regardless
of value, would not be counted among the resources attributed to
the couple or either spouse at the time of institutionalization for
purposes of determining eligibility.
One half of the value of all these resources, known as the spousal
SharE!, would be attributed to each spouse. If the spousal share of
the community spouse were less than $12,000, the institutionalized
comspouse would be allowed to transfer a sufficient amount to the com
munity spouse to enable her to hold countable resources in her
own name of a' total of $12,000. The institutionalized spouse would
not be required to make this transfer; however, any resources not
solely in the ownership of the community spouse would be attrib
attributed to the institutionalized spouse and, to the extent they exceedexceed
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ed the applicable resource standard (generally $1,800), would
render the institutionalized spouse ineligible for Medicaid.
If the spousal share of the community spouse were greater than
$48,000, the institutionalized spouse would have attributed to him,
for purposes of determining eligibility, both his own spousal share
and the resources attributed to the community spouse in excess of
$12,000 pro
pro$48,000. 1'his $48,000 limit represents four times the $12.000
tected resource level. In 1989 and each year thereafter, these dollar
conamounts would be increased by the percentage increase in the con
COllsumers for each year since Sep
Sepsumer price index for all urban consumers
tember 1987.
subseThe attribution of resources into spousal shares, and the subse
quent imposition of limits on the community spouse's shares, would
occur only once, at the time of initiaJ application. After the month
eligibilin which an institutionalized spouse has met the resource eligibil
ity standard and is determined to be eligible for benefits, no rere
sources of the community spouse.
spouse, regardless of value, would
w()uld be con
considered available to the institutionalized spouse. Thus. if while the
care of the institutionalized spouse is being paid for by Medicaid,
Medicaid.
the community spouse's countable resources grow to exceed the
limit. the State would not be authorized to require
$48,000 initial limit,
the community spouse to apply any excess toward the cost of care
of the institutionalized spouse.
institutionalThe Committee observes that, in many cases, the institutional
pplY . for Medicaid benefits until months after
ized spouse m. a......y.y. not a. pply
.. hisadmission to a nursing home. Often these individuals and their
. ..hisadmission
spouses have "spent down" a significant amount of their life savsav
couings to pay the nursing home charges. Repeated division of the cou
ple's total resources into equal spousal shares at each application
or reapplication for benefits would result in the pauperization of
the community spouse.
spouse, as the couple's total resources would effec
effectively be reduced to twice the resource eligibility standard,
standard. generalgeneral
ly $3600, before the institutionalized spouse qualified for Medicaid.
Precisely the opposite result is intended b,;r
bl the Committee. For this
reason, the bill requires, .,n effect, that a 'snapshot" of the couple's
total resources be taken at the time of initial institutionalization,
and that attribution of resources into spousal shares proceed on the
basis of that "snapshot;'
"snapshot," regardless of the point at which the insti
institutionalized spouse actually files application for benefits. The Com
Committee expects that the States, in reconstructing the couple's rere
unreason
sources at the time of institutionalization, will not apply unreason-
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Post-eligibility application of ineome.-After an institutionalized
spouse has met the resOUrce
resource and income criteria for eligibility, the
income attributed to that spouse would be applied as follows each
month. (The rules relating to attribution of income for purposes of
determination of eligibility, described above, would also apply for
purposes of post-eligibility treatment of income). From the institu
institutionalized spouse's income, the following amounts would be deduct
deducted, in the following order. First, at least $25 would be reserved for
that spouse's personal needs. Second, a community spouse monthly
income aHowance
allowance 'would be set aside. Third, a family allowance
would be deducted for each minor or dependent child. dependent
parent, or dependent sibling of either spouse living with the com
corn-

(

wil

not
par
COll
cou
mo
mu
as
cou
spa
con

894

000389

MEDICARE CAT. COVERAGE ACT
P.L. 100-360
[page 72]

munity spouse. Finally, there would be deducted amounts for in
incurred expenses for medical care for the institutionalized spouse
not paid for by Medicaid, Medicare, or another liable third party.
The community spouse monthly income allowance is the amount
needed to bring the community spouse's monthly income, including
any income otherwise available to her, up to a minimum level.
This minimum level is defined as the sum of (1) an amount equal
to 150 percent of the Federal poverty guidelines for a family of two,
or $925 per month in 1987; (2) an excess shelter allowance (the
amount by which mortgage expenses or rent, plus utility costs,
exceed 30 percent of the amount in (1); and (3) one-half of the
amount by which the income of the institutionalized spouse ex
exceeds the sum of amounts (1) and (2). The community spouse's min
minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance may not exceed $1500
per month. In 1989 and each year thereafter, this amount would be
increased by the percentage increase in the consumer price index
for all urban consumers for each year since September 1987. This
$1500 limit applies only to the amount that may be deducted from
the institutionalized spouse's income for the maintenance of the
community spouse; it does not in any way constrain the amount of
income that the community spouse may receive in her own name
from sources other than the institutionalized spouse.
The $1500 limit on the minimum monthly maintenance needs al
allowance is not absolute. Under the bill, the institutionalized spouse
is entitled to an opportunity to demonstrate, at' a fair hearing, that
the minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance is inadequate
to support the community spouse without fmancial duress. If the
spouse makes this showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the State would be required to establish an adequate monthly
maintenance needs allowance in that case.
Under the hill,
bill, States would be required, upon request by either
spouse or upon a determination of eligibility, to notify the institu
institu·
tionalized spouse of the amount of the community spouse monthly
income allowance, the family allowance, the way in which the com
community spouse resource allowance was computed, and the spouse's
institutional·
right to a fair hearing. The bill makes clear that an institutional
ized spouse who believes that the minimum monthly maintenance
needs allowance for the community spouse is inadequate, or who
believes that the State has not accurately determined the amount
of monthly income actually available to the community spouse
from other sources, is entitled to a fair hearing on either of these
issues, as well as any other State determinations that adversely
incelme or resources available to the community spouse.
affect the incclme

Court ordered support.-The Committee recognizes that there
will be some instances in which the rules set forth in the bill do
not take adequate account of the special circumstances affecting a
particular community spouse. The bill therefore provides that; if a
. court has entered an order against an institutionalized spouse for
commonthly income for the support of the community spouse, the com
munity spouse monthly income allowance must be at least as great
as the amount of the {ncome ordered to be paid. Similarly, if a
court has entered a !?UPport order against an institutionalized
spouse requiring that spouse to transfer countable resources to the
community spouse, the spouse ntay comply with the court's order
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without running afoul of the transfer of assets prohibitions, even
where the effect is to leave the community spouse with countable
resources in excess of $48,000.
Tran.~fer
Tran.~fer of resources.-The Committee is informed that a
number of States have not made effective use of the authorities
under current law to prevent affluent individuals from disposing of
resources in order to qualify for Medicaid nursing home coverage.
In the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlement program
for the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated
; wealth from nursing home patients to their non-dependent
non-d.ependent chil
children. The Committee is also concerned by the arbitrary nature of
2current SSI policy relating to disposal of assets, under which the 2
year penalty for transfers is unrelated to the amount of the assets
disposed of. Accordingly, the Committee bill replaces the current
law option with a uniform national policy, mandatory on all the
States, that is specific to Medicaid eligibility and that reasonably
relates the value of the resources improperly transferred to the
period of denial of eligibility.
Under the bill, States must determine whether each nursing
home or hospital patient who applies for Medicaid has, within 2
years of application, disposed of any countable resources for less
than fair market value. If such a transfer has occurred, the State
countmust determine the value (as of the time of transfer) of the count
able resources transferred for which the applicant received less
than fair market value. The total uncompensated value of these
countable resources must then be divided by the average cost, to a
private patient at the time of application, of nursing home care in
individthe State. This yields the number of months for which the individ
ual is ineligible for Medicaid, beginning with the month in which
the transfer took place. The Committee expects that, where practipracti
cable, the State should use the cost of nursing home care to private
institutionalpatients in the community in which the applicant is institutional
ized.
exTo avoid inequitable results, the bill provides for a number of ex
receptions from the denial of eligibility for transfers of countable re
sources for less than fair market value.
First, the prohibition on transfer does not apply at all in the case
of the transfer of an applicant's home to his or her spouse, child
recogunder 21, or blind or disabled adult child. The Committee recog
nizes that, so long as an individual lives in a home or intends to
return to it, the home is not a countable resource. The purpose of
this exception is to underscore that the transfer of an applicant's

benE~ficiary's home to the community spouse or to any minor or
or benE~ficiary's
disabled children would be protected.
Second, the prohibition on transfers does not apply at all in the
case of a transfer of countable resources to the community spouse
of an institutionalized individual, or to another for the sole benefit
of the community spouse. Since the Committee bill establishes
rules fi)r
fi>r the attribution of resources of married couples at the time
of institutionalization which reach both spouses, no purpose would
be served by prghibiting transfers of countable resources from the
institutionalized sJX?use to the community spouse.
indlvidual can demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the
Third, if an indIvidual
State, that he or she intended to dispose of the resources at fair
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market value, or for other valuable consideration, denial of eligibil
eligibility for Medicaid should not occur. The purpose of the Committee
bill is to deter those who, through llgifting"
Ilgifting" or other disposal,
knowingly seek to shelter assets from dissipation due to nursing
inadverthome costs. The bill is not intended to penalize those who inadven.
ently,
entIy, or through lack of sophistication. did not receive adequate
compensation. Nor is the bill intended to deny eligibility to those
who transfer resources to relatives or others by way of compensa
compensation for the informal care which these individuals have given to
the applicant or beneficiary; the imposition of a penalty in such
circumstances would have the unfortunate effect of discouraging
family members and friends from caring for the frail elderly or dis
disabled and helping them remain independent for as long as possible.
Finally, the Committee recognizes that there will be circum
circumstances where, although an individual may have transferred assets
in order to qualify for Medicaid benefits, the effect of denying Med
Medicaid coverage for the specified period of time would be to seriously
threaten the continuing care or well·being of the applicant or oth
otherwise work an undue hardship. The Committee also recognizes
that there will be circumstances where, with no expectation of
needing nursing home care and no intent of qualifying for Medic
Medicaid, an individual may give away money or property, perhaps for a
grandchild's education, and then later learn that, as a result of a
rapid change in medical condition, such as a stroke, nursing home
placement is suddenly required. The bill provides that where the
State determines such circumstances exist, eligibility for Medicaid
benefits must not be denied.
These prohibitions on transferring countable resources, and the
exceptions to them, are mandatory on all the States. The Commit
Committee bill expressly provides that States are not authorized to impose
more-or less-restrictive eligibility delays than those specified in
the Committee bill. Thus, the States could not impose any penalties
for transfers of resources on applicants or beneficiaries other than
those in nursing homes or hospitals. Similarly, the current SSI
policies relating to transfer of assets would no longer apply for pur
pur·
poses of determining Medicaid eligibility of applicants or benefici
beneficiaries in institutions or those outside.
Conforming changes.-Currently, a number of States that offer
Medicaid coverage to the aged and disabled under the "medically
needy" option use less restrictive income or resource methodologies
in determining eligibility than apply to the aged and disabled
HCFA
under the SSI program. HCF
A interprets current law to require
S8I income and resource
re50urce methodologies under their
that States use S8!
medically needy programs for the elderly and disabled.
The current treatment of income and resources of institutional
institutionalized spouses-substantially revised by the Committee bill-is essen
essen5SI principles in a Medicaid context.
tially the result elf applying SSI
This is only one of many examples where principles that may be
valid in the context of a cash assistance program are not appropri
appropriate in the context of a medical assistance program. The State Med
Medicaid Directors A..<ISOCiation has submitted a report to the Congress
concluding that directly linking Medicaid and 55I
SSI income and re
resource methodololPes results in impoverishment of the elderly and
disabled, increased State and Federal costs, and burdensome ad
ad-
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ministrative practices. The Medicaid Directo1'3 offer a number of
examples of SSI policies which are inappropriate when applied to
Medir.aid,
Medicaid, such as the rule that resource eligibility is determined
88I rule, if a nU1'3ing
on the first day of the month. Following this 881
home patient has resources in excess of the allowable. threshold
($1,800) on that day, he or she is ineligible for Medicaid throughout
the rest of the month, even if the amount of excess resources is too
small to enable the individual to pay for the entire month's nurs
nursing home costs.
In the View of the Committee, there is no justification for the
rigid application of 88!
881 eligibility rules to Medicaid medically
needy programs. Prior to this HCFA interpretation, States had
flexibility to establish income or resource methodologies less r~
strictive-i.e., more generous from the applicant's standpoint
standpointthan those under 88!.
flexibil88I. States should continue to have this flexibil
ity. On the other hand, the Committee does not believe that the
States should have· the discretion to apply methodologies under
their medically needy programs that are more restrictive-i.e., less
S8!.
generous from the applicant's standpoint-than those under S8I.
The bill therefore provides that the State's methodology for deter
determinirlg eligibility for the medically needy aged and disabled shall
be no more restrictive than that under the S81
S8! program (or, in the
case of families with children, under the corresponding Aid to Fam
Families with Dependent Children cash a!lsistance
ru;sistance program). To avoid
any possible ambiguity, the bill provides that a methodology is con
considerl~ to be "no more restrictive" if, using the methodology, indio
individuals qualify for Medicaid even though they would not be eligible
eligiwere the SSI methodology used, and individuals who would be eligi
ble for Medicaid under the SSI methodology would not be ineligible
under the State's medically needy methodology.
Eflective
Effective dates.-The
dates.-Tbe provisions relating to the treatment of
income and resources for institutionalized spouses are effective for
individuals residing in institutions on or after January 1,
I, 1988.
This includes spouses who were residing in nursing homes before
that date, as well as spouses who are admitted on or after that
date. The provisions relating to transfers of resources apply to all
institutionalized individuals first applying for Medicaid on or after
January 1,
I, 1988, with respect to any transfers for less than fair
market value occurring up to two years prior to the date of applica
application. Both provisions are effective whether or not the Secretary of
HHS has promulgated final implementing regulations. If the Secre
Secretary determines that a State requires State legislation. other than

an appropriations bill, to implement these requirements, the provi
provisions do not take effect until the first day of' the first calendar
quarter beginning after the close of the first regular State legisla
legislaaltive session beginning after enactment. Finally, the provision al
methodlowing States to use less restrictive income and resource method
1982. the
ologies in their medically needy programs is October 1,
I, 1982,
effective date of the current statutory language on which HCFA
HCFA er
erroneously bases its current interpretation. No disallowances or
other adverse
adverse.... actions may be taken against States based on the
currtmt
CUITlmt statutory language relating to "same" methodologies.
Examples.-The following examples illustrate the operation of
the Committee bill. Assume an elderly couple who together own a
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home assessed at $110,000 and have a joint savings account, to
which either spouse has unrestricted access, with a balance of
$20,000. The husband's monthly income, from his Social Security
benefit and his private pension, is $750. The wife, who worked at
home all her life raising a family, has income of $150 from Social
Security. The husband develops Alzheimer's disease and his wife,
nursno longer able to care for him at home, must place him in a nurs
a~plies for Medicaid. The State covers "op
"oping home. The husband a~plies
tional categorically needy' nursing home residents under a special
income standard of $875 per month and a resource standard of
$1,800. The State's maintenance needs allowance for community
spouses is $340 per month.
Under current law, the husband is categorically related due to
his age, and, as of the beginning of the first full calendar month
after institutionalization, is eligible under the special income standstand
ard of $875. (Until the beginning of the first full calendar month,
the wife's income is attributed to him, and he does not meet the
special income standard). However, he must still meet the $1,800
resource standard. The entire amount in the couple's joint savings
account is attributed to the husband, since he has unrestricted
access to it, giving him excess resources of $18,200. Until he spends
these excess resources, he will remain ineligible for Medicaid. If he
gives the $18,200 to his wife, the State has the option of denying
him Medicaid eligibility for more than 2 yea,rs from the date of
transfer.
Assuming all the excess resources in the couple's joint account
priare applied to the cost of nursing home care, and assuming a pri
vate patient rate of $2,000 per month, it will take about 9 months
elifor the husband to become resource-eligible for Medicaid. After eli
gibility has been established, the husband's income is applied as
f:)Hows.
f:Jllows. First, an allowance of $25 is reserved for his personal
needs. Then an allowance of $190 for the maintenance needs of his
wife (the State standard of $340 minus the wife's own income of
$150) is set aside. If the husband had no uncovered medical costs in
the previous month, the remaining $535 of his income is applied to
the cost of nursing home care. The remainder is paid by the State
and Federal governments through Medicaid.
The wife in the community is left with the house, a monthly
income of $340, and access to the $1,800 remaining in the couple's
joint savings account. Before her husband entered the nursing
home, the couple's total income ($900 per month) was about 146
percent of the Federal poverty level for a couple; after her hus
husband's institutionalization, she has only $1,800 in liquid assets and
her income places her at 75 percent of the Federal poverty level for
a single individual.
In sharp contrast to current law, the Committee bill would not
impoverish the wife in this case. At the time the husband enters
the nursing home, only $750 in income would be attributed to him,
and he would immediately be eligible under the State's special
income standard. With respect ,to resources, half of the couple's
hustotal assets would be attributed to the wife and half to the hus
band. However, the bill allowS'''
allows-" the husband to transfer without
penl;\lty $12,000-the minimum community spouse resource allowallow
ance-to an account in his wife's name at any time. When the hus
hus-
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band has spent all but $1,800 of the remaining $8,000, he becomes
resourcEH:!ligible for Medicaid. Assuming he applies all of these
excess resources to the cost of his nursing home care at $2,000 per
month, this will take about 4 months.
Once eligibility for Medicaid has been established, the husband's
monthly income is applied as follows. First, $25 is set aside each
month for a personal needs allowance. Second, $725 is reserved for
the maintenance needs of the community spouse. The community
spouse is allowed a minimum of $925, including her income; since
the wife's income is only $150, she can receive at least $775 from
the husband. However, since the husband's total income is less
than $775, she receives only the total income less the $25 personal
needs allowance, or $725. Nothing remains to reduce the cost of the
husband's nursing home care to the Medicaid program.
Under the Committee bill, the wife is left with a monthly income
of $875 (her Social Security check of $150 plus the maintenance
needs allowance of $725), or about 190 percent of the Federal pover
poverty level for a single individual.
individUal. She also has $12,000 in savings in
her name. The husband would qualify for Medicaid about 5 months
earlier than under current law. The total Federal and State Medic
Medicaid payment to the nursing home would go up by $535 per month
(the difference between the husband's $190 community spouse
allowmonthly income allowance under current law and the $725 allow
ance under the bill)
bill)..
Another example will illustrate the effect of the bill's provision
for an equal division of the couple's resources. Assume that the
couple's joint savings account at the time of institutionalization
contains not $20,000,
$20.000. but $50,000. Under the bill, the husband
would be. allowed, without penalty, to transfer $25,000 of this
amount to an account in the wife's name. Of the remaining half,
$23,000 would have to be spent before the husband would become·
resource-eligible for Medicaid. Under current law, all but $48,200
in the joint account has to be spent before the husband becomes
eligible for Medicaid. (Although a couple with $50,000 in savings is
likely to have household goods and personal effects valued at more
than $2,000, the bill provides that all these items are not to be con
considered resources for purposes of de~rmining
de~rmining the community
spouse resource allowance).
The effect of the bill's ceiling of $48,000 on the community
spouse resource allowance may be demonstrated by assuming that
the couple has not $20,000, but $100,000 in joint savings accounts
and jointly held stocks and mutual funds at the time of the hus
husband's institutionalization. The bill allows the husband to transfer
half of the jointly held resources, or $50,000, to the wife in her own
name, subject to the limit of $48,000. Thus, the couple would have
to spend $50,200 (the husband's $50,000 share, plus $2,000 excess
standresources from the wife's share, less the resource eligibility stand
ard of $1,800) before the husband could qualify for Medicaid. Again,
any household goods or personal effects would not be taken into ac
account in determining 'the amount of the community spouse's re
resource allowance.
The effect of the bill on financial planning (or the lack thereof)
can be illustrated with the following example. Assume that this
couple has a total of $50,000 in savings, and because it has done no
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financial planning, all of these resources are held by the husband
in his own name when he is admitted to the nursing home. Under
current law, the husband cannot qualify for Medicaid until all but
$1,800 of this amount is spent. Under the bill, however, the hus
husband may transfer $25,000 to the wife in her own name without
penalty.
If one assumes that this couple, learning of the husband's dis
disease, anticipated the need for institutionalization and transferred
all of the $50,000 joint savings to the wife more than two years
prior to application for Medicaid, the result under the bill is the
same as in the previous example. Regardless of ownership, the re
resources are attributed in equal shares to each spouse. Until the
wife's resources are reduced to $25,000, the husband is not re
resource-eligible for Medicaid. Under current law, the husband, with
no resources attributable to him, would immediately qualify for
Medicaid, and the wife would be under no Federal law obligation to
contribute toward the cost of his care.
Finally, the concept of the resource "snapshot" at institutional
institutionalization is illustrated by the following example. Assume, as above,
that couple has countable resources of $50,000, jointly held, at the
time of the husband's admission to the nursing home. The husband
does not apply for Medicaid upon admission; instead, the couple
begins to spend it resources to pay for the cost of his care. After a
year, the couple has spent $24,000 from its joint resources, and the
husband applies for Medicaid. The State would then look back to
the date of the husband's institutionalization for purposes of attrib
attributing resources. Since the wife's spousal share was $25,000 then, if
the husband transfers his interet in $25,000 of the remaining re
resources to his wife, he will immediately be resource-eligible for
reMedicaid, since the remaining $1,000 would meet the $1,800 re
source standard.
Study ofadult day care services (section 215)
The Committee bill would require the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to conduct a survey and report to the Congress on
adult day care services that are currently being provided through
throughout the United States. Such a report is to include information on
(1) the scope of adult day care services and the extent of their
availability around the country; (2) the characteristics of the vari
various entities (such as community-based programs, hospitals, and
nursing facilities) that provide these services; (3) licensure, certifi.
certifiencation, and other quality standards that are applicable to those en
tities providing such services; (4) the cost and fInancing of adult
day care services; and (5) the characteristics of individuals who use
the services (including on the individuals' level of disability and on
the availability of similar in-home care services).
The purpose of this review is to evaluate programs and projects
that have already been established, so that Congress can properly
consider the advisability of Medicare coverage for adult day care
services. Thus, it is not the intention of the Committee that the
Secretary undertake a demonstration project or in any other
matter initiate or fund new adult day care programs. The Secre
Secretary is to report only on the current availability of services and on
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Further, the committee expects that the Secretary, in reviewing a
nomState's p'roposed cost-sharing
cost-sharin/!: charges to detennine if they are nom
inal, WIll consider the monthly amounts paid by the State as cash
t.he income stand
standassistanr.e
assistanr,e under the State's AFDC program. and the
ards used to determine eligibility for the medically needy, as well as
the costs of the specific medical services. Finally the amendment as
assures thllt recipients are not denied emergency care or other needed
services because they are not able to pay required copayment amounts
as a precondition to securing such services.
Effec#ve date.-Enactment.

E8ti1TlA7.tea
E8ti1TlA7.te<1 8aving8.8aving8.
Fiscal years:

MlltIons

_ _.....................................................................
_
_.........................
1983..................................................
1984..........................................................................................................................
1984
_..............................................
1985
_
_.....................................................................................
1985..........................................................................................................................

$42
47
53

ELIlIIINATE MATCHING RATE FOR MEDICINE PART B "BUY-IN"

(Section 132 of the Bill)

Present law.-Most State Medicaid plans pay the monthly Medi
Medicare Part B premium payment for their dual eligible beneficiaries
under a "buy-m" agreement. While States may buy-in to Medicare for
both their cash assistance and medically needy populations who are
eligible for Medicare foderal matching for premium payments is
r.r.'-Dilable
'-Dilable. only for the cash assistance group. If a State does not buy
in for·
for' Purt B coverage, it cannot receive Federal matching payments
for services that would have been covered under Medicare if there had
been a buy-in arrangement. Four States and two jurisdiction~ do not
currently have a bU~'-in arrangement. These are: Alaska, Louisiana,
Oregon, '''"yoming,
'W"yoming, tl:e
tl,e Northern Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico.
AIl>,"lkll.'s buy-in agreement becomes efl'ecti,'e
AII>."lkll.'s
efi'ecti,'e flctoher
(lctoher 1. 1982.
Oommittee amendment.-The amendment eliminates Federal
matching for all Medicare Part B premium payments, effective with
comrespect to premiums due for months after September 1982. The com
mittee notes that the current comhination of the 75 per~nt
per~nt Ft'deral
general revenue subsidy for part B (for all Medicare part B eligi
eligibles) coupled with the Federal match for Medicaid eligibles results
hIes)
in a Federal subsidy of close to 90 percent for part B services for this
popnlation group.
EfFccti1Je date.-Premiums due for months after September 1982.
EfFcctt/Je

Estimated 8avinga.8avinga.
'.
Mitllons
FIScal years:
Millions
_
_
~.................. $203
1983......_ ..........................................................................................
_ _ ...............................................................
_...........................................................
1934................................................
_....... 216
_
_
_...................... 230
1985............................................................. _ ....__...................................................
MODIFY LIEN l'ROVISIONB

(Section 133 of the Bill)

Present law.-Under current law l1 States ore barred from 'imposing
·imposing
any lien .against a~y recipient's property prior to his death because of
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Medicaid claims paid or to be paid on his behalf unless placed as a
result of a court judgment. In the case of individuals under age 65, no
adjustments
ll.djustments or recoveries can be made for Medicaid claims correctly
paId.
pald. In the case of individuals over 65, adjustments and recoveries for')
for")
correctly paid claims can only be made from his/her estate after the
indivi(htal's death and only (1) after th~ death of his surviving';
spouse; and (2) where there are no surviving children who are under)
21, blind, or disabled.
''Further, under current law, States may deny medicaid eligibility to
applicants who, within the previous 24 months, transferred for less
than fair market value resources which, if retained, would have made
them ineligible for the program. However, in most instances the
applicant's ownership of a home would not make him or her ineligible
for medicaid.
It is therefore possible, under current law, for an elderly individual
who anticipates needing nursing home care to give his/her home to a
fami);y member or friend without fear of losing or being denied medic
medicfamil;y
aid elIgibility.
eligibility. By so doing, the individual assures that the home will
any
not be part of his/her estate and therefore will not be subject to an)'
reco,'ery action initiated by the State after the individual's death.
Oomtmittee
007Tltmittee amendment.-The amendment intends to assure that all
of the resources available to an institutionalized individual, including
equity in a home, which are not needed for the support of a spouse or
dependent children will be used to defray the costs of supporting the
mdividual in the i.nstitution. In doing so, it seeks to balance govern
government's legitimate desire to recover its medicaid costs against the indiindi
vidual's need to have the home available in the event rliscll1l-rge
rliscll1trge from
the institution becomes feasible.
The amendment has two parts. First, it allows States to deny :Medic
:Medicinstitution') who
aid eligibility temporarily to patients in medical institution'>
dispose of a home for less than fair market value, even though such
disposa.l would not make them ineligible for supplemental security
in(i1yidincome (SSI). States could either deny eligibility to all such in<hyid
uals for periods reasonably related to the uncompensated value, or
they could deny eligibility in all
a:ll cases for a minimum of 24 months,
with the option to provide for longer periods of ineligibility in the
case of individuals who disposed of homes worth substantial amollnts.
amonnts.
reasonThe provision would not apply in the case of individuals who reason
ably expected to be discharged from the medical institution and rere
turn home; individuals who demonstrated that they had intended to
obtain fair market value or other valuable consideration in exchange
for their homes; or individuals who transferred title to their homes
to a spouse or a minor or handicapped child. The State coulrl
could also
othermake an exception in other cases where undue hardship would other
wise result.
'
Second, the amendment would allow States to attach the real prop
property, including the home, of medicaid recipients who are permanently
institutionalized, in nursing homes or other long term care medical
institutions. The lien could not be foreclosed upon, and States could
recover the cost· of medical assistance providt>d to the recipient only
when the recipient voluntarily chose to sell the property or, after the
recipilmt's death, from his estate. As under current law, no recovery
would be permitted while the recipient's spouse was still
stilI living or
814
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whi1e
his/her
children
were
sti11
dependent
(under 21, or blind, or
while
still
disabled). Further, if the recipient is discharged from the institution
and returns home, the lien would dissolve, and the property would be
uvailable for the recipient's use until his/her death.
The commjttee notes that, under current law, States are often. un
unincomeable to recover resources which recipients hold as homes or as income
producing
producin~ real property. The amendment would facilitate States'
efforts to recover medical assistance costs from these types of resources
and to assure that all resources available to an individual 'will be used
long-term
to defray the public costs of supporting that individual in a long-term.
medical institution.
At the same time, the committee notes that the legitimate rights of
the recipient, the recipient's spouse and his/her dependent children are
protected under the amendment.
Effective date.-Enactment.
aate.-Enactment.
E8timated savings.savings.
Fiscal years:
Millions
1983.......................................................................................................................... $183
1984.......................................................................................................................... 200
1985.......................................................................................................................... 221
REDUCTION IN ERROR RATE TOLERANCE

(Section 134 of the Bill)

Present law.-Under an amendment to the 1980 Appropriations Act,
eli,~bil
States were l'eguil'erl
l'eguil'ed to reduce their payment error r~tes for elil~bil
ity determinatlons to 4 percent by September 3D,
30, 1982. States whose
error rates ex('eed
exC'eed the target figure are subject to a penalty reduetion.
The nationwide Medicaid payment error rate for the October 1980
1980.March 1981 period was estimated at 4.1 percent.
Oommittee amendment.-The amendment deletes the error rate pro
provisions and penalties incorporated in the 1980 Appropriations A<~t. It
substitutes language establishing a 3 percent target error rat;~ fqr
quarters beginning after March 30, 1982. Prospective fiscal sanction!?
a.pplied beginning in the second half of fiscal year 1983 fo'r
are to be applied
States which have error rates exceeding the 3-percent figure. The an
annual penalty, applied on a prospective basis, will be equal to th¢
ex,cee~!!
product of (a) the portion of the projected error rate WhICh ex,cee~!!
3 percent for the year in question and (b) the total amount of Federa:J
financial participation expected to be claimed
clalmed lor the yea.r for ser'vices
provided to recipients for whom the State determined eligibility. If th~
estimated prospecti ve penalty proves to be inaccurate when actual data
from the period become available, appropriate adjustments wm
wm be
be
made in subsequent grants. The Secretary is provlded discretion in
applying the fiscal penalties, in whole or part, for a State which has
npplying
made a good faith effort to meet the 3-percent target.
res:llved
The committee is aware that many questions remain to be re8o:llved
relative to the matter of sanctions for excessive rates of error. For
example•.,under
example,.,
under the existing provision no sanctions have in fact been
imposed. However, the Administration's projections of program costf$
uncleI' present law appear to he based on an assumption that no 'lVaiv-,
under
waiv-,
ers would be granted. The committee believes that the question can
can815
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PART n
.....ELIGmlLITY
ll.....ELIGmlLITY
sEc. 13611. TRANSFERS OF ASSETS; TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRUSTS.
.

AssETS.(a) PERIODS OF INELIGIBILITY FOR TRANSFERS OF AssETS.
(1) IN GENERAL.-Section 1917(c)(l) (42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(I»

is amended to read as follows:

"(l)(A) In order to meet the requirements of this subsection

b

for purposes of section 1902(a)(18), the State plan must provide
that if an institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an
noninstitutionalized
individual (or, at the option of a State, a nomnstitutionalized
individual or the spouse of such an individqal) disposes of assets
for less than fair market value on or after the look-back date
specified in subparagraph (BXi), the individual is ineligible for
assistan~ for services described in subparagraph (C)(i)
medical assistan~
noninstitutionalizeci individual, for the servi~s
servi~s
(or, in the case of a noninstitutionalized
described in subparagraph (C)(ii)) during the period beginning on
the date specified in subparagraph (D) and equal to the number
of months specified in subparagraph (E).
"(B)(i) The look-back date specified in this subparagraph is
a date that is 36 months (or, in the case of payments from a
dis~sed
trust or portions of a trust that are treated as assets dis~sed
of by
by. the individual pursuant to paragraph (3)(A)(iii) or (3XB)(ii)
of subsection (d), 60 months) before the date specified in clause
(ii).
(li).

u

D

a

.

"eii)
"(ii) The date specified in this clause, with respect to-

.

"(I) an institutionalized individual is the first date as of

which the individual both is an institutionalized individual
plan,
and has applied for medical assistan~ under the State plan.
or
"(II) a noninstitutionalized individual is the date on which
the individual applies for medical assistan~ under the State
plan or, if later, the date on which the individual disposes
of assets for less than fair market value.
"(C)(i) The servi~s
servi~s described in this subparagraph with respect
to an institutionalized individual are the following:
"(1) Nursing facility servi~s.
.
"(II) A level of care in any institution equivalent to that
ofnursing
of nursing facility services.
"(Ill) Home or community-based services furnished under
a waiver granted under subsection (c) or (d) of section 1915.
U(ii)The servi~s
servi~s described in this subparagraph with respect
"(ii)The
to a noninstitutionalized individual are services (not including any
servi~s
servi~s described in clause (i» that are described in paragraph
(7), (22), or (24) of section 1905(a), and, at the option of a State,
other long-term care services for which medical assistance is other
otherwise available under the State plan to individuals requiring long·
term. care.
.
"(D) The date specified in this subparagraph is the first day
of the first month during or after which assets have been transferred
for less than fair market value and which does not occur in any
other periods of ineligibility under this subsection.
"(E)(i) With respect to an institutionalized individual, the num
number of months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individ
individual shall be equal to-to
"(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets
transferred by the individual (or mdividual'S spouse) on or
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after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (BXi), divided
by
"en) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nurs
nursing facility services in the State (or, at the option of the State,
in the community in which the individual is institutionalized)
at the time of application.
"(ll) With respect to a noninstitutionalized individual, the num
number of months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individ
individual shall not be greater than a number equal to
to"(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets
transferred by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or
after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (BXi>,
(BXi), divided
by
"(II) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nurs
nursing facility services in the State (or, at the option of the State,
in the community in which the individual is institutionalized)
at the time of application.
"(iii) The number of months of ineligibility otherwise deter
determined under clause (i) or (ii) with respect to the disposal of an
asset shall be reducedreduced
"(1) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under
clause (i), bl the number of months of ineligibility applicable
to the indiVIdual under clause (ii) as a result of such disposal,
and
,,(II)
"(II) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under
clause (ii), by the number of months of ineligibility applicable
to the in.dividual under clause (i) as a result of such disposal.
(2) EXCEFTIONs.-Section 1917(c) is amended42 USC 1396p.
(A) in parar-aph (2XA), by striking "resources" and
inserting "assets ;
(B) by amending paragraph (2XB) to read as follows:
"(B) the assetsassets
"(i) were transferred to the individual's spouse or to
another for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse,
"(ll) were transferred from the individual's spouse to
another for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse,
"(iii) were transferred to, or to a trust (including a
trust described in subsection (dX4»
(dX4» established solely for
the benefit of, the individual's child described in subpara
subparagraph (AXiiXm, or
"(iv) were transferred to a trust (including a trust
described in subsection (dX4» established solely for the
benefit of an individual under 65 years of age who is
disabled (as defined in section 1614(aX3»;";
(C) in paragraph (2XC)(2XC)
(i) by striking "resources" each place it appears
and inserting "assets"
(ii) by stiiking "any",
"anY',
(iii) by striking "or (ii)" and inserting "(ii)", and

(iv) by striking "; or!' and inserting ", or (iii) all
(lv)
assets transferred for less than fair market value have
been returned to the individual; or";
(D) by amending paragraph (2XD) to read as follows:
"(D) the State determines, under procedures established
by the State (in accordance with standards specified by the
Secretary), that the denial of eligibility would work an undue
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hardsh!p as determined on the basis of criteria established
by the Secretary;";
(E) by striking paragraph (8) and inserting the
following:
p~es of this subsection, in the case of an asset
"(3) For p~es
held by an indiVIdual in common with another P,erson or persons
tenancyl. tenancy in common, or similar arrangement~
arrangement~
in a joint tenancy.l..
the asset (or the anected portion of such asset) shall be considereo
to be transferred by sooh individual when any action .is taken,
either by such individual or by any other person, that reduces
asset.";
or eliminates such individual's ownership or control of such asset."j
and
(F) by adding at the end of paragraph (4) the following:
sp,?use of an individwil
"In the case of a transfer br the sp'?use
which results in a period of meligibllity for medical assist··
anoo under a State plan for such individual, a State shall"
using a reasonable methodology (as specified by the Sec··
retary), apportion such period of ineligibility (or any )l(!rtioll:
of such. period) among the individual and the individual's
spouse if the spouse otherwise becomes eligible for medical
plan....
assistance under the State plan....
(b) TREATMENT OF TRUST AMOUNTS.-Section 1917 (42 U.S.C,.
1396.11) is amended by adding at the end the following:
eligibility
(dXl) For purposes of determining an individual's eligibilit:r
title.,
for, or amount of, benefits under a State plan under this title"
subject
Bubject to paragraph (4), the rules specified m paragraph (3) shalll
appll. to a trust established by such individual
(2XA) For purposes of this subsection, an individual shall
be considered to have established a trust if assets of the individua:l
form all or part of the corpus of the trust and
were used to fonn
if any of the following individuals establisned such trust other
than by Will:
"(i) The individual.
"(li) The individual's spouse.
"(ti)
.
"(iii) A person, including a court or administrative body,
with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of thE~
individual or the individual's spouse.
"(iv) A person, including any court or administrative body,
acting at toe' direction or upon the request of the individual
or the individual's spouse.
"(B) In the case of a trust the corpus of which includes assets
of an individual (as determined under subparagraph (A» and assets
of any other person or persons, the provisions of this subsection
shall apply to the portion of the trust attributable to the assets
of the individual.
"(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection shall apply with·
out regard toto-

·1

;

,

",

"(i) the purposes for which a trust is established.
"(ii) whether the trustees have or exercise any discretion

under the trust,
"(iii) any restrictions on when or whether distributions
may be made from the trust, or
"(iv) any restrictions on the use of distributions from the
trust.
of a revocable trust
trust"(3)(A) In the case ofa
"(i) the corvus of the trust shall be considered resourcel~
resoureel~
available to the mdividual,

.1
.'
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"(ii) payments from the .trust to or for the benefit of the
individual shall be considered income of the individual, and
"(iii) any other payments from the trust shall be considered
subassets disposed of by the individual for purposes of sub
section (c).
"(B) In the case of an irrevocable trusttrust
"(i) if there are any circumstances under which payment
from the trust could be made to or for the benefit of the
individual, the portion of the corpus from which, or the income
on the corpus from which, payment to the individual could
individbe made sliall be considered resources available to the individ
incomeual, and gayments from that portion of the corpus or income
(I) to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be
considered income of the individual, and
trans"(In for any other purpose, shall be considered a trans
ferof assets by the individual subject to subsection (c);
and
"(ii) any portion of the trust from which, or any income
ciron the corpus from which, no payment could under any cir
cumstances be made to the individual shall be considered,
as of the date of establishment of the trust (or, if later, the
date on which pa~ent
pa~ent to the individual was foreclosed) to
be assets disposed by the individual for purposes of subsection
(c), and the value of the trust shall be determined for purposes
of such subsection by including the amount of any payments
made from such portion of the trust after such date.
"(4) This subsection shall not apply to any of the following
trusts:
<I(A) A
A trust containing the assets of an individual under
"(A)
age 65 who is disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3» and
which is established for the benefit of such individual by a
parent, grandparent, legal· guardian of the individual, or a
court if the State will receive all amounts remaining in the
trust upon the death of such individual up to an amount equal
to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual
under a State plan under this title.
.
"(B) A trust established in a State for the benefit of an
individual if
if"(i) the trust is composed onlf of pension, Social Secu
Security, and other income to the individual (and accumulated
income in the trust),
"(ii) the State will receive all amounts remaining in
the trust upon the death of such individual up to an amount
equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of
the individual under a State plan under this title, and
"(iii) the State makes medical assistance available to
individuals described in section 1902(a)(10)(AXii)(V), but
does Dot :make such assistance available to individuals

:t h

,. ~e

trees

for nursing facility services under section 1902(a)(10)(C).
"(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who
is disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3»
1614(a)(3» that meets the
following conditions:
.
"(i) The trust is established and managed by a non·
nonprofit association.
"(li) A separate account is maintained for each benebene
ficiary of the trust, but, for p~es of investment and
management of funds, the trust pools these accounts.
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"(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely for
the benefit of individuals who are disabled (as defined
in section 1614(aX3» by the parent, grandparent, or legal
guardian of such individuals, by such individuals, or by

a ('.ourt.
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govemmental
relations.

.

"(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in the
beneficiary's account upon the death of the beneficiary
are not retained by the trust, the t1'U8t
tl'Ust pays to the State
from such remaining amounts in the account an amount
equal to the total amount of medical assistance paid on
behalf of the beneficiary under the State plan under this
titie.
title.
'
"(5) The State a~ncy
a~ncy shall establish procedures (in accordance
with standards specified by the- Secretary) under which the agency
waives the application of this subsection with respect to an individ
individual if the individual establishes that such appliCation would work
an undue hardship on the individual as determined on the basis
of criteria established by the Secretary.".
"(6) The term 'trust' includes any legal instrument or device
that is similar to a trust but includes an annui~
annui~ only to such
extent and in such manner as the Secretary specifies..
specifies..
(c) DEFINITIONS.--Section 1917 (42 U.S.C. 1396p), as amended
by subsection (b), is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
"(e) In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
"(1) The term 'assets', with respect to an individual,
includes all income and resources of the individual and of
the individual's spouse, including any income or resources
which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled
to but does not receive because of action.
"(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
"(B) by a person, including a court or adininistrative
body, with leg81 authority to act in place of or on behalf
oBhe individual or such individual's spouse, or
"(C) by any person, including any court or administra
administrativebody, acting at the direction or upon the request of
the individual or such individual's spouse.
"(2) The term 'income' has the meaning given such term
in section 1612.
"(3) The term 'institutionalized individual' means an
individual who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, who is
an inpatient in a medical institution and with respect to whom
payment is made based on a level of care provided in a nursing
facility, or who is described in section 1902(aXI0XAXii)(VI).
"(4) The term 'noninstitutionalized individual' means an
individual receiving any of the services specified in subsection
(cX1XCXii).
.
"(5) The term 'resources' has the meaning given such term
in ~tion
institutional~tion 1613, without regard (in the case of an institutional
ized individual) to the exclusion described in subsection (aXl)
of such section
....
section.".
(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.AMENDMENTS.
(1) Section 1902 (42 U.S.C. 1396a) is amended
amended(A) in subsection (aXIS),
(aXI8), by striking "and transfers
of assets" and inserting".
inserting", transfers of assets, and treatment
of
certain trusts";
ofcertain
(B) in subsection (a)(51)(a)(51)
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(i) by st~
st~ "(A)"; and

(li) by striking ", and (B)" and all that follows

and inserting a semicolon; and

(0) by striking subsection (k),
(k).

(2) Section 1924(bX2)(B)(i) (42 U.S.C. 1896r-5(b)(2)(B)(i»
1896r-5(b)(2)(B)(i))
is amended by striking "1902(k)" and inserting "1917(d)",
"1917(d)".
(e) EFFECTIVE DATES.--{l)
b;yJhhulec. 42 USC 1396p
DATES.-{l) The amendments made b;yJhilUlec.
exceJ>.~a&J)~~.d:~!~L~bi.~]ijih_ttQn;]:i)_.PI!Y-Plents
t!~n shap apply, exceJ>.~
a&._p.~~.d:~!~L~bl.~]ilih_ttQn;:J.i)-.pl!~ents note.
qridel"·tltJe··-XlX-oftlie
--so:ew. ..secunty
. AcLfor....calendal'··qwu;;ters
qridel"·tltJe··-xrx-oftlie 13OCiil
8eCiUity.AcLfor...calendal'·-quar,ters

;::-~;S!l~~~~~~-lNf!~cl:~~~:ts~a~:e~
;!!;~~!l~~~~~~·l~f!~cl:~~~:ta
~a~:e~
promulgated by such date.
(2) The amendments made by this section shaJ.LAQt-..Jlpp1.Y
shaJ.l...D.<rt...Jlpp1'y(N
to
medical assistance provided for servi~~!-fUID1sJ1ed
servi~~LfUIDlsJled
0Ct01ler-r,Tg93;.-..-----.--.·.
. - ------..
-----..-..
before 0Ct01ler-r,Tgsa;-...
-----.---........
-..

~~····{:l~~~~a=ot;-tlils~£-~~·l?:?~·~-~~-~--o.r.··~f.o.!~~Jhe
~~····{:l~~~~a=ot;_~~·~~·l?:?~·~·~~-~--o.r.··~f.o~~~Jhe
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(C) with respect to irustB established on or before the
date of the enactment ofthis Act.
(3) In the case of a State plan for medical assistance under
title XIX of the Social Security Act which the Secretary of Health
and Human Services determines requires State legislation (other
than legislation appropriating funds) in order for the plan to meet
the additional re<{uirements
re<Iuirements imposed by the amendment made by
subsection (b), the State plan shall not be regarded as failing
to comply with the requirements imposed by such amendment solely
on the basis of its failure to meet these additional requirements
before the first day of the first calendar quarter beginning after
the close of the first regular session of the State legislature that
begins after the date of the enactment of this Act. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, in the case of a State that has a 2
2year legislative se8Sion, each year of such session shall be deemed
to be a separate regular session of the State legislature.
SEC. 13612. MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERIES.

(a) MANDATE To SEEK REcOVERY.-Section 1917(b)(l) (42
U.S.C. 1396p(bXl» is amended by striking "except-" and all that
follows and inserting the following: "except that the State shall
seek atljustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case
of the following individuals:
"(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection
(a)(l)(B), the State shall seek adjustment
a<ijustment or recovery from
the individual's estate or upon sale of the property subject
to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on
behalf
of the mdividual. .
behalfof
"(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of
age or older when the individual received such medicBl assist
assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the
indiviclual's estate, but only for medical assistance consisting
of
of-·
"(0
community"(i) nursing facility services, home and community
based services, and related hospital and prescription drug
services,or
services, or
a(ii)
"(il) at the option of the State, any items or services
under the S~te
S~te plan.
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"(CXi) In the case of an individual who has received (or
is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance
policy in connection. with which assets or resources are dis
disregarded in the manner described in clause (ii), except as
provided in such clause, the State shall seek acljustment or
recovery from the individual's estate on account of medical
assistance paid on behalf of the individual for nursing facility
and other long-term care services.
"(ii) Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of an individual
who received medical assistance under a State plan of a State
which had a State plan amendment approved as of May 14,
1993, which provided for the disregard of any assets or
resourcesresources
"CD
"<D to the extent that payments are made under a
long-term care insurance policY; or
"(II) because an individual has received (or is entitled
to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance

that beg
of the I
year leg
tobeaE

(2)

to indivi

IS{
SEC. I3f

(a) ::
MINIMU

~licy.".
~licy.".

42 USC 1396p
note.

(b) HARDSHIP WAIVER.-Section 1917(b) (42 U.S.C. 1396p(b»
1396p(b»
is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(3) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance
with standards s~ed
s~ed by the Secretary) under which the agency
shall waive the application of this subsection (other than paragraph .
(lXC» if such application would work an undue hardship as deter
deterSecretary....
mined on the bains of criteria established by the Secretary....
(e)
1917(b) (42 U.S.C.
(c) DEFINITION OF ESTATE.-Section 1917(1))
1396p(b»l as amended by subsection (b), is amended by adding
.. at the ena the following new paragraph:
"(4) For purposes of this subsection,
'estate', with
subsection. the term 'estate"
respect to a deceaSed individualindividual
"(A) shall include all real and personal property and other
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for
purposes of State probate law; and
"(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall
incl~de,
incl~de, in the case of an individUal to whom paragraph (lXCXi)
pro~rty and other assets
applies),
applies). any other real and personal pro~rty
in which the individual had any legal tItle or interest at the
time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such
assets conveyed to a lJurvivor,
heir, or assign of the deceased
$urvivor. heir.
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivor
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement...,
arrangement.".
(d) EFFECTIVE DATES.-(IXA)
subparaDATES,-(IXA) Except as provided in subpara
graph (B),
ade by'...... this se~tion.
se~tion. s_ha!!-apJlJy..to
(B). the ~endments
~endments m.
m.ade
~~_~ ~~er title_X!K..of.J.he.-SoCII~L~J,U1tY-_.Act._fu.LCiilenaar
title_X!K-of..t.he..SoCII~L~J,U'1tY-_.Aet._fu.LCiilenaar
C@.~.r.s:_oo~n or after October I, 1993.
1993, WIthout
Wlthout regard
t(f whether or not 1iDiJ~gu1affonrtoca:rry-out
1iDiJ~gu1affonrti>C8.lTy-out such amendments
have been promulgated by such date.
(B) In the case of a State plan for medical assistance under
title XIX of the Social Security Act which the Secretary of Health
and Human Services determines requires State legislation (other
than legislation appropriating funds) in order for the plan to meet
the additional requirements imposed by the amendments made
by this section, the State plan shall not be regarded as failing
to comply with the requirements imposed by such amendments
requiresolely on the basis of its failure to meet these additional require
ments before the first day of the first calendar quarter be~ng
be~ng
after the close of ,the first regular session of the State legIslature

tior

unc

has
haa

seei
seci

sec
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un·
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that begins after the date of the enactment of this Act. For purposes
2of the preceding sentence, in the case of a State that has a 2
year legislative session, each year of such session shall be deemed
to be a separate regular session of the State legislature.
(2) The amendments made by this section shall not apply
to individuals who died before October 1, 1993.

PART m-PAYMENTS
SEC. 13821. ASSURING PROPER PAYMENTS TO DISPROPORTIONATE
SHARE HosprrALS.
(a) DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITALS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE
PATIENTS.MINIMUM LEvEL OF SERVICES TO MEDICAID PATIENTS.
(1) IN GENERAL.-Section
GENERAL.-8ection 1923 (42 U.S.C. 1396r-4) is

amendedamended
(A) in subsection (a)(I)(A),
(a)(I)(A),. by striking "requirement"
and inserting "requirements";
(B) in subsection (b)(l), by striking "requirement" and
inserting "requirements";
(e)
(0) in the heading to subsection (d), by striking
"REQUIREMENT" and inserting "REQUIREMENTS";
(D) by adding at the end of subsection (d) the following
new paragraph:
dispropor"(3) No hospital may be defined or deemed as a dispropor
tionate share hospital under a State plan under this title or
under subsection (b) or (e) of this section unless the hospital
has a medicaid inpatient utilization rate (as defined in sub
subsection (b)(2» of not less than 1 percent.";
(E) in subsection (e)(l)(e)(l)
(i) by striking "and" before "(B)", and
(n)
(li) by inserting before the period at the end the
following: ", aJ;ld"{C) the plan meets the requirement
of subsectiol)-{d)(3) and such payment adjustments are
made consIstent with the last sentence of subsection
(c)"; and/
s~bsection (e)(2)(e)(2)
(F) in s~bsection
(i) :'in subparagraph (A), by inserting "(other than
ofsubsection
the last sentence of
subsection (c»" after "(c)",
(li) by striking "and" at·. the end of subparagraph
(ii)

,
r
~
f

r.

b
J1
Jl

)t
It
.e

t
~

l"
1"

,g
.g

,.

(A),
(iii) by striking the period at the end of subpara
subparainserting",
", and", and
graph (B) and inserting
(iv) by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
"(0) subsection (d)(3) shall apply.".
"(e)

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by thi8
this 8Ub
sub-

42 USC 1396r-4

section shall apply to payments to States under section 1903(a) note.
seetion
of the Social Security Act for payments to hospitals made
after
under State plans after(A) the end of the State fiscal year that ends dwing
1994, or
(B) in the case of a State with a State legislature
which is not scheduled to have a regular legislative session
in 1994, the end of the State fiscal year that ends during
1995;
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I.
INTRODUCTION
By Order dated August 26, 1998, the Court has requested that the Appellant, the
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department") file a limited
responsive brief addressing only the issue of "whether the definition of 'assets' contained
in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(I)(B) as enacted in 1993 is applicable to the Marriage Settlement
Agreement between Lionel and Hildor dated March 8, 1993."
This brief concludes that:
(1)

Whether the definition is "applicable" depends on whether the issue

examined is Medicaid eligibility or estate recovery;
(2)

The definition of "assets" is not applicable for the purpose of determining

Hildor Knudson's Medicaid eligibility;
(3)

The definition of "assets" is applicable and significant in understanding

Congressional intent for estate recovery purposes; but
(4)

The definition of assets is only persuasive authority and does not control the

outcome of this case.
While the Department profoundly disagrees with many other aspects of Jackman's
Rehearing Brief, in accordance with the Court's order, only the issue presented by the
Court has been briefed herein.

LINIITED RESPONSE TO
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........

II .
II.

THE DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" lVIAY
lVIAY BE
APPLICABLE FOR ESTATE RECOVERY PlJRPOSES
EVEN THOUGH IT IS INAPPLICABLE IN
DETERlVIINING MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY.
A.

The Distinction Between Eligibility and Estate Recoverv.
When scrutinizing asset transfers, including transfers between spouses through a

marriage settlement agreement, there is a significant distinction between questions of
eligibility and questions of estate recovery. Transfers which may be appropriate for
IDAPA citations, {nlra. This
eligibility purposes, may be voidable in other contexts. See IDAPA
unusual circumstance arises because, at least in part, federal Medicaid law ignores state
marital property laws.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p deals with both eligibility and estate recovery in different
c) imposes a period of ineligibility for prohibited
sections. For example, subsection ((c)
transfers, while specifically pennitting transfers between spouses. Seemingly in conflict
with state community property principles, transfers to third parties by either spouse are
punished, without regard to which spouse is the legal owner of the property. At the same
time, what property is available for estate recovery is enlarged in subsection (b) by an
expansive definition of "estate."
The eligibility provision, punishing transfers to third parties, ignores the effect of
state community property laws. When estate recovery law is applied to the same
circumstance to recover property which has been transferred between the spouses, it

LIMITED RESPONSE TO
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appears that the laws conflict. This perceived conflict arises, however, only because of
the interplay between state community property laws and federal Medicaid law. There is
actually no conflict, and in Idaho, community property principles are preserved and are
modified only to the extent necessary to effectuate the federal scheme.
As an example, IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 permits recovery only of estate property
which had previously been the couple's community property:
20.
Limitations on Estate Claims. Limits on the Department's
claim against the assets of a deceased recipient shall be subject to Sections
surviviJ}g
56-218 and 56-218A, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a survivil}g
spouse ofa predeceased recipient is limited to the value of the assets of the
estate that were community property, or the deceased recipient's share of
the separate property, and jointly owned property.
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 (underline added).l Similarly, transfers between spouses
1'1,....
Iii,....

through a marriage settlement agreement, valid under state law, which have no effect on
eligibility, are, because of community property law, restricted for purposes of estate
recovery:
24.
Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates
assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of
the deceased recipient or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement
agreement or other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate
consideration.

lIt is because of this section that most of the "examples" posed by Jackman
lackman at pages 15 through 18 of
the Rehearing Brief are wrong. The Department does not seek recovery of property that has been received and
maintained as separate property.
property.. Only property that was, prior to establishing Medicaid eligibility, community
property, is subject to the Department's reimbursement claim. The Court's decision, contrary to Jackman's
lackman's
claim at page 16 of her Rehearing Brief, does not ignore "treasured principles of community property law", it
protects them.
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IDAPA 16.03.09.025.24. This provision is found within the Medicaid estate recoverY
provisions, but a similar provision is found within the eligibility rules:
A marriage settlement agreement may be valid for Medicaid eligibility and
still be voidable for estate recovery purposes if value is transferred between
spouses without adequate consideration.
IDAPA 16.03.05.620.04.
These provisions of State and federal law merely show that a different ar;,alysis is
required when considering questions of eligibility and questions of estate recovery. The
reason this dichotomy arises is, at least in part, because federal law ignores community
property principles and State law preserves them.
Hildor Knudson's Medicaid Eligibility Is Not in Issue and the Eligibilitv
B.
Provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p Are Not in Issue.
Had the marriage settlement agreement improperly conveyed assets between
Hildor and Lionel Knudson, Hildor's Medicaid eligibility could have been affected. No
one, however, has contended that Hildor was not eligible for Medicaid. No one has
claimed the marriage settlement agreement improperly transferred assets from one spouse
to the other. Therefore, whether the definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p applies to
the marriage settlement agreement, for eligibility purposes, is completely irrelevant to the
outcome of this case.
At page 28 (under subheading 1) of her brief, Jackman argues that the definition in
42 U.S.C. § 1396p does not apply because the marriage settlement agreement was entered
into before the effective date of the act. In support of this argument, Jackman cites P.L.

,...,
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103-66, § 13612(e)(2)(B). Section 13612 contains the effective dates for those provisions
dealing with estate recovery. However, the cited provision does not exist in section
13612. Instead, the correct citation is § 13611(e)(2)(B). Section 13611 is the section
dealing with eligibility not estate recovery. Therefore, it is true that Hildor Knudson's
eligibility was unaffected by transfers made prior to the effective date of the act. But
that was never the issue.

The effective date for the estate recovery changes is found in § 13612(d)
13612(d) (1 )(A)
which states:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the amendments made by this
section shall apply to payments under title XIX of the Social Security Act
for calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, without regard
to whether or not final regulations to carry out such amendments have been
promulgated by such date.
13612(d)(l)(A).
d)(l)(A). In other words, the estate recovery amendments are
P.L. 103-66, § 13612(
effective based on payments made, not on the date of a transfer which could have affected
eligibility. There is no question that the definition of "assets" is applicable to estate
recovery issues in this case.

<...,.
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III.
THE DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" IS IMPORTANT
AND APPLICABLE IN DEMONSTRATING
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO RECOVER ASSETS
TR<\NSF'ERRED BETWEEN SPOUSES.

A.
The Definition of "Assets" Is Significant and Important to Proving Jackman's
Preemption Claim Is Incorrect.
The fact that Hildor Knudson's eligibility is not in issue does not mean the
definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p is unimportant. It is important, but mostly to
show congressional intent. Jackman's argument has been that federal law somehow
preempts Idaho's estate recovery law and prohibits recovery from the estate of a
surviving spouse. Since there is no specific federal prohibition to spousal estate recovery,
Jackman has been forced to argue that the structure and purpose of the federalla.w
somehow implies preemption. However, this is simply not so. The definition of "assets"
in 42 V.S.c.
U.S.c. § 1396p, by including a broad range of property of both spouses merely
shows that Congress did not view State marital property laws as having an effect on the
overall scheme to permit one spouse to become eligible without impoverishing the other,
while at the same time preserving the State's ability to recover the couple's property after
both of them are deceased.
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B.

42 U.S.C. § 1396p Supports Idaho Code § 56-218 Spousal Estate Recov~.
The Court correctly held that Idaho Code § 56-218 pennits estate recovery from

the estate of Hildor Knudson's spouse in this case. This section, alone, is sufficient to
reach all of the property in this case. The court also correctly perceived the federal
support for spousal estate recovery found in the definition of "estate" in 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)( 4):
1396p(b)(4):
(4)
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with
respect to a deceased individual (A) shall include all real and personal property and other
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for
purposes of State probate law; and
(B)
may include, at the option of the State (and shall
include, in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i)
applies), any other real and personal property and other assets in
which the individual ha~ any legal title or interest at the time of
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual
through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (underline added). This section refers to "assets" and
therefore incorporates the defInition of "assets" found in subsection (e).2 Unlike the
eligibility amendments made in § 13611 of P.L. 103-66, this provision was adde:d by §
13612. As stated above, this section became effective based on payments made and is
clearly applicable in this case. There is no question but that the definition of "estate," as
2Jackman argues that the definition of "assets" in subsection (e) cannot be applied to the word "assets"
found in subsection (b). Rehearing Brief, p. 27. There is no support for this contention, however, which
contradicts the plain language of the definition which begins "(e) Definitions - In this section, the following
definitions shall apply:".
'\I
'\I,•••
•• I~
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broadened by reference to the definition for "assets" includes property transfen'ed
transfen·ed by
Hildor in the marriage settlement agreement. While these provisions of federal law are,
by no means, essential to the court's holding in this case, they clearly defeat Jackman's
argument that federal law somehow prohibits spousal estate recovery.

IV.
CONCLUSION

The Order requesting this brief asked whether the definition of "assets" £:mnd in
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) is "applicable" to the marriage settlement agreement. lfthe
question were whether the definition was applicable with regard to Hildor's eligibility,
the answer would have to be "no." However, the definition is clearly applicable to show
that Congress intended estate recovery to reach assets conveyed between spouses,
including assets conveyed through a marriage settlement agreement. While not essential
for the court's decision in this case, the property Hildor conveyed to Lionel through the
marriage settlement agreement is certainly part of the definition of "estate" and is subject
to recovery in this case.
DATED this 9 day of September, 1998,

1111'"
lilt'"
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Appeal from the District Court of the Second judicial District of the
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JOHNSON, Justice
This is a Medi~lid recovery case. We conclude that p!Jrsuant to section 56.·218(1) of the
Idaho Code (I.e.). the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) may recover
from the available estate of a surviving spouse the balance 'of Medicaid payments rl::ceived by an
1
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individual who was flfty-five
fifty-five years old or older when receiving the paymentS' if the individual's
estate is inadequate to repay the entire amount.

I.
THE BACKGl{OUND
,.'
BACKG:Q.OUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS ,."
•

•

' .

~.
~
. I

•

,

,

,

Barbara Jack.man
couple, Hildor_~~
Hildor_an~ Lionel Knudson
Jack.man (Jackman)
(Jackrnan) '.Vas the niece of jUl elderly coup~e,
(the Knudsons)
Knudsons).... Jackman was also Hildor's guardian and held a durable power of attorney for
Lionel. On behalf of the Knudsons, Jackman signed a "Marriage Settlement Agreement" (the
. agreement) on March 8, 1993. The agreement transmuted most of the Knudsons' community

..property
property into Lionel's separate property. By the agreement, Hildor received as her separ~te property
. her personal property and household effects in her possession, her irrevocable burial trust, arid
$1,900 in cash. The purpose of the agreement was to make Hildor eligible for Medicaid assistance.
Hildor received $41,600.55 in Medicaid payments (the Medicaid'payments) prior to her death on
October 27, 1994.
After Hildor's death, Jackman collected Hildor's estate'pursuant to the procedures for small

estates contained in I.e. § 15-3-1201. After paying Hildor's funeral expenses .fUld legal fees,
JaclQn~ delivered the balance ofHildor's ,estate, $1,638.03, to the l)epartment ~n August 10, 1995.

"...
..
,The Department ..accepted
accepted this. as a partial settlement ofits
of its claim fo,r,recovety
.
.
,
payments.

of the. 'Medicaid

Lionel died two weeks after Hildor on November 11, 1994. After Lionel's death, Jackman
representa.tive. Lionel's
initiated probate proceedings ~or his estate and became Lionel's personal representative.

vatu"ed at $40
$40.1798.35.
'The Department sought allowance ofa claim against Lionel's
estate was valu'ed
The
J 798.35.
estate to recover the remaining balance of !ho Medicaid payments (the balance of the Medicaid

,payments). Jackman objected to the Departmenfs claim.
The magistrate judge denied the Department's claim against Lionel' ~ estate because Hildor
had an estate, and the Department received the remainder of the estate after expenses. The

·who affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. The
Department appealed to the district judge. 'who
Department appealed.

II.
II.
. I.C. § 56-218 PERMITS RECOVERY OF THE BALANCE
2
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OF THE MEDICAID PAYMENTS FROM LIONEL'S ESTATE•
ESTATE •

........
......

The Department asserts that I.e, § 56-218 pennits recovery of the balance Cof the Medicaid
payments from Lionel's estate. We agree.
fiftyIe. § 56-218prbvides that niedic~f assist3n~e "plrid on behalf of an ~dividual who was fifty
l

"£iv-e"(55}'yeats
"fiV'e"(55}'yeats

th~:iridi~idual reteived such~~istance
such~~istance may be l'eco~ered
l'eco~ered from
'of age otoldhrwheri th~:iridi~idual

no estate the estate of the surViving sp~use> ifany, shall be charged for'such
the estate, or ifthere be rio

aid paid to either or both .... "n I.e.
I.C. § 56-218(1).

Family v, Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d
P,2d 1385 (1990), the Court
,In George W.
w: Watkins FamilYv.
- pointed out: 'The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent

is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results." [d. at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388.
LionePs estate ofthe
of the balance
If we were to read I.e. § 56-218(1) not to allow recovery from Lionel's

M~dic'aid payments because there was $1,638.03 in Hildor's estatelt our reading would be
of the M~dic'aid
contrary to expressed legislative intent and would lead to absurd results. This reading would mean
that if the estate of a spouse who received Medicaid assistance had even one cent, or a toothbrush,

the Department could collect nothing from the estate ofthesurviving spouse. As acknowledged by

,'JaCIanan'
aCIanan; attorney ~t the oral ~~erit of
,'J

s

this c~e,this readirig ~f the stafut~'would ~ean that there

;circom'stante' iIi which 'th~ iegislative"iritent
iegislativghttent 't~
t~ rebo~er' fro~:t&e: 6state rii"
iS~I:Vivi~g spo~se
'.' i~' h6; ;circum'stante'
~f iS~I~ivi~g

would be fulfilled. TIlls result flies in the face of the expressed legislative intent that the Department
recover from the estate of the surviving spouse under some circumstances. It is absurd to read the
statute as preventing recovery from the surviving,spo\lse's estate even if the recipi.ent's
recipient's estate is

inadequate for the full recovery ofMedicaid
of Medicaid payments.
ofl.C. § 56-218(1) is that if the
From this analysis we conclude that the correct reading ofI.C.

estate of the individual who received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay the full amount of
the assistance received, the Department can recover the balance from tho estate of the surviving
of this case, when the Department receivl:d the balance
spouse. Stated in tenns of the circwnstances ofthis
estate"U of Hildor remaining from which tho Department could
of Hildor's estate, there was cCno estate

is

of the medicaid payments. Therefore, the Department is entitled to recover the
recover the balance ofthe

balance from Lionel's estate.
. . ~~

~~

'.

....

3
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Jaclonan contends that the Idaho statutes allowing
allowjng for estate recovery exceed the authority
granted by federal law. We disagree.
Jaclanan relies on a portion of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(I)(B) for the proposition that re~overy
re~overy
may only be had from the recipient's estate. Reading the entir~ .section, however, it :is clear that the
statute is only a limitation on the types ofn:tedical
ofJ1.1edical assistance which can bo recovered. lbis includes
payments for nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and related ?-ospital and
prescription drug services, or, at the State's option, any items or services under the State plan. The
statute defines the types of
payments· tp.at are recoverable and does not purpprt to defllle
defille from whom
ofpayments·

.

"

,.

these payments may be recoyered.
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as well as from the
estate of the surviving spouse. The federal defmition of asset is significant. Federal law includes
within the recipient's estate "all real and personal property and <?ther assets included within the
.individual's estate ... " and "any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title orinterest at the time of death . .- .. '~ 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4);
I 396p(b)(4); I.C. §
,

56-2~8(4).

Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income and resources as well as

Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not affect the status of the assets that federal
law considers to be part of the recipient's estate because the definition of assets includes "income
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive
because of
action by a person. .. with legal authority to act in place ofor
of or on behalf ofthe
of the individual
ofaction
or such individual's spouse." 42 US.C.
u.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)(B). Jacbnan's signing ofthe agreement
constituted action by a person on behalf of Hildor and Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the
Department from recovering the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate.

III.
CONCLUSION
We vacate the magistrate judge's denial of the Department's claim against Lionel's estate
and remand the c~e to the ~agistrate
~agistrate judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We do not address Jackman's contention that pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-720 she is entitled to
receive from Lionel's estate her necessary expenses and disbursements including reasonable attorney
fees. lhis is a question the m~~gistr~te judge· must consider on remand.
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We award the Department costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal.
Chief Justice TROUT, Justices SILAK,
SItAK, SCHROEDER, and WALTERS, CONCUR.
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I a, is amended to read:
221.7 Sec. 26. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, subdivision Ia,
(~Jf a person receives any medical assistance
221.8 Subd. I a. Estates subject to claims. (&If
221.9hereunder, on the person's death, if single, or on the death of the survivor of a married
221.10couple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, or as otherwise provided
221. 11 for in this section, the total amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person
221. 12and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the person or the estate of th{:
221. 13surviving spouse in the court having jurisdiction to probate the estate or to issue a de(:ree
221.140f descent according to sections 525.31 to 525.313.
221.1S(b) For the purposes of this section, the person's estate must consist of:
221.16(1) the person's probate estate;
221.17(2) all of the person's interests or proceeds of those interests in real property the
221. 18person owned as a life tenant or as a joint tenant with a right of survivorship at the time of
221. Hthe person's death;
221.19the
221. 20(3) all of the person's interests or proceeds of those interests in securities the person
221. 210wned in beneficiary form as provided under sections 524.6-301 to 524.6-311 at the time
221. 220f the person's death, to the extent the interests or proceeds of those interests become part
221. 230f the probate estate under section 524.6-307;
221.24(4) all of the person's interests in joint accounts, multiple-party accounts, and
251?ay-on-death accounts, brokerage accounts, investment accounts, or the proceeds of
221. 25Qay-on-death
221. 26those accounts, as provided under sections 524.6-201 to 524.6-214 at the time of the
27J)erSOn's death to the extent the interests become part of the probate estate under section
221. 27QerSOn's
221.28524.6-207: and
221.28524.6-207;
221.29(5) assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the person through survivorship,
trust, or other arrangements.
221. 30living trust
221.31(C) For the purpose of this section and recovery in a surviving spouse's estate for
221. 32medical assistance paid for a predeceased spouse, the estate must consist of all of the legal
221. 33title and interests the deceased individual's predeceased spouse had in jointly owned or
221. 34marital property at the time of the spouse's death, as defined in subdivision 2b, and the
351?roceeds of those interests, that passed to the deceased individual or another individual, a
221. 35Qroceeds
tenan£Y,
222.1survivor, an heir, or an assign of the predeceased spouse through a joint tenancy, tenan£Y..
222.2in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. A deceased
222.3recipient who, at death, owned the property jointly with the surviving spouse shall hav,~
222.4an interest in the entire property.
222. sed) For the purpose of recovery in a single person's estate or the estate of a survivor
222. 60f a married couple, "other arrangement" includes any other means by which title to all or
222.7any part of the jointly owned or marital property or interest passed from the predeceas{:d
222. sspouse to another including, but not limited to, transfers between spouses which are
222.9permitted, prohibited, or penalized for purposes of medical assistance.
222 .10(&A claim shall be filed if medical assistance was rendered for either or both
222.11persons under one of the following circumstances:
222 . 1 $ j i U the person was over 55 years of age, and received services under this chapter;
13Wm the person resided in a medical institution for six months or longer, received
222. 13(bta.l
222 . 14services under this chapter, and, at the time of institutionalization or application for
222. 15medical assistance, whichever is later, the person could not have reasonably been expected
222 .16tO be discharged and returned home, as certified in writing by the person's treating
222 . 17physician. For purposes of this section only, a "medical institution" means a skilled
222 . 18fiursing
18Uursing facility, intermediate care facility, intermediate care facility for persons with
222.
Hdevelopmental disabilities, nursing facility, or inpatient hospital; or
222.19developmental
222.2ofejill the person received general assistance medical care services under chapter
222. 21256D.
222.22(QThe
222.22(QThe claim shall be considered an expense of the last illness of the decedent for the
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222. 23purpose of section 524.3-805. Notwithstanding any law or rule to the contrary, a state or
222. 24county agency with a claim under this section must be a creditor under section 524.6·-307.
222. 25Any statute of limitations that purports to limit any county agency or the state agency,
222.260r both, to recover for medical assistance granted hereunder shall not apply to any claim
222. 27ffiade hereunder for reimbursement for any medical assistance granted hereunder. Notice
222. 280fthe claim shall be given to all heirs and devisees of the decedent whose identity call be
222. 29ascertained with reasonable diligence. The notice must include procedures and instrw;tions
222.30for making an application for a hardship waiver under subdivision 5; time frames for
222. Jlsubmitting an application and determination; and information regarding appeal rights and
federal share of medical assistance
222. J2procedures. Counties are entitled to one-half of the non
nonfederal
222. 33collections from estates that are directly attributable to county effort. Counties are entitled
222. 34to ten percent of the collections for alternative care directly attributable to county effort.
lh, is amended to read:
256B.l5, subdivision 1h,
222.35 Sec. 27. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15,
223.1 Subd. 1h.
lh. Estates ofspecific persons receiving medical assistance. (a) For
223.2purposes of this section, paragraphs (b) to Wiil apply if a person received medical
223.3assistance for which a claim may be filed under this section and died single, or the
223.4surviving spouse of the couple and was not survived by any of the persons described
223.5in subdivisions 3 and 4.
~I:tFfleses ef this seetietl, the ~ersetl's estate eetlsists ef: (1) the ~ersee's
~ersee's
223.6 (\:I) fer ~\:tFfleses
~ersee's ieterests er ~reeeeds
~reeeess efthese ieterests ie real ~reflerty
223. 7preeate estate; (2) all efthe ~ersee's
~reflerty
teeast er as a jeiet teeaet
teeast with a right ef sl:!F'li'lershi~
sl:tr'li'lershi~ at the
223. sthe ~ersee e'lfeed as a life teeaet
~ersee's seath;
~reeeeas ef these iRterests-ffi
223. 9time ef the ~ersee's
death; (3) all ef the ~erseR's iRterests er ~reeeeas
223. 11osee\:trities
oseel:trities tile ~ersoR O'llRea ie eeeefieiary farm as ~ro"iaea
~ro".iaea l:tFIaer seetiees 524.6 30 l-te
~erseR's seath,
~reeil.j;e
223.11524.6 311 at the time efthe ~erseR's
death, te the exteRt they eeeeme flart efthe ~reeil-te
223 ..12estatel:tRSer
12estate \:tRder seetieR 524.6 307; (4) all ef the ~ersoR's iRterests iR jOiRt
joiRt aeeol:l:Rts, m\:tltiple
ml:tltiple
223.IJ~arty
223.1~arty aeeo\:tRts,
aeeOI:tRts, afla ~ay eR aeath aeeel:l:Rts, er the flroeeeas of those aeeol:l:Rts, as ~royided
~FOyided
223 . 14\:tRaer
death to the exteRt
14I:tRaer seetioes 524.6 201 te 524.6 214 at the time of the ~erseR's seath
223. 15they eeeome ~iH1 of
the ~roeate
\:tRder seetioR 524.6207; ass
aed (5) the flersoR's
ofihe
~roeate estate
estatel:tRSer
223 .ulegal
death iR real flre~erty
\:tRder
. 16legal title or iRterest at the time ef the ~ersoR's
~ersoR's seath
flre~erty traesferrea
trassferrea I:tRSer
223 .17a traRsfer eR seath
death sees
deed I:teser
\:teder seetioR 507.071, or iR the ~reeeeds
~reeeess [rem
frem the sooseq\:teet
sooseql:teet
223 .18sale
aey law or rule to tfttl
. 18sale of the ~eFSeR's iRterest iR the real flre~erty. Neh'lithstaedieg
Neh'lithstassieg asy
223. 1geoetraf)',
seetiofl shall se a eFeditoF
1geoetrar)" a state or eo\:tRf)'
eo\:tRty &geee)' with a elaim \:tRder
\:tRser this seetioR
eFesitoF 1:Hl4er
1:Hi4er
223.2oseetioR524.6
223.20seetioR524.6 307.
223.21 WJQl Notwithstanding any law or rule to the contrary, the person's life estate or joint
223. 22tenancy interest in real property not subject to a medical assistance lien under sections
223.23514.980 to 514.985 on the date of the person's death shall not end upon the person's d{:ath
223. 24and shall continue as provided in this subdivision. The life estate in the person's estate
223.25shall be that portion of the interest in the real property subject to the life estate that is {:qual
223.2610
223.2610 the life estate percentage factor for the life estate as listed in the Life Estate Mortality
223. 27Table of the health care program's manual for a person who was the age of the medical
223.28assistance recipient on the date of the person's death. The joint tenancy interest in real
223.29property in the estate shall be equal to the fractional interest the person would have owned
223.
223. 30in
30in the jointly held interest in the property had they and the other owners held title to the
223. Jlproperty
JlProperty as tenants in common on the date the person died.
223.32 Will The court upon its own motion, or upon motion by the personal representative
223. 330r any interested party, may enter an order directing the remaindermen or surviving joint
223. 34tenants and their spouses, if any, to sign all documents, take all actions, and otherwise
223. 35fully cooperate with the personal representative and the court to liquidate the decedent's
223. 361ife estate or joint tenancy interests in the estate and deliver the cash or the proceeds of
224.1those interests to the personal representative and provide for any legal and equitable
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224.2sanctions as the court deems appropriate to enforce and carry out the order, including ,ill
224.3award of reasonable attorney fees.
224.4 WJill. The personal representative may make, execute, and deliver any conveyances
224.50r other documents necessary to convey the decedent's life estate or joint tenancy interest
224. 6in the estate that are necessary to liquidate and reduce to cash the decedent's interest or
224.7for any other purposes.
224.8 fttm Subject to administration, all costs, including reasonable attorney fees,
224.9directlyand immediately related to liquidating the decedent's life estate or joint tenancy
224 .1ointerest in the decedent's estate, shall be paid from the gross proceeds of the liquidation
224 . 11allocable to the decedent's interest and the net proceeds shall be turned over to the personal
224.11allocable
224 . 12representative and applied to payment of the claim presented under this section.
224.13
WiD The personal representative shall bring a motion in the district court in which
224.14the
224. 14the estate is being probated to compel the remaindermen or surviving joint tenants to
224 . 15account for and deliver to the personal representative all or any part of the proceeds of any
224 . 16sale, mortgage, transfer, conveyance, or any disposition of real property allocable to the
224 . 17decedent's life estate or joint tenancy interest in the decedent's estate, and do everything
224.1soecessary to liquidate and reduce to cash the decedent's interest and turn the proceeds of
224. 19the sale or other disposition over to the personal representative. The court may grant any
224.2olegal or equitable relief including, but not limited to, ordering a partition of real estate:
224. 21under chapter 558 necessary to make the value of the decedent's life estate or joint tenancy
224. 22interest available to the estate for payment of a claim under this section.
224.23 Wig} Subject to administration, the personal representative shall use all of the cash
224.240r proceeds of interests to pay an allowable claim under this section. The remaindermen
224. 250r surviving joint tenants and their spouses, if any, may enter into a written agreement
224. 26With the personal representative or the claimant to settle and satisfy obligations imposed at
224. 27any time before or after a claim is filed.
224.28 fi:)JJll
fi:)Jhl. The personal representative may, at their discretion, provide any or all of the
224. 290ther owners, remaindermen, or surviving joint tenants with an affidavit terminating the
224.30decedent's estate's interest in real property the decedent owned as a life tenant or as a joint
224. 31tenant with others, if the personal representative determines in good faith that neither the
224.J2decedent nor any of the decedent's predeceased spouses received any medical assistance
224. 33for which a claim could be filed under this section, or if the personal representative has
224. 34filed an affidavit with the court that the estate has other assets sufficient to pay a claim, as
224.3spresented, or if there is a written agreement under paragraph Wig),
Wlg), or if the claim, as
224.35presented,
224.36allowed, has been paid in full or to the full extent of the assets the estate has available
225.1to pay it. The affidavit may be recorded in the office of the county recorder or filed in
225.2the Office of the Registrar of Titles for the county in which the real property is located.
225.3Except as provided in section 514.981, subdivision 6, when recorded or filed, the affidavit
225.4shall terminate the decedent's interest in real estate the decedent owned as a life tenant or a
225.~oint tenant with others. The affidavit shall:
225.6(1) be signed by the personal representative;
225.7(2) identify the decedent and the interest being terminated;
225. s(3) give recording information sufficient to identify the instrument that created the
225.9interest in real property being terminated;
225.10(4) legally describe the affected real property;
225.11(5) state that the personal representative has determined that neither the decedent
225. 12nor any of the decedent's predeceased spouses received any medical assistance for which
225.13a claim could be filed under this section;
225 .14(6)
.14( 6) state that the decedent's estate has other assets sufficient to pay the claim, as
225. 1spresented,
15presented, or that there is a written agreement between the personal representative and
225.
225 . 16the claimant and the other owners or remaindermen or other joint tenants to satisfy the
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225. 170bligations imposed under this subdivision; and
225.18(7) state that the affidavit is being given to terminate the estate's interest under this
225. 19subdivision, and any other contents as may be appropriate.
225.2oThe recorder or registrar of titles shall accept the affidavit for recording or filing. The
225. 21affidavit shall be effective as provided in this section and shall constitute notice even if it
225. 22does not include recording information sufficient to identify the instrument creating the
225. 23interest it terminates. The affidavit shall be conclusive evidence of the stated facts.
225.24 (:Bill
ffiJU The holder of a lien arising under subdivision lc shall release the lien at
225.2sthe
Wig) to the extent
225. 25the holder's expense against an interest terminated under paragraph Wig}
225. 260f the termination.
225.27 W.ill
1c is not released under paragraph ffiJU,
(:Bill,
Wiil If a lien arising under subdivision 1c
225.2sprior to closing the estate, the personal representative shall deed the interest subject to the
225. 291ien to the remaindermen or surviving joint tenants as their interests may appear. Upon
225.30recording or filing, the deed shall work a merger of the recipient's life estate or joint
225. 31tenancy interest, subject to the lien, into the remainder interest or interest the decedent and
225. 320thers owned jointly. The lien shall attach to and run with the property to the extent of
225. 33the decedent's interest at the time of the decedent's death.
256B.l5, subdivision 2, is amended to read:
225.34 Sec. 28. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15,
226.1 Subd. 2. Limitations on claims. The claim shall include only the total amount
226. 20f medical assistance rendered after age 55 or during a period of institutionalization
226.3described in subdivision la, elatlse (9)
(e), and the total amount of general
(6) paragraph (el,
226.4assistance medical care rendered, and shall not include interest. Claims that have been
226. 5allowed but not paid shall bear interest according to section 524.3-806, paragraph (d). A
226. 6claim against the estate of a surviving spouse who did not receive medical assistance, for
226. 7ffiedical assistance rendered for the predeceased spouse, shall be payable from the full
226.8value of all of the predeceased spouse's assets and interests which are part of the survivi.!:!&..
survivi!:!.g"
226.9spouse's estate under subdivisions 1Iaa and 2b. Recovery of medical assistance expenses in
226.1othe
226
.1othe nonrecipient surviving spouse's estate is limited to the value of the assets of the estate
226.. llthat were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage.-.:rhe
226
marriage ...Jhe
226. 12claim is not payable from the value of assets or proceeds of assets in the estate attributable
226.13to
226
.13to a predeceased spouse whom the individual married after the death of the predeceas(:d
226. 14recipient spouse for whom the claim is filed or from assets and the proceeds of assets Jin
lin the
226. 15estate which the nonrecipient decedent spouse acquired with assets which were not marital
226.. 16property or jointly owned property after the death of the predeceased recipient spouse.
226
226. 17Claims for alternative care shall be net of all premiums paid under section 256B.0913,
226. 18subdivision 12 , on or after July 1, 2003, and shall be limited to services provided on or
226.
19after July 1,
226.19after
I, 2003. Claims against marital property shall be limited to claims against
226.2orecipients who died on or after July 1, 2009.
226.21 Sec. 29. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, is amended by adding a
226. 22subdivision to read:
ForpuIJloses of this subdivision and
226.23 Subd. 2b. Controlling provisions. (a) Forpurnoses
226.24subdivisions la and 2, paragraphs (b) to (d) apply.
226.25(b) At the time of death of a recipient spouse and solely for pUIJlose
purnose of recovery of
226. 26medical assistance benefits received, a predeceased recipient spouse shall have a legal.
226. 27title or interest in the undivided whole of all of the property which the recipient and the
226.2srecipient's surviving spouse owned jointly or which was marital property at any time
226. 29during their marriage regardless of the form of ownership and regardless of whether
226. 30it
30it was owned or titled in the names of one or both the recipient and the recipient's
226.
226. 31spouse. Title and interest in the property of a predeceased recipient spouse shall not end
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226. 320r extinguish upon the person's death and shall continue for the purpose of allowing
226. 33recovery of medical assistance in the estate of the surviving spouse. Upon the death of
proper!y'226. 34the predeceased recipient spouse, title and interest in the predeceased spouse's proper!y
226. 35shall vest in the surviving spouse by operation oflaw and without the necessity for aI!y"
aI!V..
227 .lprobate or decree of descent proceedings and shall continue to exist after the death of the
227.lprobate
assistance,,227.2predeceased spouse and the surviving spouse to permit recovery of medical assistance,,
227.3The recipient spouse and the surviving spouse of a deceased recipient spouse shall not.
227.4encumber, disclaim, transfer, alienate, hypothecate, or otherwise divest themselves of
227. sthese interests before or upon death.
pU1:poses of this section, "marital property" includes any and all real or
227. dc) For pU1poses
227. 7personal property of any kind or interests in such property the predeceased recipient
227. sspouse and their spouse, or either of them, owned at the time of their marriage to each
227. 90ther or acquired during their marriage regardless of whether it was owned or titled in
227. lathe names of one or both of them. If either or both spouses of a married couple received
227.11medical assistance, all property owned during the marriage or which either or both spouses
227 .12acquired during their marriage shall be presumed to be marital property for purposes of
227.12acquired
227 .13recovering medical assistance unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the COI~
cor~
227.13recovering
227.l4(d) The agency responsible for the claim for medical assistance for a recipient spouse.
227.15may,
227.lsrnay, at its discretion, release specific real and personal property from the provisions of
227 .16this section. The release shall extinguish the interest created under paragraph (b) in the
227.16this
227 . 1 71and
71 and it describes upon filing or recording. The release need not be attested, certified, or
227.
227.18acknowledged as a condition of filing or recording and shall be filed or recorded in the
227 .19office of the county recorder or registrar of titles, as appropriate, in the county where the
227.19office
227.2areal property is located. The party to whom the release is given shall be responsible for
descri,bed
227.2lpaying all fees and costs necessary to record and file the release. If the property described
227.22in the release is registered property, the registrar of titles shall accept it for recording and
227. 23shall record it on the certificate of title for each parcel of property described in the release.
227. 2df the property described in the release is abstract property, the recorder shall accept it.
227.2sfor filing and file it in the county's grantor-grantee indexes and any tract index the cou!!!y
cou!!!y..
227. 26ffiaintains for each parcel of property described in the release.
227.27 Sec. 30. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, is amended by adding a
227. 28subdivision to read:
227.29 Subd. 9. Commissioner's intervention. The commissioner shall be permitted to
227.3aintervene as a party in any proceeding involving recovery of medical assistance upon
227.31filing a notice of intervention and serving such notice on the other parties.
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IDAHO GENERAL DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
THE POWERS YOU GRANT BELOW ARE EFFECTIVE
EVEN IF YOU BECOME DISABLED OR INCOMPETENT
NOTICE: THE POWERS GRANTED BY THIS DOCUMENT ARE BROAD AND
SWEEPING. THEY ARE EXPLAINED IN THE UNIFORM STATUTORY FORM POWER
OF ATTORNEY ACT. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT rHESE POWERS,
OBTAIN COMPETENT LEGAL ADVICE. THIS DOCUMENT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE
ANYONE TO MAKE MEDICAl. AND OTHER HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS FOR YOU.
YOU MAY REVOKE THIS POWER OF ATIORNEY IF YOU LATER WISH TO DO SO.
A TIORNEY IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND'WILL CONTINUE
THIS POWER OF ATIORNEY
TO BE EFFECTIVE EVEN IF YOU BECOME OISABLED,INCAPACITATED, OR
INCOMPETENT.
.

.~

LTCU
Lrcu

I, Martha Jean Perry 2401 Tendoy Boise, Idaho 83705
Appoint
Appoint

NDV
NDV 22 88 2007
2007

:.,
.~
'~

AECE'I'VED
AECE'I'VED ..

George D. Perry 2.401 Tendoy, Boise, Idaho 83705 or

;,
;.

;;'

(attorney-In-fact) to act for me In
as my Agent (attorney-in-fact)
in any lawful way with respect to the
following initialed subjects:
TO GRANT ALL OF THE FOLLOWING POWERS.
POWERS, INITIAL THE LINE IN FRONT OF
(N) AND IGNORE THE LINES IN FRONT OF THE OTHER POWERS.
TO GRANT ONE OR MORE, BUT FEWER THAN ALL, OF THE FOLLOWING
POWERS, INITIAL THE LINE IN FRONT OF EACH POWER YOU ARE GRANTING.
.

.

.

TO WITHHOLD A POWER, DO NOT INITIAL THEUNE IN FRONT OF IT. YOU MAY,
BUT NEED NOT. CROSS OUT EACH POWER WITHHELD.
.
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Note: If you initialltarn A or Item 9, which follow, a notarized signature will be
required on bet'lalf
Principal.
be"alf of the PrincIpal.
.
INITIAL

JJ.J d I (A) Real property transactions. To lease, sell, mortgage, purchase,
)1'/
'~e,
'~e. and acquire, and to agree, bargain, and contract for the lease, sale, .

purchase,exchange,
receive. and possess any
acqUisition of, and to accept, take. receive,
purchase,
exchange. and acquisition
interest in real property whatsoever,on such terms and conditions, and under suoh
covenants, as my Agent shall deem proper; and to maintain, repair, tear down, ialter,.
subject to liens,
'. rebuild, improve manage, insure, move, rent, lease, sell, convey, SUbject
mortgages, and security deeds, and In any way or manner deal with all or any part of
limitation, real
any Interest in real property whatsoever, Including specifically, but without limItation,
.,
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property lying and being sjtuated in the State of 1daho,
Idaho, under such tenns and conditions,
and under such covenants, as my Agent shall deem proper ancl may for all deferred
payments accept purchase money notes payable to me and secured by mortgages or
deeds to secure debt, and may from time to time collect and cancel any of said notes,
mortgages, security Interests, or deeds to secure debt.
"I
."

l.'rCU
l.'rClJ

11,
~ ics)
trana.ctlon •• To ~se,
"'asa, .e~f,lI(Oll9tllle,
se~o~lle,
;f1,~
its) Tangible .,....onal
p81'Sonal property trana.etlone.

.:;"
,:',\
"

..,

'r'
,<,

purc ase, exchange,
contr~~J.J~e )ei'BSl
eXchange, and acquire, and to agree, bargain, and contr~~J.J~e
sale, purchase, exchange. and acqulsltl?n 0'\
of\ and to ~ccept,.ta~e, re~~~ssess
re~~~ssess
any personal property whatsoever, tangible or intangible,
Intangible, or ,"terest
'"terest thereto, o~h
terms and conditions, and under such covenants, as my Agentshall deem proper; and .
to maintaIn, repair, improve, manage, insure, rent, lease, sell,
sell. convey, subject to liens or
mortgages, or to take any other security interests in said property which are recognized
under the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted at that time under the laws of the State
of Idaho or anyappJicable
(pledge). and in any way or
any applicable state, or otherwise hypothecate (pledge),
manner deal with all or any part of any rear or personal propertY whatsoever, tangible or
intangible.
exec~tion or may thereafter
intangible, or any interest therein, that I own a1 the time of exec~tjon
acquire.
acqUire, under such terms and conditions,
conditions. and under such covElnants, as my Agent
shall deem proper.
!l1...../..t.(C)
!lJ..../..t.(C) Stock and bond transactions.
transectlons. ,To purchase, sell, exchange, surrender,

assign, redeem, vote at any meeting, or otherwise transfer any and arl shares ,of stock,
bonds, or other securities In any business, association,
aSSOCiation, corporation, partnership, or
other legal entity, whether private or public, now or hereafter belonging to me.

organl~

"
','

:,:.

.:~.

.,
.\

.'

·111 17)(0)
•• To
/7)(0) Commodity and option tranaactlon
transaction••
or continue and·
~
~ny business which term includes,
~~ny
includes. without limitation, any farming,
manufacturing, service.
service, mIning, retailing or other type of business operation In any fonn, .'
manufacturing.
trust-or other legal
whether as a proprietorship, joint venture, partnership, corporation, trust'or
entity; operate, buy, sell, expand, contract, terminate or liquidate any busIness:
busIness; direct,
qirect,
oorltrol. supervise, manage or participate In the operation of any' business and engage,
oor,trol.
compensate and discharge business managers,employeee, agents, attorneys,
.
accountants and consultants; and, In general.
general, exercise all powers with respect to
business interests and operations which 'the principal could If pf'$sent and under no
disability.
disability.

~

'.

.,

(E) Banking and other flnanoial
tran$actlbn8. To make, recatva,
recetve,
flnanoia' instltutlon tran$actlbna.
s·
drafts, bills of
s' h, endorse,execute.
endorse,execute, acknowledge, deriver and possess checks, drafts.
exchange,
r$celpts and deposit
certificates, withdrawal r'$celpts
exchange. letters of credit.
credit, notes, stock certificates.
instruments. relating to accounts or deposits in, or certificates of deposit of banks,
saving/;;
savlnge; and'ioans, credit unions.
unions, or other Institutions or associattons. To pay all sums of
money.
Owing by me Upon any account, bill
money, at any time or times, that may hereafter be owing
of exchange, check, draft, purchase, cOntract,
contract, note. or trade acceptance made,
'
executed, endorsed, accepted.
accepted, and delivered by me or for me In my name, by m,Y
Agent. To borrow from time to tfme such sums of money as my Agent may deem proper
and execute promissory notes, security deeds or agreements, financing statements, or
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other security instruments in such fonn as the lender may request and renew said notes
and security Instruments from time to time In whole or in part. To have free access at
any time or times to any safe deposit box or vault to which I might have access.

MF)
Business operating transactions.
and£.~se
tra".aetlons. To conduct, engage in, and£.~se
~the
"or'K~
~the affairs of any and all lawful business ventures of whatever nature"or'J(~
hI d

."
'..:
,"

"
,
....',,-'."

,.~.,
,.~.'

,'(

• .0''

.~'
"

(

that I may now or hereafter be Involved In.

,

NiJII
NlJ1/ ') 8 , ..
~
200?

.

(G) Insurance and annuity transactions. To exercise or pe~~
pe~$l
po r, duty, right. or obligation, in regard to any contract of life, accid~~t:h~,vt:D
accid~~t:h~,vt:D
disability, liability, or other type of Insurance or any combination of insurance; and to
procure new or 'additional contracts of insurance for me snd to 'designate the beneficla'lV
beneficla'ry
of same;. provided, however, that my Agent cannot designate himself or herself as
beneficiary of any such Insurance contracts.

7tJ?!e I

)//
)fJ ~ I

..

"

',j
"j

(H) Estate, trust, and other beneficiary transacti~n•• To accept, receipt for,

.~ release, reject, renounce, assign. disclaim, demand. sue for, claim and

..recover
recover any legacy.
legacy, bequest, devise, gIft or other property interest or payment due or
payable to or for the principal; assert any Interest in and exercfse any power over any
trust, estate or property
control: establish a revocable trust solely for
properly subject to fiduciary control;
the benefit of the principal that terminatesst the death of the principal and is then
distributable to the legal representative of the estate of the principal; and, in general,
exercise all powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could exercise
if present and under no disability; provided, however, that the Agent may not make or
If
change a
and may not revoke or amend a trust revocable or amendable by the
principal or require the trustee of any trust for the benefit of the principal to pay income
or principal to the Agent unless specific authority to that end is given.
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.~.

hi l!II ;J
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,.~
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~
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(1) Claims and litigation. To commence, prosecute, discontinue. or defend all

'~r other legal proceedings touchIng my property, real or personal, or any part

thereof, or touching any matter in which I or my property, real or personal, may be in
any way concerned. To defend, settle, adjust, make allowances, compound, submit to
arbHration. and compromise all accounts, reckonings,claims, and demands whatsoever
that now are, or hereafter shall be, pending between me and any person, finn,
corporation, or other legal entity, in such manner and in all respects as my Agent shall
.
.
deem proper.
.
.

m<J)
m ( J ) Personal and family maintenance. To hire accountants, attorneys at law,
conSUltants, clerks, physicians, nurses, agents, servants, workmen,
workmen. and others and to
their place, and to pay and arlow the persons so
remove them, and to appoint others In their·
salaries. wages.
wages, or other remunerations, as my Agent shall deem
employed such salaries,

proper.
.

~

.

?J1 f1 I' (I<)
(K) Benefits from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid. or other
?t!

'~ental programs, or military service. To prepare, sign and file
any claim or·
'~ental
flleany
'application for Social Security, unemployment or military servfcebenefrts; sue for, settle .'
~:~

~.
.
.
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.,or
or abandon any claims to any benefit or assistance under any federal, state, local or
foreign statute or regulation; control, deposit to any account, collect, receiptfor, and
take title to and hold all benefits under any Social Security, unemployment, military
service or other state, federal, local or foreign statute or regulation;
regUlation; and, in general,
all powers with respect to Social Security, unemployment, military service, and
exercise al/
governmental benefits. Including but not limited to Medioare and Medicai'd, which the
principal could exercise if present and under no disability.

:<

'.
"

IF

.,;.
/"

,:>
.:>

"

,.)

l:'

Jt (/; I' (L)Retirement plan transaGtiona.
transaGtfons. T.o
to contribute to, withdraw from and

t

'

..

..

':>...
,\

','

}J,d, / (M) Tax matters. To prepare.
prepare, to make elections,
elections. to execute and to file all
a/l tax,
'JfJ,d,
~urity, unemployment insurance,
insurance. and informational returns required by the laws
~urity,
of the United States, or of any state or subdivision
subdivisIon thereof, or of any foreign
govemment;
government; to prepare, to execute, and to file all other papers and instruments wtllch
the Agent shall think to be desirable or necessary for safeguarding of me against
excess or illegal taxation or against penalties
penaHles imposed for claimed violation of any law or
other governmental regulation; and to pay, to compromise. or to contest or to apply for
refunds in connection with any taxes or assessments for which I am or may be liable.

,.

"
:'~

,, :,~

InIJ
/J ;1 (N) ALL OF THE POWERS LISTED ABOVE. YOU NEED NOT Ltt~(jL ANY
Oi1iERUNES IF YOU rNITIAL LINE (N).
'.
,
.
.
. L'
L',f, f ,.

./.

.,

...

:.
:

"

."

NOV

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

"

\

de osit funds in any type of retirement plan (which term includes, without limitation, any
tax qualified or nonquallfled pension, profit sharing, stock bonus, employee savings and
other retirement pia",
plan, individual retirement account, deferred compensation plan and
any other type of employee benefit plan); select and change payment options for the
principal under any retirement plan; make rollover contributions from any retirement
aI/ investment
plan to othenetirement plans or Individual retirement accounts; exercise all
self-directed retIrement plan; and, in general,
powers available under any type of self-direeted
and retirement plan account
exercise all powers with respect to retirement plans andretjrement
balances which the principal could If present and under no disability.
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ON THE FOLLOWING LINES YOU MAY GIVE SPECIAL
OR EXTENDING THE POWERS GRANTED TO YOUR AGENT.
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~AtDNIINUE
THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AN ~AtDNIINUE
UNTIL IT IS REVOKED.

.

.

• vr::O

THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY SHALL BE CONSTRUED AS A GENERAL DURABLE
POWER OF ATTORNEY AND SHALL CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE EVEN IF I
BECOME DISABLED, INCAPACITATED, OR INCOMPETENT.
(YOUR AGENT WILL HAVE AUTHORITY TO EMPLOY OTHER PERSONS AS
(yOUR
NECESSARY TO ENABLE 'THE AGENT TO PROPERLY EXERCISE THE POWERS
GRANTED IN THIS FORM, BUT YOUR AGENT WILL HAVE TO MAKE ALL
DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS. IF YOu. WANT TO GIVE YOUR AGENT THE RIGHT
TO DELEGATE DISCRETIONARY DECISION-MAKING POWERS TO OTHERS, YOU
SHOULD KEEP THE NEXT SENTENCE, OTHERWISE IT SHOULD BE STRICKEN.)
Authority to Delegate. My Agent shall have the right by written Instrument to delegate

aU of the foregoing pOwers involving discretionary decision-making to any person
any or all
.or persons whom my Ag~nt
Ag~nt may select, but suoh delegation may be amended or
.or
revoked by any agent Oncludlng any successor) named byrne who is acting under this
attorney at
stthe
power of attomey
the time of reference.
.

(yOUR
(YOUR AGENT WILL BE ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR ALL REASONABLE
EXPENSES INCURRED IN ACTING UNDER THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY. STRIKE
OUT THE NEXT SENTENCE IF YOU DO NOT WANT YOUR AGENT TO ALSO BE
ENTITLED TO REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES AS AGENT;)
Right to CompensatIon. My Agent shall be entitled to rea$onable compensation for
. .
services renderecl as agent under this power of attorney.

(IF YOU WISH TO NAME SUGCESSOR AGENTS, INSERT THE NAME(S) AND
ADDRESS(ES) OF SUCH SUCCESSOR(S) IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH.)
Successor Agent. If any Agent named by me shall die, become Incompetent,
incompetent, resign or
refuse to accept the office of Agent, I name the following (each toac! alone and
successively, In the order named) as successor(s) to such Agent:

..,
,

"

Steven A. Perry 3215 Targee, Boise, Idaho 83705
BarbarEil MoCormlck 2525 Joretta Drive, Boise, Idaho 83704

Choice of Law. THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS.
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO WITHOUT REGARD FOR CONFLICTS OF LAWS
PRINCIPLES. IT WAS EXECUTED IN THE STATE OF IDAHO AND IS INTENDED TO

'"
'I

"
:i~'i'
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BE VALID IN ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ALL
FOREIGN NATIONS.

an the contents of this form and understand the
I am fully informed as to a"
full import of thIs grant of powers to my Agent.

.:.'

I agree that any third party who receives a copy of this document may act
under it. Revocation of the power of attorney Is not effective as to a third
party until the third partY leams of the revocation. I agree to Indemnify the
third party for any claims that arise against the third party because of
reliance on thts power of ,attorney.
-attorney.

';",

x:

',.'
",

_3"---_ day of
Signed this _3""---_

'7J? (~

.20

"

..

. ..
~

as

41§4~~
41§4~~
Signature
{/

~,~.
, ~,~.

.':~,:~
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,, "
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;,
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..,

Security Number
Social SecurIty
",

,','
.','

;,
,

,
,
,~

,',"

.CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF NOTARY PUBLIC
.CERTIFICATE
OFIDAH~11 '
STATE OFIDAH4A
. COUNTY OF ~ t
"

'

~ent

a~nowled9~re
"1,.".., "1'tt'l~ ~ ~
c"
c'

':.'

.'

,,'
"

"

"

"1",..,

,',

~"

ft

Mv4.av·
Mv4.av

,••,'.~~
,'.~~
,••
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,

Notanal Officer)
(Signature of Notarial
.
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!I l l .~. ,.",v;z:
~ 01I

'.q'f:/
,,,,,,v
J.q'f:/
....~~ •.

X........ .
, Sr.&..-.2

'
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[Da~l ~y

.. '
.

This d~ent was acknowled9"e.... me on 3~ .3 / oS
[Da1e] by
~2:
4tm,;.:.4
4 Y' • [name of pnnclpal].
principal].
2: n,Cl "72'
'LJ'
.
l.-ofJ1
QA.--tAtt. ~
1A.-eJ.
1.-ofJ1aA---tAIt.~
..'
m~. ~
[Notary Seal, If any]:
.
,I
'1'!J~.

,',

.Notary Public for the state of Idaho
.Notary

,,'
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';.

.>

.~

My cOmmlSSjt expires:
IO/J~ bS' .
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EXHIBIT "An
The East 70 feet of Lot 111n WINeS SUBDIVISION, according to the offlctal plat thereof, filed in Book 10 of
Plats at Page(s) 489. offiCial
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
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Exhibit "AN
Legal o..c:rtptlon
oe.c:rtptlon
Lagal

000439

27/28

,,0'

We"stlaw,
Page I

970 P.2d 6
132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6
(Cite as: 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6)

I 98HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;

Medicaid
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Lewiston, April 1998 Term.
In the Matter of the Estate of Lionel Malcolm
Knudson, Deceased.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.
Barbara JACKMAN, Personal Representative for
the Estate of Lionel Malcolm Knudson, RespondRespond
ent.
No. 23928.
Nov. 2,1998.
Following death of Medicaid recipient and subsub
sequent death of her husband, Department of Health
and Welfare sought allowance of a claim against
husband's estate to recover the remaining balance
of the Medicaid payments. W.C. Hamlett, MagisMagis
trate Judge, denied claim, and the District Court,
De
Latah County, John R. Stegner, J., affirmed. Department appealed. The Supreme Court, Johnson,
J., held that: (I) if the estate of the individual who
received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay
De
the full amount of the assistance received, the Department can recover the balance from the estate of
ef
the surviving spouse, but (2) federal law, as in effect when recipient and her husband entered into

19SHk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
198Hk490
of Payments
I19SHk494
98Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient,
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak24 1.70)

Health 198H ~495
198H Health
198B
HIlI Government Assistance
198 HIII
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
Aid. Recipient,
19SHk495 k. Spouse of Aid
198Hk495
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak24 1.70)
MediIf the estate of the individual who received Medi
caid assistance is inadequate to repay the full
fuJI
amount of the assistance received, the Department
of Health and Welfare can recover the balance from
the estate of the surviving spouse. I.C. § :56-218.
:56-2tS.

12)
= >188
[21 Statutes 361 €€=>188
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VI (A ) General Rules of Construction

361 k 187 Meaning of Language
361 k188
k 188 k. In General. Most Cited

marital settlement agreement transmuting most of
recipient's and husband's community property into
Depart
separate property of husband, limited the Departrecipi
ment to recovering any community property recipient and husband may have accumulated after the
agreement.

Cases
Plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless
clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or
unless plain meaning leads to absurd results.

Vacated and remanded.

13)
[31 Health 198H ~494

West Headnotes

€ = >494
III Health 198H €=>494
198H Health
II98HIII
98HIII Government Assistance

198H Health
I98HIII
I98HIIT Government Assistance
I98HIII(B)
I 98HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Rt:coupment
of Payments
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198Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient,
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak24 1.70)

Health 198H €€=495
= 495
198H Health
I 98HIII Government Assistance
I98HIII
198J-IlH(B) Medical Assistance in General;
198HIlI(B)
Medicaid
I 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
I98Hk490
of Payments
I 98Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient,
]98Hk495
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak24 1.70)
asFederal statute regarding recovery of Medicaid as
sistance, as in effect when husband's guardian
signed marriage settlement agreement on March 8,
1993, transmuting most of husband's and wife's
community property and the income from that
preproperty into separate property of husband, pre
cluded Department of Health and Welfare from rere
covering from husband's estate the Medicaid assistassist
ance that wife had received and that Department
Dehad not recovered from wife's estate, except De
partment could recover any community property
husband and wife may have accumulated after the
1917(b)(1 )(B),
agreement. Social Security Act, § 1917(b)(I
(b)(4), (e)(l)(B),
(e)(I)(B), as amended, 42 U.S.C'.(l994
U.S.C.(l994 Ed.)
§ 1396p(b)(I)(B),
I 396p(b)(1)(B), (b)(4), (e)(l)(B); I.C'. §§
15-1-201(15),32-906(1),56-218(4).
**7 *214 Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General;
W. Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for Appellant. W. Corey Cartwright argued.
William C. Kirsch, Moscow, for Respondent.
WiIliam

PRISUBSTITUTE OPINION THE COURT'S PRI
OR OPINION DATED JUNE, 16, 1998, IS
HEREBY WITHDRAWN.
JOHNSON, Justice.
This is a Medicaid recovery case. We conclude that
section 56-218(1) of the Idaho Code (I.C.), as it ex-

isted at times applicable to this case, authorized the
DeIdaho Department of Health and Welfare (the De
partment) to recover from the available estate of a
surviving spouse the balance of Medicaid payments
received by an individual who was fifty-five years
inold or older when receiving the payments if the in
dividual's estate is inadequate to repay the entire
amount. We conclude, however, that federal law
applicable to this case prohibited this recovery, exex
cept from any community property the spouses may
have accumulated after a marriage settlement
agreement transmuting their community property
fur
into separate property of each. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

PROCEEDTHE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEED
INGS
Barbara Jackman ( Jackman) was the niece of an
elderly couple, Hildor and Lionel Knudson (the
Knudsons). Jackman was also Hildor's guardian and
beheld a durable power of attorney for Lionel. On be
half of the Knudsons, Jackman signed a "Marriage
Settlement Agreement" (the agreement) on March
8, 1993. The agreement transmuted most of the
separKnudsons' community property into Lionel's separ
ate property. By the agreement, Hildor received as
her separate property her personal property and
household effects in her possession, her irrevocable
burial trust, and $1,900 in cash. The purpose of the
Mediagreement was to make Hildor eligible for Medi
caid assistance. Hildor received $41,600.55 in
Medicaid payments (the Medicaid payments) prior
to her death on October 27, 1994.
esAfter Hildor's death, Jackman collected Hildor's es
tate pursuant to the procedures for small estates
contained in I.C. § 15-3-120 I. After paying Hildor's
funeral expenses and legal fees, Jackman delivered
Dethe balance of Hildor's estate, $1,638.03, to the De
acpartment on August 10, 1995. The Department ac
recepted this as a partial settlement of its claim for re
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covery of the Medicaid payments.
Lionel died two weeks after Hildor on November
II, 1994. After Lionel's death, Jackman initiated
probate proceedings for his estate and became LiLi
onel's personal representative. Lionel's estate was
al
valued at $40,798.35. The Department sought allowance of a claim against Lionel's estate to recovrecov
er the remaining balance of the Medicaid payments
(the balance of the Medicaid **8 *215 payments).
Jackman objected to the Department's claim.
The magistrate judge denied the Department's claim
against Lionel's estate because Hildor had an estate,
and the Department received the remainder of the
estate after expenses. The Department appealed to
the district judge, who affirmed the magistrate
judge's decision. The Department appealed.

II.

I.C. § 56-218 AUTHORIZED RECOVERY OF
THE BALANCE OF THE MEDICAID PAYPAY
MENTS FROM LIONEL'S ESTATE.
[I]
[1] The Department asserts that I.C. § 56-218, as it
existed at times applicable to this case, authorized
recovery of the balance of the Medicaid payments
from Lionel's estate. We agree.

I.e. § 56-218 provides that medical assistance "paid
on behalf of an individual who was fiftyfive (55)
years of age or older when the individual received
such assistance may be recovered from the estate,
or if there be no estate the estate of the surviving
spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid paid to
eitherorboth
.... "I.C. § 56-218(1).
eitherorboth...."I.C.
56-218(\).

[2] In George W Watkins Family v. Messenger,
118 Idaho 537. 797 P.2d 1385 (1990),
(\990), the Court
pointed out: "The plain meaning of a statute will
prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is
contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd
results." ld. at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388.

56-218(1) not to allow re
reIf we were to read I.C. § 56-218(\)
covery from Lionel's estate of the balance of the
Medicaid payments because there was $1,638.03 in
Hildor's estate, our reading would be contrary to
expressed legislative intent and would lead to
"absurd results." ld. This reading would mean that
asif the estate of a spouse who received Medicaid as
Desistance had even one cent, or a toothbrush, the De
partment could collect nothing from the estate of
Jackthe surviving spouse. As acknowledged by Jack
man's attorney at the oral argument of this case, this
reading of the statute would mean that there is no
recircumstance in which the legislative intent to re
cover from the estate of a surviving spouse would
be fulfilled. This result is contrary to the expressed
legislative intent that the Department recover from
cirthe estate of the surviving spouse under some cir
precumstances. The statute should not be read as pre
venting recovery from the surviving spouse's estate
even if the recipient's estate is inadequate for the
full recovery of Medicaid payments.
From this analysis we conclude that the correct
reading of I.C. § 56-218( I) is that if the estate of
the individual who received Medicaid assistance is
assistinadequate to repay the full amount of the assist
balance received, the Department can recover the bal
ance from the estate of the surviving spouse. Stated
in terms of the circumstances of this cas~:, when the
Department received the balance of Hildor's estate,
there was "no estate" of Hildor remaining from
which the Department could recover the balance of
the Medicaid payments.

III.
AUTHORFEDERAL LAW PREEMPTS THE AUTHOR
ITY GRANTED TO THE DEPARTMENT BY
I.C. § 56-218 TO RECOVER FROM LIONEL'S
ESTATE, EXCEPT FROM ANY COMMUNITY
PROPERTY OF LIONEL AND HILDOR.

[3J Jackman asserts that federal law applicable to
esthis case does not permit recovery from Lionel's es
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tate. We agree, except to the extent of any comcom
munity property Lionel and Hildor accumulated
after the agreement.

retransmuting the community property Lionel re
folceived into his separate property, contained the fol
lowing provision:

The pertinent portions of 42 U.S.C. §
396p(b)(l)(B) and (4), as enacted in 1993,
\I396p(b)(l)(B)
provide, as follows:

3. We further specifically agree that the income,
issues. profits, capital gains, and other earn
earnrents, issues,
deings or increases on our separate property as de
disposiscribed above and the proceeds from any disposi
tion thereof constitute the separate property of the
comperson owning such property and are: not com
munity property. The forgoing [sic] also shall apply
to all property that may be separately acquired
hereafter by either of us in any manner whatsoever.

(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance
correctly paid under a State plan
(I) No adjustment or recovery of any medical asas
sistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual
under the State plan may be made, except that the
State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medmed
ical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an indiindi
vidual**9 *216 under the State plan in the case of
the following individuals:

(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years
of age or older when the individual received such
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment
or recovery from the individual's estate, but only
for medical assistance consisting ofof
(I) nursing facility services, ....
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term
"estate", with respect to a deceased individualindividual
(A) shall include all real and personal property and

other assets included within the individual's estate,
as defined for purposes of State probate law; ....
This amended statute applied to Medicaid payments
for calendar quarters beginning on or after October
1,1993. Pub.L. 103-66, § 13612(d).
I.C
J -20 I (15) defines "estate," as follows: "
I.e. § 1515-1-20

'Estate' means all property of the decedent, includinclud
ing community property of the surviving spouse
subject to administration, property of trusts, and
property of any other person whose affairs are subsub
ject to this code as it exists from time to time durdur
ing administration." The agreement, in addition to

32-906(\), this provision
As authorized by I.C. § 32-906(1),
maintained the separate character of the assets
transmuted into Lionel's separate property by the
income. rents, issues,
agreement, as well as "the income,
inprofits, capital gains, and other earnings or in
crease" on this separate property. The agreement
comdid not prevent the accumulation of other com
munity property by Lionel and Hildor after the date
reof the agreement and before Hildor's death. The re
cord before us does not disclose whether Lionel and
Hildor had any community property at Ithe time of
Hildor's death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that
community property may be part of Lionel's estate,
and may therefore be part of Hildor's "estate" that
42 U.S.c. § 1I 396p(b)(I)(B) and (4) authorizes the
balDepartment to recover and apply against the bal
ance of the Medicaid payments.
U.S.c. §~
The Department contends that 42 V.S.c.
1396p(
I396p(e)(1
e)(I )(B), enacted in 1993, broadens the
"assets" from which it may recover the balance of
the Medicaid payments. This portion of the federal
law provides, as follows:

(e) Definitions
apIn this section, the following definitions shall ap
ply:

(I) The term "assets", with respect to an individual
includes all income and resources of the individual
inand of the individual's spouse, including any in
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come or resources which the individual or such inin
dividual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive
because of actionaction

ant to I.e. § 15-3-720 she is entitled to receive from
disburseLionel's estate her necessary expenses and disburse
ments including reasonable attorney fee:s. This is a
requestion the magistrate judge must consider on re
mand.

(B) by a person, including a court or administrative
body, with legal authority to act in place of or on
behalf of the individual or such individual's spouse,

We award no costs or attorney fees on appeal.

We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not
applicable to the agreement, which Jackman signed
on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8, 1993.
The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993
amendments to the federal statute does not apply
"with respect to assets disposed of on or before the
date of the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]."
Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e). Therefore, it does not
apply to the agreement and does not allow the DeDe
partment to recover the balance of the Medicaid
payments from Lionel's separate property. This is
U.S.c. § II396p(b)(4),
true even though 42 U.S.C'.
396p(b)(4), which
applies to Medicaid payments for calendar quarters
beginning on or after October I, 1993, authorizes
the Department to recover the Medicaid payments
from "other assets." Without the definition of
lJ.S.e. §
"assets" contained **10 *217 in 42 U.S.e.
1396p(e)(I),
1396p(
e)(1), "other assets" are only those included
within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C. §
15-1-20 II(15).
(15). Lionel's separate property, including

TROUT, C.J., and SILAK, SCHROEDER and
WALTERS, JI., concur.
Idaho, 1998.
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackman
132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6
END OF DOCUMENT

agree
the community property transmuted by the agree-

ment, is not part of Hildor's estate.

IV.

CONCLUSION

De
We vacate the magistrate judge's denial of the Department's claim against Lionel's estate and remand
proceed
the case to the magistrate judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We do not address Jackman's contention that pursu-
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Supreme Court of North Dakota.
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Verna M.
WIRTZ, Deceased.
North Dakota Department of Human Services,
Claimant and Appellant,
v.
Vernon Caroline, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Verna Wirtz, deceased, Respondent and
Appellee.
No. 990275.
March 21, 2000.
Department of Human Services petitioned for alal
lowance of claim against widow's estate for MediMedi
caid benefits paid for benefit of husband prior to his
death. The District Court, Mountrail County, NorthNorth
west Judicial District, Robert W. Holte, J., denied
department's claim, and department appealed. The
Supreme Court, Neumann, J., held that any assets
conveyed by husband to his widow before his death
de
and traceable to widow's estate were subject to department's recovery claim.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
€ = '842(1)
[11 Appeal and Error 30 €="842(1)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law,
which is fully reviewable by the Supreme Court.

121 Statutes 361 C=181(1)
€:=181(1)

361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
k 180 Intention of Legislature
361 k180
361k 181 In General
36lk
36Ik181(1) k. In General. Most
36IkI81(1)
Cited Cases
The primary objective of statutory construction is
to ascertain the legislature's intent.

131 Statutes 361 C=188
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361 k 187 Meaning of Language
361kl88 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
In ascertaining legislative intent, thf: Supreme
Court looks first at the words used in Ithe statute,
giving them their ordinary, plain-language mean
meaning.

141
; =205
(4) Statutes 361 €€;=205
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361 k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction

361k205 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases

Statutes 361 C=206
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361 k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361 k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire
Statute. Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court construes statutes as a whole to
give effect to each of their provisions, whenever
fairly possible.
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361 Statutes
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361 VT(A) General Rules of Construction
361 k212 Presumptions to Aid ConstrucConstruc
tion
361k212.7 k. Other Matters. Most
36Ik212.i'
Cited Cases
If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguunambigu
ous, the legislative intent is presumed clear from
the face of the statute.
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I 98HIII Government Assistance
I98HIII
198HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
198Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
of Payments
198Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient,
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
356Ak241. 70)
(Formerly 356Ak241.70)
separatelyRecovery from a surviving spouse's separately
owned assets because of a past obligation to pay a
exnow-deceased Medicaid recipient's medical ex
survivpenses as necessaries, or recovery from the surviv
assels not trace
traceing spouse's entire estate, including assets
able from the recipient, is not allowed. Social Se
Security Act, §1917(b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1396p(b); NDCC 50-24.1-07.

161
16) Statutes 361 €=>214
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VT(A) General Rules of Construction
36 t k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction
361k214 k. In
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If statutory language is ambiguous, the Supreme
Court may resort to extrinsic aids to construe the
statute.
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198HIII
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II98HITI(B)
98HITI(B) Medical Assistance in General;
Medicaid
J 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment
198Hk490
of Payments
198Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient,
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 356Ak241.70)
Any assets conveyed by husband to his widow bebe
fore his death and traceable to widow's estate were
subject to recovery claim by state Department of
Human Services for Medicaid benefits paid for bebe
separ
nefit of husband prior to his death; however, separately-owned assets in widow's estate, or assets in
which husband never held interest, were not subject
to department's claim for recovery. Social Security
Act, § 1917(b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)
; NDCC 50-24.1-07.

[91 Health 198H €==503(2)
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198Hk499 Administrative Procl~edings
198Hk503 Evidence
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esAs the claimant seeking recovery from widow's es
hustate for Medicaid benefits paid for bene:fit of hus
band prior to his death, the Department of Human
traceabServices bore the initial burden of showing traceab
Soility of those assets it sought recovery against. So
cial Security Act, § 19 I 7(b), as amended, 42
I 396p(b); NDCC 50-24.1-07.
U.S.C.A. § I396p(b);
AttorBlainc L. Nordwall, Special Assistant Attor
*883 Blaine
ney General, Bismarck, for claimant and appellant.
Shane C. Goettle of McGee, Hankla, Backes &
appellee.
Dobrovolny, Minot, for respondent and appelIee.

NEUMANN, Justice.
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['II
I] The North Dakota Department of Human Ser['\I 1]
Ser
vices appeals from the trial court's order denying
the department's claim against Verna M. Wirtz's eses
tate for Medicaid benefits paid by the department
for the benefit of Clarence Wirtz. We reverse and
remand.

['II
['\I 2] Clarence Wirtz and Verna Wirtz married in
1943. In July 1996, Clarence Wirtz began receiving
Medicaid benefits to pay for nursing home care.
Clarence Wirtz continued to receive benefits until
his death on August 24, 1997. Clarence Wirtz was
over age fifty-five and married to Verna Wirtz at all
times he received benefits. The parties stipulated
Clarence Wirtz received $53,635.83 in benefits.
Clarence Wirtz's estate was not probated at his
death.

['II
['\I 3] Verna Wirtz died on September 21, 1998.
Repres
Vernon Caroline was appointed Personal Representative of the estate. On November 18, 1998, the
department filed a claim against Verna Wirtz's eses
be
tate for $55,977.93, seeking reimbursement for benefits paid to Clarence Wirtz, plus interest. On
January 11, 1999, Caroline denied the claim. On
tri
January 22, 1999, the department petitioned the trial court for allowance of the claim. A hearing was
held on April 12, 1999. The department argued
Verna Wirtz's entire estate was subject to recovery
because Clarence Wirtz had a marital or equitable
interest in all of her property at his time of death.
Caroline moved to dismiss. The trial court denied
the department's claim, rendering the motion for
dismissal moot. The trial court determined "[n]one
of the property in the Verna Wirtz Estate is propprop
erty Clarence had any legal title or interest in at the
time of his death." The department appeals.

surhomestead interest, and a legal interest in the sur
viving spouse's obligation to pay for the Medicaid
arrecipient's medical care as a necessary. Caroline ar
gues the trial court did not err because any asset not
transferred by the Medicaid recipient at death to the
surviving spouse through joint tenancy, tenancy
tenancyin-common, survivorship, life estate, or living trust
is not subject to recovery, even if the asset was
transferred only hours before the recipient's death.
We disagree with both parties' arguments.

['II 5] 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b) limits a stat~:'s power to
['\I
recover Medicaid benefits, providing:
assist*884 (b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assist
ance correctly paid under a State plan
as(I) No adjustment or recovery of any medical as
indisistance correctly paid on behalf of an indi
exvidual under the State plan may be made, ex
cept that the State shall seek adjustment or re
recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid
on behalf of an individual under the State plan
in the case of the following individuals:

(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years
of age or older when the individual received
such medical assistance, the State shall seek

adjustment or recovery from the individual's
estate, ...

paragraph (1)
(2) Any adjustment or recovery under pamgraph
indimay be made only after the death of the indi
vidual's surviving spouse, if any, ...

['II
['\I 4] The department argues the trial court erred, as
a matter of law, by interpreting 42 U.S.C. §
allow
1396p(b) and N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07 as not allowing recovery for past Medicaid benefits paid to
Clarence Wirtz from Verna Wirtz's entire estate.
The department contends 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)
I 396p(b) alal
lows recovery of equitable interests, a marital estate
interest in the surviving spouse's entire estate, a

(4) For purposes of this subsection, the tt:rm 'estate
" with respect to a deceased individual (A) shall include all real and personal property and
other assets included within the individual's
proestate, as defined for purposes of State pro
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explained our statutory analysis process.

bate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State ... any
other real and personal property and other asas
sets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust, or other arrangement.
Id. (emphasis added); see Estate o/Thompson, 1998
ND 226, 586 N.W.2d 847.
[~ 6] Section 50-24.1-07, N.D.C.C., using broader
language, fully implements 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)
and provides:

assistI. On the death of any recipient of medical assist
ance who was fifty-five years of age or older
when the recipient received the assistance, and on
the death of the spouse of the deceased recipient,
the total amount of medical assistance paid on
behalf of the recipient following the recipient's
fifty-fifth birthday must be allowed as a preferred
claim against the decedent's estate....
estate ....
2. No claim must be paid during the lifetime of the
decedent's surviving spouse, if any, nor while
there is a surviving child who is under the age of
twenty-one years or is blind or permanently and
totally disabled, but no timely filed claim may be
secdisallowed because of the provisions of this sec
tion.
[~ 7] We rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) to provide
the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07 because the
federal statute limits the situations in which the
states can recover Medicaid benefits from the sur
surviving spouse's estate. Estate of Thompson, at ~~
8-11; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(b)(I) and 1I 396a(a)(I
8).
396a(a)(18).
We must, therefore, interpret 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)
to determine which assets in Vema Wirtz's estate
are subject to recovery.

[1](2][3][4][5][6]
[1](2][3.1[4][5][6]

[~8]

Interpretation of a statute is a question of law,
which is fully reviewable by the Court. Jensen v.
North Dakota Workers Compo Bureau. 1997 ND
107, ~ 9,563 N.W.2d 112.
The primary objective of statutory construction is
to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Effertz v.
Blireau, 481
North Dakota Workers' Camp. BlII"eau,
leN.W.2d 218, 220 (N.D.1992). In ascertaining le
gislative intent, we look first at the words used in
the statute, giving them their ordinary, plainplain
Worklanguage meaning. Shiek V. North Dakota Work
ers Compo Bureau, 1998 ND 139, ~ 16, 582
N.W.2d 639. We construe statutes as a whole to
give effect to each of its provisions, whenever
fairly possible. *885County of Stutsman V. State
Historical Society, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325
(N.D.1985). "If the language of a statute is clear
preand unambiguous, the legislative int,~nt is pre
A.fed
sumed clear from the face of the statute." iHedcenter One, Inc. V. North Dakota Slate Bd. of
Pharmac.v,
Pharmac:ll, 1997 ND 54,'1 13,561 N.W.2d 634.
If statutory language is ambiguous, we may resort
to extrinsic aids to construe the statute . Hassan v.
Brooks. 1997 ND 150, ~ 5,566 N.W.2e1 822.
Estate of Thompson, at ~~ 6-7.
[~9] Under 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B), the operat
operative language provides Medicaid benefits can be re
recovered from:

[R]eal and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any legal title or interest
at the time of death (to the extent of such inin
terest), including such assets conveyed to a sur
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual
through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, sur
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arar
rangement.
[~ 10] The parties stipulated Vema
Verna Wirtz is a sursur
Clarvivor, heir, or assign of Clarence Wirtz, and Clar
ence Wirtz had not transferred or conveyed any

In Estate of Thompson, we
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property or other assets he had any legal title or inin
terest in at the time of his death to Verna Wirtz
surviv
through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living trust. Our inquiry,
therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz
had "real and personal property and other assets in
which [he] had any legal title or interest at the time
of death, including such assets conveyed" to Verna
Wirtz through "other arrangement."

*

II] Under 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(l), asset
[~ 11]
defined as:

IS

(l) The term "assets", with respect to an individual,

includes all income and resources of the individuindividu
al and of the individual's spouse, including any
income or resources which the individual or such
individual's spouse is entitled to but does not rere
action
ceive because of action-

EstaTe> of
mained liable for the decedent's debts); EstaTe
Rhodes, 148 Misc.2d 744, 561 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346
(N.Y.1990) (including homestead interests). Recov
Recovasery under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) is not limited to as
Medisets in the surviving spouse's estate that the Medi
caid recipient had legal title to and conveyed
through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-comrnon, surviv
survivorship, life estate, or living trust. Such an interpret
interpretation would ignore the words "interest" and "other
arrangement." However, on this point, the statute's
language and meaning are not clear. See Estate of
Thompson, at ~~ 11-14. The words "interest" and
"other arrangement" are ambiguous. We, therefore,
resort to extrinsic aids to ascertain the legislative
intent. Id. at ~ 7.
FNI. North Dakota is not a community
property state. American Standard Life and
Ace. Ins. Co. v. Speros, 494 N .W.2d 599,
606 (N.D. 1993).

(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative

body, with legal authority to act in place of or on
behalf of the individual or such individual's
spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or adminisadminis

trative body, acting at the direction or upon the
request of the individual or such individual's
spouse.

See Idaho Department of Health and WelJare v.
Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6, 9 (Jd.1998)
(concluding the definition does not apply to assets
disposed of on or before August 10, 1993).
[~ 12] Thus, the department can assert a claim
against real or personal property, and other assets in
which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other
interest at his death, including income and assets
conveyed through "other arrangement." This has
been interpreted to include community property
FN I and homestead interests. Bucholt: v. Belshe,
114 F.3d 923, 927-28 (9th Cir.1997) (including
community property interests because they are inin
re
cluded in the state's definition of "estate" and re-

[~

13] In Estate of Thompson, we determined the
Congressional committee reports*886 on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(b) revealed an intent to allow states a wide
latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries. Id.
at ~ 14.
per"Allowing states to recover from the estates of per
sons who previously received assistance furthers
the broad purpose of providing for the medical
care of the needy; the greater amount recovered
by the state allows the state to have more funds to
provide future services." Belshe v. Hope, 33
Cal.AppAth 161, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 925
(CaI.Ct.App.1995). That broad purpose is
furthered more fully by allowing states to trace a
esrecipient's assets and recover them from the es
of a recipient's surviving spouse.
spouse. ...
tate ofa
We conclude consideration of all the relevant
statutory provisions, in light of the Congressional
repurpose to provide medical care for the needy, re
veals a legislative intention to allow states to
assisttrace the assets of recipients of medical assist
reance and recover the benefits paid when the re
cipient's surviving spouse dies.
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Id. at ~~ 14-15 (emphasis added).

[7][8] [~ 14] We hold any assets conveyed by Clar
Clarence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's
death and traceable to her estate are subject to the
recoverdepartment's recovery claim. However, the recover
able assets do not include all property ever held by
either party during the marriage. Cf Estate I~f Johe,
590 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Minn.Ct.App.1999). 42
U.S.c. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in
which the deceased recipient once held an interest
will be traced. It does not provide that separatelyseparately
owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in
which the deceased recipient never held an interest,
are subject to the department's claim for recovery.
Thus, recovery from a surviving spouse's separ
separately-owned assets because of a past obligation to
pay a now deceased Medicaid recipient's medical
surexpenses as necessaries, or recovery from the sur
viving spouse's entire estate, including assets not
traceable from the recipient, is not allowed.

N.D.,2000.
In re Estate of Wirtz
607 N.W.2d 882, 2000 ND 59
END OF DOCUMENT

[9] [~ 15] On the limited record before us, traceable
assets could minimally include Clarence Wirtz's
transferred interest in the Granada House and his
interest in a land contract for deed dated March 22,
1977. However, unless the department can show
traceability, assets subject to recovery would not inin
clude Verna Wirtz's solely-owned home interior
business, automobile, bank account, and miscel
miscelde
laneous personal property. As the claimant, the detracepartment bears the initial burden of showing trace
ability. See Sorum v. Schwartz. 411 N.W.2d 652,
654 (N.D.1987) (providing "one who asserts the ex
existence of a fact material to an issue in a case as
assumes the burden of proof'). We remand to allow
the department the opportunity to present evidence
concerning asset traceability.
[~

16] We reverse the trial court's order and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[~ 17] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, c.J.,
MARY MUEHLEN MARING, DALE V. SAND
SANDconSTROM, CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, n., con
cur.
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12) Judgment 228 €€==181(8)
12]
= =181(8)
Intermediate Court of Appeals ofHawai'i.
Blossom Joshua KUNEWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
Gladys K. Brash, Lorraine K. Daniel and Doris K.
Farm, Plaintiffs,

v.
Isaac K. JOSHUA, Jr., aka Isaac Kahele Joshua, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16229.
Aug. 28, 1996.
In suit challenging conveyances of virtually all
principal's property by agent to himself under
power of attorney, the First Circuit Court ruled that
agent exceeded authority, imposed constructive
trust on conveyed assets, and awarded punitive
damages. Agent appealed. The Intermediate Court
of Appeals, Watanabe, J., held that: (I) general
power of attorney did not authorize agent to make
gifts to himself; (2) plaintiffs attorney fees could
be considered when computing amount of punitive
re
damages; but (3) admitting evidence of agent's reprop
fusal to comply with court order for return of property was error.

228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k 181 Grounds for Summary Judgment
228k 181(5) Matters Affecting Right to
Judgment
228kI81(8) k. Ambiguity in Written
Instrument. Most Cited Cases
Where construction of written instrument is at issue
instruin lawsuit, preliminary question of whether instru
ment is ambiguous is question of law that may be
resolved on summary judgment.

[3) Judgment 228 €€==181(18)
13]
= =181(18)
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k 181 Grounds for Summary Judgment
228k181(15) Particular Cases
228k181(l5)
228k 181 (18) k. Brokers or Agents,
Cases Involving. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 228kI8I(l5.1))
228kI81(15.1»
If language of power of attorney is clear and mean
meaning of instrument can be readily ascertained from
words used, legal effect and construction of instru
instrument are questions of law properly resolved on
summary judgment disposition.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
141 Principal and Agent 308 C:=97

West Headnotes

II]I Appeal and Error 30
II

~863

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Order granting summary judgment is reviewed on
appeal under same standard applied by trial court.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c).

308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III(A) Powers of Agent
308k95 Express Authority
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases
Fundamental rule in construing power of attorney
document is that intent of parties governs, as
gleaned from entire context of instrument.

[5) Principal and Agent 308 €€==103(10)
15J
= =103(10)
308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
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30SIII(A)
308III(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
30Sk9S
OJ Purchases, Sales, and ConCon
308k I 03
30Sk
veyances
30Sk
03( 10) k. Purpose and Terms
308k II03(
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most
Cited Cases
Agent lacks authority to make gift of principal's
property, unless authority is expressly given in
power of attorney.

[6\
[61 Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1)
30S
308 Principal and Agent
30SII
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30SII(A)
3081I(A) Execution of Agency
30Sk69
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases

Principal and Agent 308 €==103(10)
308 Principal and Agent
30SIII
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
30SITI(A)
308IT1(A) Powers of Agent
30Sk9S
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
30Sk103
308k103 Purchases, Sales, and ConCon
veyances
308k II03(1
03(1 0) k. Purpose and Terms
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most
Cited Cases
Agent may not gratuitously convey principal's

property to himself absent express written authorizauthoriz
ation in power of attorney.

m
f7I Evidence 157 €==385
157 Evidence
157XI Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
II57XI(A)
57XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding
to Terms of Written Instrument
157k385
157kJ85 k. Writings Excluding Extrinsic
Evidence in General. Most Cited Cases
Extrinsic evidence of principal's intent to allow
agent to make gifts to himself or herself is not adad

missible when power of attorney does not expressly
authorize gift to agent.

[8] Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1)
181
30S Principal and Agent
308
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30SII(A) Execution of Agency
308II(A)
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
30Sk69(l) k. In General. Most Cited
308k69(1)
Cases

Principal and Agent 308 €==103(10)
30S Principal and Agent
308
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III(A)
30SIII(A) Powers of Agent
30Sk98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308k98
308k 1I03
03 Purchases, Sales, and Con
Conveyances
30Sk 103(10)
103(\ 0) k. Purpose and Terms
308k
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most
Cited Cases
Oral authorization from principal is insufficient to
prevent agent to make gift to himself or herself;
written documentation of principal's clear intent in
power of attorney is required.

[9] Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1)
[91
30S Principal and Agent
308
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30SII(A) Execution of Agency
308II(A)
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
30Sk69(1) k. In General. Most Cited
308k69(1)
Cases

Principal and Agent 308 €z;;)103(10)
~103(10)
30S Principal and Agent
308
308TII Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
30SIII(A) Powers of Agent
308III(A)
308k9S Implied and Apparent Authority
308k98
ConI 03 Purchases, Sales" and Con
308k I03
veyances
I 03(10) k. Purpose and Terms
308k 103(10)
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most
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Cited Cases
General grant of authority in power of attorney, to
perform every act that principal could, did not auau
thorize agent to make gift of principal's property to
himself, to exclusion of principal's other children.

(10) Principal and Agent 3081£:=79(9)
110)
308 Principal and Agent
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30811(A) Execution of Agency
Wrong
308k79 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful Acts of Agent
308k79(9) k. Judgment and Measure of
Damages. Most Cited Cases
Attorney fees incurred by plaintiff could be concon
sidered when determining amount of punitive damdam
ages to award against agent who used power of atat
torney to make unauthorized gifts to himself of virvir
tually all of principal's property to exclusion of
principal's other children; attorney fees provide
meaningful standard for guiding jury when awardaward
ing punitive damages. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 908 comment.

[II) Damages 1I5
115 ~87(1)
J J 5 Damages
J 15V Exemplary Damages
Ad
115k87 Nature and Theory of Damages Additional to Compensation
1 15k87( I) k. In General. Most Cited

Cases
Purpose of punitive damages award is to punish dede
fendant for aggravated or outrageous misconduct
and to deter defendant and others from similar concon
duct in future, rather than to compensate plaintiff.

f12) Principal and Agent 3081£:=79(5)
112)
308 Principal and Agent
308H
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308Il(A) Execution of Agency
308k79 Actions for Negligence or WrongWrong
ful Acts of Agent
308k79(5) k. Evidence. Most Cited

Cases
reAgent's refusal to comply with order directing re
turn of principal's assets which agent conveyed to
himself, in excess of authority granted under power
of attorney, was irrelevant to agent's state of mind
when conveyances were made and, thus, admitting
evidence on issue of punitive damages was error.

**560 *66 Syllabus by the Court
The circuit court correctly ruled that a defendant
exceeded his authority when the defendant used a
general power of attorney from his mOlther to gift
substantially all of her property to himself, to the
unamexclusion of his four sisters. The clear and unam
biguous language of the power of attomey did not
expressly authorize the defendant to make a gift to
allhimself, and we will not construe any broad, all
unencompassing grants of power to the defendant un
der the power of attorney to confer thl: power to
make a gift.
The circuit court properly instructed the jury that it
plaintiff's reasonable attorney
could consider the plaintiffs
fees in computing the amount of punitive damages.
The instruction provided objective guidance to the
jury in calculating the amount of punitive damages,
accurthus allowing punitive damages to be more accur
ately measured and decreasing the potential for an
Adarbitrary and abusive punitive damages award. Ad
ditionally, the instruction helped to em.ure that a
plaintiff entitled to punitive damages can be made
truly whole as a result of a defendant's wrongful
and malicious act.
evidThe circuit court erred, however, in admitting evid
ence at trial of the defendant's refusal to comply
with a partial summary judgment order directing
the defendant to return to the administrator of his
conmother's estate the assets he had wrongfully con
veyed to himself. Such evidence was irrelevant to
althe defendant's state of mind at the time he al
legedly committed fraud in conveying his mother's
punitproperty to himself. Since the jury's award of punit
ive damages may have been based on the foregoing
evidence, we remand this case for a new trial on
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punitive damages.
Edward Y. N. Kim, Kim & Kim, on the briefs,
Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.
counCarroll S. Taylor (Taylor, Leong & Chee, of coun
sel), on the brief, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before BURNS,; C.J., WATANABE and HEEN, JJ.,
FN
RECUSED.
FN'" On October 6, 1993, Circuit Judge
Marie N. Milks was assigned to sit with
the judges of the Hawai'i Intermediate
Court of Appeals, temporarily, in place of
then Associate Judge Walter M. Heen, who
was recused from this case. Judge Hccn
subsequently retired on October 30, 1994.
A TANABE, Judge.
W ATANABE,
This lawsuit arises out of a dispute over whether
Defendant-Appellant Isaac K. Joshua, Jr., also
exknown as Isaac Kahele Joshua, Jr. (Defendant), ex
ceeded his authority when he used a general power
of attorney from his mother, Rose K. Joshua
prop(Mother), to gift substantially all of Mother's prop
erty to himself, to the exclusion of his four sisters,
Gladys K. Brash (Gladys), Lorraine K. Daniel
Plaintiff(Lorraine), Doris K. Farm (Doris), and Plaintiff
Appellee Blossom Joshua Kunewa (Plaintiff) FNI
(collectively, Sisters).
PlaintiffFNI. This lawsuit was filed by Plaintiff
Appellee
Blossom
Joshua
Kunewa
(Plaintiff) against Defendant-Appellant
Isaac K. Joshua, Jr., also known as Isaac
Kahele Joshua, Jr., (Defendant) on March
16, 1988. On December 20, 1988, Gladys
K. Brash (Gladys), Lorraine K. Daniel
(Lorraine), and Doris K. Farm (Doris)
moved to intervene in the lawsuit as
plaintiffs, and their motion was granted on
April 17, 1989. In the meantime, however,
on December 29, 1988, Plaintiff filed a

motion for partial summary judgment
which was granted on July 14, 1989. Be
Because the intervention was granted after
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment had been filed, a question arose
as to whether the partial summary judgjudg
ment could be entered in favor of Gladys,
Lorraine, and Doris, in addition to
Plaintiff. To obviate this question, Gladys,
DeLorraine, and Doris stipulated with De
prejufendant that they would dismiss with preju
c1a:ims against
dice the prosecution of their cla:ims
Defendant, but that Plaintiffs claims for
"payment of rents and proceeds.,"
proceeds>," "fraud,"
and "willful, wanton and callous disregard
Lorof ... trust" would be tried. Gladys, Lor
raine, and Doris also agreed to be bound
by the judgment entered by the circuit
court on the issues that were tried.
**561 *67 Defendant appeals from the First Circuit
Court's: (I) July 14, 1989 order granting partial
summary judgment in Plaintiffs favor, which con
conaucluded that Mother's power of attorney did not au
thorize Defendant to convey Mother's property to
himself without consideration and which directed
Defendant to hold all property so transferred as
Mothconstructive trustee for the beneficiaries of Moth
er's estate (Partial Summary Judgment Order); (2)
June 9, 1992 Amended Judgment based upon a spespe
cial jury verdict, awarding Plaintiff $34,670.10 in
special damages and $95,000 in punitive damages
(Amended Judgment); and (3) April 26, 1991 Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of
[the February 4, 1991 Order Denying] Defendant's
Motions for (A) Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, (B) Reconsideration of Ordell
Order Denying
Motion for Directed Verdict and (C) New Trial
(April 26, 1991 Order).
We (I)
(1) affirm the Partial Summary Judgment OrOr
der, (2) affirm that part of the Amended Judgment
which awarded Plaintiff special damages, vacate
that part of the Amended Judgment which awarded
Plaintiff punitive damages, and remand for a new
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trial on the punitive damages issue, and (3) vacate
the April 26, 1991 Order.
BACKGROUND
Mother was the widow of Isaac Joshua, Sr.
(Father), who died on January 9, 1963. On SeptemSeptem
ber 15, 1947, both Mother and Father executed
wiIls, bequeathing their individual estates to the
other, and in the event of the death of the survivor,
then in equal shares to their five children-Plaintiff,
Defendant, Gladys, Lorraine, and Doris.
In 1980, Mother was hospitalized for medical probprob
lems. After she was released from the hospital,
Mother asked Defendant to take her to an attorney
so that she could settle her property and business
affairs. On June 26, 1980, Defendant took Mother
to see attorney Matthew Pyun (Pyun), a friend of
Defendant. At Mother's request, Pyun prepared a
document, which Mother subsequently signed, givgiv
ing Defendant a general power of attorney to manman
age Mother's affairs (June 26, 1980 power of attorattor
ney).
The June 26, 1980 power of attorney, which was rere
corded at the Hawai'i Bureau of Conveyances on
June 27, 1980, read in relevant part, as foIlows:
follows:
ROSE KAPU JOSHUA of 2105 St. Louis Drive,
City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii
[Hawai'i),
have made, constituted and appointed and by these
presents do make, constitute and appoint ISAAC
KAHELE JOSHUA, JR., of86-124 Hoaha Street,
Waianae [Wai'anae],
Hon
[Wai'anae), City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii [Hawai'i),
my true and lawful attorney, for me in my name,
place and stead, and for my use and benefit with
full power and authority to do and perform every
act, deed or thing that I might or could do if perper
sonaIly present, including without limitation, the
sonally
following:

******
2. To bargain, contract, purchase, receive and
take real property and/or any interests therein and
to accept the seizin and possession thereof and
the delivery of all deeds, leases, assignments,
docuagreements, options and other conveyance docu
barments thereto, and to rent, lease, sublease, bar
hypothecgain, sell, release, convey, mortgage, hypothec
the: real prop
propate, and in every manner deal with thf:
hereerty I now own, and any real property I may here
after acquire, upon such terms and conditions,
and under such covenants as he shall think fit;
3. To bargain and agree for, buy, sell, mortgage,
manhypothecate and in any and every way and man
m.!rchandise,
ner deal in and with goods and m'~rchandise,
choses in action and other property in possession
or in action;

******
deliv6. To sign, seal, execute, acknowledge and deliv
er for me and in my name, and as my act and
assigndeed, such deeds, options, grants, leases, assign
mortments, covenants, indentures, agreements, mort
gages, hypothecations, bills, checks, bonds,
notes, receipts, evidences of debts, and such other
**562 *68 instruments in writing of whatever
kind and nature as may be necessary or proper in
the premises.
The foregoing power of attorney did not contain
any language expressly permitting Defendant to
make gifts of Mother's property.
Defendant did not use the June 26, 1980 power of
attorney to transfer title to any of Mother's property
Mothuntil the summer of 1987. On June 20, 1987, Moth
treater suffered a stroke and was hospitalized. Her treat
dising physician, Dr. Bernard Fong (Dr. Fong), dis
cussed with Defendant and Sisters the possibility of
the: next four
Mother not being able to live beyond thf:
days. Dr. Fong also informed Defendant and Sisters
prothat Mother, on the other hand, might have a pro
longed recovery, in whieh case the cost of her care
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"..,

,,"-'
and treatment could consume all of her assets.
deAfter the meeting with Dr. Fong, Defendant de
cided to use the June 26, 1980 power of attorney to
transfer all of Mother's assets to himself. Because
Defendant initially could not locate the June 26,
1980 power of attorney, he requested that attorney
Blake Okimoto (Okimoto) prepare another power
hosof attorney and have Mother execute it at the hos
pital.
Upon arrival at Mother's hospital room on June 22,
1987, Okimoto found that Mother "was bedridden
determand unable to communicate verbally[.]" To determ
exine whether Mother were mentally competent to ex
execute this second power of attorney, Okimoto ex
docuplained the contents of the power of attorney docu
ment to Mother and informed her that if she signed
the document, she would be giving Defendant the
ability to act on her behalf as to all property that
she owned. Okimoto asked Mother to squeeze his
hand if she understood what he was explaining to
her, and Mother responded by squeezing his hand.
Okimoto also asked Mother if it was her desire to
convey her property to Defendant, and Mother
again squeezed Okimoto's hand.
Because of her physical condition, Mother was unun
able on her own to sign her name on the power of
attorney document. Defendant, therefore, assisted
Mother by guiding her hand to the signature line of

document, to sign his record book as witnesses to
the transaction: Doris, who would later be named as
the personal representative of Mother's estate; LorLor
raine; and Faith Brash, Lorraine's daughter and
Mother's granddaughter.
FN2. Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) §
456-15 (1993) requires, in part, that
"[e]very notary public shall record at
length in a book of records all acts,
protests, depositions, and other things, by
the notary noted or done in the notary's ofof
ficial capacity."
Following Mother's execution of the second power
of attorney, Defendant located the original June 26,
Convey1980 power of attorney at the Bureau of Convey
ances. Before Mother died on September 9, 1987,
Defendant used the original power of attorney to
transfer to himself Mother's interest in a lien-free
home on St. Louis Drive, some real property on the
Big Island, and some real property in California. In
addition, Defendant put his name on the titles to
Mother's bank accounts and car. Defendant attempattemp
ted, but was not allowed, to use the power of attor
attorney to transfer Mother's common stock into his own
name; however, he continued to use the power of
negotia1e Mother's
attorney after Mother's death to negotiale
stock dividend checks and to deposit the: same into
his bank account. Defendant never paid Mother for
any of the property so transferred.

the document and holding her hand steady as she

notmade an "X" mark. Okimoto, who was also a not
acary public, then signed and sealed the notarial ac
knowledgment certificate on the document, thus
certifying that Mother had appeared before him and
had signed the document as her free act and deed.
Okimoto also required Mother to sign her "X" in
dochis notarial record book,FN2 which contained doc
umentation of all notarial acts performed by
Okimoto. Okimoto then had both Defendant and
Defendant's wife, Maile Joshua (Maile), sign the
power of attorney document as witnesses. He also
required Maile and the following individuals, who
were present in the hospital room and had wit
witnessed Mother's signing of the power of attorney

After Defendant made the foregoing transfers of
title to Mother's property to himself, he informed
Sisters of the transfers. He also assured them that
they should not worry because "[i]t will all be
equal.... When *69 **563 [M]other gets well, I will
give everything back to [Mother]."
After Mother's death, however, DefendaJllt changed
his mind. At a family gathering in October 1987,
Defendant showed Sisters a copy of Mother's will,
the original of which was never found, and the oriori
ginal power of attorney which Mother had given
him. Defendant then informed Sisters that Mother
had expressed to him many times over the years of

..

~

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

000456

Page 7

924 P.2d 559
83 Hawai'i 65, 924 P.2d 559
(Cite as: 83 Hawai'i 65, 924 P.2d 559)

her intent to give him all of her property and that
Mother had given him the power of attorney for
that purpose. Defendant indicated that, in view of
Mother's wishes, he considered all of the property
he had transferred to himself pursuant to the power
of attorney to be his alone. He also refused to comcom
mence a probate of Mother's will or to share MothMoth
er's property with Sisters in accordance with MothMoth
.
FN3
er,s WI'11 or the statutes on mtestacy.
FN3. Under the will of Rose K. Joshua
(Mother), all of Mother's property was to
be divided equally among her five chilchil
dren. The same division of property would
result if Mother had died intestate. HRS §
560:2-103(1) (1993).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

'lil-'

On March 16, 1988, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alal
leging fraud and breach of trust by Defendant and
seeking to (1) impose a constructive trust on the
property transferred by Defendant to himself, (2)
return the transferred property to Mother's estate,
(3) submit Mother's will to probate, (4) collect fair
market rent from Defendant for his occupancy of
Mother's house after the transfer, and (5) award
Plaintiff punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs
for Defendant's conversion of Mother's property.
On December 29, 1988, Plaintiff filed a motion for
partial summary judgment on two issues: (1)
whether Mother's will should be submitted to propro
bate; and (2) whether Defendant should be required
to "convey to the personal representative of
[Mother's estate] all property, real and personal,
formerly owned by [Mother], title to which was
act
conveyed into Defendant's name by Defendant acting under a power of attorney given him by
[Mother], together with any dividends, interest,
rents, issues and profits received by Defendant
from or on account of said property." In opposing
the motion, Defendant provided three affidavits
FN4 in support of his assertion that Mother had
made several oral representations that she intended

for Defendant to have all of her property.
affiFN4. The affiants who signed the affi
Dedavits were as follows: Defendant; De
fendant's wife, Maile Joshua; and Rose
Kajioka Brash, Mother's niece.
On July 14, 1989, the circuit court enter,ed an order
granting Plaintiffs motion for partial summary
foljudgment. In relevant part, the order r,ead as fol
lows:
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS: that the power
of attorney given by [Mother] to Defendant dated
June 26, 1980 is clear and unambiguous; and that
ausaid power of attorney does not contain any au
thority for Defendant to transfer [Mother's] prop
property to himself, thereby effecting a gift to himself
of her assets;
CONAND THE COURT THEREFORE CON
attorCLUDES: that the June 26, 1980 power of attor
ney given by [Mother] must be strictly construed;
that a strict reading of said power of attorney
shows that Defendant was not empowered to
deed over [Mother's] property to himself and
asthereby effect a gift to himself of [Mother's] as
sets; that the affidavits submitted by Defendant
which tend to show [Mother] wanted Defendant
attorto obtain the property through the power of attor
unambiguney are insignificant in the light of the unambigu
ous power of attomey
attorney strictly construe:d; that the

inadmissaffidavits submitted by Defendant are inadmiss
deeml!d not ad
adible as parol evidence and are deeml~d
missible for the Court; that Defendant holds all
property formerly belonging to [Mother] which
he acquired by the use of the June 26, 1980
power of attorney and said property shall be held
as a constructive trust for the benefit of those
people who will take through the probate of
[Mother's] estate[.]
Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions,
Moththe circuit court ordered Defendant to deliver Moth
er's will to Plaintiff, to hold all of Mother's property
encumin constructive trust, and to not transfer or encum
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ber the real and personal property he had trans
transferred to himself.

DISCUSSION

On December 19, 1990, the case proceeded to trial
on the issue of damages. On January **564 *70 3,
1991, the jury returned a special verdict, awarding
Plaintiff special damages in the amount of
"$45,671.00 less documented funeral expenses"
and punitive damages in the amount of $95,000.
The circuit court entered judgment for the foregoforego
ing amounts on February 4, 1991, and Defendant
appealed from this judgment. However, on May 2,
1991, Defendant's appeal was dismissed by the
Hawai'i Supreme Court because "the judgment did
not fully determine the amount of special damages,
is therefore incomplete and not final, and we do not
have jurisdiction." Thereafter, on June 9, 1992, the
circuit court entered an amended judgment which
determined that the amount of special damages
awardable to Plaintiff, after deducting documented
funeral expenses of $11,000.90, was $34,670.10.
This appeal followed.

I. The Partial Summary Judgment: Whether De
Defendant Exceeded His Authority Under lhe Power
of Attorney
ofAttorney

Defendant argues that the circuit court committed
reversible error in several respects. First, Defendant
argues that the court was wrong when it granted
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment bebe
cause a genuine triable issue of material fact existed
as to Mother's intent in giving Defendant the power
of attorney. Second, the court improperly instructed
the jury that Plaintiffs attorney fees in bringing this
lawsuit could be considered in computing the
ciramount of a punitive damages award. Third, the cir
cuit court erroneously admitted evidence of De
Defendant's refusal to comply with a prior court order
to return Mother's assets to the administrator of
Mother's estate. Fourth, the circuit court improperly
allowed several of Plaintiffs witnesses to testify,
since insufficient notice was provided to Defendant
that the witnesses would be testifying. Finally, DeDe
fendant argues that the circuit court erred when it
refused to allow Defendant to read into evidence a
part of Plaintiffs deposition which was relevant to
attack Plaintiffs credibility.

of Review
A. Standard ofReview
[1] On appeal, an order granting summary judgment
is reviewed under the same standard applied by the
trial courts. State v. Tradewinds Elec. Servo & COII
COIItracting Inc., 80 Hawai'i 218, 222, 908 P.2d 1204,
1208 (1995). Summary judgment is appropriate "if
interrogatorthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogator
affiies, and admissions on file, together with the affi
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
ento any material fact and that the moving party is en
titled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hawai'i
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c).

[2][3] Where the construction of a written instruinstru
ment is at issue in a lawsuit, the preliminary ques
question of whether the instrument is ambiguous is a
question of law that may be resolved on summary
judgment. Pelosi V. Wailea Ranch Estates, 10
Haw.App. 424, 436, 876 P.2d 1320, 1327. cert.
denied, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994).
Moreover, if the language of the instrument is clear
and the meaning of the instrument can be readily
ascertained from the words used therein, the legal
queseffect and construction of the instrument are ques
tions of law properly resolved on summary judg
judgment disposition. Id.
Defendant contends that the circuit court erred in
atconcluding, as a matter of law, that the power of at
torney did not authorize him to convey Mother's
Defendproperty to himself without consideration. Defend
affiant claims that because he submitted three affi
davits which explained that Mother had intended
that he use the power of attorney to make gifts to
himself, a genuine issue of material fact existed as
atto the scope of his authority under the power of at
torney, thus precluding summary judgment. We disdis
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'''l'"
1.,
agree.
B. Rules Governing Construction of
Powers of
AtofPowers
ofAt

torney
"Powers of attorney are to be construed in accordaccord
ance with the rules for interpretation of written inin
struments generally; in accordance with the prinprin
ciples governing the law of agency; and, in the abab
sence of proof to the contrary, in accordance with
the prevailing laws relating to the act authorized." 3
AmJur.2d Agency § 30, at 533-34 (1986).

'II""

**565 *71 [4] The fundamental rule in construing
written instruments is that the intent of the parties,
as gleaned from the entire context of the instruinstru
ment, governs. Pelosi, 10 Haw.App. at 436, 876
P.2d at 1327. "As long as the terms of [the instruinstru
ment] are not ambiguous, i.e., not 'capable of being
reasonably understood in more ways than one,' we
are required to interpret the terms 'according to
their plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in common
speech.' " Id. (quoting Cho Mark Oriental Food,
v. K & K Tnt'!, 73 Haw. 509, 520, 836 P.2d
Ltd. 1'.
1057,1064(1992)).
1057,1064(1992».
It is also well-established that powers of attorney

"are subjected to a strict construction and are never
interpreted to authorize acts not obviously within
the scope of the particular matter to which they
refer." Lopez v. Soy Young, 9 Haw. 113, liS (I 892)
HN.C. ReRe
. As explained in F.A!. Stigler, Tnc. 1'. H.N.C.
a/~v, 595 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.Civ.App.), rev'd on
other grounds, 609 S.W.2d 754 (Tcx.1980),
when authority is conferred upon an agent by a
at
formal, written instrument, such as a power of attorney, the authority given the agent will be
strictly construed so as to exclude any authority
neces
not specifically set forth, except authority necessary to effectuate the purpose of the authority
granted.
(Emphasis added.)
[5] Accordingly, it is well-settled that an agent

lacks authority to make a gift of the principal's
property unless that authority is expressly given by
the language of the power of attorney. Kaname
Fujino v. Clark, 71 F.Supp. 1,4 (D.Haw.1947) (to
authorize gift of asset by agent, the agent must have
such a power expressly and clearly conf.erred; even
if principal intended to make a gift to agent, if
authorpower of attorney lacked express language author
izing gift, no gift could be made), affa; 172 F.2d
384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 937, 69 S.Ct.
1512,93 L.Ed. 1743, reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 839,
70 S.Ct. 34, 94 L.Ed. 513 (1949); Aiello v. Clark,
680 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska 1984) (in absence of
express authority to make a gift, none may be
made); Johnson v. Fraccacreta, 348 So.2d 570, 572
(F1a.App.1977) (agent has no power to make a gift
exof his principal's property unless that power is ex
pressly conferred upon the agent by the instrument
implicaor unless such power arises as a necessary implica
contion from the powers which are expressly con
ferred).
[6] Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the
absence of express written authorization, an agent
may not gratuitously convey the principal's prop
property to himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt. 366
So.2d 768 (Fla.App.1978) (agent exceeded author
authority in appropriating for agent's own use fiJnds in de
decedent principal's checking account in the absence
of clear language to that effect in the power of at
attorney).
denied, 376 SO.2d 76 (Fla.1979); Tn re
torney), cert. denied
Estate of DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253, 352
N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.l974)
(Sur.Ct.1974) (power of attor
attorney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held
to encompass an authorization to attorney-in-fact to
make gift to himself of principal's property; such a
gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and
self-dealing, a presumption which can be overcome
only with the clearest showing of principal's intent
to make the gift), affd, 47 A.D.2d 589, 363
N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975).
[7][8] Where a power of attorney do(:s not ex
expressly authorize the attorney-in-fact to make gifts
to himself or herself, extrinsic evidence of the prin
prin-
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cipal's intent to allow such gifts is not admissible.
An attorney-in-fact may not make a gift to himself
or herself unless there is clear intent in writing from
the principal allowing the gift. Oral authorization is
not acceptable. McCarter 1'. Willis. 299 S.C. 198,
383 S.E.2d 252, 253 (App.1989).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained
the policy reasons underlying the rule prohibiting
extrinsic evidence as follows:
When one considers the manifold opportunities
and temptations for self-dealing that are opened
up for persons holding general powers of attorattor
ney-of which outright transfers for less than value
to the attorney-in-fact [himself or] herself are the
most obvious-the justification for such a flat rule
is apparent. And its justification is made even
more apparent when one considers the ease with
which such a rule can be accommodated by prinprin
cipals and their draftsmen.
Estate of Casey v. Comm'r ofIntemal Revenue, 948
F.2d
F
.2d 895, 898 (4th Cir. 1991 ).
**566 *72 We now examine the power of attorney
at issue in this lawsuit according to the foregoing
rules.
ofAttorney
C. The Power of
Attorney in this Case
[9] In the instant case, the power of attorney which
author
Mother gave to Defendant did not expressly authorize Defendant to make gifts of Mother's property.
However, it did broadly authorize Defendant to
"perform every act, deed or thing that [Mother]
might or could do if personally present" and to
"bargain, contract, purchase, receive and take real
property and/or any interests therein and to accept
the seizin and possession thereof and the delivery
op
of all deeds, leases, assignments, agreements, options and other conveyance documents ... and to
rent, lease, sublease, bargain, sell, release, convey,
mortgage, hypothecate, and in every manner deal
with the real property 1 now own, and any real
property I may hereafter acquire, upon such terms

and conditions ... as he shall think fit. " (Emphasis
added.)
Defendant contends that since the power of attorney
sCi broad, its
which Mother conferred on him was so
language is ambiguous as to whether it authorized
him to make gifts of Mother's property to himself.
Therefore, the circuit court should have considered
extrinsic evidence of Mother's intent in giving him
the power of attorney and denied Plaintiffs motion
for partial summary judgment. We disagree.
"Well established rules of interpretation of powers
of attorney dictate that broad, all-encompassing
grants of power to the agent must be discounted."
Mercantile Trust Co. v. Harper, 622 S.W.2d 345,
349 (Mo.App.1981 ) (citing Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 34, comment h (1958)). See al50 Estate of
Contm'r of Internal Revenue, 948 F.2d at
Casey v. Comm'r
author900-0 I (where power of attorney expressly author
ized agent to transfer principal's assels by sale,
lease, or mortgage, but omitted any reference to the
power of transfer by gift, the expansive language of
the power of attorney would be interpreted to con
confer only those incidental, interstitial powers neces
necessary to accomplish objects as to which authority has
been conferred and not to confer power to make a
gift).
Three reasons are mentioned for the application of
the foregoing doctrine:
First, the power to make a gift of the principal's
property is a power that is potentially hazardous
to the principal's interests. Consequently, this
power will not be lightly inferred from broad, all
allencompassing grants of power to the agent. Ac
Accordingly, the agent must be circumspe'ct with re
regard to the powers created-or the lack of
(If them.
Second, the main duty of an agent is loyalty to
the interest of his principal.... Thus, in exercising
granted powers under a power of attorney, the at
attorney in fact is bound to act for the be,llefit of his
principal and must avoid where possible that
which is detrimental unless expressly author
author-
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ized
....
ized....
Third, it would be most unusual for an owner of
property to grant a power of attorney authorizing
the attorney in fact to give his property away. If a
person has decided to make a gift of property, he
or she usually decides as to who is going to be
the donee.

King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 492 A.2d 608, 613
(1985) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted).
In Kaaukai v. Anahu, 30 Haw. 226 (1927), the
attorHawai'i Supreme Court held that a power of attor
ney broadly authorizing an agent to "grant, bargain
and sell" on behalf of the principal "any land in the
Territory of Hawaii [Hawai'i] belonging to [him or]
her or in which [he or] she might have an interest"
did not confer authority on the agent to give the
land away. Id.
In the present case, we similarly conclude that the
clear and unambiguous language of the general
power of attorney given by Mother to Defendant
did not authorize Defendant to make a gift to himhim
Mother'S property. Therefore, the circuit
self of Mother's
Defendcourt correctly ruled as a matter of law that Defend
ant lacked authority to make a gift of Mother's
property to himself and properly granted Plaintiffs
motion for partial summary judgment.
**567 *73 II. The Punitive Damages Award
In its charge to the jury, the circuit court gave the
damfollowing instruction regarding how punitive dam
ages should be calculated:
If you allow punitive damages in this case then in
considassessing such damage you may take into consid
eration the following items: (I) such amount as
will deter defendant from such future conduct;
(2) an amount as shall be an example to others
and deter them from such conduct; (3) [t]he
probable and reasonable expense of the litigation
including attorney's fees, expert witness fees and

the inconvenience and time involved in preparing
for trial [.] The amount should not be so small as
to be trifling nor so large as to be unjust, but such
as candid and dispassionate minds can approve as
a punitive example and as a warning to others
against a similar lapse of duty.
(Emphasis added.)
[10] Defendant contends that the circuit court comcom
mitted reversible error when it instructed the jury
damthat attorney fees are an element of punitive dam
ages. Defendant points out that the "longstanding
rule of Hawai'i law" is that "no attorney fees may
be awarded as damages or costs unless so provided
by statute, stipulation or agreement" and no statute,
stipulation, or agreement authorized the imposition
of attorney fees in this case. Therefore, Defendant
indircontends, the court's instruction provided an indir
ect means for Plaintiff to obtain compensation for
attorney fees where none was allowed by law.
We find no error in the circuit court's instruction.

of Punitive Damages in Hawai'i
A. The Law ofPunitive
[II] The purpose of a punitive damages award in
Hawai'i is not to compensate the plaintiff, but
rather, to punish the defendant "for aggravated or
outrageous misconduct and to deter the defendant
and others from similar conduct in the future." Ma
MaJ\Jofors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 6, 780
saki v. General J\.-[otors
P.2d 566, 570, reconsideration denied, 71 Haw.
punit664, 833 P.2d 899 (1989). In order to recover punit
ive damages, the plaintiff "must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has acted
wantonly or oppressively or with such malice as
implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference
to civil obligations, or where there has been some
wilful misconduct or that entire want of ,;are
I;are which
would raise the presumption of a conscious indifindif
ference to consequences." I d. at 16-17, 780 P.2d
P .2d at
575.

The Hawai'i Supreme Court has instructed that "the
proper measurement of punitive damages should be
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'[t]he degree of malice, oppression, or gross negli
negligence which forms the basis for the award and the
defendamount of money required to punish the defend
ant....
ant....', " Kang v. Harrington, 59 Haw. 652, 663,
Asso587 P.2d 285, 291 (1978) (quoting Howell v. Asso
ciated Hotels,
Hotels. 40 Haw. 492, 501 (1954». However,
no Hawai'i case has specifically addressed the
question of whether a plaintiffs attorney fees may
be considered (n determining the amount of punit
pun it. damages. FN5
FNS
Ive

FN5. In Masaki v. General Motors Corp.,
71 Haw. 1,780 P.2d 566, reconsideration
P .2d 899 (1989),
denied, 71 Haw. 664, 833 P.2d
the Hawai'i Supreme Court observed in
dicta that "[o]ther purposes for imposing
punitive damages which have been recogrecog
nized by courts and commentators include
preserving the peace; inducing private law
enforcement; compensating victims for
otherwise uncompensable losses; and paypay
ing the plaintiffs attorneys' fees." 71 Haw.
at 8 n. 2, 780 P.2d at 571 n. 2 (emphasis
added; citation omitted).
of Punitive Dam
DamB. Attorney Fees as an Element ofPunitive
ages in Other Jurisdictions

Courts in other jurisdictions disagree on whether a
jury, or a judge sitting as fact finder, may consider

Viner v. Untrecht, 26 Cal.2d 261, 158 P.2d 3 (1945)
; Kinane v. Fay. III N.J.L. 553, 168 A. 724 (1933);
International Elecs. Co. v. N.s. T. Metal Prods. Co.,
370 Pa. 213, 88 A.2d 40 (1952); Earl v. Tupper.
Tupper, 45
Vt. 275 (1873); Fairbanks v. Witter, 18 Wis. 287
(1864).
of jurisdictions, however, regularly al
alThe majority ofjurisdictions,
low a jury to consider attorney fees in computing
Afrothe amount of punitive damages. See e.g., Afro
American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649
(D.C.Cir.1966); Marshall v. Betller, 17 Ala. 832
Santangelo. 195 Conn. 76, 485
(1850); Markey v. Santangelo,
A.1d 1305 (1985); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho
Partner700,682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Anvil Inv. Ltd. Partner
ship v. Thornhill Condominiums, Ltd., 85
Il\.Dec. 147,407 N.E.2d 645
IlI.App.3d 1108,41 III.Dec.
(1980); Dorris v. Miller, 105 Iowa 564, 75 N.W.
482 (1898); Newton v. Hornblower, 224 Kan. 506,
P.1d 1136 (1978); St. Luke Evangelical Luther
Lllther582 P.2d
Church. Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md. 337, 568 A.2d 35
an Church,
(1990); Oppenhuizen v. Wennersten, 2 Mich.App.
288, 139 N.W.2d 765 (1966); Central Bank of MisMis
sissippi v. Butler, 517 So.2d 507 (Miss.1987); Senn
v. Manchester Bank of St. Louis, 583 S.W.2d 119
Gallagher, 149
(Mo.1979); Jeffries Avlon,
AvIan, Inc. F. Gallagher.
FreMisc.2d 552,567 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y.1991); Fre
mont Oil Co. v. Marathon 0;1
Oil Co., 26 O.O.2d 109,
Lav192 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio Com.PI.l963); Hofer v. Lav
ender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.1984); Debry & Hilton

a plaintiffs attorney fees or other litigation costs in

Servs .. Inc. v. Capito! Int'! Airways. Inc ..
Trave! Servs.,

Andetermining an award of punitive damages. See An
ofLitnotation, Attorneys' Fees or Other Expenses ofLit
igation as Element in Measuring Exemplary or
Punitive Damages, 30 A.L.R.3d 1443 (1970).

583 P.2d 1181
] 181 (Utah 1978);
]978); Kemp v. Miller. 166
661, 186 S.E. 99 (1936); Olds v. Ho.~ford,
Ho.~ford, 354
Va. 661.
P.2d 947 (Wyo. 1960),
I 960), reh'g denied, 359 P.2d 406
(Wyo.1961 ).

Several jurisdictions refuse to allow a jury to con
consider reasonable attorney fees in measuring an
award of punitive damages, reasoning that (I)
(1) such
fees are compensatory in **568 *74 nature and
therefore not a proper consideration in measuring a
punitive damages award, or (2) the jury ought to
have unfettered discretion in deciding the amount
of punitive damages subject only to a trial court's
remittitur if it deems the award excessive. See, e.g.,

Under the majority approach, " 'attorney fees are
not allowed as compensation [to the plaintiff] but
rather as punishment for defendant's wrongful and
malicious act. They are not allowed in addition to
the sum assessed as [punitive] damages., and their
recovery is never permitted in a separate action
.... '
action....
" Brewer v. Home-Stake Production Co., 434 P.2d
at 830 (quoting 25 c.J.S. Damages § 50 (1966».
generCourts that have adopted the majority V:lew gener
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ally reason that allowing a jury to consider the
amount of a plaintiffs attorney fees in calculating
arbitpunitive damages diminishes the potential for arbit
rary and abusive punitive damages awards. In St.
v. Smith.
Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church.
Church, Inc. 1'.
568 A.2d 35. for example, the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that allowing a jury to consider reasreas
onable attorney fees in determining punitive dam
damages satisfies two seemingly disparate goals:
First, because the jury will be offered objective
guidance in calculating the amount of its punitive
award, punitive damages will be more accurately
measured and the potential for abuse decreased.
Second, the plaintiff can be made truly whole in
deprecisely those kinds of cases in which the de
fendant's wrongful conduct is found to be at its
most flagrant, for only in such cases are punitive
damages warranted.

568 A.2d at 43 (citations omitted),
omitted).

....,

The majority view is consistent with the approach
advocated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1958). The Restatement recognizes that "damages
(1958),
in a tort action do not ordinarily include compensa
compensalitigation for attorney fees or other expenses of the litiga
RestateId. § 914(\),
914(1), at 492. However, the Restate
tion." ld.
damment also states that "[i]n awarding punitive dam
ages when they are otherwise allowable, the trier of
fact may consider the actual or probable expense
incurred by the plaintiff in bringing the action." Id.,
493. See also Restatement (Second)
comment a, at 493,
of Torts § 908, comment e, at 467 (in determining
the amount of punitive damages, the trier of fact
can consider the extent of harm to the injured per
person, including "the fact that the plaintiff has been
put to trouble and expense in the protection of his
interests, as by legal proceedings in this or in other
suits").

C. Attorney Fees as an Element ofPunitive
ofPunitive Dam
Damages in Hawai 'i
In Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont,
Vermont. Inc. v. Ke/co

Page 13

Disposal. Inc.,
Inc .• 492 U.S. 257, 278, 109 S.Ct. 2909,
Disposal,
2922, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989), the United States
Supreme Court **569 *75 held that "the propriety
of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in
question, and the factors the jury may consider in
determining their amount, are questions of state
relaw." (Emphasis added.) The Court thus left the re
sponsibility for framing guidelines for punitive
damages awards to the states. In a cogf:nt concurconcur
ring opinion, however, Justice Brennan lamented
the general lack of guidance given to juries faced
with the responsibility of calculating a punitive
damages award:

Without statutory (or at least common-law)
standards for the determination of how large an
award of punitive damages is appropriate in a
given case, juries are left largely to themselves in
making this important, and potentially devastatdevastat
ing, decision. Indeed, the jury [in Browning-Fer
Browning-Ferris ] was sent to the jury room with nothing more
determinthan the following terse instruction: 'In determin
ing the amount of punitive damages, ... you may
take into account the character of the defendants,
their financial standing, and the nature of their
acts.' [Citation omitted.] Guidance like this is
scarcely better than no guidance at all. I do not
in
suggest that the instruction itself was illl error; indeed, it appears to have been a correct statement
of [state] law. The point is, rather, that the inin
struction reveals a deeper flaw: the fact that pun
punitive damages are imposed by juries guided by
little more than the admonition to do what they
think is best.
492 U.S. at 281, 109 S.Ct. at 2923 (Brennan, 1.,
J.,
concurring).

Subsequently, in Pacijic Mut. Lije Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,
I, III S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d I
Has/ip,
(1991),
(199 I), the Court was called upon to determine
whether a due process violation had occurred when
an Alabama jury awarded over $800,000 in punitive
dedamages against an insurer whose agent had de
frauded an insured. The award was more than four
times the amount of the compensatory damages
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award, more than two hundred times the outout
of-pocket expenses incurred by the insured, and
greatly in excess of the fine that could be imposed
for insurance fraud under Alabama law.
The Court's majority initially conceded "that unlimunlim
ited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion
for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages
may invite extreme results that jar one's constituconstitu
tional sensibilities." ld.
at
18,
111
S.Ct.
at 1043.
1d.
III
However, the Court ultimately upheld the award,
concluding that the award had been made pursuant
to objective criteria and had also been subjected to
a full panoply of procedural protections. First, the
trial court's instructions had placed reasonable concon
straints on the exercise of the jury's discretion by
expressly describing the retribution and deterrence
purposes of punitive damages, requiring the jury to
consider the character and degree of the particular
wrong, and explaining that the imposition of punitpunit
ive damages was not compulsory. Second, the trial
court had conducted a post-trial hearing to scrutinscrutin
ize the punitive damages award. Finally, the award
be
had been subject to meaningful judicial review because the Alabama Supreme Court had approved
the verdict, on appeal, after reviewing the propriety
of the award according to the following factors:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship
between the punitive damages award and the
harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct
as well as the harm that actually has occurred; (b)
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
defend
conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendexist
ant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c)
the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful
conduct and the desirability of removing that
profit and of having the defendant also sustain a
loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant;
(e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of
con
criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the
de
existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be

taken in mitigation.
ld. at 21-2, III S.C!.
S.Ct. at I1045 (emphasis added).
1d.

The Court held that the application of th{: foregoing
df:finite and
standards "impose[d] a sufficiently d{:finite
meaningful constraint on the **570 *76 discretion
damof Alabama fact finders in awarding punitive dam
"ensure[ d] that punitive damages
ages [,]" and "ensure[d]
awards are not grossly out of proportion to the
understandseverity of the offense and have some understand
able relationship to compensatory damages." !d. at
S.Ct. at 1045. The award of punitive dam
dam22, III S.C!.
ages, therefore, "did not lack objective criteria" and
did not "cross the line into the area of constitutional
impropriety." Id. at 23-4, III S.Ct. at 1046. Com
Compare BMW of North America. Inc. v. Gore. 517U.S.
S.Ct. 1589.
1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996),
559, 116 S.C!.
where the Court struck down a $2 million punitive
damages award against BMW of North America,
Inc. (BMW) for having knowingly failed to tell a
BMW automobile buyer that, at a cost of $600, it
had repainted portions of his new $40,000 car,
thereby lowering its potential resale value by ap
approximately ten percent. The Court held the award
grossly excessive in light of the following: (1) the
low level of BMW's reprehensible conduct, (2) the
500 to I ratio between the punitive and compensat
compensatory damages awards, and (3) the difference between
the punitive damages award and the civil or crimin
criminal sanctions that could be imposed for comparable
conduct.
If a reviewing court may consider a plaintiffs litig
litigation expenses in evaluating the propriety of a pun
punitive damages award, we see no reason to preclude
a jury from considering such expenses in calculat
calculating the award. Indeed, lustice
Justice O'Connor suggested
as much in her dissent in Haslip, in which she
strongly criticized the vagueness of the ililstructions
concerning punitive damages provided to the jury
and strongly urged that the same factors which the
Court held that appellate courts could consider in
reviewing punitive damages awards "could assist
juries to make fair, rational decisions." 499 U.S. at
52, III S.Ct. at 1061 (O'Connor, 1., dissenting)
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(emphasis added). As Justice O'Connor pointed out:
ImPunitive damages are a powerful weapon. Im
posed wisely and with restraint, they have the popo
tential to advance legitimate state interests. ImIm
posed indiscriminately, however, they have a
comdevastating potential for harm. Regrettably, com
dammon-law procedures for awarding punitive dam
ages fall into the latter category. States routinely
authorize civil juries to impose punitive damages
without providing them any meaningful instruc
instructions on how to do so. Rarely is a jury told anyany
thing more specific than "do what you think
best."
In my view, such instructions are so fraught with
implementauncertainty that they defy rational implementa
untion. Instead, they encourage inconsistent and un
predictable results by inviting juries to rely on
private beliefs and personal predelictions. Juries
are permitted to target unpopular defendants,
penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and
redistribute wealth. Multimillion dollar losses are
inflicted on a whim. While I do not question the
general legitimacy of punitive damages, I see a
strong need to provide juries with standards to
exerconstrain their discretion so that they may exer
malicise their power wisely, not capriciously or mali
ciously. The Constitution requires as much.
disId. at 42-3, 111
III S.Ct. at 1056 (O'Connor, J., dis
senting).
More recently, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg. 512
U.S. 415, 114 S.Ct. 2331,129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994),
the Court struck down a $5 million punitive dam
damages award by an Oregon jury which was over five
times the amount of the plaintiffs compensatory
damages award. The Court held that because the
Oregon Constitution prohibited judicial review of
the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury,
"unless the court can affirmatively say there is no
proevidence to support the verdict," the Oregon pro
cedure for awarding punitive damages violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Id. at ---, 114

S.Ct. at 2332. Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg noted
that although Oregon did not provide for a postpost
verdict review and remittitur of the amount of a
punitive damages award, it provided several prepre
disverdict mechanisms which channeled the jury's dis
cretion more tightly than in Haslip. Significantly,
the jury was instructed that the defendant could not
be found liable for punitive damages unless the dede
fendant's liability were established by "clear and
imconvincing evidence." FN6 **571 *77 More im
deportantly, jurors were given precise instructions de
tailing seven substantive criteria which they could
consider in making their award, far more guidance
Has/ip received. These
than their counterparts in Haslip
criteria resembled the seven factors against which
the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the punitive
damages award in Haslip. Justice Ginsburg argued
that
FN6. United States Supreme Court Justice
Ginsburg noted that in Pacific Mut. Life
I, 6 n. I, III
fns. Co. v. Haslip. 499 U.S. 1,
111
S.Ct. 1032, 1037 n. I. 1\3
113 L.Ed.2d 1
(1991), the "jury was told it could award
punitive damages if 'reasonably satisfied
comfrom the evidence' that the defendant com
mitted fraud." Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
Oberg.
512 U.S. 415, ---- n .4, 114 S.Ct. 2331,
A, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994).
2334 n .4,
requir[ing] the factfinder to apply ... objective cricri
teria [when calculating punitive damages is] more
likely to prompt rational and fair punitive damage
decisions than are the post hoc checks [by appelappel
late courts] employed in jurisdictions following
Alabama's pattern.
dissentId. at ----, J J4 S.Ct. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J., dissent
ing). Justice Ginsburg also remarked that "
suf'application of objective criteria ensures that suf
ficiently definite and meaningful constraints are
imposed on the finder of filct.' " Id. (quoting
Or. 263, 283,
Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 316 Or
851 P.2d 1084, 1096 (1993)).
We agree with Justices Brennan, O'Connor, and
Ginsburg that meaningful standards are needed to
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guide a jury in its award of punitive damages. Ac
Accordingly, we adopt the majority view that a jury
should be allowed to consider a plaintiffs attorney
damfees in determining the amount of a punitive dam
ages award. We also conclude that, in the instant
case, the circuit court's instruction to the jury to this
effect was proper.
III. The Circuit Court's Evidentiary Rulings

of Defendant's Refusal to Comply with
A. Evidence ofDefendant's
Circuit Court's Order
[12] At trial, the jury was repeatedly allowed to
hear evidence about Defendant's refusal to comply
with the circuit court's Partial Summary Judgment
adminisorder directing Defendant to return to the adminis
wrongtrator of Mother's estate the assets he had wrong
fully conveyed to himself. In explaining the relev
relevance of such evidence, Plaintiffs counsel stated it
was necessary for the jury to understand that its
task was not to determine whether Defendant
asshould return property to Mother's estate, but to as
sess the damages caused by Defendant's breach of
duty. Plaintiffs counsel also explained that this
evidence was relevant to establishing that DefendDefend
ant's behavior was willful:
The gist of my question, Your Honor, is the mental
damintent which I have to establish for punitive dam
ages. My analysis of the case is that the question
of intent breaks down into two parts post Judge
punKlein's order which is a separate element of pun
itive damages. This disobedience of the court's
order and pre Judge Klein's order when he-what
is his intent in breaching his fiduciary duties as
an attorney in fact. So what I am getting at right
now is his disregard, callous, wanton, and wilful
disregard of Judge Klein's order and it goes into
the punitive damages on the post Judge Klein isis
sue.
Defendant contends that evidence of his refusal to
comply with the Partial Summary Judgment Order

should have been excluded at trial. Based on Kong
v. Harrington, 59 Haw. 652, 587 P.2d 285, we
agree.
In Kang, supra, the Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled
damthat a non-jury award of $20,000 in punitive dam
ages was excessive because it appeared that the trial
court, in making its determination, improperly con
conattempt
sidered a defendant's subsequent actions in attempting to perpetrate a fraud on the court, as. well as on
rethe plaintiff. 59 Haw. at 660,587 P.2d at 291. In re
ducing the punitive damages award, the supreme
court held as follows:
"The proper measurement of punitive damages
should be '[t]he degree of malice, oppression, or
gross negligence which forms the basis for the
award and the amount of the money required to
punish the defendant..
defendant. .....', Howell v. Associated
Hotels. [40 Haw. 492, 50 I (1954) ]. Further, in
determining that degree, the analysis H 5n *78 is
limited to an examination of defendant's state of
mind at the time of the act. O'Harm v. Pundt,
210 Or. 533, 310 P.2d 1110 (1957). ConCon
sequently, defendant's subsequent actions and
state of mind during trial are irrelevant."
supreml~ court also
ld. at 663, 587 P.2d at 293. Tht: supreml~
explained that
[t]he distinction between appellant's fraud on the
court and his fraud on appellee is cm~ial since a
finding of fraud on the court is unrelated to the
fraud on appellee and will not provide a basis for
punitan award of punitive damages. In assessing punit
ive damages the trial court should haNe ignored
appellant's fraud upon the court and looked only
to his fraud on appellee.

ld. at 660, 587 P.2d at 291.
In this case, Defendant's conduct in violating the
circuit court's Partial Summary Judgment Order is
similarly distinguishable from Defendant's fraud
upon Sisters and cannot form a basis for an award
of punitive damages. While Defendant's conduct
may appropriately subject Defendant to contempt of
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Decourt sanctions, such evidence is irrelevant to De
fendant's state of mind at the time he allegedly
committed fraud in conveying Mother's property to
himself.
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in allowing
such evidence to be admitted at trial. Because the
jury's award of punitive damages may have been
based on the foregoing evidence, we must remand
isthis case for a new trial on the punitive damages is
sue.
B. The Circuit Court's Other Evidentiary Rulings

In view of our remand of this case for a new trial,
rewe find it unnecessary to address Defendant's re
maining arguments on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the
First Circuit Court's July 14, 1989 order granting
partial summary judgment in Plaintiffs favor. We
Judgvacate that part of the June 9, 1992 Amended Judg
ment which awarded Plaintiff S95,000
595,000 in punitive
damages and remand this case for a new trial on the
punitive damages issue. In all other respects, we af
affirm the June 9, 1992 Amended Judgment. In view
of our vacatur of part of the June 9, 1992 Amended
Judgment, we also vacate the April 26, 1991 Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of

[the February 4, 1991 Order Denying] Defendant's
Motions for (A) Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, (B) Reconsideration of Order Denying
Motion for Directed Verdict and (C) New Trial.
Hawai'i App.,1996.
Kunewa v. Joshua
83 Hawai'i 65, 924 P.2d 559
END OF DOCUMENT

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

000467

West law;
Page 1I
550 N.W.2d 168
(Cite as: 550 N.W.2d 168)

Supreme Court ofIowa.
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Archard A.
CRABTREE, Deceased,
Mary Ann Crabtree, Appellant.
No. 95-399.
June 19, 1996.

162VI(D) Disputed Claims
162k256 Review
I 62k256(6) k. Scope and Extent ofRe
ofRe162k256(6)
view. Most Cited Cases
apResolution of claims in probate are reviewed on ap
peal for correction of errors at law. Rules
App.Proc., Rule 4.

131 Appeal and Error 30
13)

~1010.1(6)
~1010.1(6)

Decedent's child, who was named payee upon death
of certificate of deposit owned by decedent,
brought damages suit against attorney-in-fact who
cashed certificate upon maturity. The District
Court, Chickasaw County, James L. Beeghly, 1.,
dismissed suit and appeal was taken. The Supreme
Court, Tcrnus,
(l) attorney-in-fact did
Tcmus, 1., held that: (1)
not engage in self-dealing or make prohibited gift
by cashing certificate to provide support for prinprin
cipal; (2) attorney-in-fact acted in principal's best
interests by cashing disputed mature certificate,
rather than using other certificates of deposit which
were subject to early withdrawal penalty; and (3)
claim that attorney-in-fact owed fiduciary duty to
payee as third-party beneficiary was waived.

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
VI~rdicts, and
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Vl~rdicts,
Findings
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30k]J 00]100 Sufficiency of Evidence in
30k
Support
30k 10 10.1 In General
I 0 10.1 (6) k. Substantial
30k I0
Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Appellate court is bound by trial court's findings of
fact, provided findings are supported by substantial
evidence.

Affirmed.
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308TII
308m Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III(A) Powers of Agent

West Headnotes
(I) Executors and Administrators 162 ~249
III
162 Executors and Administrators
162VI Claims Against Estate
162VI(D) Disputed Claims
162VJ(D)
162k248 Trial by Probate Court
Pro
162k249 k. Nature and Form of Proceeding. Most Cited Cases
Claims in probate are triable at law.

€=>
121 Executors and Administrators 162 €=>
256(6)
]62 Executors and Administrators
162
162VI Claims Against Estate

14)
141 Principal and Agent 308 ~97

308k95 Express Authority

308k97 k. Construction of Letters or
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases
Power of attorney is strictly construed and instru
instrument will be held to grant only those powers which
are specified.
(5) Principal and Agent 308 ~103(6)
151
~103(6)
308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Thitrd Persons
308TII(A)
308III(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308kl03
Con308k] 03 Purchases, Sales, and Con
veyances
308k I03(6)
ConveyI 03( 6) k. Sales and Convey
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ances in General. Most Cited Cases
Absent express grant in power of attorney, of power
to make gift, attorney-in-fact did not have that
power.

16]
16J Gifts 191 ~4
191 Gifts
191I Inter Vivos
191 k4 k. Requisites in General. Most Cited
Cases
Gift is made when donor has present intention to
make gift and owner is divested of all control and
dominion over subject of gift.

17]
17J Gifts 191 €=18(2)
€ = 18(2)
191 Gifts
191 JI Inter Vivos
19lkl7Delivery
191kl7Delivery
191klR Necessity
191 k 18(2) k. Necessity of SurrenderSurrender
ing Control. Most Cited Cases
Transfer of dominion and control, required for gift,
must be actual transfer, rather than future interest.

18J Gifts 191 €=30(1)
€ = 30(1)
181
191 Gifts
19 IIII Inter Vivos
191 k30 Gifts of Deposits in Bank
191 k30(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases

€ = 69(1)
Principal and Agent 308 €=69(1)
308 Principal and Agent
308H Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30811(A) Execution of Agency
308II(A)
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69( 1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Attorney-in-fact did not make gift to herself by
cashing principal's mature certificate of deposit
which was payable on death to another, even
princip
though effect of transaction was to increase principal's estate and residual bequest to attorney-in-fact,

given that principal retained dominion and control
over certificate proceeds, attorney-in-fact's ability
to use funds remained restricted, attomey-in-fact
did not benefit from transaction at time it occurred,
and certificate was cashed to provide support for
principal.

19] Principal and Agent 308 €€=69(1)
19)
= 69(1)
308 Principal and Agent
308IJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30811
308IJ(A) Execution of Agency
308I1(A)
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69( I) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Attorney-in-fact did not breach fiduciary duty by
paycashing mature certificate of deposit that was pay
able on death to attorney's sibling, rather than using
another certificate of deposit given that it was in
principal's best interests to use mature certificate of
deposit to provide needed support.

(101 Appeal and Error 30 €€=170(1)
1101
= 170(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower
Court of Grounds of Review
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court
30k170 Nature or Subject-Matter of Is
Issues or Questions
30k170( I) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases

Person named as payee on death of ce:rtificate of
deposit, whieh attorney-in-fact cashed upon matur
maturity to support principal, waived claim that attorney
attorneyin-fact owed payee a fiduciary duty as third-party
beneficiary by failing to raise issue in trial court.
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TERNUS, Justice.
Appellant, Mary Ann Crabtree, seeks damages resres
ulting from the cashing of a certificate of deposit in
the name of her father, Archard A. Crabtree, and
payable on his death to Mary Ann. This transaction
was consummated before Crabtree's death by
Sherry Wurzer, Mary Ann's sister and Crabtree's
daughter, who was acting under a power of attorattor
ney. Because we find no merit in Mary Ann's chalchal
lenge to Sherry's action, we affirm the district court
judgment dismissing Mary Ann's claim.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On March 4, 1991, Crabtree deposited $20,000 in a
one-year certificate of deposit, payable on his death
to Mary Ann. In October 1991, Crabtree had a
stroke. After his stroke, he had problems with balbal
ance and vision, and moved to a nursing home.
In November 1991, Crabtree executed a plenary
attorney
power of attorney, appointing Sherry his attorneyin-fact. Pursuant to the power of attorney, Sherry
con
had "full power and authority to manage and conalI of [Crabtree's] affairs, with full power and
duct all
authority to exercise or perform any act, power,
duty, right or obligation" that Crabtree had the legal
right, power or capacity to exercise or perform. The
appointment included the power and authority "[t]o
open, maintain or close bank accounts, ... savings
and checking accounts; to purchase, renew or cash
certificates of deposit.. ....""
The cost of Crabtree's care varied depending upon
his medical condition; expenses ran between $1600
and $2000 per month. By March 1992, the cash on
hand was insufficient to continue into the next
de
month. At the same time, Crabtree expressed a desire to purchase a $4000 burial contract and a
$1700 monument. Crabtree's assets then consisted
of a one-half interest in a 200-acre farm and several
AlI of the certificates mama
certificates of deposit. All
tured after March 4, 1992, except the one payable at
death to Mary Ann.

The district court found that in consultation with
Crabtree and with his agreement, Sherry cashed the
$20,000 certificate dated March 4, 1991, and placed
the money in Crabtree's checking account. Sherry
chose this certificate to cash because it was mature
and the only one that could be cashed without a
penalty for early withdrawal. She then purchased
the burial contract and monument Crabtree wanted.
Crabtree died in December 1992. In his will, ex
executed in 1989, he appointed his daughters, Mary
reAnn and Sherry, as co-executors; any assets re
maining after the payment of his legal obligations
were to be distributed equally to Mary Ann and
Sherry. At the time of his death, Crabtree still
owned certificates of deposit in excess of $20,000.
Mary Ann filed a claim in probate seeking $20,000.
As noted by the district court in its ruling, had
Sherry liquidated other certificates*170 or personal
certificproperty of Crabtree instead of the $20,000 certific
ate, Mary Ann would have received the $20,000
certificate when Crabtree died. Thus, the liquida
liquidation of the certificate prior to Crabtree's death in
increased the probate estate by $20,000. As a result,
Sherry benefits by $10,000 while Mary Ann loses
the same amount.
The district court dismissed MalY Ann's daim, con
concluding Sherry did not breach her fiduciary duty to
Crabtree. On appeal, Mary Ann argues Sherry made
a gift to herself by cashing the $20,000 certificate
of deposit, a power not granted to Sherry under the
power of attorney. Alternatively, Mary Ann con
contends Sherry breached a duty to Mary Ann under
the power of attorney not to defeat Crabtree's
"contractual disposition" of his property unless it
was necessary for his support or maintenance. We
find no merit in the first argument and conclude the
second issue was not raised in the district court.
Therefore, we affirm.

II. Scope ofReview.
of Review.
[1 ][2] [3] Claims in probate are triable at law. In re
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Estate ol Voelker, 252 N.W.2d 400, 402 (Iowa
1977). Consequently, we review for correction of
errors of law. Iowa R.App. P. 4. We are bound by
the trial court's findings of fact provided they are
supported by substantial evidence. Voelker, 252
N.W.2e1 at 402.
III. Did Sherry Breach her Duty to Crabtree Under

the Power ofAttorney?
of Attorney?
A. Sherry did not have the power to make a gift.
Mary Ann first asserts Sherry did not have the right
to make gifts pursuant to the power of attorney. We
agree.

attor[4 ][5] "The established rule is that a power of attor
ney must be strictly construed and the instrument
will be held to grant only those powers which are
specified." Bloom v. Weiser, 348 So.2d 651, 653
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977); accord Whitlord v. Gaskill,
119 N.C.App. 790, 460 S.E.2d
S.E.2e1 346, 348 (1995),
cert. granted, 342 N.C. 197,463 S.E.2d 250 (1995)
CaVl·as. 221 N.W.2d 494,501-02
; see Abodeely v. CaVl'as,
grant(Iowa 1974) (construing power of attorney as grant
ing only powers specified therein). Because the
power of attorney form used by Crabtree did not
expressly grant Sherry the power to make a gift, she
did not have that power. See Aiello v. Clark, 680
FracP.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska 1984); Johnson v. Frac
cacreta, 348 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977)
; In re Estate of Rolater,

542 P .2d 219, 223

(Okla.App.1975).

unB. Sherry did not breach her duty to Crabtree un
der the power of attorney. Mary Ann argues that by
increascashing the $20,000 certificate and thereby increas
ing the probate estate, Sherry made a gift to herself.
We disagree.
[6][7] We have held in other contexts a gift is made
when the donor has a present intention to make a
domingift and divests himself "of all control and domin
ion over the subject of the gift." Taylor v. Grimes,
223 Iowa 821, 826, 273 N.W. 898,901 (1937); see
Kirchner v. Lenz, 114 Iowa 527, 530, 87 N.W. 497.
497,

(190 I) (a gift is anything "which is voluntarily
498 (1901)
comtransferred by one person to another without com
Fender.
pensation") (emphasis added); Fender P. Fender,
285 S.c. 260, 329 S.E.2d 430, 431 (1985) (attorney
in fact may not use his position for his "personal
benefit in a substantially gratuitous transaction").
actuThe transfer of dominion and control must be actu
al-a present, not a future, transfer. Reeves v. Lyon.
224 Iowa 659, 662, 277 N.W. 749, 751 (1938);
Jones v. Luing. 152 Iowa 276, 277, 132 N.W. 371.
371 (1911). Here Crabtree's "dominion and control"
transacover these funds was just as great after the transac
Sherry'S ability to use the funds
tion as before, and Sherry's
for herself personally was just as restricted. Sherry
benefited in no way from this transaction at the
time it occurred.
[8] The trial court found the $20,000 certificate was
the only mature certificate and it was cashed to
subprovide needed support to Crabtree. There is sub
stantial evidence to support these findings. Thus,
any benefit to Sherry was unintentional and merely
fortuitous. There was no reason to believe at the
time of the transaction that Sherry would profit
from it in the future. Had Crabtree lived longer,
eventually all his certificates would have been used
comto pay his expenses. Moreover, Crabtree was com
petent to make *171 changes to his will, so there
benewas no certainty that Sherry would eventually bene
fit from this transaction as a beneficiary of the es
estate. Thus, we conclude Sherry did not make a gift
deto herself by cashing the $20,000 certificate of de
posit.
[9] Mary Ann's real complaint is that Sh(:rry did not
cash other certificates of deposit before she cashed
the one payable on death to Mary Ann. As the trial
court found, however, cashing other certificates of
deposit would have reduced the monies available
for payment of Crabtree's expenses because he
would have had to pay an early withdrawal penalty.
Thus, it would not have been in Crabtree's financial
interest to cash a different ceJ1ificate. Sherry, as
Crabtree's fiduciary, was required to act in his best
exer
interests. See Rolater, 542 P.2d at 223 ("in exer-
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cising granted powers, the attorney is bound to act
posfor the benefit of his principal avoiding where pos
sible that which is detrimental"); Fender, 285 S.c.
260, 329 S.E.2d at 43
431I ("an agent must further the
principal's interests"). Although not determinative,
we also note Crabtree approved of Sherry's cashing
of the certificate.
In summary, we conclude Sherry's cashing of the
certificate of deposit did not result in a gift to her.
Although her interest in the estate was ultimately
increased, there is no evidence this result was anyany
thing other than fortuitous. Additionally, Sherry acac
ted in Crabtree's best interest, and with his approvapprov
al, in cashing a mature certificate of deposit rather
than one which would have required payment of a
penalty. For these reasons, Sherry did not breach
her fiduciary duty to Crabtree.

party beneficiary, nor did either party advance this
theory in its trial brief'). Because Mary Ann did not
present this issue at trial, it is waived. See Hagartv
v. Dysart-Geneseo Community Sch. Dist., 282
N.W.2d 92. 96 (Iowa 1979) ("we cannot permit her
claim to be tried here on a theory not urged in the
trial court"); General Expressways, Inc. v. Iowa
Reciprocity Bd., 163 N'w.2d 413, 417 (Iowa 1968)
(we only consider issues argued to and considered
by the trial court).
AFFIRMED.
lowa,1996.
Matter of Estate of Crabtree
550 N.W.2d 168
END OF DOCUMENT

IV. Did Sherry Violate a Duty to Mary Ann Under
Crabtree's Power ofAttorney?
of Attorney?
[10] On appeal Mary Ann argues that Sherry owed
her a duty under the power of attorney "much like
the rights of a donee beneficiary under the doctrine
of third party beneficiaries." This argument was not
made to the district court.
Although the district court ruled Sherry's "fiduciary
duty was to Mr. Crabtree, not Mary Ann Crabtree,"
discussthis statement was made in the context of discuss
ing whether Sherry breached her fiduciary duty by
remaking a gift to herself. There is nothing in the re
thirdcord to indicate the district court had a third
stateparty-beneficiary theory in mind when this state
ment was made. At trial, Mary Ann simply claimed
Sherry "engaged in self-dealing as [a] fiduciary and
effectively made a gift to herself." No mention was
made to the district court of the theory of third
party beneficiary.
We conclude the issue of third party beneficiary
was not raised in the trial court. See Kanzmeier v.
Me Copp in, 398 N.W.2d 826. 829-30 (Iowa 1987)
("trial court ... did not mention the concept of third
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this, burden is on contestant to show that a different
type of association or purpose existed.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
Donna Louise AIELLO, Appellant,

12) Principal and Agent 308 ~97
121

v.
Ray CLARK and Joyce Clark, Appellees.
No. 7468.
April 6, 1984.
As Modified May 8, 1984.
Daughter, individually and as coconservator of her
mother's estate and who was also named as cotrustcotrust
ee of her mother's inter vivos trust, sought to set
aside an assignment to her brother by mother of bebe
neficial interest in a note contained in the trust and
purportedly assigned by mother as attorney in fact
for daughter or, in the alternative, an award of damdam
ages. The Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District,
Jay Hodges, J., refused to set aside the assignment
Su
or award damages, and daughter appealed. The Supreme Court, Moore, J., held that: (I) power of atat
torney granted by daughter to mother did not inin
clude power to make gifts; (2) son could not claim
estoppel on part of daughter; (3) note in which
daughter held a one-half interest was part of trust
property even though trustor mother retained pospos
session of it; and (4) purported assignment was in
violation of trust agreement.

308 Principal and Agent
3081lI
308ITT Rights and Liabilities as to Thlird Persons
308III(A) Powers of Agent
3081lI(A)
308k95 Express Authority
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cascs
Intention of daughter in granting mother a power of
writattorney was required to be gleaned from the writ
ten grant of power as a reasonable person reading
the instrument would interpret it, where daughter
failed to meet her burden to show that a different
attortype of association or purpose other than an attor
ney in fact existed.
13\ Principal and Agent 308 ~103(7)
308 Principal and Agent
308lI1 Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
3081I1
308lI1(A) Powers of Agent
3081I1(A)
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308k103 Purchases, Sales, and Con
Con308klO3
veyances
308kl 03(7) k. Existence of Author
Authority to Sell or Convey. Most Cited Cases
attor"Otherwise dispose of," as used in power of attor

Reversed.
West Headnotes
11 IJ Principal and Agent 308

~97

308 Principal and Agent
308m Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308IlI(A)
3081lI(A) Powers of Agent
308k95 Express Authority
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or
Powers of Attorney. Most Citcd Cascs
Powers of attorney creating relationship of attorney
in fact must be taken as prima facie evidence of
nature of relationship between the parties; beyond

ney granting power to bargain, agree for, buy, sell,
mortgage, hypothecate, and in any and every way
and manner deal with and otherwise dispose of
property, is a catchall phrase and adds nothing
dissince it refers to such undescribed methods of dis
position as may have been omitted and are in nature
like those specifically enumerated.
141 Principal and Agent 308 ~100(2)
14J
308 Principal and Agent
3081lI
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
I 00 Principal's Property and Busi
Busi308k I00
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16J Principal and Agent 308 ~48

ness
308k 1I00(2)
00(2) k. Lease of Property.
Most Cited Cases
Principal and Agent 308

~100(3)
~100(3)

308 Principal and Agent
308IIl Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308II1(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
100 Principal's Property and Busi
Busi308k 100
ness
308k 100(3)
100(3) k. Mortgage of PropProp
erty. Most Cited Cases
Principal and Agent 308 ~100(7)
308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308IlI(A) Powers of Agent
308Il1(A)
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308k I 00 Principal's Property and Busi
Business
308k100P) k. Forming Partnership.
Most Cited Cases
Power of attorney, which granted power to lease,
bargain, and sell land upon such terms as grantee
mortsaw fit and to bargain, agree for, buy, sell, mort
gage, hypothecate, and in any and every way and
manner deal in and with other property and to
busimake, do and transact all and every kind of busi
ness of whatsoever nature and kind, did not include

power of making gifts of property in which grantor
had a beneficial interest; therefore, grantor/daughter
aswas not bound by grantee/mother's attempted as
signment of daughter's beneficial interest a promispromis
sory note and the assignment was void.
ISJ Gifts 191 ~6
191 Gifts
1911 Inter Vivos
191 k6 k. Power to Make Gift. Most Cited
Cases
In absence of express authority to make a gift, none
may be made.

308 Principal and Agent
308H Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308IJ(A) Execution of Agency
308k48 k. Nature of Agent's Obligation.
Most Cited Cases
An agent must avoid acting to the detriment of his
principal in absence of an explicit direction.
17J Principal and Agent 308

~137(1)
~137(1)

308 Principal and Agent
308IJl
308IJ1 Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
3081II(A) Powers of Agent
308I1I(A)
308k 137 Estoppel to Deny Authority
308k 137(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Son, who received an assignment of daughter's be
beneficial interest in certain property from his mother,
who had been granted a power of attorney by
daughter, could not claim estoppel on part of
daughter, where he knew that mother hdd a power
of attorney from daughter, he did not inquire into
its limits, he did not pay for the assignment, and
daughter did not benefit from it.
~37.5
18J Trusts 390 ~37.5

390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
390I(A) Express Trusts
390k37.5 k. Necessity and Sufficiency of
Delivery of Property. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 390k37 112)
execuA note may be assigned to a trust merely by execu
netion of the trust document; no endorsement is ne
cessary where there are no challenges from a holder
appropriin due course and, if creator of a trust by appropri
ate words or acts fully and completely constitutes
himself trustee, no change of possession of the note
is necessary.
19J Trusts 390 ~37.5
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
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3901(A) Express Trusts
390k37.5 k. Necessity and Sufficiency of
Citcd Cases
Delivery of Property. Most Cited
(Formerly 390k371/2)
Trust was validly created and contained trustor/
mother's one-half interest in a note, even if mother
retained possession of the note as trustor, where
inlanguage of the trust showed necessary present in
tent to create the trust, mother's capacity at that
time was not contested, and trust agreement
provided that property set forth in exhibit, which
listed the note, would constitute the trust estate.

no
ment provided for her revocation upon written notice to trustee/daughter and prohibited her from dis
disconposing of trust property for less than adequate con
sideration in money or money's worth, daughter
was not notified in writing of the assignment, the
written assignment was not directed to daughter and
did not mention the trust, assignee did not pay for
the assignment, and mother did not replace the note
with any other property.
*1164 Andrew 1. Kleinfeld, Fairbanks, for appelappel
lant.
Daniel T. Saluri, Fairbanks, for appellees.

[10) Trusts 390 ~58
390 Trusts
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity
3901(A) Express Trusts
390k58 k. Modification. Most Cited Cases
Strict compliance with terms of trust providing that
written notice of revocation be given by trustor/
mother to trustee/daughter was mandated in regard
to mother's attempt to remove certain property from
the trust, where mother suffered a gradual deterior
deterioration of her physical and mental health, was de
described as tired, forgetful, confused, and in need of
full custodial care, was diagnosed as suffering from
Alzheimer's disease, and was declared incompetent
after establishment of the trust and after her attempt
to remove the property from the trust.
(111

Trusts 390 €€=147(1)
= 147(1)

390 Trusts
390II Construction and Operation
390Il(B) Estate or Interest of Trustee and of
Cestui Que Trust
390k 146 Transfer of Estate or Interest of
Cestui Que Trust
390k 147 Express Trusts in General
390k147(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Trustor/mother's attempted assignment of her benebene
ficial interest in a note contained in the trust was in
violation of the trust, where her right to receive
payments on the note was a trust asset, trust instruinstru

Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MAT
MATTHEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.

OPINION
MOORE, Justice.
Donna Aiello, individually and as co-conservator of
the estate of Fern Palfy, appeals the judgment of the
superior court refusing to set aside an Assignment
of Beneficial Interest or, in the alternative, award
damages. Palfy purported to act for herself and as
attorney in fact for Aiello in assigning a note which
asthey held as joint tenants. Aiello alleges that the as
atsignment was beyond Palfy's general power of at
torney and in violation of the Palfy Family Trust.
We agree and reverse the judgment of the superior
court.
I. Factual Background
Raymond Clark and Donna Aiello are the son and
daughter of Fern Palfy. Donna Aiello (Aiello)
signed a "General Power of Attorney" on Septem
Septemmakber 9, 1968 and another one on April 16, 1974 mak
ing Fern Palfy her attorney in fact at all material
times. During the mid-1970s Palfy conveyed a great
deal of property to Aiello; however, through her
power of attorney, she retained use of the property
and proceeds from sales of property. On March 24,
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1976 Palfy sold a piece of real estate known as the
brewery property to Daniel and Josephine GaudiGaudi
ane. The subject promissory note (Gaudiane note)
and deed of trust were executed giving Palfy and
Aiello undivided half interests with the right of sur
surAi
vivorship in the lien on the brewery property. Aiello had no direct input concerning the terms, concon
ditions or decisions to sell in the property transactransac
tions of which she was a beneficiary. However, she
was one of the payees on the Gaudiane note and a
named beneficiary under the deed of trust. She was
outalso very active in the efforts to collect the out
standing debt.
On October 20, 1976 Palfy created a trust to hold
the Gaudiane note and other property. Palfy was
Trustor of "The Palfy Family Trust." Palfy and AiAi
ello were named as Co-Trustees. Fern Palfy was to
be the trust beneficiary during her life. Upon her
death, Donna Aiello, as trustee, was to distribute
Palfy's residence to Ray Clark and his daughter
Joyce and the remainder of the Trust property to
exherself. The property placed in the Trust, to the ex
tent it still exists, is administered pursuant to the
Trust Agreement.
On April 21, 1979, Palfy, purporting to act indiindi
vidually and as attorney in fact for Aiello, signed an
Assignment of Beneficial Interest. The assignment
attempted to transfer the Gaudiane note from Palfy
and Aiello to Ray and Joyce Clark. Daniel Gaudi
Gaudiane and Attorney Eugene Belland jointly prepared
the documents. Palfy signed the instrument in the
presence of Gaudiane and his notary friend, John
Rowlett.
Under the assignment, Palfy retained a life estate
and the Clarks took the remainder interest. Aiello
was completely divested of her interest. According
to the instrument, the assignment was "in considerconsider
ation of love and affection, and other good and
... "
valuable considerations, in hand paid ..."
Clark testified that Palfy told him she was "going to
do it for what she owed me, *1165 money she
owed .... " However, Clark regarded the promissory
owed...."

notes representing the money owed as outstanding,
oband therefore, he did not release Palfy from the ob
ligations in consideration of the interest in the
Gaudiane note. Furthermore, Clark testJified he did
not learn of the assignment until April 30, 1979 and
testified he did not pay anything for it at that or any
other time.
Aiello revoked the powers of attorney in August
1979 when she learned Palfy had granted Gaudiane
a two-year extension on t~e note, which was at that
. arrears. FN 1
.
$12 ,000 III
tIme
FN1. Unaware of the assignment which
Aipurported to divest her of any interest, Ai
ello traveled to Fairbanks in the summer of
1979 to begin foreclosure proceedings
against the Gaudiane note. Shf: learned at
this time that in April, Palfy, individually
and as Aiello's attorney in fal;t, had exex
ecuted a modification of Deed of Trust and
Promissory Note moving the due date for
the $12,000 installment from March 1978
(over a year past due) to March 1981 (two
years hence).
Aiello testified she did not learn of the assignment
to the Clarks until October 1981. On May 8, 1979,
just a week after he first learned of the assignment,
assignClark testified that he told Aiello about the assign
transment. She testified that he did not explain the trans
action to her. Neither Clark nor Palfy (nor anyone
else) ever sent Aiello a copy of the assignment or
aw" written notice of the termination of her interest.
aw"written
F - On April 13, 1982, six months after learning
of the assignment, Aiello filed suit individually and
as co-conservator of the estate of Fern Palfy
FN3
'
against the Clarks.
FN2. In fact, Aiello received a document
prepared by the Clarks' attorney dated July
16, 1981 titled Declaration of Default
benefiwhich she was requested to sign as benefi
ciary and as co-conservator for Fern Palfy,
beneficiary under the Gaudiane 1I10te.
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FN3. Mrs. Palfy was declared incompetent
and Ray Clark and Donna Aiello were
named as co-conservators based upon a
hearing and a petition filed with the superisuperi
or court dated June 24, 1980. According to
trial testimony, Palfy, age 75, suffered a
gradual deterioration of her physical and
mental health between the mid-1970s and
1980. She was described as tired, forgetful,
confused, and in need of full custodial
care. She was diagnosed as suffering from
Alzheimer's disease.
of Attorney
II. Powers ofAttorney
Aiello argues that Palfy, under the provisions of the
powers of attorney acted outside the scope of her
inauthority when she made a gift of Aiello's half in
terest in the Gaudiane note to the Clarks without
her knowledge or consent. The Clarks argue that
the powers of attorney were held by Palfy to protect
her equitable interest in the property and, as such, a
gift was authorized. They further argue that Aiello
had no more than bare legal title, and thus no
agency relationship was ever created.
[1][2] The powers of attorney granted by Aiello in
1968 and 1974 were general. These were not grangran
ted in consideration of being named as payee on the
Gaudiane note in 1976. The instruments creating

for, buy, sell, mortgage, hypothecate, and in any
and every way and manner deal in and with ...
other property ... and to make, do and transact all
and every kind of business of what nature and
kind soever.
[3][4] Expressions such as "and otherwise dispose
of' are catchall phrases and add nothing for they
refer "to such undescribed methods of disposition
as may have been omitted (but were not) and are in
nature like those specifically enumerated." *1166
Clark. 71 F.Supp. 1,4 (D. Hawaii 1947).
Fujino v. Clark,
The powers of attorney held by Palfy contained
phrases of the same nature (see above); however,
these phrases do not transform the power granted to
include making gifts.
The general rule of construction is stated in Brown
Laird. 291 P. at 354 deferring to Gouldy v. Met
Met1'. Laird,
calf: 75 Tex. 455, 12 S.W. 830, 831 (1889):
The language used in the grant of general power is
certainly very comprehensive, but the established
rule of construction limits the authority derived
by the general grant of power to the acts authorauthor
ized by the language employed in granting the
special powers.
In Gouldy, the Texas Court further stated that:
When an authority is conferred upon an agent by a
formal instrument, as by a power of attorney,

evidthe relationship must be taken as prima facie evid

there are two rules of construction to be carefully

ence of its nature. "The intention of the donor or
grantor is to be gathered from the instrument of cre
creLaird. 291 P. 352, 353 (Or.1930)
ation." Brown v. Laird,
citing 49 C.J. §§ 34, 40. See also 72 CJ.S. Powers
con§ 22 (1951). Beyond this, the burden is on the con
testant to show that a different type of association
or purpose exists. This burden was not met. Thus,
Aiello's intention must be gleaned from the written
grant of power as a reasonable person reading the
instrument would interpret it. In 1968, Aiello gran
granted Palfy power to:

attended to: (1) The meaning of general words in
the instrument will be restricted by the context,
and construed accordingly. (2) The authority will
be construed strictly, so as to exclude the exerexer
cise of any power which is not warranted either
by the actual terms used, or as a necessary means
of executing the authority with effect.

lease, ... bargain, sell ... lands ... upon such terms ...
'"
as she shall think fit. Also to bargain and agree

12 S.W. at 831
Thus, the authority to deal "upon such terms as she
shall think fit" does not alter the type of acts which
are authorized.
A general power of attorney authorizing an agent to
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sell and convey property, even though it author
authorizes him to sell for such price and on such terms
as to him shall seem proper, implies a sale for the
benefit of the principal, and does not authorize
the agent to make a gift of the property, or to
consideraconveyor transfer it without a present considera
tion inuring to the principal.
Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768, 773-74
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979) quoting Johnson v. Frac
FraccacreTa, 348 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977)

The terms of the powers of attorney granted to
Palfy were general though limited to business transtrans
actions. Consistent with that, Palfy had on all prior
Aioccasions received valuable consideration in Ai
attorello's behalf for transfers she made as Aiello's attor
ney in fact. As the court said in Fujillo,
Fujino. 71 F.Supp.
at 4, "[a] gift is not a business transaction." FurtherFurther
C ..T.S. Powers § 25 (1951)
(195]) states: "Gifts.
more, 72 C.J.S.
Power to sell does not include authority to make a
con
gift of the subject matter, or convey it without consideration, and such a transfer is void." See also
Brown 1'. Laird, 291 P. 352, 354 (Or. 1930).
[5][6] In the absence of express authority to make a
gift, none may be made. The agent must avoid act
acting to the detriment of his principal "in the absence
Rolater, 542
of an explicit direction." Estate of RolaTer,
P.ld 219. 223 (Okla.App.1975).

beneficial interest in the promissory nolle
noile and deed
of trust and was informed of most of her interests
although she was not active in the transactions.
Palfy's apparent purpose in placing title in Aiello's
name was not to evade creditors but rather to give
her daughter a beneficial interest in the property
which would become hers at Palfy's death, or when
attorPalfy could no longer exercise the power of attor
ney.
The power of attorney granted to Patlfy merely
made her an agent for Aiello. Palfy acted beyond
the scope of her authority in making the gratuitous
assignment to *1167 Clark, and Aiello is not bound
by Palfy's acts and representations.
[7] The general rule was stated in State v. Neal &
489 P.2d 1016,1019
1016.1019 (Alaska 1971):

SOilS.

[A] person who deals with another, knowing that
the other is acting as an agent, and who fails to
inquire into the extent of the delegated authority,
may be held to deal at his peril.
attorClark knew that his mother held a power of attor
limney for his sister. He did not inquire into its lim
its. Clark did not pay for the assignmf:nt, and AiAi
ello did not benefit from it. Clark did not justifi
justifiably rely to his detriment upon another's acts, and
Aithus, he cannot claim estoppel on the part of Ai
ello. We hold that Palfy's assignment of Aiello's
beneficial interest to the Clarks is void. FN4

Clark relies upon the case of Clay v. Saute. 295
P.2d 914 (CaI.App.1956) for the proposition that
the agent may make a gift where the principal holds
bare legal title and the agent holds equitable title.
Clay is distinguishable from this case. In Clay, the
agent conveyed property to his daughter in order to
acdeprive his business associates and creditors of ac
cess to his assets. His daughter never knew about
these transfers and there is no evidence that she
held any beneficial interest. The agent was declared
deincompetent, although he was not, and was later de
termined to be competent.

III. The Trust

To the contrary, in this case, Aiello was holder of a

The Clarks argue that Palfy's own beneficial inin

FN4. It is also possible that Aiello's own
interest was transferred to the Palfy Family
Trust, and that a gift of this interest would
also be invalid for reasons discussed in
Section III, infra, of this opinion. Because
atwe have already held that the powers of at
torney did not authorize a gift, we need not
reach and do not decide this issue.

'W'
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terest in the Gaudiane note was validly assigned for
the reason that no conveyance of the property into
the Trust was ever made, or in the alternative, that
the Trust was revocable, and in fact had been rere
voked by Palfy. Aiello argues that the Trust AgreeAgree
ment was valid and enforceable, but that Palfy's gift
of her own interest was invalid for two reasons: (I)
that she was mentally disabled and (2) that GaudiGaudi
ane. and perhaps Clark, exercised undue influence.
FN:l
FN5. Palfy's mental disability or the exerexer
cise of undue influence over her affairs by
others need not be addressed. Our decision
here makes these issues moot.
The Trust Agreement provided in Article I:
Trustor has contemporaneously with the execuexecu
tion of this Agreement, transferred and delivered
to Trustee, or stated that she would transfer and
deliver to Trustee, without consideration paid or
Ex
to be paid therefor, the property set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this reference
incorporated herein and made a part hereof. Such
property, together with any additions of property
made to this Trust, whether by Trustor or by an
other person, shall constitute and be known as the
"Trust Estate" and shall be held, administered,
and distributed as hereinafter provided.

( 1955).
[9) Even if Palfy retained possession as Trustor, a
[9J
trust was completed as to her one-half interest.
"Where the instrument creating the tru~,t expressly
grantprovides that it shall be for the benefit of the grant
or during his life, a retention of possession by him
is not inconsistent with the trust." 89 c.J.S. Trusts §
64 (1955). Palfy created a valid trust. The language
of the trust shows the necessary present intent to
concreate a trust. Her capacity at that time is not con
tested.
For Palfy to transfer the interest held in trust would
have required revocation of the Trust. The terms of
the Trust are unambiguous. The Declaration of the
Trust provided:
*1168 This Declaration and Agreement of Trust,
made and entered into this 21 day of October,
PALFY of Fairb
Fairb1976, by and between FERN PALFY
anks, Alaska, (hereinafter referred to as
"Trustor") and FERN PALFY
P ALFY and DONNA
LOUISE AIELLO of Redwood City, California,
as Co-Trustees, (hereinafter referred to as
"Trustee").
The Trust was revocable as specified in Article IV:
During the lifetime of Trustor, this Trust may be
revoked in whole or in part by the Trustor. The

Schedule A was attached to the Trust Agreement. It

power o/revocation shall be exercised by written

listed the Gaudiane $874,000 promissory note. The
testi
terms of the Trust were not contested. The testimony at trial established that the property listed for
the Trust was being administered as part of the
Trust.

notice delivered to the Trustee. In the event of
such revocation, the revoked portion thereof shall
revert to Trustor and shall constitute her separate
property as if this Trust had not been created.

[8)
[8J A note may be assigned merely by execution of
the trust document. No endorsement is necessary
where there are no challenges from a holder in due
course. II Am.Jur.2d Bills and ~otes § 313 (1963).
As to delivery of the note, ""...
... if the creator of the
com
trust by appropriate words or acts fully and completely constitutes himself trustee, no change of
necessary...."
possession is necessary
.... " 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 64

The document provides for revocation by the Trus
Trustor (Palfy) upon written notice to the Trustee (both
Palfy and Aiello). (emphasis added) The only writ
writing prepared by Palfy regarding the Tmst property
was the Assignment of Beneficial Intf:rest
Jntf:rest to the
Clarks. This was never given to Aiello. She dis
discovered it only through the Fairbanks Title Com
Company while doing a title search. Her investigation
was triggered by a form she was requested to sign
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only as Palfy's co-conservator to permit Gaudiane
to transfer the brewery property. The parties were
listed as Clark and Aiello as co-conservators for the
estate of Palfy and the proposed transferee. The
writing was not directed to the Trustee nor did it
mention the Trust.
[10] No other method of revocation is permissible
FN6
under the terms of the Trust.
As stated in ReRe
statement 2d Trusts § 330 (1959):
FN6. Under the facts of this case, see fn. 3,
strict compliance with the terms of the
Trust is mandated absent any exceptional
reasons that might justify non-adherence to
the requirement that written notice of rere
vocation be given the Trustee.
(I) The settlor has power to revoke the trust if and
to the extent that by the terms of the trust he rere
served such a power.

"Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the
contrary, no powers enumerated herein or accor
accorded to the Trustee generally pursuant to law shall
be construed to enable the Trustor, or any other
person, to purchase, exchange, or oth,~rwise deal
with or dispose of all or any part of the corpus or
conincome of the Trust for less than adequate con
... "
sideration in money or money's worth ..."
Clark did not pay for the assignment and Palfy did
not replace the Gaudiane note with any other prop
property. Therefore, neither Palfy's nor Aiello's interest
was properly transferred to the Clarks.
REVERSED.
Alaska, 1984.
Aiello v. Clark
680 P.2d 1162
END OF DOCUMENT

Comment (a) to the same section explains: "The inin
tention of the settlor which determines the terms of
the trust is his intention at the time of the creation
of the trust and not his subsequent intention."
Moreover, Comment j of § 330 states:

Where method of revocation specified. If the settlor
reserves a power to revoke the trust only in a parpar
ticular manner ... he can revoke the trust only in
that manner
.... If the settlor reserves power to remanner....
re

voke the trust only by a notice in writing dede
livered to the trustee, he can revoke it only by dede
livering such a notice to the trustee.
[I I] Palfy could not avoid this provision by assignassign
ing her interest in the Trust because her interest was
only a life estate. The interest which she purported
to assign to Clark was everything but an estate for
her life.
The assignment was in violation of the Trust.
Palfy's right to receive the payments on the GaudiGaudi
ane note was a Trust asset. Article VII, M. of the
Trust instrument provides:
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Estate of Alphons Cheloha, deceased, Appellee and
Cross-Appellant,
v.
Robert C. CHELOHA, Appellant and Cross-ApCross-Ap
pellee.
No. 8-96-360.

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(F) Trial De Novo
30k892 Trial De Novo
30k893 Cases Triable in Appellate
Court
Proceed30k893(2) k. Equitable Proceed
ings. Most Cited Cases
~895(2)
Appeal and Error 30 ~895(2)

July 17,1998.
Personal representative for uncle's estate sought acac
counting from nephew regarding transactions he
entered into on behalf of uncle by virtue of durable
power of attorney. The District Court, Platte
County, Robert R. Steinke, J., found that nephew
had converted money from uncle's certificates of
deposit to his own use and awarded personal reprep
resentative that amount plus post
judgment interest
postjudgment
repres
and costs. Nephew appealed and personal represGer
entative cross-appealed. The Supreme Court, Gerex
rard, J., held that: (I) nephew failed to establish express oral contract for payment of compensation for
services rendered; (2) nephew converted uncle's
certificates of deposit; (3) nephew converted money
from uncle's checking account; and (4) personal
representative was entitled to prejudgment interest

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(F) Trial De Novo
30k892 Trial De Novo
30k895 Scope of Inquiry
Be30k895(2) k. Effect of Findings Be
low. Most Cited Cases
In an appeal of an equity action, an appellate court
tries factual questions de novo on the record and
reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of
the trial court, provided, however, that where cred
credible evidence is in conflict on a material issue of
fact, the appelIate
appellate court considers and may give
weight to the fact that the trial judge heard and ob
observed the witnesses and accepted one version of
the facts rather than another.

on amount converted from certificates of deposit,

but not amount converted from checking account.

13/
131 Principal and Agent 308 ~10(l)
~10(1)

Affirmed, as modified.
Affinned,

308 Principal and Agent
3081 The Relation
3081(A)
308I(A) Creation and Existence
308k7 Appointment of Agent
308k I0
I 0 Letters or Powers of Attorney
Under Seal
308k I O( I) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
A power of attorney authorizes anoth~:r to act as
one's agent.

West Headnotes

11 I Executors and Administrators 162

~468

162 Executors and Administrators
162XI Accounting and Settlement
IJ62XI(B) Proceedings for Accounting
Form of Remedy.
162k468 k. Nature and Fonn
Most Cited Cases
An action for an accounting of estate property is in
equity.

141 Principal and Agent 308 ~64(.5)i
~64(.5)i
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30S Principal and Agent
30SJJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30SH
30SII(A) Execution of Agency
Collection of Debts Due Principal
30Sk64 Col1ection
30Sk64( .5) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
An agent has a duty to account to his principal for
al1 property or funds which he has received or paid
all
out on behalf of the principal.

[51 Principal and Agent 30S
308 1£;=7S(4)
1£;=78(4)
151
308 Principal and Agent
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30SII(A) Execution of Agency
30Sk7S Actions for Accounting
30Sk78(4) k. Presumptions and Burden
of Proof. Most Cited Cases
disThe burden is upon the agent to prove a proper dis
al1 property and funds which have been
position of all
entrusted to him pursuant to a power of attorney,
since the agent was the one who managed the propprop
erty and funds and had control of the accounts.

[61 Principal and Agent 30S
308
161

~48
~4S

308 Principal and Agent
30SlJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30SII(A) Execution of Agency
308k48 k. Nature of Agent's Obligation.
Most Cited Cases
An agent is generally required

10

act solely for the

all matters connected
benefit of his principal in al1
instrucwith the agency and adhere faithfully to the instruc
tions of the principal.

308 ~1
17) Principal and Agent 30S
308 Principal and Agent
30S1 The Relation
30SI(A) Creation and Existence
Gener30Skl k. Nature of the Relation in Gener
al. Most Cited Cascs
An agent and principal are in a fiduciary relation
relationship such that the agent has an obligation to refrain
from doing any harmful act to the principal.

Page 2

)8) Principal and Agent 30S
308 €=69(1)
IS)
308 Principal and Agent
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30SJJ(A) Execution of Agency
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69(l)
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
An agent is prohibited from profiting from the
principagency relationship to the detriment of the princip
al.

[9)
308 1£;=103(.S)
(9) Principal and Agent 30S
308 Principal and Agent
308111 Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308JIIlA)
3081I1lA) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
Con308kl03 Purchases, Sales, and Con
veyances
30Sk II03(.5)
03( .5) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
himNo gift may be made by an attorney in fact to him
self unless the power to make such a gift is exex
pressly granted in the instrument itself and there is
shown a clear intent on the part of the principal to
make such a gift.

[10) Principal and Agent 30S
308
110)

~69(1)

308 Principal and Agent
30STI Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308TJ(A) Execution of Agency
308T1(A)
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69(l) k. In General. Most Cited
308k69(1)
Cases
Absent express intention, an agent may not utilize
his position for his or a third party's benefit in a
substantially gratuitous transfer.
substantial1y

Ill) Contracts 95 1£;=9(1)
111)
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95I(A) Nature and Essentials in General
951(A)
95k9 Certainty as to Subject-Matter
95k9(l) k. In General. Most Cited
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Cases
A court of equity will not enforce a contract unless
it is complete and certain in all its essential ele
elements.
112] Specific Performance 358 ;€€;;;;.>28(1)
;;;.>28(1)
358 Specific Performance
35811 Contracts Enforceable
358k27 Certainty
358k28 In General
35Sk2S(I) k. In General. Most Cited
358k28(1)
Cases
The parties to a contract must agree upon the mater
material and necessary details of the bargain, and if any
of these be omitted or left obscure or indefinite so
reas to leave the intention of the parties uncertain re
specting the substantial terms, the case is not one
for specific performance.
113) Contracts 95 €€:=>143(3)
= >143(3)
95 Contracts
95JT Construction and Operation
9511
95JI(A) General Rules of Construction
Gen95k 143 Application to Contracts in Gen
eral
95kl43(3) k. Rewriting, Remaking, or
Revising Contract. Most Cited Cases
It is not a function of a court of equity to make a
macontract for the parties or to supply any of the ma
terial stipulations thereof.
[141 Contracts 95 €€:=>9(2)
1141
= >9(2)
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95I(A)
951(A) Nature and Essentials in General
95k9 Certainty as to Subject-Matter
95k9(2) k. Services and Compensation
Therefor. Most Citcd Cases
Elderly uncle's statement to nephew, that he would
pay for nephew's services, was insufficient to create
express oral contract for payment of compensation
for services rendered, absent additional evidence as
to material terms of purported contract.

€:=>28(.5)
115) Contracts 95 C=>28(.5)
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95T(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance
951(B)
95k28 Evidence of Agreement
95k28(.5)
95k2S(.5) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Fact that nephew did not report income he received
from uncle's certificates of deposit on his tax re
returns supported inference that certificates of deposit
did not represent compensation for services
rendered.
116] Contracts 95 €€:=>14
= >14
95 Contracts
95T Requisites and Validity
951
95I(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance
951(B)
95kl4 k. Intent of Parties. Most Cited
Cases
Mutual assent to an agreement is determined by the
objective manifestations of intent by the parties, not
by their subjective statements of intent.
€:=>22
117] Trover and Conversion 389 C=>22
389 Trover and Conversion
38911 Actions
389JI(A) Right of Action and Def{:nses
38911(A)
389k21 Defenses
389k22 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
exSince uncle and nephew had not enterl~d into ex
press contract for payment of compensation for ser
serexvices rendered, and power of attorney did not ex
pressly grant nephew the power to makl~
mak,~ gifts with
uncle's property, nephew'S
certificnephew's use of uncle's certific
ates of deposit for his own purposes constituted
conversion.
1181 Principal and Agent 308 ;€€;;;;.>62(1)
118]
;;;.>62(1)
308 Principal and Agent
308TI Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30SJI(A) Execution of Agency
30811(A)
308k62 Custody and Care of Principal's
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Property
308k62( II)) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Disbursements nephew made from uncle's checking
account pursuant to power of attorney were proper,
to the extent they represented expense reimbursereimburse
ments and items that benefited uncle during his lifelife
time.

[191 Trover and Conversion 389 ~22
1191
389 Trover and Conversion
38911 Actions
389II(A) Right of Action and Defenses
38911(A)
389k21 Defenses
389k22 k. In General. Most Citcd
Cases
Compensation payments nephew made to himself
from uncle's checking account while acting as
uncle's attorney in fact were not proper disbursedisburse
ments, since uncle and nephew had not entered into
express contract for payment of compensation for
services rendered, and power of attorney did not auau
thorize nephew to compensate himself from uncle's
property.

[20] Trover and Conversion 389 ~22
1201
389 Trover and Conversion
3891I Actions
3891I(A) Right of Action and Defenses
389k2l Defenses

389k22 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Since power of attorney did not grant nephew the
power to make gifts with uncle's property, nephew's
use of uncle's money to purchase gifts for his wife
and children was not a proper disposition of uncle's
property.
121] Trover and Conversion 389 €'=>22
389 Trover and Conversion
38911 Actions
38911(A)
389TI(A) Right of Action and Defenses
389k21 Defenses

389k22 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Nephew's purchase of radar detector with money
from uncle's checking account while acting as
uncle's attorney in fact was not proper disposition
of uncle's property; although nephew te:stified that
uncle authorized him to purchase radar detector so
that he would not get speeding tickets while transtrans
porting uncle to doctor's appointments, this testitesti
mony was not credible.
f221 Statutes 361 €'=>278.17
36 J Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
VI(D) Retroactivity
361 Vl(D)
361k278.17 k. Amendatory Acts. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 361 k270)
procedWhere an amendment to a statute makes a proced
efural change, it is binding upon a tribunal on the ef
fective date of the amendment and is applicable to
pending cases that have not been tried.

€;=29
fB] Interest 219 €==29
219 Interest
21911 Rate
2191I
Provi219k29 k. Constitutional and Statutory Provi
sions. Most Cited Cases
Amended prejudgment interest statute applied in
personal

representative's

action

for

accounting;

amendment became effective before action was
tried, and prejudgment interest statute was procedproced
ural in nature. Neb.Rev.St. § 45··103.02
45 .. 103.02 (1993).

[241 Statutes 361 €'=>174
1241
361 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k 174 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 361 k265)
Statutes 361 €'=>278.10
361 Statutes
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361 VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(D) Retroactivity
361k278.10 k. Statutes Imposing LiabilitLiabilit
ies, Penalties, Duties, Obligations, or Disabilities.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 361 k266)

atSince nephew, in his capacity as uncle's agent or at
torney in fact, wrongfully converted to his own use
unc:Ie without
and retained money belonging to unc:le
uncle's consent, interest was allowable pursuant to
statute authorizing interest on money retained
without the owner's consent. Neb.Rev.St § 45-104.

Statutes 361 €=:>278.13

€;;=39(2.15)
127] Interest 219 €==39(2.15)

361 Statutes
361 VT
VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(D) Retroactivity
361 k278.12 Statutes Relating to Remedies
and Procedures
361 k278.13 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 361k267(l»
A substantive law creates duties, rights, and obligaobliga
tions, whereas a procedural law prescribes the
means and methods through and by which substantsubstant
ive laws are enforced and applied.

219 Interest
219ITI Time and Computation
219k39 Time from Which Inter,est Runs in
General
Gen219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in Gen
eral
Unli219k39(2.15) k. Liquidated or Unli
quidated Claims in General. Most Cited Cases
prejudgA claim is "liquidated," for purposes of prejudg
ment interest statute, when there is no reasonable
recontroversy either as to the plaintiffs right to re
cover or as to the amount of such recovery.
Neb.Rev.St. § 45-103.02 (1993).

1251 Interest 219

~12

128] Interest 219 €==39(2.20)
€;;=39(2.20)
219 Interest
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General
219k8 Compensation for Use of Money
219k12 k. Money Wrongfully Obtained,
Held, or Used. Most Cited Cases

Interest 219

~31

219 Interest
219Il Rate
219k31 k. Computation of Rate in General.
Most Cited Cases
An agent is chargeable with interest at the legal rate
with
from the time that the money is wrongfully withheld from the principal. Neb.Rev.St. § 45-104.

1261 Interest 219 ~12
2 ll9
9 Interest
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General
219k8 Compensation for Use of Money
219k 12 k. Money Wrongfully Obtained,
Held, or Used. Most Cited Cases

219 Interest
219ITI
2191TI Time and Computation
219k39 Time from Which Intefl~st Runs in
General
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in Gen
General
219k39(2.20) k. Particular Cases and

Issues. Most Cited Cases
Since damages were liquidated and no reasonable
controversy existed as to nephew's conversion of
money from uncle's certificates of deposit to his
own use, uncle's personal representative was en
entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law on
that amount from the time that nephew received the
certificates of deposit. Neb.Rev.St. § 45-103.02
( 1993).

129] Interest 219 ~39(2.20)
219 Interest
219TIT Time and Computation
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219k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in
General

ney, since the agent was the one who managed the
th(! accounts.
property and funds and had control of th(:

Gen219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in Gen
eral
219k39(2.20) k. Particular Cases and
Issues. Most Cited Cases
Since, in personal representative's action for acac
counting regarding transactions nephew entered inin
to on behalf of uncle by virtue of durable power of
attorney, reasonable controversy existed regarding
nephew's disbursements from uncle's checking acac
count, personal representative's claim against nephneph
ew was not liquidated, and personal representative
was not entitled to prejudgment interest on impropimprop
er disbursements from the checking account.
Neb.Rev.St. § 45-103.02 (1993).
**294 Syllabus by the Court

*32 1. Equity: Decedents' Estates: Accounting.
An action for an accounting of estate property is in
equity.
2. Equity: Appeal and Error. In an appeal of an
quesequity action, an appellate court tries factual ques
conclutions de novo on the record and reaches a conclu
sion independent of the findings of the trial court,
provided, however, that where credible evidence is
in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate
court considers and may give weight to the fact that
the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and
anoth
accepted one version of the facts rather than another.
au3. Principal and Agent. A power of attorney au
thorizes another to act as one's agent.
4. Principal and Agent: Property. An agent has a
propduty to account to his or her principal for all prop
erty or funds which he or she has received or paid
out on behalf of the principal.
5. Principal and Agent: Property: Proof. The
burden is upon the agent to prove a proper disposidisposi
tion of all property and funds which have been enen
trusted to him or her pursuant to a power of attor
attor-

re6. Principal and Agent. Generally, an agent is re
quired to act solely for the benefit of his or her
principal in all matters connected with the agency
prinand adhere faithfully to the instructions of the prin
cipal.
7. Principal and Agent. An agent and principal are
in a fiduciary relationship such that the agent has an
obligation to refrain from doing any harmful act to
the principal.
8. Principal and Agent. An agent is prohibited
from profiting from the agency relationship to the
detriment of the principal.
9. Principal and Agent: Gifts: Intent. No gift may
be made by an attorney in fact to himself or herself
unless the power to make such a gift is expressly
granted in the instrument itself and there is shown a
clear intent on the part of the principal to make
such a gift.
10. Principal and Agent: Intent. Absent express
posiintention, an agent may not utilize his or her posi
subtion for his or her or a third party's benefit in a sub
stantially gratuitous transfer.
11. Equity: Contracts. A court of equity will not
enforce a contract unless it is complete and certain
in all its essential elements.
them12. Contracts: Parties: Intent. The parties them
selves must agree upon the material and necessary
details of the bargain, and if any of these be omitted
or left obscure or indefinite so as to leave the inteninten
substantion of the parties uncertain respecting the substan
tial terms, the case is not one for specific perform
performance.
13. Equity: Contracts: Parties. It is not a function
of a court of equity to make a contract for the
parties or to supply any of the material stipulations
thereof.
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**295 *33 14. Statutes: Time. Where an amendamend
ment to a statute makes a procedural change, it is
binding upon a tribunal on the effective date of the
amendment and is applicable to pending cases that
have not been tried.
15. Statutes. A substantive law creates duties,
rights, and obligations, whereas a procedural law
prescribes the means and methods through and by
which substantive laws are enforced and applied.
16. Principal and Agent: Prejudgment Interest:
Time. Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-104 (Reissue
1993), an agent is chargeable with interest at the
legal rate from the time that money is wrongfully
withheld from the principal.
17. Prejudgment Interest: Claims. A claim is lili
quidated when there is no reasonable controversy
either as to the plaintiffs right to recover or as to
the amount of such recovery. There must be no disdis
pute either as to the amount or as to the plaintiffs
right to recover.
Richard K. Watts, of Mills, Watts & Nicolas,
Osceola, for appellant.
Clark J. Grant, of Grant, Rogers, Maul & Grant,
Columbus, for appellee.
CAPORALE, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD
, STEPHAN, and McCORMACK, 11.
GERRARD, Justice.
In this equity action, Sophia Cheloha, as personal
de
representative of the estate of Alphons Cheloha, deceased, filed a third amended petition in the district
court, seeking an accounting from Alphons' brother,
Carl C. Cheloha, and Carl's son, Robert C. Cheloha,
as to all transactions they entered into on behalf of
Alphons by virtue of a durable power of attorney.
Sophia alleged that sums of money expended by
at
Carl and Robert, in their capacities as Alphons' attorneys in fact, were not solely for the benefit of
Alphons. Following a bench trial, the district court

entered judgment, finding that Robert converted
certi$33,495.05 in either principal or interest from certi
ficates of deposit owned by Alphons to his own use
postjudgment
and awarded Sophia that amount plus postjudgment
interest and costs. Robert appeals, and Sophia
cross-appeals.
*34 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Alphons was a bachelor and retired tarmer who
AIlived in rural Platte County, Nebraska. In 1986, AI
somephons was admitted to a nursing home, but some
time later was able to return to his own home.
However, in late July or August 1988, Alphons was
reagain admitted to a nursing home, where he re
mained until his death on October 10, 1993.
Robert was Alphons' nephew and lived less than a
lifemile from Alphons' home. During Alphons' life
attentime, few people other than Robert paid any atten
tion to Alphons or his needs. Robert cleared snow
from Alphons' roads, trimmed his trees, provided
transportation for him for doctor's appointments,
and made arrangements for his medical a.nd
and nursing
home care. In addition, Robert paid Alphons' bills,
managed his finances, and provided transportation
for him to purchase his groceries.
Robert testified that in April 1986, he had a discus
discussion with Alphons regarding Robert's desire to be
compensated for the services that he had been
providing to Alphons. Robert testified that he had
this discussion with Alphons at the nursing home in
the presence of Robert's wife and parents. Accord
According to Robert, as corroborated by his mother,
Robert told Alphons that his care was more re
responsibility than Robert could handle, to which AI
Alphons allegedly responded, "I am so gla.d
glad that you
have been helping me, that you are helping me, and
I want you to be paid."
Robert testified that After this conversation, he dis
discussed the matter with the family attomey, Cleo
Robak. Robert told Robak what Alphon:; had said,
and Robak told Robert that he was entitkd to com
com-
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pensation. Robak testified by deposition that he was
never informed or heard of any agreement between
compensaAlphons and Robert for the payment of compensa
tion. Robak, however, did testify that sometime
after problems began to surface with Alphons,
reasonRobak told Robert that he could charge a reason
able fee for **296 whatever work he had done for
Alphons, although no further details were discussed
and no legal work was embarked upon by Robak to
specifically deal with this issue.
On August 11,
II, 1988, Alphons executed a durable
power of attorney, naming Carl and Robert as his
attorneys in fact. Robak testified that in preparing
Alphons' power of attorney, Robak had no know
knowledge of any discussion between Alphons and *35
Robert regarding an agreement for the payment of
compensation for services rendered by Robert purpur
suant to the power of attorney. The power of attor
attorauthorizney instrument did not contain a provision authoriz
ing Robert to compensate himself or a provision au
aupropthorizing Robert to make gifts from Alphons' prop
erty.
represOn September 20, 1995, Sophia, as personal repres
entative of the estate of Alphons, filed a third
amended petition in equity in the district court,
seeking an accounting from Carl and Robert as to
AIall transactions they entered into on behalf of AI
alphons by virtue of the power of attorney. Sophia al
leged that sums of money expended by Carl and
Robert, in their capacities as Alphons' attorneys in
fact, were not solely for the benefit of Alphons and
were, in fact, paid to the detriment of Alphons. At
the bench trial on the matter, Robert admitted that
he used the power of attorney in order to convert
$33,495.05 in certificates of deposit owned by AI
Alphons to his own use. Robert, however, testified
that he received these monies as compensation for
conservices rendered by him pursuant to an oral con
tract with Alphons. Robert also admitted to using
the power of attorney to make various purchases
and disbursements with money from Alphons'
checking account. Robert, however, testified that
constithese various purchases or disbursements consti

tuted either gifts, reimbursement of expenses, or
compensation for services rendered.
Following the bench trial, the district court entered
judgment, finding that Robert converted $33,495.05
in either principal or interest from certificates of
deposit owned by Alphons to his own use and
awarded Sophia that amount plus postjudgment
postjudgment in
interest and costs. The district court dismissed the pe
petition as it related to Carl, since no evidence was
submitted that he had ever come into possession,
control, or management of Alphons' property.
Robert appeals, and Sophia cross-appeals. We re
reto. our power
moved the case to our docket pursuant to
to regulate the caseloads of the Nebraska Court of
Appeals and this court. See Neb.Rev.Stat. §
24-1106(3) (Reissue 1995).

II. SCOPE OF REVIEW

prop[1][2] An action for an accounting of estate prop
erty is in equity. Mischke v. Mischke, 247 Neb. 752,
N'w.2d 235 (1995). In *36 an appeal of an
530 N.W.2d
quesequity action, an appellate court tries factual ques
tions de novo on the record and reaches a conclu
conclusion independent of the findings of the trial court,
provided, however, that where credible evidence is
in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate
court considers and may give weight to the fact that
the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and
anothaccepted one version of the facts rather than anoth

er. Schram Enters. v. L & H Properties. 254 Neb.
717,578 N.W.2d 865 (1998); Mischke v. Mischke,
supra.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
consolidRobert's four assignments of error can be consolid
ated and restated into the following one: The trial
court erred in finding that the conversion of AI
AIphons' certificates of deposit represented a gift to
Robert as Alphons' attorney in fact rather than comcom
pensation for services rendered pursuan1
pursuant to an exex
press or implied contract.
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In her cross-appeal, Sophia assigns the following
two errors: The trial court erred in (1) determining
that she was not entitled to a money judgment for
funds wrongfully converted from Alphons' checkcheck
ing account to Robert's personal use pursuant to the
power of attorney and (2) not awarding prejudgprejudg
ment interest.
IV. ANALYSIS
1. POWER OF ATTORNEY
[3][4][5] A power of attorney authorizes another to
act as one's agent. Mischke v. Mischke, supra;
**297Fletcher v. Mathew, 233 Neb. 853, 448
N.W.2d 576 (1989). An agent has a duty to account
to his or her principal for all property or funds
which he or she has received or paid out on behalf
of the principal. Walker Land & Cattle Co. v. Daub,
223 Ncb. 343,389 N.W.2d 560 (1986). The burden
is upon the agent to prove a proper disposition of
all property and funds which have been entrusted to
him or her pursuant to a power of attorney, since
the agent was the one who managed the property
and funds and had control of the accounts. See id.
[6][7][8] Generally, an agent is required to act
solely for the benefit of his or her principal in all
faith
matters connected with the agency and adhere faithfully to the instructions of the principal. Fletcher v.
Mathew, supra. *37 An agent and principal are in a
ob
fiduciary relationship such that the agent has an obligation to refrain from doing any harmful act to the
principal. Id. An agent is prohibited from profiting
from the agency relationship to the detriment of the
In re Estate
principal. Mischke v. Mischke, supra; III
Lienemann. 222 Neb. 169, 382 N.W.2d 595
(!f Lienemann,
(1986).
[9][ I 0] It is well settled that no gift may be made
by an attorney in fact to himself or herself unless
the power to make such a gift is expressly granted
in the instrument itself and there is shown a clear
intent on the part of the principal to make such a
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Mischke, supra. We adopted the
gift. Mischke v. Mischke.
orforegoing rule in Fletcher v. Mathew, supra, in or
der to discourage fraud and abuse by attorneys in
fact. Thus, absent express intention, an agent may
not utilize his or her position for his or her or a
third party's benefit in a substantially gratuitous
transfer. Mischke v. Mischke, supra.
Robert asserts that his conversion of $33,495.05 in
principal or interest from Alphons' certificates of
deposit to his own use represented compensation
for services rendered by him pursuant to an express
oral contract or an implied contract and that, thus,
the district court erred in awarding Sophia
$33,495.05. At trial, however, Robert did not raise
certhe theory that he properly converted Alphons' cer
tificates of deposit pursuant to an implied contract.
Therefore, on appeal, our sole inquiry is whether an
express oral contract existed whereby Alphons
agreed to pay Robert $33,495.05 in certificates of
deposit as compensation for services rendered. See
Sunrise Country Manor v. Neb. Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 246 Neb. 726,
726. 523 K.W.2d 499 (1994)
(cases are heard in state appellate courts on theory
upon which they were tried). Robert claims that an
express oral contract existed because Alphons had
specifically told Robert in the presence of his im
immediate family that Alphons wanted Robert to be
paid for his services.
[11][12][13]
[\\][12][\3] A court of equity will not enforce a
contract unless it is complete and certain in all its
essential elements. Sayer v. Bowley, 243 Neb. 80 I,
I.
503 N.W.2d 166 (1993). The parties themselves
must agree upon the material and necessary details
of the bargain, and if any of these be omitted or left
obscure or indefinite so as to leave the intention of
the parties uncertain respecting *38 the substantial
terms, the case is not one for specific performance.
Id. It is not a function of a court of equity to make a
contract for the parties or to supply any of the ma
material stipulations thereof. Id.
[14] In the instant case, the only evidencl~
evidenc,~ in the re
record that would support a mutual understanding
between Alphons and Robert that Robert's services
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were not rendered gratuitously was the self-serving
testimony of Robert and the testimony of his moth
mother that Alphons told Robert that Alphons would pay
Robert for his services. Even assuming that this
conconversation did, in fact, take place and that a con
tract was formed between the parties, the record
contains no evidence of a mutual understanding as
to the specific terms of the compensation to be paid
to Robert. While Robert testified that 4 years after
the alleged conversation with Alphons, Alphons
told Robert that he was entitled to a certificate of
deposit as compensation for services rendered,
certithere is no evidence in the record as to which certi
ficate of deposit or as to the amount of the particu
particuenlar certificate of deposit to which Robert was en
titled. In short, the record is devoid of any evidence
as to the material terms of the purported contract,
and thus, as an appellate court, it is not our function
to supply the terms for the parties and enforce
**298 the parties' alleged contract for the payment
of compensation for services rendered.
[15] [16] Moreover, contrary to Robert's claim of a
contract for compensation of services, the record
reveals that Robert never reported the income he re
rereceived from the certificates of deposit on his tax re
turns, thereby supporting an inference that the certi
certificates of deposit did not represent compensation
agreefor services rendered. Mutual assent to an agree
ment is determined by the objective manifestations
of intent by the parties, not by their subjective
statements of intent. See Viking Broadcasting Corp.
Co., 243 Neb. 92, 497 N.W.2d
v. Snell Publishing Co..
383 (1993).
re[I 7] Therefore, we determine from our de novo re
view of the record that Robert's conversion of AI
AIphons' certificates of deposit to Robert's own use
was not pursuant to any enforceable oral contract,
but, rather, was a substantially gratuitous transactransac
tion. Moreover, since the power of attorney did not
expressly grant Robert the power to make gifts with
Alphons' property, Robert has failed to meet his
burden of proof with respect to the *39 proper dis
disposition of Alphons' certificates of deposit and inin

terest totaling $33,495.05. Accordingly, the district
court was correct in awarding Sophia the sum of
depos$33,495.05 with respect to the certificates of depos
it. Robert's assignment of error is without merit.
2. SOPHIA'S CROSS-APPEAL
(a) Checking Account
In her cross-appeal, Sophia asserts that the trial
court erred in not awarding a judgml:nt
judgm(:nt against
Robert for money he wrong-fully converted from
Alphons' checking account to his own lise. Robert
admits to using the power of attorney to make vari
various purchases and disbursements with money from
conAlphons' checking account; however, Robert con
tends that these various purchases or disbursements
reimwere proper because they represented either reim
bursement of expenses, compensation fix services
rendered, or gifts.
[1 8] As we address Sophia's claims in our de novo
review, we recognize that the nature of many of the
checking account expenditures was in d:ispute,
dispute, and
we have considered and given weight to the fact
ac
that the trial court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of facts over anothl:r
anoth(:r with re
reS,~e Schram
spect to several of the transactions. SI~e
Enters. v. L & H Properties, 254 Neb. 717, 578
N.W.2d 865 (1998). In that regard, there were nunu
merous checks that were written by Robert on be
bereimhalf of Alphons either for alleged expense reim
bursements or for items that allegedly benefited A1
A1phons during his lifetime. Without detailing each
purand every check, Sophia claims that se:veral pur
chases were not solely for the benefit of Alphons
and that certain checks were not reimbursement for
legitimate expenses. The checks at issuc!
issue~ were for
the purchase of two filing cabinets to keep track of
Alphons' business, the payment of real estate taxes
on Alphons' farmstead and personal property tax on
Alphons' pickup truck, several checks. to WalWal
green's to purchase personal hygiene items and
televimedications for Alphons, the purchase of a televi
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sion set for Alphons' room in the nursing home, the
paypurchase of a vacuum for Alphons' home, the pay
ment for repairs to Alphons' truck, the purchase of a
camcorder that was eventually sold to Robert, and
insurthe payment of utilities *40 and homeowner's insur
ance on Alphons' farmstead. The evidence was in
dispute in many of these transactions, and the trial
court heard several witnesses, including the admin
adminregardistrator of the Genoa Haven Home, testify regard
ing the issue whether Alphons was benefiting from
the purchases and disbursements outlined above.
deBased on our de novo review of the record, we de
termine that the trial court did not err in concluding
that Sophia was not entitled to judgment regarding
the aforestated disbursements.
[19] However, based on the principles set forth in
A1athew, 233 Ncb.
Neb. 853,448 N.W.2d 576
Fletcher v. A1athew.
( 1989), our de novo review of the record leads us to
a different conclusion regarding Sophia's claims
serwith respect to the alleged compensation for ser
purvices and gifts to Robert. With regard to those pur
chases constituting alleged compensation for ser
services rendered, Robert testified that he purchased
**299 a pair of shoes for himself in the amount of
$241.50. Robert also testified that he paid himself
$500 for handling Alphons' funeral arrangements.
Lastly, Robert testified that he paid himself $80.15
for moving Alphons' belongings to and from the
various nursing homes. As previously determined,
because the record is devoid of satisfactory proof
that Alphons entered into a binding contract to
compensate Robert for services rendered and bebe
pro
cause the power of attorney does not contain a provision authorizing Robert to compensate himself
from Alphons' property, we determine that Robert
has failed to meet his burden of proof with regard
to the proper disposition of Alphons' money in the
sum of$821.65.
[20J As to those purchases made with Alphons'
money allegedly constituting gifts, Robert wrote
checks to Wal-Mart totaling $7,055.74. While
Robert testified that these purchases were primarily
for personal items for Alphons, Robert also testified

that a portion of those purchases was for gifts for
his wife and children pursuant to Alphons' oral auau
thorization. Despite Alphons' alleged oral authorizauthoriz
ation, because the power of attorney did not grant
Robert the power to make gifts with Alphons' prop
property and the purchases were not solely fc)r Alphons'
benefit, we determine that Robert has failed to meet
his burden of proof with respect to the disposition
of Alphons' money in the amount of$7,055.74.
[21] *41 Robert also purchased a radar detector for
$240.14. Robert testified that Alphons authorized
Robert to purchase a radar detector so that he would
not get speeding tickets while transporting Alphons
to doctor's appointments. Because we do not find
deRobert's testimony credible in that regard, we de
termine that Robert has failed to meet his burden of
AIproof with respect to the proper disposition of AI
phons' money in the further sum of$240.14.
Based on the foregoing, we determine that the trial
court erred in not awarding Sophia a judgment in
the amount of $8,117.53 for funds wrongfully concon
bene
verted from Alphons' checking account to the benefit of Robert.
(b) Prejudgment Interest
Sophia asserts that the trial court wrongly applied
an old version of Nebraska's prejudgmmt interest
statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-103.02 (Reissue 1993),
in denying her request for an award of prejudgment
interest. Sophia claims that under the amended ver
version, § 45-103.02 (Cum.Supp.1996), she is entitled
to prejudgment interest.
The version of § 45-103.02 that the trial court ap
applied in the instant case provided the following:
Except as provided in section 45-103.04, judg
judgment interest shall also accrue on decrees and
judgments for the payment of money from the
date of the plaintiffs first offer of settlement
which is exceeded by the judgment until the
rendition of judgment if all of the following con
conditions are met:
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defend(1) The offer is made in writing upon the defend
ant ... ;
(2) The offer is made not less than ten days prior
to the commencement of the trial;
(3) A copy of the offer and proof of delivery to
the defendant ... is filed with the clerk of the
court in which the action is pending; and
(4) The offer is not accepted prior to trial or withwith
in thirty days of the date of the offer, whichever
occurs first.

§ 45-103.02 (Reissue 1993). Under this version of §
45-103.02,
45-]
03.02, in order to receive prejudgment interest
in a cause of action accruing after January 1, 1987,
requirea litigant must comply with the *42 four require
Pantallo v. McGowan,
ments of § 45-103.02. See, Pantano
Con247 Ncb. 894,530 N.W.2d 912 (1995); Label Con
cepts v. Westendorf Plastics. 247 Neb. 560, 528
N.W.2d 335 (1995).
However, in 1994, the Legislature amended §
45-103.02, which now provides the following:
(1) Except as provided in section 45-103.04, in
in(I)
terest as provided in section 45-103 shall accrue
on the unpaid balance of unliquidated claims
plaintiffs first offer of settle
settlefrom the date of the plaintiff's
ment which is exceeded by the judgment until the
rendition of judgment if all of the following con
conditions are met:

**300 (a) The offer is made in writing upon the
defendant ... ;
(b) The offer is made not less than ten days prior
to the commencement of the trial;
de livery to
(c) A copy of the offer and proof of delivery
the defendant ... is filed with the clerk of the
court in which the action is pending; and
with(d) The offer is not accepted prior to trial or with
in thirty days of the date of the offer, whichever
occurs first.

(2) Except as provided in section 45-103.04, inin
terest as provided in section 45-104 shall accrue
on the unpaid balance of liquidated claims from
the date the cause of action arose until the rendirendi
tion ofjudgment.
of judgment.
(Emphasis
supplied.)
§
45-103.02
(Cum.Supp.l996). Thus, under the amended ver
version of § 45-103.02, compliance with the four concon
ditions is no longer a prerequisite for an award of
prejudgment interest if interest is provlided for in
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-104 (Reissue 1993) and the
claim is liquidated. Before analyzing whether inin
terest is available pursuant to § 45-104 and the
claim is liquidated, it is necessary for us to resolve
the question of whether the amended prejudgment
interest statute is applicable in the instant case.
[22][23] Where an amendment to a statute makes a
procedural change, it is binding upon a tribunal on
the effective date of the amendment and is applic
applicable to pending cases that have not been tried.
HEP, Inc..
Inc., 248 Neb. 706, 539
5.39 N.W.2d
Stansbury v. HEP.
28 (1995); Behrens v. American Stores Packing
Neb. 279, 460 N.W.2d 671 (1990). See,
Co., 236 Ncb.
also, Jackson v. Branick Indus., 254 Neb. 950, 581
N.W.2d
N.W.ld 53 (1998). In the instant *43 case, the
amendment became effective July 16, 1994, and the
case was tried on November 28 and 29, 1995.
Therefore, the amended § 45-103.02 was in effect
at the time of the trial, and thus, the new statute will
procedapply if the amendments to the statute we:re proced
ural in nature.
[24] A substantive law creates duties, rights, and
obligations, whereas a procedural law prescribes
subthe means and methods through and by which sub
stantive laws are enforced and applied. Stansbury v.
InHEP, Inc., supra. See, also, Jackson v. Branick In
dus., supra. In the instant case, the amendments to
§ 45-103.02 did not create a new substantive right
to prejudgment interest on liquidated and unliquid
unliquidated claims, since that right was already provided
for in the statute. Rather, the amendme:nts to the
statute merely altered the method for exercising the
right to prejudgment interest in a cause of action
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where the claim is liquidated. Therefore, because
we determine that the amendments to the statute
were procedural in nature, the district court erred in
not applying the amended version of § 45-103.02 to
determine whether prejudgment interest should be
awarded in the instant case. Nevertheless, it still
must be resolved whether interest is provided for
pursuant to § 45-104 and whether Sophia's claim is
liquidated.
[25][26] First, with regard to whether interest is
available pursuant to § 45-104, this section states in
relevant part that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, in
interest shall be allowed at the rate of twelve percent
anper annum ... on money received to the use of an
exother and retained without the owner's consent, ex
.... " Un
Unpress or implied, from the receipt thereof ...."
der this section, an agent is chargeable with interest
at the legal rate from the time that the money is
wrongfully withheld from the principal. See PearlPearl
Snitzer. 112 Neb. 135,198 N.W. 879 (1924)
man v. Snitzer,
. In the case at bar, because Robert, in his capacity
as Alphons' agent or attorney in fact, wrongfully
beconverted to his own use and retained money be
longing to Alphons without Alphons' consent, in
interest is allowable pursuant to § 45-104.

pre(1989). The record reveals that the amount of pre
judgment interest on the certificates of deposit, as
set forth in exhibit 32, shall be callculated as
$17,873.74. However, a reasonable controversy did
AIexist regarding Robert's disbursements from Al
phons' checking account. Therefore, Sophia's claim
on her cross-appeal is not liquidated, and Sophia is
not entitled to prejudgment interes.t on the
$8,117.53 in disbursements from the checking ac
account.
V. CONCLUSION
judg
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is modified to provide a total r,ecovery of
$59,486.32, and as modified, it is affirmed in all
other respects.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
WHITE, c.J., participating on briefs
briefs..
Neb.,1998.
Cheloha v. Cheloha
255 Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291
END OF DOCUMENT

[27] Second, with regard to whether Sophia's claim
liquid
is liquidated, it is well settled that a claim is liquidated when there is no reasonable controversy either
as to the plaintiffs right to recover or as to the
v.
amount of such recovery. See, Blue Tee Corp. 1'.
Neb. 397, 529 N.W.2d
CD/ Contractors, inc.,
Inc., 247 Neb
16 (1995); Lange indus.
Indus. v. Hallam Grain Co., 244
Neb. 465, 507 N.W.2d 465 (1993). *44 There must
be no dispute either as to the amount or as to the
plaintiffs right to recover. Id.
[28][29] Since the damages were liquidated and no
reasonable controversy existed **301 as to Robert's
conversion of $33,495.05 in principal and interest
from Alphons' certificates of deposit to his own
use, Sophia was entitled to prejudgment interest as
a matter of law on that amount from the time that
Robert received the certificates of deposit. See
Fletcher v. Mathew, 233 Neb,
Neb. 853,448 N.W.2d 576
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unquired to establish validity of power of attorney un
der which property was conveyed (C.S. § 6652).
Supreme Court of Idaho.
ARTHUR

Principal and Agent 308 €€==97
= =97

v.
KILPATRICK BROS. CO.
No. 5203.
Feb. 14, 1929.
Appeal from District Court, 81aine
Blaine County; Hugh
A. Baker, Judge.
Action by Edward J. Arthur against the Kilpatrick
Bros. Company. Judgment for defendant was
entered, and, after plaintiffs subsequent death, nono
tice of appeal was filed and served in name of dede
ceased plaintiff. On defendant's motion to dismiss
appeal. Granted.
West Headnotes
Abatement and Revival 2 ~71
2 Abatement and Revival
2\/ Death of Party and Revival of Action
2\/(B) Continuance or Revival of Action
2\/(8)
2k71 k. Nature and Necessity. Most Cited
Cases
Action cannot be continued in deceased's name in
de
behalf of his heirs without substitution of de-

ceased's representative or successor in interest (C.S.
§ 6652).

308 Principal and Agent
308HI Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III(A) Powers of Agent
308HI(A)
308k95 Express Authority
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases
auPowers of attorney are strictly construed not to au
thorize acts beyond those specified.
Principal and Agent 308 €€==103(7)
= =103(7)
308 Principal and Agent
3081Il Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
3081U
308II1(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
Con308kl03 Purchases, Sales, and Con
veyances
308k I 03(7) k. Existence of Author
Authority to Sell or Convey. Most Cited Cases
Power of attorney containing no specifi,; authority
to convey realty did not authorize such conveyance.
*800 J. G. Hedrick, of Hailey, and C. T. Ward, of
Boise, for appellant.
Sullivan & Sullivan, of Boise, and Roy Van
Winkle, of Hailey, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.

Abatement and Revival 2

~75(2)

2 Abatement and Revival
2\/ Death of Party and Revival of Action
2\/(B) Continuance or Revival of Action
2\/(8)
There
2k75 Application and Proceedings Thereon
Determ
2k75(2) k. Issues Raised or Determined, and Pleading and Proof. Most Cited Cases
Grantee's right to continue action of deceased
re
grantor to quiet title being disputed, she was re-

This was an action to quiet title to real property, in
which judgment was entered in favor of defendant,
on November 15, 1927. Some time in thl~
th'! month of
December, 1927, plaintiff died intestate, and no ad
administrator has been appointed to represent his es
estate. On January 30, 1928, notice of appeal was
filed and served in the name of the deceased
plaintiff. Thereafter motion to dismiss the appeal
was filed in this court, mainly on the ground that an
appeal may not be taken in the Hame
Ilame of a deceased
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person, without a substitution of, or voluntary apap
pearance*80t by, a representative of such deceased
party.
Edward B. Arthur, a son of the deceased plaintiff,
filed an affidavit, to which was attached as an exex
hibit a power of attorney executed by Edward 1. ArAr
thur, deceased, on November 16, 1926, under
which it is claimed Edward B. Arthur was given the
authority and power, among other things, to convey
all property of Edward 1. Arthur, and that, pursuant
thereto, the property in controversy had been
deeded to Catherine J. Arthur after the entry of
judgment in the cause and prior to the death of EdEd
ward 1. Arthur, and that she elected to continue the
action and appeal the same in the name of the oriori
ginal party, under the provisions of C. S. § 6652.
On the same date of the filing of the affidavit above
referred to, a motion was filed to have Catherine 1.
Arthur substituted as appellant, for the reason that
she is the real party in interest. A subsequent affiaffi
davit of Edward B. Arthur set forth the names of
re
certain heirs of Edward 1. Arthur, deceased, referred to the conveyance to Catherine 1. Arthur, and
stated: "As no administrator has been appointed in
Ed
this state or elsewhere for the said deceased, Edward J. Arthur, this affiant respectfully requests
Ed
that the said action be continued in the name of Edward J. Arthur in case it should be determined by
this court that the said premises constitute part of
his estate."

Affidavits were also filed by others of the Arthur
family, deposing that respective affiants knew that
Ar
the purpose, object, and intention of Edward J. Arthur, deceased, in executing the power of attorney
to Edward B. Arthur, was to give and grant unto the
latter power and authority, among other things, to
convey property of the said Edward J. Arthur.

c.

S. § 6652, provides: "An action or proceeding
does not abate by the death or any disability of a
party, or by the transfer of any interest therein, if
contin
the cause of action or proceeding survive or continue. In case of the death or any disability of a party,

prothe court, on motion, may allow the action or pro
representceeding to be continued by or against his represent
ative or successor in interest. In case of any other
transfer of interest the action or proceeding may be
continued in the name of the original party, or the
the: transfer is
court may allow the person to whom tht:
made to be substituted in the action or proceeding."
statHaving in mind the provisions of the foregoing stat
the: motion to
ute, the situation to be addressed on tht:
dismiss is (I) the request of Catherine 1. Arthur, as
Argrantee of the property under deed of Edward 1. Ar
thur, by Edward B. Arthur, attorney in fact, before
the death of Edward 1. Arthur, to be substituted as
appellant; and (2) if the efficacy of the deed to
Catherine 1. Arthur be inquired into, and it is held
to be of no force or effect by reason of failure of
conthe power of attorney to extend to the right of con
veying real estate belonging to Edward J. Arthur,
the application to have the action continued in the
name of Edward J. Arthur, deceased, in behalf of
his heirs.

If there were no question as to the sufficiency of the
power of attorney, claimed to authorize the deeding
of the property to Catherine J. Arthur, undoubtedly
she would have the right to be substituted as appel
appellant, coming within the provisions of the last sen
sentence or clause of C. S. § 6652, supra, covering a
transfer during the lifetime of the original party,
such as is purported to have occurred herein. In
such circumstances it is unnecessary to decide
whether, upon the death of the transferor and ori
original party, the action could be continued in his
name, since the request is made by the transferee or
assignee to be substituted. Her right, however, to
continue the action or to be substituted as appellant
being disputed, it appears to us that she must
present satisfactory evidence of the grounds upon
which she relies to be made a party to the action in
her own right entirely. This involves, therefore, a
consideration of the power of attorney, under which
it is contended the property formerly belonging to
Edward J. Arthur, deceased, was conveyed to her
and is now her property, subject of course to de
de-
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termination of the litigation involving the title.
The instrument is denominated "special power of
attorney," and admittedly does not expressly give
Edward B. Arthur the power to convey real estate
of Edward J. Arthur, but grants him "full power and
authority to do and perform all and every act and
thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done
in and about the premises (concerning all property
belonging to Edward J. Arthur within the State of
Idaho) as fully to all intents and purposes as he
might or could do if personally present, hereby ratirati
fying and confirming all that his said attorney, EdEd
ward B. Arthur shall lawfully do or cause to be
done by virtue of these presents." It is seen that this
power of attorney contains no authority to convey
real estate, eo nomine, and as such instruments are
pa
subject to strict interpretation, without regard to paauthor
rol evidence, and are not to be construed as authorizing acts beyond those specified (see II Cal. JUT. p.
748 et seq.), our conclusion is that the deed to CathCath
erine J. Arthur was ineffective by reason of insuffiinsuffi
ciency of the power of attorney to authorize concon
veyance of real estate. It follows, therefore, that the
request of Catherine 1. Arthur to be substituted as
appellant in the cause and to continue the same in
her name and right must be denied.

Idaho 1929.
Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co.
47 Idaho 306, 274 P. 800
END OF DOCUMENT

The request that the action be continued in the
name of Edward J. Arthur, deceased, in behalf of
his heirs, if granted, would not be a substitution,
and, by the provisions of C. S. § 6652, "In case of
the death *802 or any disability of a party, the
proceed
court, on motion, may allow the action or proceeding to be continued by or against his representative
or successor in interest," it is clearly expressed that
a substitution of a representative or successor in inin
terest of the deceased is necessary in order to have
the action continued. 20 Cal. JUT. 544; Lowe v. SuSu
perior Court, 165 Cal. 708, 134 P. 190.
There is no proper party appellant before the court,
and the appeal must be dismissed. It is so ordered.
All concuT.
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Supreme Court of Idaho.
EATON
v.
at.
McWILLIAMS et al.
No. 5798.

308HI(A) Powers of Agent
308k95 Express Authority
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases
Power of attorney to sell land must be strictly con
construed.

Principal and Agent 308

~103(6)
~103(6)

May 26, 1932.
Appeal from District Court, Canyon County; John
C. Rice, Judge.
Action in equity by A. L. Eaton against W. H.
McWilliams and others for the cancellation of an
assignment of a contract of sale of real property and
for the return of money paid thereunder. From a
judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.

308 Principal and Agent
308111 Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308III
3081II(A) Powers of Agent
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority
308k 103
I 03 Purchases, Sales, and ConCon
veyances
308kI03(6) k. Sales and Convey
Convey308kl03(6)
ances in General. Most Cited Cases
Power of attorney to sell land and convey complete
title did not include power to assign contract and
receive payment therefor.

West Headnotes

Principal and Agent 308
Appeal and Error 30

~122(1)
~122(1)

~1008.1(8.1)
~1008.1(8.1)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30k 1I 008 Conclusiveness in General

I 008.1 In General
30k I008.1
1008.1 (8) Particular Cases
30k 1008.1
and Questions
1008.1 (8.1)
(8.t) k. In General.
30k 1008.1
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 30kI008(l))
Court's finding under evidence that principal did
not ratify agent's unauthorized act in assigning land
contract held conclusive on appellate court.

Principal and Agent 308

~97

308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons

308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308111
3081II(A) Powers of Agent
308111(A)
308k 118
t18 Evidence as to Authority
308k 122 Declarations and Acts of
Agent
308k122(1) k. Declarations and

Acts in General. Most Cited Cases
Statement in assignment of land contract that agent
was lawfully authorized to execute assignment held
not binding upon principal.

Principal and Agent 308

~)47(3)
~)47(3)

308 Principal and Agent
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308111
308III(C) Unauthorized and Wrongful Acts
308111(C)
308kl47
308k147 Duty to Disclose or Ascertain
Authority
308kI47(3) k. Special Agency. Most
308k147(3)
Cited Cases
Where power of attorney authorized ag,~nt only to
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308 Principal and Agent
308IIl Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
3081J1(D) Ratification
308IIl(D)
308k 175 Operation and Effect
308k 175(2) k. Agent's Contracts. Most
Cited Cases
Principal's ratification of agent's sale of land upon
credit did not impart validity to agent's unauthor
unauthorized assignment of contract from which principal
received no benefit.
*259 Herman Welker, of Weiser, John H. Norris, of
apPayette, and Walter Griffiths, of Caldwell, for ap

of the premises to one Earl F. McClure for the sum
of $1,000, $100 of which was paid down, and the
$ 100 per year.
balance being payable at the rate of $100
Pursuant to this contract, McWilliams as attorney in
fact for Eaton executed and acknowledged a deed to
the premises, and thereafter kept the contract, deed,
and abstract in his possession for a considerable
length of time, instead of depositing them in escrow
in the First National Bank of Caldwell as provided
reby the contract. The down payment of $100 was re
ceived by McWilliams and was never accounted for
to Eaton. McWilliams was entitled to $:50 as com
compensation for making the sale, and expended $17
for conveyancing and abstracting costs. On March
en4, 1929, and prior thereto, McWilliams had en
deavored to sell this contract to the defendant
Pence, who had offered him $646 for it. This
McWiIliams refused to accept, but made a deal with
McWil1iams
Pence that the latter should advance $500, taking
the contract in pledge as security, together with a
written assignment thereof, and that he
(McWilliams) would endeavor to sell the contract
elsewhere and out of the proceeds pay Pence. This
McWilliams was unable to do, and later he agreed
to take the balance of $146 from Pence, which was
paid to him. All of this $646 was converted by
McWilliams and he never paid over any portion of
it to Eaton, nor did he account therefor. After the
Penee received
assignment was made the defendant Pence
from the purchaser on the contract the total sum of

pellants.

$164, covering payments of principal and interest

sell land, one taking assignment of contract from
agent, and paying him therefor, did so at his peril.
Principal and Agent 308 €;=169(3)
€:=169(3)
308 Principal and Agent
308I1l Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
308I1l(D) Ratification
308Ill(D)
308k 168 Implied Ratification
308k 169 In General
308k 169(3) k. Acts Not Amounting
to Ratification. Most Cited Cases
That principal attempted to secure settlement from
agent assigning land contract without authority held
efimmaterial, as regards rights of assignee, where ef
forts were unsuccessful.
Principal and Agent 308

~175(2)
~175(2)

LEEPER, J.

from the year 1929, and on October 26. 1930, the
purchaser paid the further sum of $121 to the First
Security Bank of Payette, in which institution the
papers had been placed by Pence.

The plaintiff was the owner of a tract of land in
Canyon county, Idaho. On the 13th day of March,
1928, the plaintiff executed a written power of at
attorney in favor of the defendant W. H. McWilliams,
which authorized him only to sell and convey the
aforesaid premises, to execute a deed therefor, and
to do all acts necessary to convey a complete title.
The defendant McWilliams, acting under the power
of attorney, thereafter made a contract for the sale

During the time occupied by these transactions
Eaton was living in Montana and was never present
in Idaho. McWilliams advised him by letter that he
had made the sale some time in the fall of 1928, but
nothing was remitted to him, and he did not know
reof the details of the deal with McClure until he re
turned to Idaho in February of 1930. At that time
McWilliams concealed the fact that he had so sold
the contract to Pence, but admitted having drawn

Cleve Groome, of Caldwell, for respondent.
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some money on it. On August 12, 1930, Eaton
again returned to Idaho, and saw McClure and
Pence. He had an argument with Pence about the
division of a $38 check given for damages to the
land by a drainage ditch constructed across it, and
*260 finally compromised by dividing it equally,
Mr. Pence acting as intermediary and dividing the
money. At that time McClure advised him that
McWilliams had assigned the contract to Pence,
and they had some further discussion about that
matter. This was the first time that Eaton knew of
the assignment, and he later went to the Payette
bank and inspected the papers. Shortly after this,
Eaton employed an attorney, who thereafter served
notice upon the bank and in November, 1930, filed
this action on behalf of Mr. Eaton, seeking cancelcancel
lation of the purported assignment, for the return of
moneys theretofore paid by McClure, and for the
delivery of the deed, contract, and abstract to him.
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff
granting him full relief, from which this appeal is
taken by defendants McWilliams and Pence.
We have carefully inspected the record and find no
error. The power of attorney given to McWilliams
clothed him only with the power to sell, and must
be strictly construed. "In accordance with the rule
con
requiring powers of attorney to be strictly construed, a power of attorney to sell lands must be
con
strictly construed and cannot be extended by construction. Hence an authority to sell must be strictly
legitim
pursued and acts beyond those which are legitimately necessary to carry the particular power into
effect will not bind the principal, although, in the
absence of restrictions, the agent has the undoubted
power to do those things which are usually done in
making such sales." 2 C. J. 611, § 245. Obviously,
pay
the power to assign the contract and receive payment therefor is not included within the purview of
the written power of attorney, by the limitations of
assign
authority therein expressed. Pence being the assignee of the contract, and having full knowledge of the
terms of the power of attorney, certainly knew or
should have known that McWilliams was acting
beyond the scope of his agency. Indeed, as a matter

of law, that agency was entirely terminated and no
longer existed after the sale was completed. This
apparcase does not involve any question as to the appar
speent scope of an agent's authority, because the spe
cific written limitation was known to the purchaser,
and the record does not disclose that this was ever,
subsequent to its execution, changed or enlarged in
any manner by the principal. A person who makes a
payment to an agent acting without the scope of his
employment does so at his peril. Whalen v. Vallier,
46 Idaho, 181,266 P. 1089; Nielson v. Westrom, 46
Idaho, 686, 270 P. 1054.

assignAppellant contends that Eaton ratified the assign
ment and isis therefore bound. We have searched
the record for evidence of ratification and found
renone. Eaton moved with reasonable rapidity to re
cover his property as soon as he leamed of the
transaction on August 12, 1930, and prior to this
time he had no knowledge of it. Apparently he did
assignnot know of many facts connected with the assign
ment, particularly the purchase price, and he never
received any of the consideration. That he attemp
attempted to secure settlement from McWilliams is imma
immaterial, in view of the fact that his efforts were un
unsuccessful. Pence did not rely upon anything said or
done by Eaton at any time, and it appears to us that
almost every element essential to ratification is
missing in this case. Black-well v. Kercheval. 29
Idaho, 473, 160 P. 741. The finding of the court,
upon this record, that there was no ratification is
conclusive upon us. The statement contained in the
assignment to the effect that McWilliams was law
lawfully authorized to execute it amounts to no more
than a declaration of the agent and is not binding
upon Eaton. Cupples v. Stanfield, 35 Idaho, 466,
207 P. 326; Cox v. Crane Creek Sheep Co., 34
Idaho, 327, 200 P. 678. As to whether or not
McWilliams was empowered to sell upon credit un
under the terms of the power of attorney we are not
called upon to decide, since Eaton ratified the deal.
This ratification, however, does not impart validity
to the transaction between McWilliams and Pence,
of which Eaton knew nothing and from which he
received no benefit.
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The judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondent.
LEE, C. 1., and BUDGE, GIVENS, and VARIAN,
J1., concur.
Idaho 1932.
Eaton v. McWilliams
52 Idaho 145, 12 P.2d 259
END OF DOCUMENT
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for himself or others.
Supreme Court ofIdaho.
JENSEN

v.
SIDNEY STEVENS IMPLEMENT CO.
No. 3621.
Dec. 4, 1922.
Appeal from District Court, Bear Lake County;
Robt. M. Terrell, Judge.
Action by Thomas C. Jensen against the Sidney
Stevens Implement Company. From a judgment for
plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and rere
manded.
West Headnotes
Principal and Agent 308 €;:;::I48
€ = :'48
308 Principal and Agent
308JJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
30SJJ
308J1(A) Execution of Agency
308k48 k. Nature of Agent's Obligation.
308k4S
Most Cited Cases
It is an agent's first duty to communicate to his
principal any facts relating to the business of his
agency which he should in good faith under their
trust relations have made known to his principal.

€ = =69(1)
Principal and Agent 308 €:=69(1)
308 Principal and Agent
308JJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308JI(A) Execution of Agency
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
prin
The law guards the fiduciary relation between prinpre
cipal and agent with jealous care, and seeks to prevent the possibility of a conflict between the agent's
act
duty and his personal interest, and forbids him acting adversely to the interests of his principal either

Principal and Agent 308 €€;:;::I69(2)
= :'69(2)
308 Principal and Agent
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities
308II
30SII(A) Execution of Agency
308II(A)
30Sk69 Individual Interest of Agent
308k69
Ac308k69(2) k. Duty of Agent to Ac
count for Profits of Agency. Most Cited Cases
If an agent makes a profit in the course of his
agency because of his failure to inform his principal
of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of
due diligence he should have ascertained for his
principal, the profits of such transaction as a matter
of law will belong exclusively to the principal.
*1003 Jones, Pomeroy & Jones, of Pocatello, and
D. C. Kunz, of Montpelier, for appellant.
Budge & Merrill, of Pocatello, and A. B. Gough, of
Montpelier, for respondent.
LEE,J.
Respondent brought this action to recover from ap
appellant a balance on account of wages ea.rned
earned while
in its employment. Appellant, by way of answer
and *1004 cross-complaint, alleged tha.t
that it was a
Utah corporation, qualified to transact business in
the state of Idaho, and had for many years main
maintained a branch establishment at Montpelier in said
state, where it was engaged in selling farming im
implements and other merchandise, in the course of
which it acquired the ownership of real property
hereafter referred to; that until August, 1919, re
respondent was in its employment, and his duties
were to collect accounts, look after its real estate,
and find purchasers for the same, collect rents, and
attend to all of its business matters arising in that
locality, subject to the direction of appellant; that in
May of that year it was the owner of certain real es
estate, specifically described, comprising about 120
acres of farm land in Bear Lake county, which it
listed for sale with respondent, together with other
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of its real estate; and that it was at the time winding
up its affairs and closing its business at said branch
house. It further alleges that respondent was under
instructions, and that it was his duty, to obtain the
best possible price for said property, and to keep
appellant fully informed with respect to all matters
affecting the sale of such property, but that re
respondent failed to do so, but that respondent while
so employed, and when occupying such fiduciary
relationship, failed to disclose to appellant the true
conditions regarding offers made for the farm land
in question, and thereby induced appellant to sell
said premises to respondent for a much less sum
than respondent had been offered for the property
by a prospective purchaser, to whom he afterward
Appelresold the same for an advance of $1,000. Appel
lant asked to have the balance claimed for wages
set off against the excess obtained by respondent
upon the resale of this property, and judgment for
the remainder.
Respondent answered said cross-complaint, in ef
effect admitting the relationship of principal and
agent as alleged, that the real estate in question had
been listed with him for sale, that he had purchased
disthe same from his principal without having dis
closed the facts to appellant as to a previous offer
confrom a third party, and that, after obtaining a con
veyance of the same, he had soon thereafter con
contracted to resell said premises to the party who had

informed it that he had an offer of $2,600 cash for
this farm. The letter does not disclosf: who was
trimaking this offer, but respondent testified at the tri
al that it was in fact his own offer. Two days later
appellant replied, rejecting the offer, but stating that
it would accept $3,000 as its lowest price, with the
condition that such price was subject to change at
any time prior to acceptance. On the 12th day of
appelMay following, respondent again Wrotf: to appel
lant, stating that he had decided to purchase the
land for himself and his boys at the price of $3,000.
This offer appellant accepted, and respondent paid
$2,000 and gave a mortgage for the remainder.
The witness Berry, who had been negotiating with
respondent for the purchase of this land, testifies
that about the 7th of May respondent, with other
members of his family, came to his place, which
adjoined the land in question, and that he made rere
spondent an offer of $3,600 for the land. Respond
Respondent never informed appellant as to this offer, and
gave as a reason for not doing so that the condition
which Berry attached with regard to the lease
caused him to believe that the offer would not be
acceptable. Upon respondent securing title to the
premises, negotiations were renewed between Berry
and himself, which resulted in Berry agreeing to
purchase the land from respondent for the sum of
$4,000. Before the deal was consummated, Berry
ascertained that respondent had just previously pur
pur-

the offer before he had purchased the

dechased the land from appellant for $3,000, and de

premises, for $1,000 in excess of the price for
which he had purchased the land from his principal,
and had subsequently closed such sale for $850 in
excess of what he had paid his principal for the
land.

Remurred to paying this much of an advancement. Re
spondent and Berry adjusted their differences by
agreeing upon a consideration of $3,850, which sale
was finally consummated on June 9th.

made

ver
The cause was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of respondent for his wages, and failed
isto make any direct finding upon the affirmative is
sues tendered by the cross-complaint.
There is practically no conflict in the testimony re
regarding the material issues presented by the plead
pleadings. On May 7, 1919, respondent, by letter ad
addressed to appellant's home office at Ogden, Utah,

There is a conflict between the testimony of Berry
and that of respondent as to when Berry made the
offer of $3,600 which respondent reject1ed without
submitting the same to his principal, he giving as a
reason that Berry's offer imposed some condition
with reference to the lease that made such offer of
less value than that of $3,000 which he had made.
But it is not controverted that Berry made this offer
prior to respondent receiving the letter from his
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principal quoting him a price of $3,000, so it is
clear that respondent, after having submitted his ofof
fer of $2,600, which was rejected, and prior to the
counter proposal from his principal to sell for
$3,000, had received from Berry an offer of $3,600,
Rewhich he failed to disclose to his principal. Re
spondent admits in his testimony that the statement
contained in his letter of May 12th to his principal,
wherein he says that a Mr. Groo was the party who
had made the offer of $2,600, was not true, and that
Groo had not made such an *1005 offer, but that,
on the contrary, the offer was intended to be for
himself.
From these conceded facts it is clear that respondrespond
ent did not exercise toward his principal in the mat
matter of the sale and purchase of this real estate such
good faith as the law requires an agent to exercise
cartoward a principal. The entire transaction was car
ried on by correspondence, and it was his duty bebe
fore purchasing this land for himself to fully dis
disclose all of the facts and circumstances regarding
the negotiations then pending with any other propro
spective purchaser, so that appellant would be fully
instrucadvised of the situation. The court correctly instruc
ted the jury that:
"Loyalty to his trust is the first duty which an agent
conowes to his principal. It follows as a necessary con
clusion that the agent must not put himself in such a
relationship that his interests become antagonistic
to those of his principal. Fidelity in the agent is
what is aimed at, and as a means of securing it the
law will not permit the agent to place himself in a
situation in which he may be tempted by his own
private interest to disregard that of his principal. So
it is the duty of the agent to make his principal a
full and complete disclosure of all facts relative to
the subject of his agency which it may be material
to the principal to know. And, if an agent makes
any profit in the course of his agency because of his
failure to inform his principal of facts known to
him, or which in the exercise of due diligence he
should have ascertained for his principal, the profits
of such transaction, as a matter of law, will belong

exclusively to the agent's principal. The law guards
the fiduciary relation, which the relation of princip
princippreal and agent is, with jealous care. It seeks to pre
vent the possibility of a conflict between duty and
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall
work with an eye single to the interest of his prin
principal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his
principal, either for himself or for others. * * *"
The jury in rendering a verdict for respondent,
failed to apply to the admitted facts in this case the
rule of law thus given to it by the court. It was not
until some 60 days after this transaction that appel
appellant became aware of respondent's breach of trust,
and demanded an accounting for the $850 he had
received for this land in excess of what he had paid
his principal. The demand was refused, and re
rerecovspondent subsequently brought this action to recov
er from appellant the balance of his wages in part
earned while the transaction relative to the land sale
was pending. We think that appellant was entitled
to set off its demand against respondent's claim for
these wages, and to recover judgment for the excess
received by respondent for the sale of said land.
Appellant complains of that part of the court's inin
structions which is as follows:
"In
"Tn this connection, you are advised that, if you
find that the defendant and cross-complainant has
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the
transaction whereby the plaintiff purchased the land
in question was not made in good faith, and likelike
wise that the defendant and cross-complainant has
proved each and every material allegation of its
cross-complaint, then your verdict should be in fa
favor of the defendant and cross-complainant."
We think that this instruction does not correctly
state the law applicable to the admitted facts in this
case, because it is equivalent to an instruction that
preit was incumbent upon appellant to prove by a pre
ponderance of the evidence that the transaction
whereby the respondent purchased the land in ques
question was not made in good faith. All of the material
facts and circumstances relating to the agency set
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forth in the cross-complaint were in effect admitted
by respondent, either by his pleading or his testitesti
mony. The fact of his having purchased the real
property which had been listed for sale with him,
under both express and implied conditions that he
should sell it for the best interests of his principal,
prevented him from purchasing the same on his
comown account without first making a full and com
purplete disclosure to his principal of all offers of pur
circumchase by others, and of all the facts and circum
stances connected with the sale of this property. His
admission that he did not do so would relieve the
appellant from the requirement that it assume the
entire burden of proof of establishing the agent's
want of good faith. That is, the question of good
faith on the part of respondent must be determined
from all the facts and circumstances of the case,
and we do not think that the burden of establishing
this by a preponderance of the evidence shifted to
appellant, in view of the admissions of respondent
in his answer to the cross-complaint and also in his
testimony.
instrucThe cause is reversed and remanded, with instruc
appeltions to grant a new trial. Costs awarded to appel
lant.
conRICE, C. J., and McCARTHY and DUNN, 11., con
cur.
BUDGE, J., took no part.
Idaho 1922.
Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co.
36 Idaho 348, 210 P. 1003
END OF DOCUMENT

'IIIWI"
'1llWl"

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

000504

'liQ

'~_~~-4~1 '~_~~-4~1

-10'2010
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIALJ.>~~~~!f.rj{(1,,;Cj~'"
JUDICIALJ.>~~~~!f.tj{(1,,;Cj~'"
l)EBRAV.:jJfj~W1 - .
By l)EBRAV.:jJfj~W1

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AD1fPl1T'f
AD1fPUT';
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of:
Case No. CVIE0905214
GEORGE D. PERRY,
ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM
Deceased.

On February 26, 2010, the Court conducted a hearing on the claim of the State of
Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (Department) against George Perry's estate.
The Department seeks to recover Medicaid benefits paid to Mr. Perry's wife, Martha
Perry. The personal representative ofMr. Perry's estate, Barbara McCormick, is
represented by Peter Sisson and the Department by Corey Cartwright. The parties have
agreed to the relevant facts and have presented written memoranda and made oral
argument.
1. Background.

During George and Martha Perry's marriage, Martha owned a home at 2104
Tendoy Drive in Boise. On November 18, 2002, by quitclaim deed, Martha transferred
this property to herself and George. On July 31,2006, again by quitclaim deed, the
property was transferred to George alone. 1
Over the years, Martha's health has failed and, since October 1, 2006, she has
received assistance from the Medicaid program to pay for her nursing home care. At the
time of George's death, February 25,2009, Medicaid had provided over $100,000,00 in
benefits to Martha. In March 2009, Ms McCormick, in her capacity as personal
I The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power of attorney from Martha and that he had
the authority to transfer the property to himself.
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representative of George's estate, sold the Tendoy home and has preserved the net
proceeds of the sale in an estate account. This money is the only significant asset of
George's estate.
On April 15,2009, the Department filed its claim against George's estate and on
June 4,2009, Ms. McCormick filed a notice of disallowance of the claim. Pursuant to
Idaho Code 15-3-806, on June 15,2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance
of Claim which is now before the court.
II. Issues Presented.
The ultimate issue is: May the Department recover Medicaid benefits that it has
paid to Martha (who is still living) from George's estate--the proceeds of the sale of the
Tendoy home? Under the Department's reasoning, since Martha had an interest in the
Tendoy home during the marriage (and after federal statutory changes in 1993), it may
recover benefits paid in an amount equal to Martha's ownership interest from the
proceeds of the sale of the home. The personal representative (PR) argues that the
Department may only recover, from George's estate, an amount equal to Martha's
interest in the Tendoy home at the time of her death. Since Martha is still living and

neither this home nor its proceeds will ever pass to her, the PR denies that the
Department may recover any amount.
The foundation of the Department's claim is Idaho Code 15-56-218(1) which
provides:

Recovery of certain medical assistance.-(1) Except where exempted or waived
in accordance with federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter
paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) year so age or older when
the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the individual's
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both:

ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM Page 2

000506

(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate will be authorized
pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under this section
may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse.
(emphasis added)
The only Idaho case dealing with recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of
of Health and Welfare v. Jackman 132 Idaho
the recipient's spouse is Idaho Department ofHealth

213 (1998)?
(1998).2 Jackman's essential holding is that the Department is not limi ted to the
estate of the recipient for recovery of Medicaid benefits, but may recover appropriate
amounts from the estate of the recipient's spouse. The case was remanded to the probate
court for a determination of whether the Medicaid recipient (Hildor Knudson) had an
interest in community property, at the time of her death, the value of which, the court
suggested, could be recovered from her husband's estate.
Jackman does not directly address the critical question for our case: To what

time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid recipient's interest
in property-any time (after 1993) during the couple's marriage or the time of the
recipient's death. 3
The Department's claim depends upon an interpretation of the definitions of
"estate" and "assets" found in Idaho and federal statutes. 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(1)
provides:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:
In re Estate ofKaminsky
of Kaminsky 141 Idaho 436 (2005) involved a claim to recover Medicaid benefits from the
recipient's estate and was decided on the grounds that the Department's claim was untimely.
3 Jackman certainly suggests that the time of the recipient's death is the determinative time: "The record
before us does not disclose whether Lionel and Hildor had any community property at the time of Hildor's
death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that community property property may therefore be part of Hildor's
"estate" that 42 V.S.c.
U.S.c. 1396p(b)(l)(B) and (4) authorizes the Department to recover and apply against the
balance of the Medicaid payments." Id. at 216. (emphasis added)
2
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or
recovery from the individual's estate,
This statute goes on to define "estate" in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4):
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased
individualindividual
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real and personal property
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time
of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
(emphasis added)
Finally, 42 U.S.C.1396p(h) contains general definition provisions:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any income
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but
does not receive because of action-action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such
individual's spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's
spouse.

To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate because
Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's spouse; 42 U.S.C.
1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of "estate" and 42 U.S.C.
1396p(h)(l)
1396p(h)(1) says "assets" includes property that a person transferred to her spouse. The
court cannot accept this interpretation.
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The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in Estate of
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N. Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received Medicaid

benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the estate of Vema Witz,
Clarence's wife. The Wirtz court analyzed the federal statutory definitions of "estate" and
"asset" as quoted above and held that" ... any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to
Vema Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's death are subject to the department's recovery
claim." Id at 886. This ruling depends, however, on an awkward interpretation of the
term "other arrangement" in 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dakota court in Wirtz
interpreted the "other arrangement" language independently from the rest of the section.
The bulk of the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an automatic fashion
on the death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfers and life estates.
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of property of

this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in the context of the surrounding
language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include transfers of a similar, automatic
nature not any possible transfer.
The case of Estate of
oj Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008) provides a more
reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory language.
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not
have an interest in at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale
for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates
from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from the "estate" of the
Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would not be part of the
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wirtz, to the
extent the 1993 amendments allow states to expand the definition of "estate" for
Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal law clearly limits that
expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death.
Id at 71._(emphasis added)
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III. Conclusion.
The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include transfers of property
made by a Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim against the estate of
a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only recover against property in
which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her death. Martha Perry
conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was no joint
tenancy, right of survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have conveyed any
interest in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The Department may not
recover Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the proceeds of the sale of this property.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department's Petition for Allowance of claim is
denied.
DATED This 10" day of March, 2010>.

I

'_

/

~.~~~
Hon. Christo'P~ M. Bieter
Magistrate Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
GEORGE D. PERRY,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV IE 0905214
NOTICE OF APPEAL
EXEMPT:

I.e. § 31-3212

-------------)
----------------------------)

TO:

BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND HER
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PETER SISSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, AND TO THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH AND WELFARE (hereinafter "the Department"), appeals pursuant Idaho Code § 17
17201 and Rule 83, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:
1.

The title of the court from which the appeal is taken is the Magi strate Division of

the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District ofthe State ofIdaho in and for the County of
Ada, Magistrate Judge Christopher M. Bieter, presiding.
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2.

The title of the court to which the appeal is taken is the District Court of the

Fourth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Ada.
3.

The Department appeals from the ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM filed

March 10,2010.
4.

This appeal is taken upon matters oflaw.

5.

This matter was heard by oral argument on February 26,2010, at Boise, Idaho;

however, no evidentiary hearing was had and no testimony or evidence was taken. The hearing
was tape recorded and the recordings are in the possession of the clerk of the court.
6.

The issues on appeal are:
1.

Did the Magistrate err in detennining that the general power of attorney

held by George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha
Perry's real property?
2.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code

§ 56-218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of George
Perry?
3.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.c.

§ 1396p as pre-empting application ofIdaho Code § 56-218?
4.

Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding

in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to
the facts of this case?
5.

Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
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DATED this 18th day of March, 2010,
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2402 W JEFFERSON ST
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DATED this
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Marchel e Premo, Legal AssIstant
Division of Human Services
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This case is before the Court on Appellant Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's

11

(Department's) motion for stay pending appeal. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be

12

granted in part and denied in part.

13

14

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

15

The Department made a claim against the Estate of George D. Perry (George) for
16

reimbursement of amounts expended by the Medicaid program on behalf of George's wife Martha,
17
18

who survives George and is confined to a nursing home. The personal representative of the estate,

19

Martha . It appears
Barbara McCormick (Personal Representative), is the daughter of George and Martha.

20

that she may be a beneficiary of the estate. The Personal Representative denied the claim. The

21

magistrate, Hon. Christopher M. Bieter, upheld the Personal Representative's denial of the claim,

22

and the Department now appeals. The present motion before the Court is to stay distribution of the

23

Represent.ative has no
assets of George's estate pending the outcome of this appeal. The Personal Representative

24

objection to the stay, except to the extent necessary to pay her costs and attorney fees.
25

~.

~

26
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ANALYSIS
1

2

The Department asserts that the Personal Representative is not entitled to pay costs and

3

attorney fees from estate funds because she has a fiduciary responsibility to the estate and creditors

4

and therefore cannot use estate funds to advocate for her personal interests.

5
6
7

8
9

10

Idaho Code § 15-3-720 provides:
If any personal representative or person nominated as personal representative
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he
is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred.

At least two Idaho cases have discussed whether a personal representative is entitled to
reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in pursuing his or her own interests. In Eliasen v.

11

Fitzgerald, 105 Idaho 234, 668 P.2d 110 (1983), the court allowed attorney fees to the personal
12

representative on a finding that the litigation was pursued in good faith, including the representative's
13

14

ofEstate
resistance to efforts to remove him. In Matter of
Estate ofBerriochoa,
of Berriochoa, 108 Idaho 474, 700 P.2d 96

15

(1985) the personal representative was also a beneficiary under the will and incurred attorney fees in

16

noll entitled to
asserting his claim to certain assets of the estate. There, the court held that he was noil

17

attorney fees under the foregoing statute because he was litigating solely his own personal interests.

18
19

The present case is clearly distinguishable. Here, the claimant is the Department; the personal
representative is simply defending the appeal. There is no allegation that she is doing so in bad faith.

20

The fact that denial of the Department's claim may increase the amount available to the beneficiaries
21

does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty absent some showing of bad faith. Indeed a personal
22
23
24

representative who is also a beneficiary would breach a fiduciary duty by failing to dispute
unmeritorious claims, and should not be required to front the attorney fees to do so on the basis of a

25
26
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woulld render the
personal interest (a greater share) if successful. The Department's interpretation wouId
1

2

statue essentially meaningless, in any case in which the personal representative is also a beneficiary.

3

CONCLUSION

4
5

Based on the foregoing, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

6

The Personal Representative shall distribute no funds or assets of the estate to any beneficiary,

7

except for payment of expenses and attorney fees incurred in this appeal, until further order of the
8

Court.
9

10
11

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

1'\*
J'\*

day of May, 2010.

12
13

14

Kathryn A ticklen
District Judge

15
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22
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24
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order disallowing a creditor's claim in a probate proceeding. It
involves Medicaid, also known as "medical assistance," and estate recovery, as provided by
Idaho Code § 56-218. Estate recovery is a program required by federal and state law that seeks
to recover assets of deceased Medicaid recipients, from their estates, to reimburse the taxpayers
for expenditures made during the Medicaid recipient's life. This matter involves the
Department's claim filed in the estate of the deceased spouse of a Medicaid recipient.
Course of Proceedings
The personal representative was appointed in this estate on March 19,2009. The
Department filed a contingent I claim, in the amount of$106,251.08, on April 15, 2009. On June
2,2009, a Notice of Disallowance of Claim was filed by the personal representative. On June 15,
2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim. Hearing was held on the
Department' Petition on February 26, 20lO.
lO, 2010, Judge Bieter issued his Order
2010. On March 10,
Disallowing Claim. This appeal followed.
Statement of the Facts
George D. Perry ("George") was born
age of79. Martha J. Perry ("Martha") was born

25,20109, at the
and died February 25,2009,
and at the time this brief is

written is believed to be still living. Martha was previously known as Martha Jean Boyle and, no
later than September 18, 1977, was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of c<::rtain real
property in Ada County. At some point in time later, Martha and George were marri<::d. On

IIdaho
'Idaho Code § 15-3-810.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1
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"-'
November 18, 2002, Martha executed a Quitclaim Deed, with the grantor named as "Martha Jean
Boyle" and the grantee as "Martha Jean Perry & George Donald Perry." At some point, with
Martha's health declining, George and Martha needed assistance in paying for Martha's medical
care. About July 31,2006, George purported to transfer Martha's interest in the real property to
himself, signing a Quitclaim Deed on behalf of Martha as her Power of Attorney. About
September 15, 2006, George and Martha applied to the Department for medical assistance to help
pay for Martha's medical care. Since October 1, 2006, the Department has provided payment for
Martha's medical care, through the Medicaid program, in the sum of at least $108,364.23. (This
was the amount on April 27, 2009. Medicaid expenditures are ongoing.)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 2
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ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Did the Magistrate err in detennining that the general power of attorney held by

George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha Perry's real property?
2.

56Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation ofIdaho Code § 56

218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of George Perry?
3.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 V.S.c.. § 1396p as

preempting application of Idaho Code § 56-218?
4.

Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding in

ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P
.2d 6 (1998) to the
Idaho Department ofHealth
P.2d

facts of this case?
5.

Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 3
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ARGUMENT

I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(u)( 1) sets forth the standard of review for appeals to the
district court from the magistrate's division, as follows:
Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division ofthe district court, not involving a
trial de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and determine
the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon the same standards
of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the
statutes and law ofthis state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court.
Rule 83(
u)(1), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Idaho Supreme Court in Hawkins v.
83(u)(1),
Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785, 589 P.2d 532 (1978), explained the import of Rule 83(u)(1):
We read [I.R.c.P. 83(u)(1)] as saying that a district court, in making an
appellate review of a magistrate's decision, should perform that task in the same
manner as this Court performs its appellate review ofthe
of the trial decision of a district
court. In reviewing a magistrate's findings, therefore, the district courts should
adhere to the well recognized rule that findings based on substantial and
competent, though conflicting, evidence will not be set aside on appeal. Prescott
fsaguirre v. Eschevarria, 96
v. Prescott, 97 Idaho 257, 542 P.2d 1176 (1975); Jsaguirre
Idaho 641, 534 P.2d 471 (1975); I.R.C.P. 52(a).
Furthermore, upon the appellate review conducted in a district court, the
district court is, as is this Court on an appeal where the district court has been the
factfinder, empowered to affirm, reverse, remand (including remand for a new
trial with instructions), or modify the judgment. I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2). Where the trial
court's findings of fact are confused or in conflict, or where findings on a
particular issue are lacking, and resort to the record does not show clearly what
findings are correct, the district court ordinarily will not modify the judgment.
frr. Co., 15 Idaho 41, 96 P. 117 (1908); 5B C,J.S.
C.J.S.
Frederickson v. Deep Creek Jrr.
Appeal and Error § 1874 (1958). The district court will either remand for new
findings, or, alternatively, act under I.c. § 1-2213(2) and I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2) and
conduct a partial or whole trial de novo.
Hawkins, 99 Idaho at 788-789,589 P.2d at 535-536.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires that a trial court, sitting without a jury, enter
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 4
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specific findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. In the Matter ofthe
of the Estate ofSpencer,
of Spencer, 106 Idaho
316, 678 P.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1984), the Idaho Court of Appeals explained this requirement:
Rule 52(
a), I.R.C.P., requires a trial court in all actions tried upon the facts
52(a),
without a jury to "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of
law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment." The rule also
provides that "[i]f an opinion or memorandum decision is filed, it will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein."
Ordinarily, in reviewing a decision of the district court on appeal from a
magistrate, we must determine from the trial court (magistrate) record whether
substantial evidence supports the magistrate's findings of fact and whether those
findings support the magistrate's conclusions oflaw. Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho
559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981); Ustickv. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215,657 P.2d 1083
(Ct.App.1983). If so, and if correct legal principles have been applied, then the
district court's decision affirming a magistrate's judgment will be upheld. Id. Only
where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete
understanding of the material issues and the basis ofthe magistrate's reasoning
will the absence of findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings.
See Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982); In re
Estate ofStibor, 96 Idaho 162,525 P.2d 357 (1974).

ofSpencer,
Estate of
Spencer, 106 Idaho at 320,678 P.2d at 112.
In the case of In re Estate ofStibor, 96 Idaho 162,525 P.2d 357 (1974), the Idaho
Supreme Court was presented with a district court's affirmance ofa magistrate's refusal to admit
a will to probate. The magistrate's decision was rendered by memorandum opinion, without the
entry of specific findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. Id. at 163. Reversing the district court,
the Supreme Court stated:
52(a)
Even though IRCP 52(
a) recognizes that findings of fact and conclusions
of law may be embodied in a memorandum opinion, still both the findings and
conclusions must be specially stated if they are to fulfill their designed purpose.
This court has held that the absence of findings of fact may be disregarded by the
appellate court if the record is so clear that the court does not need their aid for a
complete understanding of the issues. However, in this case the record is not that
clear. The assignments of error are directed to the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the magistrate's decision. It cannot be determined upon what facts the
magistrate based his decision.
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***

When the district judge was considering the appeal in this case, explicit
findings of fact and separate conclusions of law by the magistrate would have
clearly reflected the basis of the magistrate's decision, and then the district court
more readily could have determined whether facts sustained the magistrate's
decision and whether he had correctly applied the appropriate principles of law.
Moreover, with such findings offact, the district court could have properly
determined whether this was such a case as should have been tried de novo before
the district court. I.e. § 1-2213.
Estate ofStibor, 96 Idaho at 164,525 P.2d at 359. (citations omitted).
II.

MEDICAID IS NOT A FEDERAL PROGRAM
STATEADMINISTERED BY THE STATE, IT IS A JOINT STATE
FEDERAL PROGRAM.
To the uninitiated, Medicaid law can be obscure and unintuitive. 2 While outsiders may
view Medicaid as a federal program administered by the state, it is in fact ajoint state-federal
program. Federal enactment provides a framework and the states then enact their own laws to
provide medical assistance to their own citizens and receive federal financial participation.
Medicaid is intended to provide care for the needy. Unlike social security disability or
Medicare, there are no premiums or payroll taxes for Medicaid. Instead, it is a welfare program
funded by state and federal general fund revenues. It is intended to be the payer of last resort.
Medicaid is a strictly means-tested program, available only to those ofthe most limited
resources. For example, an elderly single person must have no more than $2,000 in available
resources to qualify for assistance.

2Indeed, one federal court has noted that Medicaid law is of "labyrinthine complexity" and called it "almost
unintelligible to the uninitiated." Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 (2nd CiT. 1976).
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Where a married couple is involved, and only one of them needs nursing home care, the
law takes care not to impoverish the at-home spouse. Resources such as the couple's home and
automobile are not counted in establishing eligibility. In this way, the nursing home spouse can
qualify for Medicaid while the at-home spouse3 can retain the resources needed for his support.
However, there is a trade-off for the public's largesse. Restrictions are impos4;!d
impos4~d on both
spouses' ability to transfer assets to third parties. Penalties are imposed for transfers of assets
within federal "look back" dates, which are either three or five years prior to Medicaid
application, depending on the circumstances and date of transfer. See generally 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(c). Likewise, Idaho law criminalizes transfers of assets to qualify for Medicaid, and
1396p(c).
transfers of assets by either spouse, without adequate consideration, can be set aside by the
courts. Idaho Code §§ 56-227 and 56-218(2).
Medicaid has always been intended to provide only for the needy. In 1993, Congress
strengthened federal law relating to estate recovery and asset transfers in response to widespread
reports of abuse. Among the changes made were longer look back periods, an expanded
definition of assets subject to estate recovery, and penalties for asset transfers. The legislative
history accompanying these actions shows Congress' intent that a couple's assets be traced to
facilitate recovery:
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The pro&ram must identilfy
and track resources (whether or not excluded for eli&ibility purposes) of
individuals who receive nursing facility, home and community-based services.,
and other specified long-term care services. The program must promptly ascertain

3In Medicaid parlance, this person is known as the "community spouse." This has nothing to do with
community property law, since federal Medicaid law ignores state community property principles, but rather refers to the
spouse that lives "in the community" rather than in an institution.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 7

O:\Appellants Brief.wpd

000531

when the individual and the surviving spouse, if any, dies, and must provide £)f
the collection ofthe amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf ofthe
individual for long-tenn care services from the estate of the individual or tbe
the
survivine spouse. The tenn "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally
cognizable title or interest at the time of his death, including assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living
trust, or other arrangement.
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 1993), Section 5112. (emphasis added).
The federal Medicaid framework anticipates transfers between spouses for the: sole
purpose of providing a necessary living for the at-home spouse. See generally 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(c). The federal law uses tenns such as "for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse." 42
1396p(c).
U.S.c. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii). When eligibility is detennined, all ofthe assets of both spouses
are taken into consideration, without regard to whether the property is separate or community
property or whether it has been transferred from one spouse to the other. See IDAPA
IDAP A
16.03.05.735 to .752. The eligibility process involves complicated provisions meant to ensure
that the at-home spouse has enough resources to provide for himself. See id. It is obvious that
these provisions are not intended to provide an inheritance for the couple's heirs. To the
contrary, they are intended to make necessary medical care available to one spouse, provide for
the necessary living expenses of the other, and that is all. 4

III.
ESTATE RECOVERY IS PART OF THE WHOLE
PROCESS OF MEDICAID FOR THE ELDERLY.
The 1993 amendments to the Medicaid law (often referred to as OBRA '93) made estate
recovery mandatory to the states. OBRA '93 also created the anti-spousal impoverishment

4There are also provisions to provide for minor or disabled children, but those provisions are not relevant here.
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provisions that pennitted the spousal transfers referred to above. Prior to OBRA '93, the athome spouse would be left destitute and unable to provide for himself. With OBRA '93, the
Medicaid spouse was allowed to transfer property needed for the at-home spouse's living, and
the at-home spouse was allowed to retain sufficient resources to maintain his household. OBRA
'93 also enacted the expanded definition of estate found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) and Idaho
Code § 56-2I8(
4)(b). Of course, these enactments are all related and support the legislative
56-218(4)(b).
intent quoted in the house report, above. The intent was to prevent the impoverishment ofthe athome spouse, but at the same time, provide for recovery of the couple's assets after both had
passed away and no longer needed them.
The process for this is estate recovery. Estate recovery involves the recovery ofthe assets
of the couple from the probate estate. Probate law is uniquely state law; there is no federal
probate law. Accordingly, there is no part of the federal-state Medicaid partnership that is more
completely governed by state, rather than federal, law. It is state probate and marital property
law that defines what property is available for payment of creditors from the probate f:state.
Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) specifically anticipates that the states will define what other
property, not included in the probate estate, will be included in Medicaid recovery:
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the tenn "estate", with respect to a.
individual
deceased individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets includ'ed
includ,ed
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include. at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
conveYf:d to
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyf:d
a survivor. heir. or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement;.
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''
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (underline added).
Estate recovery is an anticipated and expected part of providing Medicaid for the elderly.
The restrictions on the amount of assets and resources the couple can retain are relaxed, but the
trade-off is that once the need of the couple for those assets has ended, they must be n:~paid
n:~paid into
the treasury to offset the expense to the taxpayers and provide for the needs of others similarly
situated. Federal and state law is not intended to provide an inheritance to the able bodied heirs
of Medicaid recipients and their spouses, at taxpayer expense, but only to provide for the elderly
couple and return the retained assets to the treasury when they are no longer needed.

IV.
IDAHO LAW HAS ALWAYS PLACED THE
RESPONSIBILITY ON SPOUSES TO PROVIDE
NECESSARY CARE AND SUPPORT FOR EACH OTHER.
Idaho recognizes the responsibility of spouses to provide for one another. Idaho Code §
32-901 states that "Husband and wife contract toward each other obligations of mutual respect,
fidelity and support." In the case of Edminston v. Smith, 13 Idaho 645, 92 P. 842 (1907), a wife
entered into a contract for lodging and her landlord brought an action to recover from the
husband. The question before the court was whether the husband could be liable for a contract
for lodging entered into only by the wife. The Idaho Supreme Court held in the affimlative:
affimtative:
On the part of the husband, it is contended that he is not liable, for the reason that
the complaint shows that the credit was extended to the wife on her promise, and
not upon any implied liability of his.

***

The liability of the wife, if any, rests on her contract and promise to pay, while the
husband's liability for a necessary, such as board and room. grows out of and is
incident to his marital duties. and arises therefrom by operation oflaw. The wife
is entitled to these necessaries at the husband's expense, but, ifhe neglects to
furnish them and she cannot secure them on his credit, and can do so on the faith
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of her own promise to pay the bill, she is certainly entitled to procure them in that
manner. Ifthe creditor parts with his goods on the faith ofthe wife's promise to
pay, he is entitled to recover against her ifthe debt is not paid. The fact that she is
obliged to obligate herself can in no way relieve the husband of his duty and
responsibility in the matter. The wife has a right, on the other hand, to have the
husband holden for the debt, so that, if it can be collected from him, she may be
relieved of that obligation. The creditor is entitled to hold the husband, although
he is not willing to part with his goods without the additional assurance of the
wife's personal obligation to pay the debt.

***

We conclude that the husband is unquestionably liable for the debt. and that a
good cause of action is stated against him.

Edminston, 13 Idaho at _,92 P. at 843-44. Clearly, the Idaho legislature'S
legislature's choice in Idaho
Code § 56-218, of making one spouse's estate liable for medical expenses paid on behalf of the
other is not unusual or unprecedented. Indeed, it only makes sense that the couple's money
should be used first for their own care, and only after Medicaid is reimbursed, can the remainder
be distributed to the heirs. 5

V.
IDAHO LAW CLEARLY PROVIDES FOR RECOVERY IN
THIS CASE.
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) permits the Department to recover from the estate of the spouse
of a Medicaid recipient:
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistan4::e
assistan4;:e
,my,
maybe recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if
iflmy,
for such aid paid to either or both;

5 While the heirs sometimes complain that Medicaid recovery takes their inheritance, this program benefits them
as well as the needy couple. Without the Medicaid program, the couple would have to liquidate their assets to pay for
their own care. Medicaid rates are substantially lower than private pay medical rates, and therefore, the heirs are more
likely to have something left for their inheritance because their decedent was a Medicaid recipient.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 11

O:\Appellan4s Brief.wpd
O:\Appellanls

000535

Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added). This law, on its face, is not limited to the community
or other property the Medicaid recipient owned at death. Indeed, there is no limitation of any
kind on what property of the spouse's estate is subject to recovery. Where a statute is.
unambiguous, there is no need for construction. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State

Dept. of
Agriculture, 143 Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d 632, 634 (2006).
ofAgriculture,
Even though federal Medicaid law, as discussed above, ignores state community property
principles, by rule the Department recovers only property which had been community property or
jointly held property after October 1, 1993 (the effective date of OBRA '93). IDAPA
16.03.09.900.20 states:

20. Limitations on Estate Claims.

***

A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the
assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993, community
property, or the deceased participant's share ofthe separate property, and jointly
owned property. * * *
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). However, the rules also make it clear that transfer of
property between spouses will not eliminate the Department's right of recovery. IDAPA
16.03.09.900.24 states:

24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement.
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate ofthe deceased
participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or
other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate consideration. (3-30-07)
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (underline added). The Department's rules have the same force and
615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004).
effect as law. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615,619,84
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Clearly, Idaho law penn
its the Department's claim in this estate and the claim was
pennits
required to be allowed against the estate.
VI.
IDAHO'S SPOUSAL RECOVERY LAW IS NOT
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.
State Law Will Only Be Preempted Where Congress Intends to Occupy an Entire Field of
Law or Where a State Law Directly Conflicts with Federal Law.
A.

The Magistrate did not use the terms "preempted" or "preemption." However, since, as
discussed above, Idaho law unambiguously permits the Department's claim and recovery in this
case, he could only have concluded that Idaho law is preempted by federal law. The (~ourt stated:
The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include transfers of
property made by a Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim
against the estate of a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only
recover against property in which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time
of her death. Martha Perry conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during
her lifetime. There was no joint tenancy, right of survivorship or "other
arrangement" that would have conveyed any interest in this property to Martha at
George Perry's death. The Department may not recover Medicaid benefits paid to
Martha from the proceeds of the sale of this property.
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 6. Likewise, the case of Estate ofBarg,
of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn.
2008), relied upon by the Magistrate, was based on federal preemption of a portion of
Minnesota's spousal recovery law. Therefore, the Magistrate must have concluded that Idaho
Code § 56-218(1) is preempted by federal law.
When it comes to preemption, however, the question is not what "[t]he federal statutory
estate'"'" includes, but whether federal law directly conflicts with state law. It does
definition of' estate
not.
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Federal law only preempts state law where Congress has evidenced an intent to
toO occupy a
given field or where state law is in direct conflict with federal law:
[S]tate law can be pre-empted in either of two general ways. If
Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling
within that field is pre-empted. If Congress has not entirely displaced state
regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent
it actually conflicts with federal law
law,, that is, when it is impossible to compbl
with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.

Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 377, 913 P.2d 1141, 1147
(1996), quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S.Ct. 615, 621, 78
L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). Therefore, to show that Idaho Code § 56-218 is invalid, the personal
representative must show that either Congress intended to occupy the entire field, or that the
Idaho statute directly conflicts with the application of federal law.
That Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field is abundantly clear. Congress
intended that the states enact their own legislation governing estate recovery. The Mt:dicaid law
specifically requires the states to establish estate recovery programs:
[T]he State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the
following individuals:

** ** *
*

In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or
older when the individual received such medical assistance, the State
shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate" but only
for medical assistance consisting of
of(i)
nursing facility services, home and
community-based services, and related hospital and prescription
drug services, or
(ii)
at the option of the State, any items or services:
under the State plan.
(B)
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,~,

42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (underline added). Moreover, as shown, above, certain parts of the
Medicaid program are optional and may be adopted, or not, as the State desires. Such provisions
require enabling legislation or rule making by the State.
Idaho Code § 56-218 appropriately implements the estate recovery mandate of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1396p. For the personal representative to show that section 56-218 is preempted, she must
show that the Idaho statute directly conflicts with federal law. This she cannot do.

B.

The Federal Statute Anticipates Recovery of Assets Transferred to a Surviving Spouse.
The federal law, 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(l), defines what payments are recoverable and

does not restrict from whom recovery is made. Medicaid does much more than pay for nursing
care for the elderly poor. It also pays for medical care for families receiving temporary support,
and for the blind and disabled under the AABD (Aid for the Aged, Blind and Disabled) program.
Funds expended for such care, however, are not recoverable in an estate recovery cast!.
cas(~. Rather,
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) mandates estate recovery only for payments made to certain elderly
persons.
Note the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(I) which restricts what payments may be
recovered (discussion regarding from whom recovery may be made follows):

(b)
Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid
State plan

und{~r

correcth~:
(1)
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correcth~:
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that
the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following
individuals:
(A)
In the case of an individual described in subsection
(a)( l)(B)
nCB) of this section. . ..
(B)
In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or
older when the individual received such medical assistance . . ..
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) (underline added). It is important to realize that the primary purpose of
this section is to define what payments may be recovered, rather than from whom those payments
are recovered.
The Magistrate focused on the language in section 1396p(b)(1 )(B) which requires
recovery "from the individual's estate" and rules that the State cannot reach beyond property
owned by the recipient at death. Order Disallowing Claim, pp. 4, 6. This, however, ignores both
the plain language and the context of the statute.
Subsection (b)(4) defines the term "estate" as used in this subsection:
(4)
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect
individualto a deceased individual
(A)
shall include all real and personal property and other
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of
State probate law; and
(B)
may include, at the option of the State (and shall include,
in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), an'~
other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor. heir. or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.

42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Importantly, the individual's estate, for purposes of
section 1396p, goes far beyond traditional concepts of a probate estate6 and includes "'other
assets" of the individual, as well as "assets ... conveyed to a survivor." This is important
because "assets" has a special meaning in Medicaid law. "Assets" is defined in subsection (h) of
section 1396p to include the property of the spouse of the recipient:

6 See also Belshe v. Hope, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 (Cal. App. 1995) ("Estate" for purposes of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p,
must be interpreted broadly, and included the assets of a non-testamentary trust which contained property placed there by
the decedent recipient and which attempted to convey property to decedent's heirs avoiding estate recovery).
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(h)
Definitions
In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1)
The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse,
including any income or resources which the individual or such individual's
actionspouse is entitled to but does not receive because of action
by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(A)
(B)
by a person, including a court or administrative body,
with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or
such individual's spouse, or
(C)
by any person, including any court or administrative
body, acting at the direction or upon the request of the individual or
such individual's spouse.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h) (emphasis added). Thus, for estate recovery purposes, "assets" includes
income and resources of the individual's spouse, including property transferred to the spouse
from the Medicaid recipient.
Therefore, by definition, the estate of the individual, for purposes of section 1396p,
includes the property ofthe spouse. Contrary to the Magistrate's ruling that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p
forbids recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse, this section specifically permits recovery
from the property of the surviving spouse.
While it is true that federal Medicaid law (like all public assistance law) is difficult to
construe unless the entire statute is read in context, a review of section 1396p, alone, reveals the

intent of Congress to view the property of the recipient and the recipient's spouse as the same
and subject to the same limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2), the very next subsection after the
section that defines what payments may be recovered, provides, in part, as follows:
(2)
Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made
only after the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (underline added). Recovery is permitted only after the death ofthe
surviving spouse because the spouse is permitted to possess and use the couple's property during
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 17
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his lifetime. If the State were limited to property in the possession of the recipient at the time of
her death, then why would the State be prohibited from recovering until after the death of the
spouse?
Likewise, subsection (c) of this section imposes a penalty on the recipient for asset
transfers by the recipient's spouse:

(c)

Taking into account certain transfers of assets

(l)(A) In order to meet the requirements of this subsection for purposes
of section 1396a(a)(l8) of this title, the State plan must provide that if an
institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual (or, at the option
of a State, a noninstitutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual)
disposes of assets for less than fair market value on or after the look-back date
specified in subparagraph (B)Ot the individual is ineligible for medical
assistance for services described in subparagraph (C)(i) (or, in the case of a
noninstitutionalized individual, for the services described in subparagraph
(C)(ii» ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (underline added). Again, if the recipient spouse could simply transfer her
assets to her spouse and, thereby, cut off the State's claim to those assets, then it would be
pointless to penalize the recipient for further transfers by the spouse. Instead, however, the
spouse is only permitted to use the couple's property and cannot give it away. This is because
the State has the right to recover from those assets after the death of the recipient and the spouse.
If the spouse is prohibited from giving the couple's property away to avoid the State's claim
during life, why should he be permitted to avoid the State's claim by giving the property away at
death??
Clearly, the very nature of section 1396p is to treat the property of the recipient and the
property of the recipient's spouse as the same for the purposes of estate recovery.

? See also 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c)(2)
1396p(c)(2) (Assets may only be transferred to the spouse or certain other parties having
an interest in the property.
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C.
The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision in the Jackman Case Necessarily Upholds the
Validity ofIdaho Code § 56-218(1).
of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970
In the case of Idaho Department ofHealth

P.2d 6 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld recovery from the estate of the non-Medicaid
spouse. In the Jackman case, just as alleged here, the Medicaid spouse, Hildor, transferred all
her property to her spouse, Lionel. Hildor passed away first and Lionel passed away two weeks
later. Jackman was appointed personal representative of Lionel's estate and the Department filed
an estate recovery claim. The personal representative challenged the Department's claim on
numerous grounds including federal preemption. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld Idaho's
spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definition of estate permitted by federallaw 8 and
adopted by Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b), together with the definition of assets found at 42 U.S.c. §
1396p(h)( 1), validated recovery of property that had, at any time after October 1, 1993, been
community property.
The Jackman decision must be read carefully because of the way it was decide:d. The
final decision is an edited version, altered on re-hearing, of the original decision of the court. It
is helpful to understand the original decision and the reason for the court's alteration on
rehearing. In the court's first decision, the Supreme Court held wholly in favor of the
Department. Upon Petition for Rehearing, the Supreme Court modified its decision because the
effective date of the federal law on which they had relied in their original opinion was after the
date of the couple's marriage settlement agreement. The court, therefore, held that recovery
would be limited to property that had been community property after the effective date of the

842

U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
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federal law, "OBRA 93.,,9 Effectively, the court upheld spousal recovery against the federal
preemption argument, but in the Jackman case, the couple's property had been divided by a
marriage settlement agreement in March, 1993, prior to the effective date of the law:
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the
8..
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8..
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the fed(~ral
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611 (e). Therefore,
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover
the balance ofthe Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true
even though 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l), "other assets" are
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C. § 15-1-20.1..(,l2}.
15-1-20.1..(J2}.
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the
agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate.

Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7,970 P.2d at 9-10 (underline added). The definition of "assets" the
Supreme Court is referring to is that found in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h), discussed above, which at
that time was found in section 1396p(e). Therefore, what the Court was referring to, was a
definition where "assets," for purposes of estate recovery, included the assets ofthe spouse and
assets a spouse divests herself of, such as by signing a marriage settlement agreement or a deed.
As noted, above, in Jackman, the court altered its decision because it determined the
transfer of assets from Hildor to Lionel occurred prior to the enactment of OBRA '93 which
included both 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h). The court remanded the
matter for a detennination of what community property the parties had acquired since their
marriage settlement agreement. The only reason the Department was not pennitted to recover the

9This limitation is embodied in IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20, limiting spousal recovery to property that had been
community property at any time after October 1,1993.
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property transferred through the marriage settlement agreement was because of the timing: the
OBRJ\ '93.
marriage settlement agreement divided the property before the effective date of OBRi\

Note that because Hildor died first, whatever property she possessed on death necessarily
became the sole and separate property of Lionel before his death. Therefore, even in the
Jackman case the court approved recovery of property that had become the sole and sleparate
property of Lionel.
The Magistrate found Jackman inapplicable and believed it required property to be
community property at the time of death of the Medicaid recipient for recovery to be made. The
Magistrate said:
The case was remanded to the probate court for a determination of whether thl~
Medicaid recipient (Hildor Knudson) had an interest in community property, at
the time of her death, the value of which, the court suggested, could be recovered
from her husband's estate.
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 3. However, this goes too far. In Jackman there was a marriage
settlement agreement that divided the couple's assets before the effective date ofOBRA '93.
This same marriage settlement agreement maintained the separate nature of proceeds from the
separate property:
I.e. § 32-906( 1),
I), this provision maintained the separate
As authorized by I.C.
character of the assets transmuted into Lionel's separate property by the
agreement, as well as "the income, rents, issues, profits, capital gains, and oth~r
earnings or increase" on this separate property. The agreement did not prevent the
accumulation of other community property by Lionel and Hildor after the date of
the agreement and before Hildor's death. The record before us does not disclose
Hildor':~
whether Lionel and Hildor had any community property at the time of Hildor':~
death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that community property may be part of
U.S.e. §
Lionel's estate, and may therefore be part of Hildor's "estate" that 42 U.S.c.
13 96p(b )( 1)(B) and (4) authorizes the Department to recover and apply against the
1396p(b)(1)(B)
balance of the Medicaid payments.
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Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216,970 P.2d at 9 (underline added). The entire issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the Department could recover from Lionel's estate. The only context for
property transfers was the marriage settlement agreement. The only reason the marriage
settlement agreement made a difference was because it was executed prior to October 1, 1993.
The whole upshot of the Supreme Court's decision was that ifthe marriage settlement agreement
had been executed after October 1, 1993, it would have been irrelevant and the Department's
recovery would have been permitted. Accordingly, there was no issue as to property transfers
after October 1, 1993. The question on remand was not what Hildor owned at death, but what
fI~asoning of
community property had accumulated after the marriage settlement agreement. The fI~asoning

the Magistrate swallows up the entire decision of the Court by reference to chance phraseology
that has nothing to do with the issue before the court.
The view of the Magistrate is that property transferred by a Medicaid recipient before
death cannot be recovered. But in Jackman the marriage settlement agreement did exactly that.
Therefore, if the Magistrate is correct, then the Supreme Court's entire discussion ofOBRA '93
and its effective date, the definition of assets in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (now 1396p(h», and the
expanded definition of estate are all superfluous. The Court could just as well have said, "since
there was marriage settlement agreement and the property was transferred before her death, there
can be no recovery."
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VII.
THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF MINNESOTA LAW IN IN RE
ESTATE OF BARGDOES NOT INVALIDATE IDAHO LAW.
The personal representative found her challenge to Idaho law on a Minnesota Icase, In re

Estate ojBarg,
ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). In Barg the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
Minnesota's spousal recovery statute was partially preempted by federal law. As discussed
above, the Jackman case relied on the interaction between Idaho law and federal law.
law . Therefore,
the Barg holding and the Jackman holding, in which each state's highest court was interpreting
its own law, is not necessarily inconsistent.
A.

The Barg Decision Did Not Consider the Decisive Issue in Jackman.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Jackman, found 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)'O significant in

their analysis. The original decision stated the following:
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as
well as from the estate of the surviving spouse. The federal definition of asset is
significant. Federal law includes within the recipient's estate "all real and
personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate ..."
... " and
"any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had
..... " 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); I.C. §
any legal title or interest at the time of death ....."
56-218(4). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income and
resources as well as Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not
affect the status ofthe assets that federal law considers to be part of the recipient's
estate because the definition of assets includes "income or resources which the:
individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because
of action by a person ... with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf ofthe
individual or such individual's spouse." 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(l)(B)'
1396p(e)(1)(Bl. Jackman's
signing of the agreement constituted action by a person on behalf of Hildor anll
Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the Department from recovering the balance
of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate.

l~OW 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1).
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Jackman, original opinion, p. 4 (Exhibit C to Memorandum in Support of Petition for
Allowance) (underline added). On rehearing, the Supreme Court did not retreat from their
original holding except to recognize the marriage settlement agreement was executed before the
I 396p(h)(l)(B) came into effect:
"assets" definition of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1)(B)
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8,
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the fed~:ral
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e).
13611(e) . Therefore,
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true
even though 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l),
1396p(e)(1), "other assets" are
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.e. § 15-1-201(1~.
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the
agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate.

Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7,970 P.2d at 9-10 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court didn't
1396p(h)(1). In fact, by necessary implication, it
change its mind about the effect of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l).

ofassets
stated that with the definition of
assets contained in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(I) the transferred
assets would have been part of Hildor's estate, and therefore, subject to recovery.
This is the same reasoning used by the North Dakota Supreme Court in In re Estate of

Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000):
Our inquiry, therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz had "real and
personal property and other assets in which [he] had any legal title or interest at
the time of death, including such assets conveyed" to Verna Wirtz through "other
arrangement."
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1), asset is defined as:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all incom~
(l)
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including
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any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse
actionis entitled to but does not receive because of action
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such
indi vidual's spouse, or
individual's
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.
ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970
See Idaho Department ofHealth
(ld.1998) (concluding the definition does not apply to assets disposed of
P.2d 6, 9 (Id.1998)
on or before August 10, 1993).
Thus, the department can assert a claim against real or personal proper~
and other assets in which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other interest at his
death, including income and assets conveyed through "other arrangement."
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885 (underline added). The North Dakota Supreme Court then went on to
decide what the terms "interest" and "other arrangement" mean in the federal statute and
concluded:
We conclude consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light
of the Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a
legislative intention to allow states to trace the assets ofrecipients
of recipients ofmedical
of medical
assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse
dies.
We hold any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Vema Wirtz before
Clarence Wirtz's death and traceable to her estate are subject to the department's
recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all property ever
ofJobe, 590 N.
W .2d 162, 166
N.W.2d
held by either party during the marriage. Cf Estate ofJobe,
(Minn.Ct.App.1999). 42 V.S.c.
U.S.c. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in which
the deceased recipient once held an interest will be traced. It does not provide that
separately owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in which the deceased
recipient never held an interest, are subject to the department's claim for recovery.
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886 (italics in original; underline added).
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Barg, did not even consider the effect of this important
definition of "assets" found critical in both Jackman and Wirtz. It cannot be said that if the
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Minnesota Supreme Court had been informed of this definition it might not have reached the
same conclusion as the Idaho and North Dakota Supreme Courts.

8.

The State of Minnesota Has Already Amended its Law to Overcome the Barg Holding.
The Barg decision is an anomaly with limited application. It runs directly contrary to

other state supreme court decisions such as Jackman and Wirtz. It is understandable, then, that
Minnesota has already amended its state law to overcome the holding of its supreme (:ourt in
Barg. Without objection, the Department provided a copy of changes made to Minnesota law in

2009 (Exhibit F to its Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim), for the
express purpose of remedying the Barg decision. This legislation makes it clear that a Medicaid
recipient's marital assets, at death, include assets jointly owned at any time during marriage, even
when transferred by the Medicaid spouse to the non-Medicaid spouse. This is exactly the effect
ofthe Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Jackman.
Obviously, if Minnesota can overrule Barg by a statutory change, it is state law and not
federal law, per se, that creates the problem. The Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of
Idaho's existing law already overcomes the Barg decision. Like the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Wirtz, the Idaho Supreme Court has already held that Idaho's law permits recovery
under the circumstances ofthis case. These holdings are not necessarily inconsistent with Barg.
The Barg decision has limited application to Minnesota and has already been made irrelevant by
a change in Minnesota law.
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VIII.
EVEN IF THE BARG CASE WERE APPLIED IN IDAHO,
THE DEPARTMENT MUST STILL RECOVER BECAUSE
THE GIFT OF THE DECEDENT TO HIMSELF WAS
INVALID.
If Barg is to be the law in Idaho, it is critical to detennine what property was transferred
by the Medicaid recipient to her spouse. In the court below, the Department challengl~d
challengl~d the
validity ofthe Quitclaim Deed by which the decedent purported to convey the Medicaid
recipient's real property to himself, through a power of attorney. The Magistrate made no
findings of fact in this regard, but concluded, apparently as a matter of law, that the transfer was
valid. In a footnote, the court said:
The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power of attorney from
Martha and that he had the authority to transfer the property to himself.
Order Disallowing Claim, p. I, fn 1.
A.
As a Matter of Law. the Power of Attorney Did Not Authorize the Decedent to Make a
Gift to Himself.
The Medicaid recipient, Martha Perry, brought the real property of this estate into the
marriage as her sole and separate property. Exhibit A to Memorandum in Support of Petition for
Allowance of Claim. She later transferred the property to herself and to George, granting George
an interest in the property. Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of
Claim. George later transferred Martha's interest to himself. Exhibit A to Affidavit of Barbara
K. McCormick. However, the transfer of Martha's interest to George, was not performed by
Martha, but by George using his power of attorney for Martha. See id. The power of attorney,
however, contains no provision permitting gifting, much less, self-gifting. Exhibit G to
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Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim. Indeed, the power of attorney
includes some language clearly prohibiting self dealing. See Exhibit G, to Memorandum in
Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim,

~~

G and H. George's gift to himself was, therefore,

invalid, and failed to eliminate Martha's interest in the real property. While this failure is
irrelevant under Jackman, it is important ifthe court follows Barg.
It is black-letter law that a power of attorney does not grant authority to make gifts absent

Am . Jur. 2d
an express provision in the power of attorney granting that power. As stated in 3 Am"
mus1l be
Agency § 87, "The authority of an agent to make a gift on behalf ofthe principal must
express." Courts have uniformly supported this view. In Kunewa v. Joshua, 83 Hawaii 65, 924
(Haw.Ct.App.1996), the court explained:
P.2d 559, 565 (Haw.Ct.App.l996),
Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the absence of express written
authorization, an agent may not gratuitously convey the principal's property to
(Fla.App.1978) (agent
himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768 (Fla.App.l978)
exceeded authority in appropriating for agent's own use funds in decedent
principal's checking account in the absence of clear language to that effect in the
power of attorney), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla.1979); In re Estate of
DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253,352 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.1974) (power of
attorney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held to encompass an
authorization to attorney-in-fact to make gift to himself of principal's property;
such a gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and self-dealing, a
presumption which can be overcome only with the clearest showing of principal's
A.D.2d 589, 363 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975).
intent to make the gift), aff'd,
aJ!'d, 47 AD.2d

ofEstate ofCrabtree,
of Crabtree, 550 N.W.2d
Kunewa, 83 Hawaii at 71,924 P.2d at 565; see also Matter ofEstate
168 (Iowa, 1996) (absent express grant in power of attorney, of power to make gift,
attorney-in-fact did not have that power); Aiello v. Clark, 680 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska 1984) (in
the absence of express authority to make a gift, none may be made); Cheloha v. Cheloha, 255
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Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291 (1998) (no gift may be made by an attorney in fact to himse:lfunless
the power to make such a gift is expressly granted in the instrument itself).
Idaho law is consistent with these pronouncements. In Idaho, powers of attorney are
strictly construed not to authorize acts beyond those specified. Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47
Idaho 306, 274 P. 800 (1929); accord Eaton v. McWilliams, 52 Idaho 145, 12 P.2d 259 (1932).
In the case of Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348, 210 P. 1003 (1922), the
Idaho Supreme Court said:
... [I]f an agent makes any profit in the course of his agency because of his faillure
to inform his principal of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of due
diligence he should have ascertained for his principal, the profits of such
transaction, as a matter oflaw, will belong exclusively to the agent's principal.
The law guards the fiduciary relation, which the relation of principal and agent is,
with jealous care. It seeks to prevent the possibility of a conflict between duty and
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall work with an eye single to th{~
interest of his principal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his principal,
either for himself or for others.
Jensen, 36 Idaho at _,210 P. at 1005 (underline added).
Likewise, Idaho Code § 32-912 requires an "express power of attorney" for one spouse to
conveyor encumber community property:
32-912. Control of community property. - Either the husband or the
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and
either may bind the community property by contract, excWt that neither the
husband nor wife may sell,
sell. conveyor encumber the community real estate unless
the other joins in executing the sale agreement. deed or other instrument of
conveyance by which the real estate is sold,
sold. conveyed or encumbered, and any
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the
spouse who did not so consent; provided,
provided. however,
however. that the husband or wife m~
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell,
sell.
conveyor encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds,
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in conformity
herewith are hereby validated.
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Idaho Code § 32-912 (emphasis added). I I The title company may have recognized this defect
when it required the signature of Martha on the closing statement when the personal
representative sold the real property. 12 See Exhibit D to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick.
The term "express power of attorney" means more than a general power of attorney.
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, defines "express" as follows:
Clear; definite; explicit; plain; direct; unmistakable; not dubious or ambiguous.
Declared in terms; set forth in words. Directly and distinctly stated. Made known
distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference. Manifested by direct and
appropriate language as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.
The word is usually contrasted with "implied."
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition (citation omitted). There is no express language in the power
of attorney at issue. At best, the authority to make gifts at all, much less to oneself, is implied,
not express.
Therefore, even ifthe court were to find that Barg were controlling law in Idaho, the
estate is still subject to the Department's claim: The deed George executed conveying Martha's
interest in the property to himself, using his power of attorney for Martha, is ineffective to
extinguish Martha's interest in the real property.

liThe Uniform Power of Attorney Act, adopted in 2008, was not in effect at the time of the transft:r of Martha's
interest to George, but it also includes the requirement for an express grant of authority to make a gift of the principle's
principle'S
lS-12-201(l)(b), (c).
property. Idaho Code 15-12-201(l)(b),

*

12Barbara K McCormick signed not only as personal representative for George's estate, but also as attorney in
fact for Martha.
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The Magistrate Failed to Make Any Findings of Fact That Could Support the Personal
Representative's Argument ofInterspousal Agency.

B.

The personal representative argued before the magistrate that there was an exception to
the clear law requiring an express authorization in a power of attorney to make gifts to oneself.
See Reply Memorandum in Support ofthe Personal Representative's Objection to Department of

Health and Welfare's Petition for Allowance of Claim, section D. However, if this argument was
accepted by the court, it would have required findings of fact that the circumstances under which
such "interspousal agency" could be found are present. No evidence was presented, and
therefore, the court could, at best, make inferences from the documents and facts in the record.
Still, such findings would be required to support such a ruling.
ofEstate ofSpencer,
ofSpencer, 106 Idaho 316, 320, 678 P
.2d ]l08,
08, 112
P.2d
As set forth in the Matter ofEstate

(Idaho App., 1984)
] 984)
Only where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete
understanding of the material issues and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning
will the absence of findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings.
Estate ofSpencer,
of Spencer, 106 Idaho at 320, 678 P.2d at 112 (citations omitted). In this case, the

Magistrate failed to make any findings of fact upon which to base its ruling that gifting was
authorized by the power of attorney. Therefore, even if Barg is to apply to this case, and even if
the gift isn't invalid as a matter oflaw, the matter must still be remanded for findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
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IX.
ATTORNEY FEES
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding
or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Idaho Code § 12-117 (underline added). Idaho Code § 56-218(1) clearly and unambiguously
permits the Department's claim in this estate. The personal representative has advanced an
erroneous interpretation of an unambiguous statute. The Barg case relied upon by the personal
representative is clearly not the law in Idaho. The court in Barg failed to even consider the
critical federal definition of assets the Idaho Supreme Court found important in Jackman. The
personal representative, in disallowing the Department's claim, has acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law and the Department should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION

1.

Did the Magistrate err in determining that the general power of attorney held by

George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha Perry's real prop1erty?
Yes. As a matter of law, the power of attorney, lacking any express authority to make
eonvey Martha
gifts, or gifts to oneself, is insufficient to have given the decedent authority to convey
Perry's real property to himself. The Magistrate made no findings of facts that could in any way
support the personal representative's theory of "interspousal agency."
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''
2.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code § 56
56-

218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of George Peny?
Yes. Idaho Code § 56-218 unambiguously pennits the Department's claim against this
estate.

3.

Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p as

preempting application of Idaho Code § 56-218?
Yes. The Idaho Supreme Court has already overruled similar preemption claims in
Jackman, and pennitted the Department to recover from the estate of the spouse in cases such as
this. The North Dakota Supreme Court in Wirtz reached the same conclusion. The Minnesota

Supreme Court in Barg, relied upon by the Magistrate, did not consider the definition of "assets"
found important in Jackman and Wirtz.

4.

Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding in

Idaho Department ofHealth
ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to the facts of this

case?
Yes. The Magistrate's holding that assets transferred from the Medicaid recipient to her
spouse cannot be recovered ignores the entire underlying reasoning and holding in Jackman.

5.

Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

Yes. There is no reasonable basis in fact or law for the disallowance of the Department's
claim in this estate.
DATED this 8 day of July, 2010,

t8/~L ~

W.
w. CO~CAiTWRIGHT
CA~TWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
PETER C SISSON
SISSON & SISSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE ID 83702
DATED this ~ day of July, 2010.
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature ofthe Case
The Personal Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry, Barbara McConnick
("PR"), agrees with the Department's statement of the Nature of the Case as far as it goes. This
1396p{b)) and consideration of
case requires interpretation of a federal statute (42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b))
whether the Department's application ofIdaho law (LC. § 56-218) violates federal law and is
therefore preempted by federal law. Federal law requires the states to make claims against the
probate estates of Medicaid recipients to recovery correctly paid benefits. Federal law also
allows the states to expand the definition of "estate" to include non-probate assets owned by a
recipient at the time of the recipient's death. Idaho has chosen this expanded definition of
"estate." LC. § 56-218(4). Nothing in the federal medical assistance statutes authorizes a direct
medical assistance estate claim against the estate of any person other than the recipient of
benefits.
Under federal law, the states are permitted to pull back into a recipient's estate any
property or other assets in which the recipient held a legal title or interest at the time of the
recipient's death (to the extent ofthe interest). Idaho's estate recovery statute, I.c. § 56-218,
requires that a medical assistance claim be filed against the estate of a deceased recipient, but
also requires that a claim be asserted against the estate of a surviving spouse who neve:r received
medical assistance benefits. The Department's interpretation and application ofLC. § 56-218 in
this estate recovery claim conflicts with federal law because the Department asserts a elaim
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against George's estate which does not contain any assets in which Martha held an interest at the
time of her death.
Course of Proceedings
The PR restates the course of proceedings comprehensively as follows.
Date
2/25/2009
212512009
3/18/2009
3/1812009
3/19/2009
3/1912009
3/19/2009
3/1912009
4/7/2009
41712009
4/13/2009
512812009
5/28/2009
6/4/2009
6/1112009
6/11/2009
6/25/2009
612512009
1112712009
11127/2009
118/2010
11812010

~

Event
George Perry died testate
Application for Informal Probate of Will filed
Personal Representative appointed
Letters Testamentary signed a2pointing
appointing Barbara McCormick as PR
Information to Heirs and Devisees (giving Department notice)
Department filed estate recovery claim against Estate
90 day inventory served identifying all property
propert~ as George's separate property
PR filed Notice of Disallowance of Claim
Department Petitioned for Allowance of Claim
PR filed Objection to Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim
PR filed Affidavit and Memo in Support ofPR's Objection to Dept's
De2t's Claim
Telephonic Status Conference with Judge Bieter. Court and parties agree that
the Department be given three (3) weeks to file Memorandum in Support of
Petition for Allowance and Personal Representative be given two (2) weeks
after that to file Re21y
2/26/2010
Reply Brief prior to hearing set for 2126/2010
Department filed Memorandum in Support
Snpport of Petition for Allowance ~
PR filed Reply Brief in Opposition to Petition for Allowance
Hearing On Petition for Allowance of Claim before The Honorable J. Bieter

==
~
I

1129/2010
112912010
2119/2010
2/19/2010
2/26/2010
2/2612010
3/10/2010
3/18/2010
3/1812010
5/3/2010

Magistrate issued Order Disallowing Claim

Department filed Notice of Al'i'eal
Appeal to District Court
Martha Perry died

~

Statement of Facts
The PR agrees with the Department's Statement of Facts, aside from the use of the word
"purported" in reference to the 2006 quit claim deed. The PR respectfully refers the Court to the
Affidavit of Barbara McCormick and the exhibits attached thereto, for a more complete and
detailed rendition of the facts. Since this appeal was filed, Martha died on May 3,2010. The
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only property that Martha owned at the time of her death was one financial account located at
Depa.rtment on
Wells Fargo. The balance of this Wells Fargo checking account was paid to the Department
August 13,2010.

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL
1. Whether the PR is entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b)(
5) and I.e. § 12-117, the PR claims attorney fees on appeal. The
35(b)(5)
Department's decision to appeal the Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim lacks any reasonable
56basis in fact or in law. The law does not support the Department's manner of applying I.C. § 56
218 and making a claim against property in which the Medicaid recipient has no title or interest
at the time of her death. If this was not apparent prior to this case, the proceedings below made
the law in this area quite clear.
The authorities cited in the briefing before the Magistrate, including but not limited to the
U.S. Solicitor General's amicus brief before the United States Supreme Court in In Re Estate of

Barg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008), the oral argument and The Honorable Christoph(~r
Christoph(~r M.
Bieter's Order Disallowing Claim all support the conclusion that the Department did not have a
reasonable basis in law or fact to bring this appeal. The Department's appeal asserts an
erroneous interpretation of clear, unambiguous federal statutes.
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III. ARGUMENT
A. OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING RECOVERY OF
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS CORRECTLY PAID
i. Statutory Framework.

The Medicaid program is jointly funded with the states as a "cooperative endeavor in
which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in
furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2671,
65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into
state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2(03).
2003). After this,
the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its
own program within the federal requirements, and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services ("CMS"), one of several federal agencies under HHS, administers the program and
ofHealth and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268
approves state plans. Arkansas Dept. ofHealth
(2006).
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider
assets of both husband and wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.C. §
1396r-5(c) (2000). There are several provisions in place to protect the community spouse (the
spouse not applying for Medicaid) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of
assets needed to qualify the applicant for Medicaid. The value of the couple's home is not
included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-.5(c)(5); 42
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u.S.c. § 1382b(a)(1) (2000). The community spouse ofa Medicaid recipient is also
U.S.C.

c~ntitled

to

consider,ed available
an allowance of income and assets designated for his or her needs that is not consider'ed
to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.c. § 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the
recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, to his or
her community spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of
community spouses to contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses
against the accommodation of the community spouse's need for his or her own support.

ii. Federal Medicaid Recovery Provisions.
It is important to understand pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid recovery, to give context
to the post-1993 changes, and because pre-1993 law is the basis for the sole case in Idaho upon

ofHealth and
which the Department relies exclusively for its position - i.e. Idaho Department ofHealth
Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). Prior to amendments adopted in the
("OBRA")
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("0
BRA") of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute stated a
general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to
several exceptions, one of which is relevant here:

No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of
an individual under the State plan may be made, except ---

****

(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he
received such assistance, from his estate.
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1396p(b)(l) (1988). Under this pre-1993
pre-19931aw,
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1)
law, states were allowed, but not required,
to recover Medicaid benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery
would be from the recipient's estate).
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993 2.

As

amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover
Medicaid payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42
U.S.c. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 1993 amendments changed section 1396p(b)
I396p(b) in several ways.
First, the 1993 amendments lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55. Second, the
1993 amendments made recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive.
Third, the amendments added a definition of "estate," which itself had both mandatory and
permissive elements. As amended, the general nonrecovery rule and the relevant exception read
as follows:
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf
seek
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall s.eek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:

****
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or
recovery from the individual's estate * * *. (emphasis added)

J The statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the
U.s.c. § 1396p(b)(2)
1396p(b )(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovel)' before the
recipient's surviving spouse. 42 USc.
death ofa surviving spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate ofa surviving spouse. The
pre-1993 federal law contained no definition of the term "estate."

OBRA of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312, 627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. §
I 396p(b)(1), (4) (2000)).
I396p(b)(I),

2
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''
Id. The amended version of section 1396p(b)(1 )(B) retained the express reference to recovery
from the recipient's estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the
recipient's estate is only permitted after the death ofthe recipient's surviving spouse. 3

As with

the pre-l
pre-1993
993 version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or
reference to, recovery from a surviving spouse's estate.
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery,
with a mandatory provision that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that
authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the scope of probate law:
[T]he term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual
individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option ofthe State * * * any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
o(death (to the extent ofsuch
o(such interest), including such assets conveyed to
the time ofdeath
a survivor, heir, or assign ofthe deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added).
Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of "estate" for Medicaid
recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be
part of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone else on
the recipient's death. For example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right
of survivorship and one dies, the deceased joint tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the
surviving joint tenant and is not part ofthe probate estate. Under the optional expanded
3 "Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the individual's surviving
spouse, if any * * *." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to
the surviving joint tenant. Thus federal statutes place limits on the state's powers to define the
scope of recovery of medical assistance benefits correctly paid. The limits are set forth in 42
ofHealth and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268
U.S.c. § 1396p. Arkansas Dept. ofHealth

(2006).
iii. Idaho's Medicaid Recovery Provisions.

Idaho Code I.C. § 56-218, entitled "RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE" states in pertinent part,
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
fifty
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fiftyfive (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistiillce may
be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any,
for such aid paid to either or both: ...
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which th(;:
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of
such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust or other arrangement. (emphasis added).
Idaho has adopted verbatim the optional federal provision that authorizes states to expand
the definition of "estate" beyond the scope of probate law. I.C. § 56-218(4). Therefore, it
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follows that Idaho is required to abide by the interpretation of the language in the federal statute
that CMS and HHS promulgate. Idaho's Supreme Court
has long followed the rule that the construction given to a statute by the executive
and administrative officers of the State is entitled to great \veight and will be
followed by the courts unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise.
Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 595 P .2d 309 (1979). This same principle holds true with regard
of Health & Famity
F amity Servs. v.
to HHS' s reading of the Medicaid statutes. In Wisconsin Dept ofHealth
Blumer, 534 U.S. 473,497, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002), the Court stated,

The Secretary's position warrants respectful consideration. Cf. United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S.
504,512 (1994) (reliance on Secretary's "significant expertise" particularly
appropriate in the context of "a complex and highly technical regulatory program"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,
43-44 (1981) (Secretary granted "exceptionally broad authority" by Congress
under the Medicaid statute).

'N".
'N.

B. THE DEPARTMENT MUST ACT CONSISTENTLY WITH FEDERAL LA

ofAppeal ofStafford,
of Stafford, 181 P .3d 456, 461 (2008), our Supreme Court
In In the Matter ofAppeal

stated,
Following passage of the MCCA [Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act], the

director of the Department requested the Attorney General's opinion as to whether
legislation was required to implement its provisions. The Attorney General
responded:
While participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary, a state that
chooses to participate must comply with all requirements imposed by the
federal statutory provisions and by regulations promulgated by the Secretary
Services .... (emphasis added).
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services....
One of the requirements imposed on state plans in order to participate in the Medicaid
program and receive federal funding is that the state must "comply with the provisions of [42
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U.S.c. § 1396p] with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of medical assistance correctly
paid, transfers of assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 U.S.c. § 1396a(a)(18) (2000). To
the extent a state statute "seeks to reach further than § 1396p(b)(I), it cannot stand." Bucholtz v.
Belshe, 114 F.3d 923,925 (9 th Cir. 1997). The same holds true for state regulations, such as
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 and 16.03.09.900.24, which cannot reach further than 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)( 1).
1396p(b)(1).
The Department does not have a choice in this matter. It must follow federal law
4
governing Medicaid estate recovery claims
• The Department argues that Idaho law is "clear"
claims4.

and supports its claim against George's estate. Appellant's Brief, p. 11-13. This contention does
not withstand scrutiny. Once mandatory federal restrictions on the scope of estate recovery are
considered, it becomes very clear that the Department's claim asserted in George's estate
violates federal law as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p.
Idaho law currently allows the state to seek recovery for medical assistance paid "from
the individual's estate, and the estate ofthe spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both."

I.e.

§ 56-218(1). The PR has challenged the manner in which the Department applies

56I.e. § 56

218(1), not the language of that statute itself. This is because there may exist some
circumstances in which an asset in which the Medicaid recipient holds an inten~st at d(:ath
dt::ath passes
to the surviving spouse's estate upon the Medicaid spouse's death. In that circumstance, the
asset would be recoverable from the surviving spouse's estate. For example, assets held jointly
with rights of survivorship would fall into this category. So the

actuallanguagt~ used
actuallanguagt~

in I.c. §

4 The Department does recognize that it "is bound by federal law." Department's Memorandum in Support, p. 15,
f.n. 11.
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56-218(1) is not offensive to the federal mandate, only the manner in which the Depmtment has
chosen to exercise estate recovery claims against community spouse estates in Idaho.
In order to be consistent with federal law, the Department's claims against a Medicaid
spouse's estate must be against "assets in which the individual [Medicaid recipient] ha.d any legal
title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of such interest." The Department's claim in
this probate, however, is against assets in which the Medicaid recipient (Martha) has no legal
her death. The Magistrate recognized this core issue in his Order
title or interest at the time of
ofher
Disallowing Claim, p. 3, stating,
Jackman does not directly address the critical question for our case: To what
time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid recipient's
interest in property - any time (after 1993) during the couple's marriage or the
time of the recipient's death. (f.n.
(fn. omitted).
The Magistrate sought an answer from the Department's counsel at the hearing on this
very issue. He asked counsel,
And where does the authority come from that says that the interest in that prop,erty
may be determined at any time in the marriage of these people after '93? What
says that it's not the time that the recipient dies, but it includes a period of timE:
when she had an interest other than - other than at the time of her death?
Tr., p. 25, LL. 21 through p. 26, LL. 3.
The Department's counsel was unable to answer that question. His first response was "I
think I can help that by analogy, Your Honor. And that's if you look at a different section that's
here..."
not part of our case here
... " Tr., p. 26, LL. 4-7. The Court continued to press for an answer to
this question and counsel for the Department remained unable to present one. See Tr., p. 28, LL.
2 through p. 33, LL. 18. Finally, the basis for the Department's position came out. The
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Magistrate stated, "your argument depends on a definition of assets and that's different, you're
arguing, then, than the definition of the estate of the person." Tr. LL. 19-22. Department's
counsel answered "Yes." Tr., p. 33, LL. 23.
The Magistrate stated in his Order Disallowing Claim, p. 4,
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate
because Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate ofa recipient's
spouse; 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of
"estate" and 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(1) says "assets" includes property that a person
transferred to her spouse. The court cannot accept this interpretation.
(emphasis added).
As discussed below, the Magistrate properly ruled in rejecting the Department's argument.
C. FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW

Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). Even when Congress has not chosen
to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre
preempt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law. " Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state
and federal laws is impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
142143,83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when th<::: state law
is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective:s of
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
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D. THE DEPARTMENT'S APPLICATION OF I.C. § 56-218 AND ITS REGULATIONS
CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL LAW AND ARE PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.
i. The Department's Claim, Based On An Erroneous Application Of I.C. § 56-218,
Conflicts With Federal Law.
The Department argues that because I.C. § 56-218 appropriately implements the estate
recovery mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, the PR cannot show that this statute conflicts with
federal law. Appellant's Brief, p. 15. This argument entirely misses the mark. It is the
Department's practice of using I.e. § 56-218 to improperly expand the scope of estate recovery
claims that violates federal law. If the Department applied the language ofI.C . § 56-218
consistently with federal law and only made claims against assets in which the Medicaid
recipient had an interest in at death, there would be no conflict. But conflict preemption occurs
when the state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution ofthe full purposes and
objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581
(1941). Compliance with both state and federal law is impossible when the Department makes
overly broad estate recovery claims based on I.C. § 56-218 that violate federal law.
of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132
In 1998, our Supreme Court in Idaho Department ofHealth

Idaho 213, 215, 970 P.2d 6,8-10 (1998), held that the version ofI.C. § 56-218 then in effect
(pre-OBRA 1993) authorized the Department to recover against the surviving spouse's estate but
expressly recognized that such recovery was limited by federal law to assets that were part of the
Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under state probate law. The Jackman Court recognized
that federal law does preempt the authority granted to the Department by I.e. § 56-218, and held
that the only asset that might be recoverable from the surviving spouse's estate was community
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property accumulated by the couple after the execution of their marriage settlement agreement.
Id. at 215-216. Our Supreme Court has already recognized, therefore, that federal law does

preempt in the area of Medicaid recovery claims - i.e. with respect to I.C. § 56-218. The
Department argues that estate recovery is really controlled by state law. Appellant's Brief, p. 11
1112. Our Supreme Court in Jackman and Stafford, as well as the plethora of federal authority
cited supra, completely rebuts this contention.
ii. The Department's Regulations Conflict With Federal Law.

As discussed infra, the Department has misread and misapplied Jackman for over a
decade. Unfortunately, what ensued after the Jackman decision in 1998 was that the Department
enacted rules, adopted policies and made claims in married couple Medicaid cases as if the Court
had ruled on the very issue it explicitly did not rule upon. Simply because the Department enacts
regulations on its misreading of the Jackman decision and no one objects does not melID those
regulations are consistent with federal law.
In Jackman, the Court held that the community spouse's separate property, including the
community property transmuted by agreement, was not part of the Medicaid recipient's estate

and not subject to the Department's recovery claim. Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-217. The
Department cites IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24, its regulation allowing it to void a marriagt:
settlement agreement, as support that Idaho law controls, not federal law. Appellant's Brief, p.
12. This regulation proves nothing except that the Department enacted an overly broad
regulation that violates federal law based on an erroneous reading of Jackman and that this
regulation has gone unchallenged.
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IDAP A 16.03.09.900.20 as support for its position stating, "By
The Department also cites IDAPA
rule, the Department makes its recovery from property in which the Medicaid jpouse had an

interest at some point in the past. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20." (emphasis added). !d. This
regulation is just as offensive as the statute in Minnesota that was struck down by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in In Re Estate ofBarg,
ofBarg, 752 N.W.
N. W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) because it was
inconsistent with federallaw 5 Barg is discussed in detail in the next section of this brief.

E. A RECENT MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISION AND TH~=
PROCEDURAL AFTERMATH OF THAT DECISION ARE DIRECTLY ON POINT
AND SUPPORT AFFIRMING THE MAGISTRATE'S ORDER.
of Barg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) is the latest state court decision on
In Re Estate ofBarg,
point and is on all fours with the instant case. The Court's analysis in Barg provides an in-depth
and exhaustive review of other state court cases analyzing the issue. Reading Barg in its entirety
is very instructive because Minnesota's department of health and welfare made the very same
argument in support of its recovery action as the Department makes in this action.

Thl~

facts of

Barg, when pared down to the essentials, are essentially the same facts present in this probate.
For the Court's convenience, the PR has appended a complete copy of Barg to this Memorandum
as Appendix 1.
In Barg, supra at 73-74, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a provision ofthe
state's Medicaid estate recovery statute that allowed recovery from the estate of a surviving

5 The offending Minnesota statute allowed recovery against assets of the estate "that were marital property or jointly
owned property at any time during the marriage." Both IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 and 16.03.09.900.20 are in conflict
with federal law and are therefore preempted by it. These regulations must be repealed or amended to comport with
clear federal mandate that the Department may only recover against resources in which the Medicaid recipient had
an interest in at death.
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spouse for any assets jointly owned by the couple at any point during their marriage. In that
case, Mrs. Barg transferred her partial interest in the couple's home to her husband when she
entered a nursing home. She died without leaving a probate estate and her husband died soon
thereafter. The county then sought recovery against Mr. Barg's estate for the amount of
Medicaid benefits paid out on behalf of Mrs. Barg. The Barg Court determined that the county
could recover only from assets that the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest in at the: time of
her death. Mrs. Barg had no legal interest in any property when she died because she had
transferred her interests to her husband while she was alive. Therefore, the Court ruled that the
county had no way to seek recovery from Mr. Barg's estate6 • Id.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota discussed 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) in depth. This
discussion is directly applicable to the instant case because Idaho has adopted the federal
I.e. § 56-21S.
56-218. In discussing the statutes at issm:
language in that statute verbatim in I.C.
issut: the Court

addressed and rejected the state's argument that the "other arrangement" phrase opened the door
for the broader recovery allowed under Minnesota's statute. The Court stated in pertinent part,
We turn to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a
surviving spouse's estate allowed under Minnesota law is consistent: with
Minn.Stat.
federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.
Stat. § 2568.15
256B.15 allows the state to recover
from a surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were
marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage. "
(Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority
does not conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section
1396p(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993 amendments were intended to
expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this argument for
6 These are the same facts present in the instant case. Martha transferred her interest in the couple's horne
home to her
husband in 2006, prior to applying for Medicaid benefits. She retained no legal interest in that real property, nor in
the proceeds from the sale of that real property, which are the only assets that make up her husband's estate.
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broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with
the dual goals of federal law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance
available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting community spouses firom
pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section
l396p(b)(1) allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section
1396p(b)(I)
1396p(b)(4) allows expansion ofthe estate only to include assets in which the
1396p(b)(4)
recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage"
recovery allowed by subdivision 2 is preempted.
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favorilllg
the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its language.
preSignificantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre
1993 federal law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of
assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but transferred by the
death ....
recipient spouse prior to her death....
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional
definition of "estate" allows inclusion of
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust,
or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further
describes the assets that a state may include in this expanded estate. The clause
describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are
"conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers back to the immediately
preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any
legal title or interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to
whom "such" assets may have been conveyed--a "survivor, heir, or assign ofthe
of the
deceased individual." [d. (emphasis added). And finally, the clause describes
-several methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place -
"through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust,
or other arrangement." !d.
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient
having a legal interest at the time of death. When we construe a federal statute we
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"'must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used." Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To
read "other arrangement" to include a lifetime transfer would be to read the words
"at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other arrangement"
cannot include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context.
"[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of examples of conveyances that occur at the:
time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign
of the deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid
recipient, must have died for the conveyance to occur. A recipient cannot have
heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the
deceased" during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language
and its context, the conclusion of the Wirtz court that" other arrangement" is
sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable.

We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the:
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did
not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from
the" estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to deatl!
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to
def"mition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the
expand the dermition
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold
that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent th;nt it
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been SUbject to
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis
added)
/d. at 68-71.
The State of Minnesota filed a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking to
overturn the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Barg. In May of 2009, the U.S. Solicitor
General submitted an amicus curiae brief authored by not only that office but joined by the
attorneys from the Department ofHHS in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's order inviting
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the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. This is the most recent legal
briefing by HHS on the issue. The United States' brief examines and rejects each and every

argument posited by the State of Minnesota seeking to expand Medicaid estate recovery beyond
that allowed by federal law. For the Court's convenience, the entire United States Solicitor
General's amicus curiae brief is appended hereto as Appendix 2.
The import of the United States' briefing in this matter cannot be overemphasized. The
legal positions taken in that brief represent HHS's interpretations of federal law. CMS, as noted
above, is governed by HHS. By accepting federal support for its Medicaid program, Idaho is
legally obligated to abide by HHS/CMS interpretations of federal Medicaid law. Congress has
extended HHS extremely broad authority in the Medicaid area. Blumer, supra.
In its 2009 briefing, HHS expressly rejects the interpretation and application that the
Department relies upon in using I.C. § 56-218 to support the claim made against the Estate of
George Perry. The United States/HHS in Barg, supra at p. 8-9, stated in pertinent part,
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision is correct and does not warrant
further review. The federal Medicaid Act permits recovery of correctly paid
reCipient's surviving spouse, but limits that
benefits from the estate of the recipient's
recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest alt
the time of her death ...
A. The Decision Of The Minnesota Supreme Court Is Correct

1. The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly concluded that the
Medicaid Act forbids petitioner from seeking to recover correctly paid
benefits from assets in which the Medicaid recipient had no legal in.terest
interest at
the time of her death.
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...
· .. the Medicaid Act, which permits recovery only after the death of
the recipient's surviving spouse7, 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(2), authorizes a StatE~ to
file a reimbursement claim against the surviving spouse's estate, !ID to the
value of any assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the
time of her death.
The Minnesota estate-recovery law exceeds the scope of that
authorization. It permits the State to recover from a surviving spouse's
estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or
jointly owned property at any time during the marriage, "Minn.
" Minn. Stat. Ann. §
256B.15, subd. 2 (2007) (emphasis added), without regard to whether the
recipient retained an interest in the assets at the time of her death. Becau:se a
State may not recover correctly paid Medicaid benefits except to the extent
authorized by federal law, see 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(1), Minnesota's statute
conflicts with federal law and is therefore preempted. .. . (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court decided not to grant cert and did not review the
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Barg.
F. IDAHO'S APPELLATE COURTS HAVE NOT DECIDED THE ISSUE AT ]JAR
In 2005, our Supreme Court considered the Department's claim filed in the probate of a
a/Kaminsky, 141 Idaho
Medicaid recipient's estate whose spouse survived him. In Re Estate ofKaminsky,

436, 111 P. 3d 121 (2005). Although the issue in Kaminsky was the timeliness of the
Department's claim, the Court did recognize that the Department's recovery claim was properly

made only against the Medicaid recipient's estate. The Court stated,
Only persons with few financial resources qualify for assistance and assistanct:
comes with strings attached. Included in these strings is a right on the part of
the State, pursuant to I.C. § 56-218, to obtain reimbursement of Medicaid
7 The Department argues that because federal estate recovery does not occur until after both spouses die, this
somehow is in conflict with the clear statutory language which mandates that only assets in which the Medicaid
recipient had an interest in at death are subject to recovery. Appellant's Brief, p. 17-18. The Department's
argument finds no support in the statutes. Nor does the argument find support in logic. Permitting recovery after
both spouses have died makes sense because it is only at that time that a final determination can be made as to what,
if any, interest the Medicaid spouse has in any property at her death.
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assistance from the estate of a recipient. Under any reasonable definition,
this right of recovery constitutes a "claim" against the recipient's estate.
(emphasis added).
Id. at 439.

i. The Jackman Decision Is Neither Dispositive Nor Controlling.
As it argued below, the Department's primary argument on appeal is that Idaho
ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998) is dispositive.
Department ofHealth

Appellant's Brief, p. 19-22. A thorough reading of the Department's briefing and the case law
reveals the following: 1) The Department cites and relies heavily upon a Jackman opinion that
Idaho's Supreme Court withdrew. The withdrawn opinion is not Idaho law, has absolutely no
precedentia1 value and is not binding upon this Court or any court; and 2) The Department relies
on dicta in the substituted and published Jackman decision to bootstrap itself into a position of
arguing that somehow the law is settled in this area by the withdrawn Jackman opinion 8 •

The Department also confuses pre-eligibility transfers and look-back rules with post-eligibility rights. From that
confusion it then makes an incorrect assertion regarding the community spouse's right to property post-eligibility.
Appellant's Brief, p. 18. The look back period referred to in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c) applies when one spouse applies
Appel1ant's
for Medicaid. Contrary to the Department's argument, once one spouse qualifies for Medicaid, any resources
belonging to the community spouse are solely the property of that spouse and the community spouse can do
I 396r-5(c)(4).
whatever he wants with them. 42 U.S.C. § I396r-5(c)(4).
8

The import of this statute was discussed in a June 29, 19991etter to Idaho attorney Rod Gere from Rob{:rt Reed,
Chief of the Medicaid Branch of the HHS Division of Medicaid and State Operations for Region X. This letter was
copied to Karl Kurtz, then acting Director of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and stated in part,

Thus, after the eligibility determination any resources belonging to the community spouse are
solely the property of that spouse. That spouse can do whatever he or she wants to with them,
including leaving them, via a will, to particular heirs that do not include the institutionalized
spouse.

See also, April 5, 2000 letter from Ronald Preston, HHS Associate Regional Administrator for Region I stating in
part,
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In its November 2, 1998 Jackman decision, the opinion clearly notes "Substitute Opinion
The Court's Prior Opinion Dated June 16, 1998, Is Hereby Withdrawn." See Department Exhibit
E, p. 2. The Internal Rules Of The Idaho Supreme Court (amended January 3, 2008) found on
the Idaho State Judiciary website under Idaho Court Rules (www.isc.idai1o.gov),
15(f)
(www.isc.idabo.gov), Rule 15(t)
states in full:
(t)
(f) Unpublished Opinions of the Court. At or after the oral conference following
the presentation of oral argument or the submission of the case to the Court on the
briefs, the Court, by unanimous consent of all justices, may determine not to
publish the final opinion of the Court. If an opinion is not published, it may not
be cited as authority or precedent in any court. (emphasis added).

The June 16, 1998 Jackman opinion was never published. The Court withdrew it and
issued a substitute opinion. The June 16, 1998 Jackman opinion may not be cited as authority or
precedent in this Court, or any other for that matter. Yet the Department cited the withdrawn
opinion repeatedly before the Magistrate. Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for
Allowance, p. 13-14. Even more surprisingly, the Department again cites that withdrawn and
unpublished opinion before this Court, even though the PR raised Idaho Supreme Court Rule
15(1) in the briefing below. See PR's Reply Memo, p. 19; Appellant's Brief, p. 23. The
15(t)
Department's continued reliance on and citation to this unpublished opinion is improper. The
withdrawn Jackman opinion carries absolutely no weight on the issue before this COUli and the

Thus, after the month in which an institutionalized spouse is determined eligible for Medicaid, any
Thus.
resources belonging to the community spouse are solely the property of that spouse. That is, the
community spouse can do whatever he or she wants to with them.
The above-cited HHS letters are attached hereto for the Court's convenience as Appendix 3. The
Department errs when it asserts thaI federal law treats the property of the recipient and that ofthe spouse as
the same for purposes of estate recovery. Appellant's Brief, p. 18. Clearly it does not.
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Department is prohibited by rule from citing it as authority or precedent in any Idaho court. It
certainly in no way establishes law in Idaho. Yet the Department would have this Court
speculate as to what our highest Court would have opined had it ruled on the issue at bar,
because of reasoning or rationale in an opinion that the Court never published and withdrew 9 •
That leaves the Department with the November 2, 1998 Jackman decision that was
published to support its position. The fundamental problem with the Departm{mt's
Departmtmt's reliance on
the published Jackman decision is that the Court was dealing with a situation that pre··dated the
OBRA-1993 amendments. The Supreme Court in Jackman stated repeatedly and was very
careful to make sure that its opinion was restricted to the version of federal law applicable to the
controversy before it - in other words the decision was applicable only to cases arising preOBRA 1993. Jackman was explicitly restricted to the facts in that case. The Court made this
very clear when it stated its holding that, "We conclude that section 56-218( 1) of the Idaho Code
(I.e.), as it existed at times applicable to this case, ... " (emphasis added). Jackman, supra at

214.
The Court also stated,

We conclude that this [the post-OBRA 1993] definition of "assets" Js not
applicable to the agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and
Hildor
Hi1dor on March 8, 1993. The defmition of "assets" contained in the 1993
amendments to the federal statute does not apply "with respect to assets
disposed of on or before the date of the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]."
Pub. L. 103-66, § 13611(e). Therefore, it [the post-OBRA 1993 definition qf
"assets"] does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Departmlent
DepartmleDt
to recover the balance of Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property.
app(!al (see last
Either the Department has misstated the holding of the published Jackman decision in its brief on app(:al
four lines of ftrst full paragraph, Appellant's Brief, p. 19) or it is once again improperly citing the unpublished
opinion. In either event, the Department is ascribing a holding to Jackman that the Court simply did not make.
9
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.......

Jackman, supra at 216.

The Department argues that because the Court discussed the OBRA 1993 amendments
that this somehow settles the issue. Appellant's Brief, p. 22. Justice Johnson's statements in
Jackman, upon which the Department so heavily relies, are simply dicta or dictum. "Dicta" is

defined as,
Opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the
specific case before the court. Expressions in the court's opinion which go
beyond the facts before court and therefore are individual views of author of
opinion and not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent. (emphasis
added)
Dictum is defined as follows:
The word is generally used as an abbreviated form of obiter dictum, .. "
Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal
proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the c:ase
in hand are obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication. ... (emphasis
added).
Black's Law Dictionary (6 th ed. 1991).
Justice Johnson's comments on how to interpret the post-OBRA amendments in federal
law were not involved in or necessary to the holding in the published Jackman decision which
was a pre-OBRA 1993 case. The Court says as much - repeatedly. The Department itself
admits as much when it states that, "there was no issue as to property transfers after October 1,
1993" at issue in Jackman and the question before the Jackman Court "was not what Hildor [the
Medicaid recipient] owned at death.

10"

(emphasis added). Appellant's Brief, p. 22.

10 While briefing the matter before the Supreme Court in 1998, the Department also admitted that any
comments the Court might make on the issue of whether the definition of "assets" in the post-OBRA
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The Magistrate also appropriately recognized that Jackman does not control this post-

of I.e. § 56-218. The
OBRA 1993 case and does not support the Department's misapplication ofLe.
following exchange occurred between counsel and the Court.
THE COURT ... I really have been struggling to deal with the definitions
schemes .... I perceive the
of estate and assets in both the state and federal's schemes....
State as saying that Jackman [sic] allows the Court to look at any time, any
property ..
period of time, in which the recipient of benefits had an interest in property..
. . I don't see that Jackman [sic] says that. ... Because I think we've got to
look at the published opinion, not the first one. What does that leave us.
And I don't think it leaves us much.
At least that's how it feels to me, that it doesn't necessarily say to me that
the State may look to any period of time after 1993 that a Medicaid beneficiary,
mak(lS
Medicaid recipient had an interest in property. I don't think it [Jackman] mak(:s
that determination....
determination .... I don't think it [Jackman I makes a determination of
where in that period of time the estate may look at the recipient's interest in
property. (emphasis added).

Tr., p. 12, LL. 18 through p. 13, LL. 25.
No matter how much the Department would like to draw implications or speculate about
the Jackman decision based on the unpublished opinion, the fact remains -Jackman does not

control the outcome of this case. This Court should affirm the Magistrate's Order Disallowing

amendments was applicable in defming the breadth of an estate recovery action was dicta. The Department
stated in its Limited Response to Petition for Rehearing, p. 8 (provided below in the Department's
Exhibits), "While not essential for the court's decision in this case, the property Hildor conveyed to Lionel
to'
through the marriage settlement agreement is certainly part of the definition of "estate" and is subject to
recovery in this case." (emphasis added). The Department admitted in its briefing before the Magistrate
and this Court that it is relying upon an "implication" that it draws from that opinion. Department's M~:mo
in Support, p. 14; Appellant's Brief, p. 24. The Department's perceived "implication" in the Jackman
decision - what is really dicta - is entirely insufficient to establish law in Idaho on the post-OBRA issue
before this Court.
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Claim, and do so unencumbered by the Department's efforts to shackle the Court's analysis with
dicta from the Jackman opinion. 11

G. FEDERAL LAW CONTAINED IN 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(B)(4)(B) IS CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS. THE DEPARTMENT'S POSITION, BASED ON THE GENERAL
DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" IN 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1), IS WITHOUT MERIT.
Federal law says nothing about allowing recovery from assets in which the M(:dicaid
recipient does not have an interest at death12.
bri(!fbefore the U.S.
death 12 . The U.S. Solicitor General's bri(~fbefore
Supreme Court plainly rejects the Department's argument relying on the definition of "assets" in
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) stating,

2.
Petitioner [State of Minnesota] argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on permissible recovery from the estate of the
Medicaid recipient's surviving spouse, because the Act defines the term
"assets" to include "all income and resources of the individual and of the
individual's spouse." 42 U.S.c. 1396p(h)(1). According to petitioner, "[b]y
including resources of both 'the individual' and 'of the individuals spouse' in
the meaning of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's resources
fall within the scope of § 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet. 27.
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statutory definition of
"assets" does encompass resources of both "the individual" (i.e., the
Medicaid recipient) and "The individual's spouse," the particular provision
II Even if the Court concluded that the Jackman opinion's dicta upon which the Department relies was actually a
holding in the case, the Court should still rule in the PR's favor for all the reasons urged by the PRo It is well past
time for Idaho law to be brought into line with mandatory federal statutes which require that estate recovery in Idaho
be limited to recovery against assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest in at death.

12

See e.g., 42 CFR § 433.36(h) entitled "Adjustment and recoveries" states as follows:
(1) The agency may make an adjustment or recovery from funds for Medicaid claims cOITectly paid

for an individual as follows:
any individual who was 65 years of age or older when he or she
ofany
(i)
From the estate of
received Medicaid; and
(ii)
From the estate or upon sale of the property subject to a lien when the individual is
institutionalized as described in paragraph (g)(2) of this section. (emphasis added).
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of the Medicaid Act at issue here refers specifically to any "assets in whict~
whiet~
U.S.c.
the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death." 42 U.S.c.
1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Petitioner's argument fmds it necessary to
rewrite that clause to read "'any * * * assets in which [either or both the
individual and the individual's spouse] had any legal title or interest.'" Pet. 26
(brackets and asterisk in original) (emphasis added). But this editing doe!!
nothing less than make the statute say the opposite of what it says. The plain
reading~~. [3
language of the operative provision of the Act refutes petitioner's reading~~.
4.
Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity about limiting spousal
estate recovery to the value of assets in which the Medicaid recipient had l!
legal interest at the time of death, the presumption against preemption dOles
not come into play, Pet. 28 ... (emphasis added).
U.S. Solicitor amicus brief, p. 10-12.
The Department fails to even mention the U.S. Solicitor General's briefing in its
Appellant's Brief. The PR anticipates it will argue, as it did below, that it is not governed by
HHS's position as expressed in the amicus briefl4 . The U.S. Solicitor General's position is in
fact HHS's (and therefore CMS's) opinion on the issue. As noted above, a federal agE:ncy
interpreting federal statutes is entitled to great weight by the court and HHS has extremely broad
authority in the Medicaid area. Blumer, supra. The Secretary ofHHS in essence spoke through
its counsel in presenting its position before the U.S. Supreme Court in Barg. The U.S. Supreme
Court agreed with the U.S. Solicitor General and refused to grant cert in Barg.

13 (footnote 2 in the original) In describing the operation of the amended estate-recovery provision, the :legislative
history of the 1993 amendments also focused on the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid benefits,
I03d Cong., 115151
rather than the resources of both the individual and his or her spouse. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 213, 103d
Sess. 835 (1993) ("At the option of the State, the estate against [which] '" '" '" recovery is sought may include any
real or personal property or other assets in which the beneficiary had any legal title or interest at the time of death,
including the home.") (emphasis added) (footnote original)

14

II.
See Department's Memo in Support, p. IS, f.n. 11.
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i. Basic Rules Of Statutory Construction Support The Magistrate's Decision.

Applying well-established rules of statutory construction also supports the conclusion
that the Department's position is without merit. Subsection 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)'s
I 396p(b)(4)'s definition
of "estate" is specific to "this subsection." That definition is specific to subsection (b) of 42 U.S.
C. § 1396p. In contrast, subsection 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1)'s
1396p(h)(I)'s definition of "assets" applies
generally to "this section (i.e. all of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p) and is included in the "definitions"
section at the end of the statute. When interpreting statutory definitions and provisions, specific
definitions take precedence over general definitions. See e.g., In re Drainage District No.3, 40
Idaho 549, 553,235 P.2d 895 (1925), citing Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 387. The
more specific definition of "estate" under (b)(4) supplants or takes precedence over the broader,
(h)(l), thereby imposing limits on what is recoverable in
more general definition of assets in (h)(1),
Medicaid recovery actions. The Department's interpretation attempts to superimpose the
general definition of "assets" improperly upon the specific definition of "estate" that applies in
I396p(b)(4)(B). The U.S. Solicitor General explicitly rejected this flawed statutory
42 U.S. C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
analysis. See U.S. Solicitor General amicus brief, supra at 10-12.

ii. The Department Has Misread Or Failed To Read The Barg Opinion.

The Department argues that the Barg court did not consider the definition of the word
"assets" in its opinion. The Department also argues that had the Barg Court simply considered
the definition of "assets", it would have ruled as the court did in In re Estate a/Wirtz, 607
N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000). Appellant's Brief, p. 25-26. In its request for attorney fees on appeal,
the Department reiterates this contention stating, "the court in Barg failed to even consider the
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critical federal definition of assets the Idaho Supreme Court found important in Jackman."
Appellant's Brief, p. 32. Even a cursory reading ofBarg
of Barg rebuts these arguments completely.

a/Wirtz,
The Barg Court discussed and rejected Estate of
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D.2000), and
explicitly addressed and rejected the Department's definition of "assets" argument stating,

... Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed
that authority to extend to assets that were transferred before the death of
the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate of
a/Wirtz,
Wirtz. 607 N.W.2d
882, 885-86 (N.D.2000).
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other
than the Medicaid recipient's estate have construed that authority to reach only
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, that
stah~
is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional statl~
probate law or included in the estate under an expanded definition allowed by the
1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 (limiting
recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probatl~
probatl:!
law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 (same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding th,at
recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid recov(~ry
recov(~ry
statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid
recipient's estate as dermed under state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d
at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of' estate' in [section]
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance ben(~fits
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the time of death'''); see also In re
Estate a/Smith,
ofSmith, No. M2005-0141D-COA-R3-CV,
M2005-0141O-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 11,, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery
intl:!rest in
against estates of surviving spouses have required that recipient had intl~rest
assets at time of death)
....
death)....

As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting
principle requiring an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. .,.
. .. Concluding
that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied
on the Congressional intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking
Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-86. . ..

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 29

000593

We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993
amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied in Wirtz. The plain meaning of
"other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4),
1396p(b)(4), is
arrangements other than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the
....
time of the Medicaid recipient's death
death....
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient didl
not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above. the
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover frOD!
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to deatl!
even~
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further. as recognized by even~
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to
expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, lhe
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold
that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent th~lt it
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time
recoverable. the assets must have been subject to
during the marriage. To be recoverable,
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis
added)
Barg, supra at 68-71. Either the Department failed to read Barg or it has misread it.
iii. Wirtz Is An Anomoly That Should Not Be Followed In Idaho.

The Department argues that Barg is an anomaly with limited application that "runs
contrary to other state supreme court decisions such as Jackman and In re Estate of Wirtz ... "
Appellant's Brief, p. 26. As the Barg Court's comprehensive state survey makl~s clear, Wirtz is
in fact the anomaly. Jackman cannot be cited for the proposition the Department would like to
cite it for (i.e. the unpublished opinion), so that leaves Wirtz standing alone. The Department's
argument inherently recognizes the weakness in the Wirtz court's reasoning because the
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Department does not even assert the same position that the Wirtz court relied upon to justify its
decision - i.e. a tortured reading of the words "other arrangement." See Barg, supra at 70.
Recognizing the clear weight of cogent, well-reasoned authority, the Magistrate rejected
the untenable "asset" definition argument and the Wirtz reasoning. The Magistrate stated,
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate
because Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's
spouse; 42 U.S.C.
U .S.C. 1396p(b)(4)
1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of
"estate" and 42 U.S.c. 1396p(h)(l) says "assets" includes property that a person
transferred to her spouse. The court cannot accept this interpretation.
The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in
Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received
Medicaid benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the
estate of Verna Witz [sic], Clarence's wife. The Wirtz court analyzed the federal
statutory definitions of "estate" and "asset" as quoted above and held that " ... any
assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before Clarence Wiliz's death
are subject to the department's recovery claim." 1d.
Id. at 886. This ruling depends.
however, on an awkward interpretation of the term "other arrangement" in 42
U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dakota court in Wirtz interpreted the "other
arrangement" language independently from the rest of the section. The bulk of
the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an automatic fashion on the
death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfers and life estates.
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of
property of this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in J-he context
ofthe surrounding language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include
transfers of a similar, automatic nature not any possible transfer. (emphasis
original).
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 4-5. The Magistrate went on to note that the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Barg, supra at 71, provided a "more reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory
language." Jd.
The Magistrate concluded.
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The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include transfers made by a
Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim against the estate of a
Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only recover against property in
which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her death. Martha PelTY
conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was
no joint tenancy, right of survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have
conveyed any interest in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The
Department may not recovery Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the
proceeds from the sale of this property.
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 6. The Magistrate was correct and this Court should affinn
that decision.

H. MINNESOTA'S POST -BARG LEGISLATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
DEPARTMENT'S POSITION IN THIS CASE.
The Department argues that because the State of Minnesota has amended its statutes in an
attempt to overcome the Barg holding, this proves that federal law governing estate recovery
claims are actually dictated by state law. Appellant's Brief, p. 26. This argument simply ignores
federal law and ignores the state of the law in Idaho I 5. Federal law limits the scope of estate
recovery to assets in which the Medicaid recipient has an interest in at death. State law then
15 The

Department asserts that it is "obvious" that federal provisions are intended to allow recovery "of the

couple's assets." Appellant's Brief, p. 8-9. It is interesting to note, however, that when the Departmenl

cites and relies on the House Committee Report 42 U.S.c. § I396p(b)(4)
I 396p(b)(4) in its brief, p. 7-9, it underscores a
lot oflanguage but consistently fails to highlight the very language that is key to the resolution of the issue
at bar. The Department ignores the fact that right after the words "estate of the individual or the surviving
spouse" the House Report contains the following language,
The term "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of a deceased individual and all
other assets in which the individual had any legally cognizable title or interest at the time of
death, including assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship,
life estate, living trust or other arrangement. (emphasis added)
Appellant's Brief, p. 8. This is the exact same language the Department ignores when it cites 42 U.S.C. §
II396p(b)(4)
396p(b)(4) and argues that federal law does not control the breadth of estate recovery. Appellant's Brief, p, 8-10.
The Department consistently ignores the language that limits the overly broad approach it has practiced for years
and which violates federal law. This same limiting language appears in I.c. § 56-218(4). The Departm~nt
Departm~nt cannot
prevail by simply ignoring clear, controlling, mandatory federal language.
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enters into the analysis to dett:nnine whether the Medicaid recipient retained an interest in any
assets at death. As the Magistrate found, pursuant to state law Martha retains no interest in the
house sale proceeds that make up George's estate because she conveyed her interest in the home
to George in 2006.
Simply because a state legislature enacts a law in a blatant attempt to skirt mandatory
federal limitations on estate n:covery claims does not mean that the state law will withstand
challenge.

In fact, a recent district court decision out of Minnesota illustrates that courts in that

state continue to uphold the federal limitations contained in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p despite: contrary
state law. See Douglas Coumy
County v. Lindgren (Minn., 7th Jud. Dist., No. 21-CV-09-477, August 4,
2010) (Minnesota court grants summary judgment against the county concluding that the
Minnesota law authorizing recovery against third parties of correctly paid medical assistance
benefits conflicts with, and is thus preempted by, federal Medicaid law.).
Minnesota has not "remedied" anything by its new law. It has only made math~rs
math::rs worse
by clouding marital property law in Minnesota and raising serious practical and constitutional
concerns. The changes in the Minnesota statute impair the separate property rights of all married
individuals, because their property rights will be modified by operation oflaw if one or the other
applies for medical assistance benefits. This obviously discriminates against married individuals
and their spouses on the basis of receipt of federally secured benefits. Further litigation
challenging these statutes is sure to follow in Minnesota. The Minnesota legislature's recent
actions do nothing to change the conclusion that the Department's claim herein violatt::s federal
law.
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I. THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT.
The Department repeatedly invites this Court to engage in a policy debate on the intent
law , contending that the estate recovery laws are not intended to protect an
behind the federal law,
inheritance for children. Appellant's Brief, p. 7-8, 10-11, 17. The Department's opinion of
public policy, Congressional intent, or the purpose of the Medicaid statutes is irrelevant. This
Court need not, indeed may not, engage in policy interpretations when faced with clear,
statutes.,
unambiguous federal statutes.
Analysis of a statute or regulation always begins with the literal language of the
of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197,46
enactment. Friends ofFarm
P.3d 9, 14 (2002) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has established that it
will not look to the legislative intent of a regulation where the express written
language of the regulation is unambiguous. Friends ofFarm
of Farm to Market, 137
Idaho at 197,46 P.3d
P .3d at 14 (citing Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 560 P.2d
P .2d 497
(1977». "Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to
construe the language
. " Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, then a
language,,"
court may not interpret the language to include an unwritten legislative intent.
Stafford, supra at 464-465. As Minnesota's Supreme Court noted in discussing the same types
of policy arguments made by the Department in this case, "[that] argument would take us too far
down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its
language." Barg, supra at 69.
TUE: FIRST
J. THE DEPARTMENT IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING ISSUES FOR TUE;
TIME ON APPEAL.
The Department cites I.C. § 32-901 as authority to support its reading of I.C. § 56-218.
Appellant's Brief, p. 10-11. The Department did not raise this argument in the proceedings
below. Issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v.
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Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195,824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Similarly, the Department relh::s on
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 for the first time on appeal. Appellant's Brief, p. 12. These arguments
are not entitled to consideration on appeal I 6•

K. GEORGE, AS HIS WIFE'S AGENT, HAD LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN
THE TRANSFER AT ISSUE ON HER BEHALF.
i. Martha's Power Of Attorney Satisfied The Requirements Of I.e. § 32-912.
The Department asserts that George's action in utilizing the power of attorney violates

I.e. § 32-912. Appellant's Brief, p. 27-30. This assertion is incorrect. A thorough review of the
power of attorney itselftotally rebuts the Department's contention. The power of attorney form
Martha signed is incredibly comprehensive. It starts out stating in all capital letters that the
"powers granted by this document are broad and sweeping." The power of attorney then goes
into great detail explaining a very wide variety of powers that are granted to George, as agent.
bc;!neficiary
Those powers include, under paragraph (H), entitled "Estate, trust, and other bl~neficiary

16 Even if the Court did consider I.c. § 32-901, the Department's argument lacks merit and does nothing to
advance its position. Again, the V.S.
U.S. Solicitor General and HHS most recently rejected the exact same type
of argument stating,
3.
Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act also fmds little support in the Act's other
provisions concerning the treatment of spousal assets. See Pet. 27-28. As petitioner notes, th{:
Medicaid Act generally considers the community spouse's assets for purposes of determining
whether an institutionalized individual is eligible to receive benefits. But the Act also exempts
1396rU.S.c. 1382b(a)(10, 1396r
certain property, such as the couple's home, from consideration, 42 V.S.c.
5(c)(5), and allows the community spouse to retain certain amounts of resources and income that
are not considered available to pay for the applicant's medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and
(f)(2). Moreover, once the institutionalized spouse is determined to be eligible for benefits,
the Medicaid Act provides that "no resources of the community spouse shall be deemed
available to the institutionalized spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(c)(4). The Medicaid Act, in
short, imposes significant limitations on petitioner's asserted principle that "spouses are
expected to support each other." Pet. 27. To read Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) in accordance with
its plain terms thus is consistent with the broader statutory scheme. (emphasis added).

U.S. Solicitor General amicus brief, p. 11.
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transactions" the power "To ... exercise ... any ... gift ... for the principal.,,1? Martha
expressly authorized George as her agent to make gifts on her behalf. A "gift" is "a voluntary
transfer of property to another made gratuitously and without consideration." Black's Law
Dictionary (6 th ed. 1991). By including the qualifier that George, as agent, may exercise "any
gift" on her behalf, Martha broadened that power to authorize George to make gifts to any
person, including himself. The Magistrate held that although this language was not the "clearest
kind of authority" he agreed that the gifting language in paragraph H "certainly can be read that
ofattomey
attorney satisfied I.e. § 32-912. 18
way." Tr., p. 11, LL. 12-13. Martha's power of
The gifting authority that Martha gave to George must also be read in conjunction with
the other powers Martha granted to her husband, specifically the power to exercise all powers
with respect to Medicaid" that she could exercise. Paragraph (K) entitled, "Benefits from Social
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, or other governmental programs, or military service" authorizes
Martha's husband as her agent
"To ... file ... claims to any benefit or assistance under any federal, state, local
or foreign statute; and in general, exercise all powers with respect to ...
government benefits, including but not limited to Medicare and

which the principal could exercise if present and under no
(emphasis added).

Medicaid~,
Medicaid~,

disabili~y.
disabili~y.

17 The full sentence that contains this language states, "To accept, receipt for, exercise, release:, reject, renounce,
assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or
payment due or payable to or for the principal." (emphasis added).
18The fact that a title company required the PR to sign off on the closing statement for Martha is not equivalent to a
attorney was somehow deficient, as the Department implies. Appellant's Brief,
legal finding that Martha's power of
ofattomey
p. 30. That signature requirement is simply the title insurer covering its bases because the couple was married at the
time of the closing and Martha was still alive. It is standard procedure for a title insurer to have everyone possible
sign off as a liability avoidance precaution.
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As discussed supra, conveying the Medicaid spouse's interest in the couple's home to the
community spouse is expressly sanctioned by federal law. Such a transfer is typical in cases of
married couples where one needs long-term care and will be qualifying for Medicaid benefits.
agentlhusband could make such an
Martha's power of attorney not only contemplated that her agent/husband
interspousal transfer, it expressly authorized it. The combination of the comprehensive power to
"exercise any gift" and the comprehensive power to "exercise all powers with respect to ...
Medicaid" expressly establishes that George acted well within his authority as Martha's agent in
executing the deed that the Department challenges.
The Department cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions to support its argument
that Martha's power of attorney was somehow insufficient. Appellant's Brief, p. 28-29. All of
these cases are easily distinguishable from the instant case. In none of those cases did the power
of attorney contain the specific gifting and Medicaid planning language that Martha's power of
attorney contains. In none of those cases did the power of attorney contain any gifting language
]n none of those cases was an interspousal transfer at issue. In none ofthose cases
whatsoever. 1n
was Medicaid at issue.
In addition, every case the Department cites involved agents who were not spouses. In
the Department's cited cases, the non-spouse agents were conveying assets to themselves or to
other third parties, often in contravention of the principal's estate distribution plan or somehow
in contravention to what the principal would have intended. In this case, Martha's agent was her
husband, conveying Martha's interest in a home in which he was residing, to himself, while his
wife was in a nursing home. Martha had already taken action to put George's name on the title
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herself, indicating her intent he have ownership of the home. George is the natural object of
Martha's bounty.
The interspousal transfer makes sense and was contemplated by the power of attorney
Martha put in place specifically to allow such actions. There simply are no concerns present in
this case regarding financial abuse of the principal, negation of the principal's estate plan or
fraud on the principal as was at issue in the cases the Department relies upon.
"Powers of attorney are to be construed in accordance with the rules of interpn!tation
interpn~tationof
generally.... ,,19
written instruments generally....
,,19

In construing a written instrument, a court must consider

2o "The
it as a whole and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible. 2o
intention of the donor or grantor is to be gathered from the instrument of creation.,,21 Reading
the power of attorney in its entirety, one is struck by the comprehensiveness ofthe do(;ument. In
addition to the introductory language indicating that the powers conveyed to George are broad
and all-encompassing, the powers under each paragraph provide great detail emphasizing and
. th
22 .
IUSlOn
' 22
un d ersconng
at conc
undersconng

19

3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 30, at 533-34 (1986).

VaJley
20 Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Insurance Fund, 135 Idaho 434,437,18 P.3d 956 (2000), citing Magic Valley
Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 565, 808 P.2d 1303, 1310 (1991).
21

49 C.J. §§ 34,40. See also 72 C.J.S. Powers § 22 (1951)

22

Paragraph (A) entitled "Real property transactions" authorizes George to deal with her real property
on such tenns and conditions ... as my Agent shall deem proper; and to ... convey . .. and in any
ofany interest in real property whatsoever, irrc1uding
illcluding
way or manner deal with all or any part ofany
ofIdaho .
specifically, but without limitation, real property lying and being situated in the State ofIdaho"
under such terms and conditions . .. as my Agent shall deem proper. (emphasis added).
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The Department argues that Martha's power of attorney contained restrictions on
George's authority in ~~ G and H. Appellant's Brief, p. 28. The language referred to prohibits
the agent from designating himself as a beneficiary under an insurance contract (~ G) and
changing the principal's will or trust so that the agent benefits from that change (~H). These
standard provisions, however, do not prohibit George from engaging in the interspousal transfer
at issue and simply do not apply to this case23 •
ii. Martha's Power Of Attorney Met The Requirements Of I.e. § 15-5-501 et seq.
seq .

I.C. § 15-5-501 et seq. was in effect at the time Martha signed the powt:r of attorney. I.C.

§ 15-5-502 stated in pertinent part,
All acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during
any period of disability or incapacity ofthe principal have the same effc:::ct and ...
The authority granted under this paragraph also includes the authority to "cancel" notes, mortgages, security interest,
or deeds to secure debt, which is equivalent to "giving away" assets of the principal. Paragraph (B) entitled
"Tangible personal property transactions" includes the power to,
ofany
in any way or manner deal with all or any part of
any real or personal property whatsoever,
tangible or intangible, or any interest therein, that I own at the time of execution or may thereafter
acquire, under such terms and conditions, and under such covenants, as my Agent shall deem
proper." (emphasis added).
Paragraph (H), discussed above, also includes language granting the agent power to " ... in general, exercise all
powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could exercise if present and und{:r no disability." The
other paragraphs in Martha's power of attorney consistently imbue George with authority to act with total and
absolute discretion. The Department's counsel actually agreed with this conclusion when he stated at the hearing, " .
. . this is a very comprehensive power of attorney." Tr., p. 7, LL. 5-6.
23 This language is typical "anti-slayer" language which is included in such forms to prohibit an agent trom
engaging in transactions that are contrary to public policy, such as the agent taking out life insurance or changing an
estate plan to name himself as beneficiary and then murdering the principal and thereby profiting from those actions.
The meaning of these boilerplate restrictions should not stretched beyond reason, as the Department's argument
encourages. None of the concerns that underpin these type of "agent as bad actor" provisions is present in this case
where we have an agent/spouse who is the natural object of the principal's bounty acting in a manner that is fully
authorized by other language in the power of attorney and acting in a manner that Martha would have wanted.
Martha would have signed the deed at issue were she able to do so. Instead, she authorized her husband to do it for
her under a power of attorney that was adequate to accomplish her wishes in this regard.
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bind the principal and his successors in interest, as if the principal were competent
and not disabled.
The power of attorney meets I.e. § 15-5-501 's requirement that it contain words "showing the
intent of the principal that the authority conferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding the
principal's subsequent disability or incapacity." The Idaho statute which

gov(~rns

Martha's

power of attorney did not mandate that Martha was required to use any specific language or
"terms of art" in order to imbue her spouse/agent with the requisite authority to make the
interspousal transfer at issue. Yet as discussed above, the power of attorney does contain such
language. The power of attorney at issue is completely sufficient under the law then in effect to
grant Martha's spouse/agent, George, the full and complete authority to engagt!
engag(~ in the
interspousal transfer at issue.
iii. Idaho's Recently Enacted Uniform Power Of Attorney Act Also Supports The
Magistrate's Ruling.

In 2008, Idaho's legislature overhauled our Uniform Power of Attorney Act and required
that specific gifting language be included in the power of attorney if the principal wanted her
agent to have that authority. I.e. § lS-12-201(1)(b)24.
lS-lZ-Z01(1)(b)24.

These changes were made, in part, to

guard against elder abuse. In the official comments to Article 2 of the Model Act it states,
The rationale for requiring a grant of specific authority to perfOlm the acts
thos«~
enumerated in subsection (a) [adopted as I.C. § 15-12-201(1)] is the risk thos«~
estate ....
acts pose to the principal's property and estate....
Subsection (b) [I.C. § 15-l2-201(1)(b)]
15-12-201(1)(b)] contains an additional safeguard
for the principal. It establishes as a default rule that an agent who is not aln
ancestor, spouse, or descendant of the principal may not exercise authority to
This Act was constructed from a review and revision of the National Conference of Commissioners On Uniform
State Laws' Uniform Power of Attorney Act dated July, 2006 ("Model Act").

24
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create in the agent or in an individual the agent is legally obligated to support, an
interest in the principal's property. For example, a non-relative agent with ~~ift
making authority could not make a gift to the agent or a dependent of the
agent without the principal's express authority in the power of attorney.
This comment underscores the point that the concerns present when examining an agent
making a gift to himself are generally not present when a spouse/agent is involved. George
utilized the powers given him by his wife to convey Martha's interest in the couple's home to
himself. The new Uniform Act, I.e. § 15-12-217(2), specifically recognizes that then: will
continue to be powers of attorney which contains language "granting general authority with
respect to gifts" which authorize the agent to make gifts to themselves. Although the standards
encompassed in the new Act are more restrictive than those that governed Martha's power of
attorney, even the new law recognizes the fact that powers of attorney are to b(: read less
stringently when the spouse is the one engaging in an interspousal transfer25 .
In this case, when all of these factors are considered, the Magistrate correctly concluded
that George acted consistently with the authority granted him in Martha's power of attorney.
The amendments made in 2008 and the policy rationales behind those amendments lend
additional support for the legal conclusion Martha's power of attorney was sufficient to allow
George as her agent to effectuate the interspousal transfer.

25 In addition, the new Act's I.e. § 15-12-217(3) indicates that even if the principal's objectives are not
actually known to the agent, the agent may make gifts of the principal's property in what he detennines to
be the principal's best interest, taking into account such facts as the nature of the principal's property, the
principal's foreseeable need for maintenance, the principal's history of making gifts, and eligibility for
government benefit program assistance. Thus even under the new Act it appears pennissible for an
agent/spouse with gifting power to engage in exactly the type of interspousal Medicaid-motivated transfer
at issue in this case.
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iv. The Court Should Infer From The Undisputed Facts And Circumstances That
Thnt
Common Law Interspousal Agency Existed And Validates The Transfer.
In Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 713, 779 P.2d
P .2d 22 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court
stated,
We have noted that community real property can be validly encumbered
32only ifboth spouses join in executing the instrument of encumbrance. I.C. § 32
912. The statute evim:es a legislative policy of protecting community real
property from creditors, unless both spouses agree in writing to incur the debt.
Thus, the statute usually requires two signatures. However, an exception to this
general rule exists if one spouse is authorized to act as an agent for the
management and disposition of community real property. Noble v. Glenns
SupremE~
Ferry Bank, Ltd., 91 Idaho 364, 367, 421 P.2d 444, 447 (1966). Our SupremE~
Court has held that such an agency may be created by an express power of
attorney, as authorized by I.C. § 32-912, or may be inferred from the
P .2d at
circumstances and conduct of the parties. Noble, 91 Idaho at 368, 421 P.2d
448.

See also, Noble v. Glenns Ferry Bank Ltd., 91 Idaho 364,421 P.2d 444 (1966) (existence
of the wife's agency was a question of fact to be determined by the finder of the facts
from the husband's and wife's dealings, circumstances, and conduct).
George and Martha's dealings, circumstances and conduct support a ruling that an
interspousal agency can be inferred from the undisputed facts of this case. Consideration of the

facts and circumstances present, including the actions Martha took in putting the power of
attorney in place, the comprehensive language it contains, and the Magistrate's factual findings
(discussed below), supports this Court affirming the interspousal conveyance based on the
alternative ground of common law interspousal agency.

v. The Magistrate Made Findings of Fact On The Power Of Attorney Issue.
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The Department argues that the Magistrate made a legal conclusion unsupported by
findings of fact when he stated, "The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power
of attorney from Martha and that he had the authority to transfer the property to himself." Order
Disallowing Claim, f.n. 1. Appellant's Brief, p. 27, 31. The Department ignores what occurred
at the hearing. The Magistrate's legal conclusion as stated in the Order was supported by
explicit findings of fact made at the hearing. There is no prohibition against a magistrate making
oral findings of fact. See e.g., State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 776, 992 P.2d 769 (1999).
The Magistrate ruled from the bench on the power of attorney issue stating,
The power of attorney issue was - is interesting to me and -- b{:cause ]
don't think that that - that paragraph where the word gift is written, paragraph H,
is the clearest kind of authority to make a gift of property. It certainly can be
read that way
way.. ..
But I think - when everything - all of the language in that power of
attorney is considered, it's so - the intent that you just can't get around is
that document was entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as
possible, it seems to me, including the right to deal with interest in real
property.
So I'm going to make a determination for purposes of this case that
that is a valid power of attorney for purposes of dealing with - including
giving Martha Perry's interest in that property.
So I'm going to decide that question for purposes of this case.

(t~mphasis
(t~mphasis

added)
Tr., p. 11, LL. 8-25; p. 12, LL. 1-11.
The Magistrate clearly ruled not only that paragraph H in the power of attorney was
sufficient to satisfy I.e. § 32-912, but also that the comprehensive nature ofth{: document
supported a conclusion that Martha's power of attorney gave George sufficient authorilty to
legally effectuate the interspousal transfer. The Magistrate found as a matter of fact that Martha
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intended to give George the necessary authority in the power of attorney to transfer the property
to himself. There is no need, as the Department argues, to remand for further factual :5ndings in
order to support the Magistrate's legal conclusion on the power of attorney issue, nor to find that
interspousal agency existed under the circumstances of this case sufficient to uphold the transfer
on that basis as well.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the Personal Representative respectfully requests that the
Court affirm the Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim in its entirety.
DATED this 26 th day of August, 2010.

PETER C. SISSON
Attorney for Personal Representative
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Appeal from the District Court, Mille lacs County, Steven P. Ruble, J.

55
Mille lacs County Attorney, Melissa M. Saterbak, Asst. Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, MN, for appellant Mille Lacs
County.
Thomas J. Meinz, Princeton, MN, for respondent Michael Barg.
law Section
section of the Minnesota State Bar Association and National
Julian J. Zweber, st. Paul, MN, for amid curiae Elder Law
senior Citizens law Center.
Senior
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Robin Christopher Vue-Benson, Asst. Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for clmicus curiae
services.
Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en bane.
OPINION
MEYER, Justice.

serviceS and Welfare Department (County) filed a claim against the Estah~ of Francis E.
The Mille lacs County Family ServiceS
Barg (Estate), seeking to recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of his predeceased Wife,
wife, Dolores Barg. The
Estate partially allowed the claim, and disallowed the other part. The district court, concluding that Dolores Barg's
interest in the couple's property was limited because she had conveyed it to her husband before her death, evaluated
her interest as a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance. The County appealed, argUing
arguing that it was e'ntitled to
recovery from the full value of the property. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, partially allOWing
allowing the claim
and evaluating Dolores Barg's interest in the property as a joint tenancy interest equivalent to one-half the value of the
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property. In re Estate of lJiJrg,
BiJrg, 722

57
N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn.App.2006). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Factual and Procedural 8iJckground.
BiJckground.
The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case. Dolores J. Barg was born in 1926, married Fralnds E. Barg in
1948, and remained married to him until her death in 2004. In 1962 and 1967, in two separate transa<:tions,
transa(:tions, the Bargs
took title as joint tenants to real property in Princeton, Minnesota. Their home was located on this property. On October
24, 2001, Dolores Barg entered a nursing home in Mille Lacs County, at first paying the costs herself. In December 2001,
she applied for long-term Medicaid benefits.(fnl)
An asset assessment for Dolores Barg was completed in February 2002. The Bargs' marital assets including their
homestead totaled $137,272.63.(fn2) Approval for long-term Medicaid benefits was given retroactive tel December 1,
2001.
On February 27, 2002, Frands Barg executed his will,
i)S personal
Will, nominating the couple's son Michael F. Barg i)S
representative, leaving his estate to his surviving descendants, and making no provision for his wife. Dolores Barg
transferred her joint tenancy interest in the homestead property to Francis Barg on July 2, 2002, when her daughter and
guardian of her estate, Barbara Anderson, executed a Guardian's Deed. Also in July 2002, Barbara Anderson deleted
Dolores Barg's name from certificates of deposit the couple held jointly
jOintly at Bremer Bank. There is no alle~ation
alle~ation that these
actions were improper or fraudulent.
On January 1, 2004, Dolores Barg died, having received $108,413.53 in Medicaid benefits. At the time of her death,
Barg included three certificates of deposit,
assets belonging to either Dolores or Francis Sarg
depoSit, a checking account, and an IRA
account, all in the name of Frands Barg alone; one certificate of deposit payable to the funeral home for Dolores Barg's
approXimately $9,000; the homestead titled in Frands Barg's name, valued at
funeral; two vehicles, together worth approximately
jointlv held at some time
$120,800; and miscellaneous household goods and furniture. All of these assets had been joint/v
during the couple's 55-year marriage.
haVing received Medicaid benefits. On July 30, 2004, the County filed a
On May 27, 2004, Francis Barg died, never having
Barg's estate, seeking to recover $108,413.53, the full amount Dolores Barg had received
claim against Francis Sarg's
re<:eived in
Medicaid benefits.

Michael Barg disallowed $44,533.53 Of the claim, and allowed $63,880. The County petitioned for an allowance of
the full claim, arguing that the entire value of the marital property, both the homestead and the certificatl!S of deposit,
was subject to its claim because Dolores Barg's joint tenancy interest gave her a right to use of the entire property. The
district court concluded that Dolores Barg's interest in the property at the time of her death was

58
eqUivalent to a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance.
equivalent

The County appealed. The court of appeals explained that, based on In re Estate ofGu//berg,
of Gu//berg, 652 N. W.2d 709
Francis Barg's estate was limited to Dolores's
(Minn.App. 2(02), the County's ability to recover against FranCis
Dolol'es's interest in marital
BiJrg, 722 N.W.2d at 496. The court decided that property law
or jointly owned property at the time of her death. lJiJrg,
principles should be applied to determine the nature of that interest and that under federal law and Gu//berg, Dolores
joint tenancy interest in the homestead at the time of her death. Id. at 497. The court valuled that
Barg retained a jOint
interest as an undivided one-half of the property's value, and remanded the case to the district COlirt for a recalculation
of the amount of the claim that was allowable. !d.
The County petitioned for review. The Estate opposed review but sought conditional cross-review on th,e issue of
whether federal law permits the State to recover at all from a surviving spouse's estate. We granted reView, as well as
cross-review, and asked for briefing on whether the Estate had adequately preserved for review the issue of
01' "whether
the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a
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surviving spouse." We granted requests by the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services to file an clmicus
C1micus curiae brief
aligned with the County and to participate in oral argument.(fn3) We also granted requests by the Eldt!l' Law Section of
atizens Law Center to file an amicus curicle brief aligned
the Minnesota State Bar Association and the National Senior Otizens
with the Estate. After oral argurrlent, we asked the parties for supplementary briefing on the relationship of the 2003 and
2005 amendments of Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subds. 1 and lc-lk
ar~lues exists under
1c-1k (2006), to the authority the County ar~lues
Minn.Stat.
Minn,Stat. § 2568.15, subd. la
1a (2006) and Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 2 (2006), and how that relationship affects
preemption analysis and the scope of recovery permissible under Minnesota law.
Statutory Framework.

Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as TItle XIX of the Social
Sodal Security Act to ensure medical care to individuals who
do not have the resources to cover essential medical services. Martin ex rei. Hoffv. Oty ofRochester,
of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 9
(Minn. 2002). Medicaid was intended to be the payor of last resort. Id. The program is jointly funded with the states as a
"cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to partidpating States to aid them
in furnishing health care to needy persons." HarTis v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308,
30S, 100 5.0.2671,65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980).
Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and submit those
plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.c. § 1396a(a)·(b) (2000 & Supp. III
2003). After this, the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.c. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its own
program within the federal requirerrlents,
(CMS)(fn") administer
requirerrlel1ts, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)(fn-')

59
the program and approve state plans. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. One of the reqUirements
requirements imposed on state plans is that
they must "comply with the proviSions
provisions of [42 U.S.c. § 1396p) with respect to liens, adjustments and reclJveries of
medical asSistance
1396cI(a)(IS) (2000).
assistance correctly paid, transfers of assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 U.S.c.. § 1396cI(a)(18)
To receive Medicaid, a person must qualify as either "categorically" or "medically" needy. 6"tate ofAtkinson
ofAtkinson v. Minn.
Dep'tofHuman Servs., 564 N.W.2d 209, 210-11 (Minn.1997). A person is "categorically needy" if he is eligible for other
specified federal asSistance
assistance programs. Id at 211. A person is "medically needy" if he incurs medical expenses that
reduce his incorrle to roughly the level of those who are categorically needy. Id. To qualify as medically needy a person
pe~n
may have income no higher than a defined threshold and may own assets of no more than a defined value. ld. If the
assets of a Medicaid applicant and her spouse exceed the qualifying threshold, they must "spend down" their assets until
they are at or below the qualifying threshold. Id. If a potential Medicaid recipient transfers assets below fair market value
within a certain period of time before eligibility, the redpient is deemed ineligible for benefits for a time period mandated
by statute. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c) (2000). This prOVision
provision prevents people who are not needy from becoming eligible for
Medicaid by transferring their assets away.
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider assets of both husband and
wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.c. § 1396r-5(c) (2000). But there are several provisions in
place to protect the community spouse(fn5) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down
spend·down of as-.ets needed to
qualify the applicant for Medicaid. See Atkinson, 564 N.W.2d at 211; 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (2000). The valLie of the
couple's home is not included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. Id. § 1396r-S(c)(S);
1396r·S(c)(S); 42 U.S.c. §
1382b(a)(1) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid recipient is also entitled to an allowance of income and assets
designated for his or her needs that is not conSidered
ccue. 42 U.S.C.
considered available to pay for the recipient spouse's medical Que.
§ 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead,
to his or her community spouse. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of community spouses to
contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses against the accommodation of the community
spouse's need to provide for his or her own support.

see

Federal Medicilid Recovery Provisions.

Although it is not applicable to the facts before us, it is useful to start with the pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid
recovery, because it is relied on in the parties' arguments and is the basis for the rationale of several relevant cases.
Prior to amendments adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute
stated a general prinCiple
principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject

60
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to several exceptions, one of which is relevant here:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the
State plan may be made, except ---

••••
(8) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he received such
assistance, from his estate.
1396p(b)(1) (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, tlO recover Medicaid
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(l)
recipiE!nt's estate. The
benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery would be from the recipiE!nt'S
statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the recipient's
surviving spouse. fa
fd. § 1396P(b)(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovery before the death of a surviving
spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The pre-1993 federal law
contained no definition of "estate."
Section 1396P(b) was amended as part of the OBM amendments of 1993. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
PUb.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312, 627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1396P(b)(1), (4)
1993, Pub.L.
(2000». As amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover Medicaid
payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 1993
amendments changed section 1396p(b) in several ways. First, they lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55.
Second, they made recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. Third, they added a definition
of "estate," which itself had both mandatory and permissive elements. As amended, the general nonrec,overy rule and
the relevant exception read as follows:
(1) No adjusbnent or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following
individuals:

••••
(8) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate • • •.
fd. The amended version of section 1396P(b)(1)(B) retained the express reference to recovery from the recipient's
estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the recipient'S estate is only permitted after the
death of the recipient's surviving spouse: "Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be mademade' only afferthe
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any • * *." 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis added). And hke the pre
pre1993 version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or reference to, recovel1f from a
surviVing
surviving spouse's estate.

The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery, with a mandcltory provision
that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the
scope of probate law:
[TJhe term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual··
individual -(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate, as
defined

61
for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State * * * any other real and personal property and other assets in
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which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest),
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint
jOint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.c. § 1396P(b)(4) (emphasis added). Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of
"estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes that indudes
Which, under ordinary probate law, would not be part
includes some assets which,
of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone else on the recip~!!nt's
recip~!!nt's death. For
example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship and one dies, the deceased joint
jOint
tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate ~
~itate.
. tate. Under the
optional expanded definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint
jOint
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to the SUrviving
surviving joint
jOint
tenant.

Minnesota s Medicaid Recovery Laws.
Minnesota has long had a policy of requiring partidpants in the Medicaid program and their spouses to use their own
assets to pay their share of the cost of care during or after enrollment. Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 1(a)
l(a) (2006).
(2006), To
implement this policy, Since
since 1987 Minnesota law has provided
proVided for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid from the estate of a
la (originally enalcted as Act of
recipient or the estate of the redpient's
recipient's surviving spouse. Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 1a
June 12, 1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82, 1987 Minn. Laws 3255,3347). As relevant here, subdivision 1a provides that, "on
the death of the survivor of a married couple, either or both of whom received medical assistance,
aSSistance, • • ~. the total
amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the
[recipient] or the estare of the SUrviving
surviving spouse." Id. (emphasis added). A claim against the estate of a surviving spouse
for medical assistance provided to the recipient spouse may be made up to "the value of the assets of the estate that
jointly owned property at any time dUring
during the marriage."
maniage." Id., subd. 2 (emphasis added).
were marital property or jOintly
The broad estate recovery authority contained in subdivisions 1a
la and 2 was supplemented in 2003 by amendments
to the statute expanding subdivision 1 and adding subdivisions 1c-1k. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 1.4, art. 1:2, §§ 40-50,
2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751, 2205-17. These amendments implement the optional expanded definition of
SeeMinn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 1(a)(2) (2006); 42
"estate" authorized in the 1993 amendments to the federal law. 5eeMinn.Stat.
U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The 2003 amendments to the Minnesota estate recovery law modify common liJW
liJW to proVide
provide for
continuation of a recipient's life estate or joint tenancy interest in real property after his death for the purpose of
recovering medical assistance, Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, SUbd' 1(a)(3) (2006), and include that continued interest in the
recipient's estate. Mlnn.Stat. § 2568.15, subds. Ig,
19, 1h(b), 1i(a), 1j. The 2003 amendments also establish specific
procedures for exerdsing claims against these continued life estate and joint tenancy interests, CIS well as procedures
and waiting periods that differ according to whether the recipient's spouse, dependent children, or other relatives

62
living in the homestead survive the recipient. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 48-49,2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec.
Sess.
1i and 1j). In this case, the County filed its
5ess. 1751,2213-17 (codified as amended at Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subds. li
claim under subdivisions la
1a and 2 and did not rely on provisions added in the 2003 amendments.
The issues presented in this case involve several questions about the relationship between the recovery provisions of
federal and Minnesota Medicaid law. The court of appeals held that a partial disallowance of the County's claim was
proper, relying on its earlier decision in Gullberg that the broad authorization in subdivision 2 for recovery up to the value
of all assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned at any time dUring
during the maniagewas partially
preempted by the 1993 amendments to the federal law that limit the expanded estate to assets in which the recipient
spouse had a legal interest at the time of her death. lJiJrg,
BiJrg, 722 N.W.2d at 595-96 (citing Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714).
The County, and its supporting amicus curiae the Commissioner of the Department of Human 5ervices,
Services, argue that
the court of appeals was wrong, both here and in Gul/berg,
Gullberg, in finding any preemption of the broad estate recovery
authorized in subdivisions 1a and 2. They contend that there was nothing in the federal statute prior to thE! 1993
amendments that limited the states' authority to pursue estate recovery of Medicaid benefits paid, and that: the 1993
amendments were intended by Congress to expand state options, not limit them. Alternatively, the County argues that
even if recovery is limited to the assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, Dolores Barg had
an interest in the property notwithstanding the conveyance to her husband, and the court of appeals erred in valUing
valuing
that interest as only one-half the value of the homestead.
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The Estate and its supporting amid curiae counter that federal law authorizes recovery only from a recipient's estate,
and Minnesota law that allows recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is therefore preempted.(fn6) The Estate argues
that recovery is also barred because, to the extent recovery is allowed from the estate of a surviving spouse, federal law
limits that recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death, and
subdivision 2 of section 2568.15 is preempted to the extent it allows broader recovery. Rnally, the Estate argues that
there should be no recovery here because Dolores Barg had no legal interest

63
in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, having conveyed her interest to her husband
during her lifetime.
Thus, the issues presented are as follows. Rrst, does federal law preempt the authorization in Minn.Stat. § 2568.15,
subd. la, for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid for a recipient spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse? second,
Second, if
such recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is not preempted, does federal law limit the recovery to assets in which
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, preempting the broader recovery allowed in Minn.Stat. § 2568.15,
subd. 2, as to assets owned as marital property or in joint tenancy at any time during the marriage? Third, if recovery is
limited to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death what, if any, interest did Dolores Barg
have in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, and specifically, was the court
c:ourt of appeals
correct in holding that Dolores Barg had a joint tenancy interest for purposes of estate recovery even though she
transferred that interest to her husband during her lifetime? We address these issues in turn, after first reviewing basic
preemption principles.
I.

Whether federal law preempts state law is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation, which we rE!View de novo.
Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. The application of law to stipulated facts is a question of law, which we also review de novo.
8/dgs., Inc. v. Comm'rofRevenue, 488 N.W.2d 254,257 (Minn. 1992).
Morton 8/elgs.,
Congressional purpose is n' the ultimate touchstone'" of the preemption inqUiry.
inquiry. Malone v. WhIte Motor Corp., 435
LEd.2d 443 (1978) (quoting RetailOerks Int1
U.S. 497, 504,98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d
Inn Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhom, 375
LEd.2d 179 (1963». Our primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertalin the intent of
U.S. 96, 103,84 S.O. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d
see cal. Fed. Sdv. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107S.Ct. 683,93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The
Congress. See
United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause' start[s]
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that
Congress.... Gpollone v. Uggett
liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 11:2 S.Ct. 2608,
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'"
ElevatrJrCorp., 331 U.S. 218, 230.67 S.Ct. 1146.91
L.Ed. 1447
120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevatr:JrCorp.,
1146. 91l.Ed.
Thus. preemption is generally disfavored. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11 (citing Gpollone, 505 U.S. at: 516, 518,112
(1947». Thus,
S.Ct. 2608).
II'

Congress may preempt state law in several ways. cal. Fed. Sdv. & Loan Ass'n,
Assn, 479 U.S. at 280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First,
it may do SO with express language preempting state law. Id. second,
Second, it may do so by fully occupying the field, that is,
"congressional intent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation
is suffiCiently
sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress .'left
'eft no room' for supplementary state
regulation." Id at 280-81, 107 S.O. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230,67 S.Ct.
5.Ct. 1146). Here, it is clear that Congress
neither expressly preempted state law nor so completely occupied the field as to leave no room for state action, because
the Medicaid program specifically permits and even requires action by participating states. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11.
The third kind of preemption is at issue in this case. Even when Congress

64
has not chosen to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre-empt
Sdv. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683.
state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cdl. Fed. Sav.
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible, Fla. Lime Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143,83 s.n. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963).
(1963), or when the state law is "an obs.tacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. DrJV1dowitz,
OrJV1dowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61
S.Ct. 399,85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
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II.
We now turn to the question of whether Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. la, which requires Medicaid recovery against
the estate of a surviving spouse, is preempted by federal law, particularly 42 U.S.c. § 1396P(b)(1)(8). Because only
conflict preemption may be applicable, we seek to determine whether compliance with both statutes is impossible or
whether the state law stands as an obstade to accomplishment of the purposes of the federal law.
requires-The County seeks recovery here under subdivision 1a of section 2568.15, which authorizes--indeed requires-
recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of the surviving spouse of a recipient. The Estate argues that this state law
authorization to recover from the estate of the surviving spouse is preempted because it conflicts with 42 U.S.c. § 1396p
(b)(1), which prohibits recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits except from the estate of the recipient of the
(b)(l),
benefits.
The federal statute establishes a general prohibition against recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to
three specified exceptions:
of any medical assistance correctly paid on be!k1/f
beIk1lf ofan
of an individual under
( 1) No adjustment or recovery ofany
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical
foIlo ....iing
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the CiJse of the foIlo....
ng
individuals:
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(l) (emphasis added). Only one exception potentially applies to the circumstance of this case:
(6)
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate· • •.
r1ecovery of
Id. § 1396p(b)(l)(B) (emphasis added). Because this express exception to the general rule against r,ecovery
Medicaid benefits directs that recovery come from the recipient's estate and makes no reference to a surviving spouse's
estate, the Estate argues that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federalla'w. Because
exceptions to a general statement of policy
polley are to be construed narrowly, Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109S.Ct.
109 S.O.
1455, 103 LEd.2d
L.Ed.2d 753 (1989), it appears on its face that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not permitted by
federal law.
Two courts have agreed with this analysis and conduded that section 1396p(b)(l)(B)
1396p(b)(l)(B} authorizes recovery only from
the recipient's estate and does not allow recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. Hines v. Dep't 01' Pub. Aid, 221
m.2d 222, 302 III.Dec.
I11.Dec. 711,850 N.E.2d 148, 152-53 (2006); In re Estate ofBudney,
Ill.2d
of Budney, 197 Wis.2d 948,541 N.W.2d 245,
245.
246 (1995), rev. denied546 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1996). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained that the federal statute
never "counter[ed] the initial blanket prohibition"

65
on recovery by authoriZing
authorizing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. Budney, 541 N.W.2d at 246. The Illinois
Supreme Court noted that under federal and Illinois law, the state had authority to seek reimbursement from the
recipient's estate after the death of his surviving spouse. Hines, 302 III.Dec. 711,850 N.E.2d at 153. But instead, as
here, the state sought recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse. Id. The court explained that feder;~llaw allows
only three exceptions under which a state may seek reimbursement and "[alII
"[a]1I are specifically directed to the estate of
the recipient. No provision is made for collection from the estate of the recipient's spouse." Id. ThE! court declined to add
to the unambiguous language of the federal statute or to recognize exceptions beyond those specified in the federal law.
Id.
The Commissioner argues that Hinesand Budney were wrongly decided, misinterpreting the federal statute,
particularly in light of the presumption against preemption. The County contends that this statutory exception to the
nonrecovery principle allows recovery generally against individuals who received benefits after age 55, and does not
narrowly limit the sources of recovery. The County asserts that the reference to the individual's estate is merely a
designation of the timing for recovery rather than a limit on the scope of recovery, because the language does not say
that the state may recover "only" from the individual's estate. The County argues that, absent such express limiting
language, and applying the presumption against preemption, section 1396P(b)(1)(B)
1396P(b}(1)(B} merely specifies one potential
source of recovery, the recipient's estate, and does not preclude others, such as a spouse's estate.

000616
hUn" ·//,1••",,, l!lwritpr npt /~t!ltp~1MN/h"nl, "Ir~",,,-,,,.Li'--<-,-,-.~·
.I,-=-~-_=..J..I..£.n1---~c---~----------------

Page 8 of 15

Casemaker - MN - Case J v - Search - Result
~

In our view, the plain language of section 1396P(b)(1)(B) comports far more closely with the inte!rpretation of the
Illinois Supreme Court in HInes than with the County's expansive view of the authority imparted by that provision.
Moreover, we know of no court that has adopted the County's broad view of that language alone. Indeed, in explaining
the then-existing law in a report on proposed OBRA amendments in 1993, a House Report referred only to the possibility
of recovery from the estate of the recipient, even when describing recovery after the death of a surviving spouse:
Under current law, a State has the option of seeking recovery of amounts correctly
correctfy paid on behalf of an
individual under its Medicaid program from the individual's estate if the individual was 65 yea~; or older at
the time he or she received Medicaid benefits. The State may not seek recovery from the benE~ficiary's
estate until the death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only if the individual has no surviving minor or
disabled child.
H.R.Rep. No. 103-111, at 208 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 535 (emphasis added). In contrast,
describing the proposed 199
3 amendments to the Medicaid recovery law passed by the House, the same
sarne House Report
1993
stated that newly-required state estate recovery programs would have to "provide for the collection of the amounts
correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the
surviving spouse."
spouse," Id. Thus, when the House wanted to describe recovery from the surviving spouse's 4~ate,
4~ate, it said so
clearly.
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly plain language providing only for recovery from the recipient's estate, we
acknowledge that several courts have interpreted the federal recovery provisions to allow recovery from the estate of a
surviving

66
spouse. The courts reaching this condusion have for the most part relied on the 1993 amendments to the federal law
that allow the states to adopt an expanded definition of estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery. For e>(ample, the New
York Court of Appeals explained, in dicta, that although federal law did not expressly provide for recovery of Medicaid
payments from the "secondarily dying spouse's estate," the 1993 amendments gave the states power to recover against
the spouse's estate for certain categories of assets. In re Estate of Oaig, 82 N.Y.2d 388, 604 N. Y.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d
1003, 1006 (1993). The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the O'aiginterpretation
Oaiginterpretation that the 1993 expanded estate
provision gave the states the option to recover against a surviving spouse's estate assets conveyed through joint
jOint tenancy
or right of survivorship. In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847,850 (N.D.1998). Indeed, the court in Thompson
rejected the ruling in Budney that recovery against a surviving
surviVing spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law on the
basis that the Budneycourt had not considered the optional expanded definition of "estate."
"estate," Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at
850. The North Dakota court concluded that "consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light of the
Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative intention to allow states to trace the
assets of recipients of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies." Id. at
851. The court explained that. under the drcumstances, it made no difference whether recovery was from one estate or
the other:
Because the expansive federal definition of "estate" in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in
which the medical assistance benefits recipient "had any legal title or interest in at the time of death," it is
a IT7iJtter of little moment whether the department seeks to ~ver
~ver the benefits paid by tiling a dclim in
the estate of the recipient after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse or by filing a claim in the
surviving spouse's estate.
Id n. 3 (emphasis added). Finally,
of Health and We/fare
Welfare v. JacklT7iJn, 1.32 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d
Finallv, in Idaho Department
lJepiJrtment ofHealth
6,9-10 (1998), the Supreme Court of Idaho also ruled that some recovery of Medicaid benefits could
cCluld be made from the
estate of a surviving spouse, but held that such recovery was preempted by federal law except to the extent of assets
that had been in the recipient's estate as defined by state probate law.

These courts provide little explanation for their conclusions that the statutory language expressly mentioning
recovery only from the recipient's estate also allows recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. We infer that the courts
viewed the authority to recover from assets that were part of the recipient's estate after the death of the surviVing
surviving
spouse to fairly imply authority to recover those assets from the surviving spouse's estate to which they had passed on
the death of the recipient. In other words, to the extent assets in the surviVing
surviving spouse's estate are there be!Cause they
had passed to the surviving spouse from the estate of the recipient, recovery from those assets in the surviving spouse's
estate is, in essence, recovery from the recipient's estate.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have made a similar unspoken inference in assessing preemption of
California Medicaid recovery laws in two cases. Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923 (9th Or.1997); atiz~~s Action League v.
Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Or.1989), cert. dffiied, 494 U.S. 1056,
1056,1105.0.
1105.0. 1524, 108 L.Ed.2d 764 (1990). In both cases,
the

67
Ninth Orcuit addressed whether California's Medicaid recovery law was preempted by pre-1993 amendment federal law.
The California law allowed the state to seek recovery not only from the estate of the deceased Medicaid recipient, but
,,' against any recipient of the property of that decedent by distribution or survival:"
survival.'" Kizer, 88:7 F.2d at 1005 (quoting Cal.
Welf. & Inst.Code § 14009.5 (West Supp.1989». Thus, California law allowed the state to tra(:e assets of the deceased
Medicaid recipient and seek reimbursement from the recipients of those assets.
In Klzerthe
reCipient and had
Kizerthe plaintiffs were individuals who had owned property in joint tenancy with a Medicaid recipient
succeeded to ownership by right of survivorship upon the death of the Medicaid recipient. fd. at 1005. To deterrnine
whether California's claimed right of recovery from these surviving joint tenants was inconsistent with federal law, the
court looked to section 1396P(b)(1)(B), which, as discussed above, provided the general prohibition against
ag.ainst recovery with
the exception for individuals who were 65 years old when they received assistance. fd. at 1006. The Ninth Orcuit noted
that the federal statute provided only for recovery from the individual's "estate," and in the absence of a federal statutory
definition of estate, looked to common law for the meaning of the term. fd. at 1006. The court held that an "estate"
under common law did not include property held in jOint
joint tenancy at death, and therefore the California law that allowed
recovery against such property went beyond the recipient's estate and was too broad. fd. at 1008.
to08. The court in Kizerdid
not expressly address the issue of whether assets within the definition of "estate" could only be reached by a claim
against the recipient's estate, or whether federal law would permit the state to follow those assets and make the claim
against a surviving joint tenant--or, as here, a surviving spouse.
Several years later, still applying pre-1993 federal law, the Ninth Orcuit again addressed a preemption challenge to
the same broad California Medicaid recovery provision. Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 924. At issue in Bucholtz was application of
the state recovery law to assets of Medicaid recipients that had been subject to three forms of joint interests: inter vivos
trusts, tenancy in common, and community property. fd. at 924. The court applied the Kizerprinciple thilt use of the
word "estate" in the [federal] recoupment provision limits a state's recovery to property which descends to the recipient's
heir or the beneficiaries of the recipient's will upon death,'" id. at 925 (quoting Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005), to each of the
forms of shared interest at issue. The court concluded that, like the joint tenancy in Kizer, property held lin an inter vivos
common law, and therefore was not part of the estate subject
trust is not part of the decedent's estate under California cornmon
to recovery under the federal law. fd. at 926. In contrast, the court explained, a decedent's interest in pnoperty held in
tenancy in common or community property is subject to disposition and administration as part of the decledent's estate
under California law. fd. at 926-27. The Ninth Orcuit concluded not only that the decedent's interest in property held in
law, but also held, albeit without explanation, that recovery could
those forms was subject to recovery under the federal law.
beneficiaries who received that property: "[California] may, however, pursue people who
be sought from the heirs or benefiCiaries
received property held by the decedent in the form of tenancy in common or community property:'
property." fd. at 928 (emphasis
added). Like other courts, the Ninth Orcuit seems to have inferred that the federal law's reference to recclvery from the
Medicaid recipient's "estate" conferred
II'

68
authority to follow the assets from that estate and recover them from the people who received the property.
Thus, the courts that have considered the issue are split on the question of whether the narrow reference in section
1396P(b)(1) to recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient allows recovery only through a direct claim against that
estate, or whether recovery is also allowed from those who received covered assets from the Medicaid recipient's estate,
including the estate of a surviving spouse. Were this an ordinary question of statutory interpretaticlO,
interpretaticln, we w4)uld condude
prOVides only for recovery against the Medicaid recipient's estate, as the
that the plain language of the federal statute provides
Illinois court persuasively reasoned in Hines. But we are influenced by the principle that preemption of stah~ laws is
allOWing recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is consistent with both the
disfavored, combined with the fact that allowing
federal provision precluding recovery from the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a survivin9 spouse as
well as with the purposes of the federallegislation.(fn7) These additional considerations lead us to conclude that the split
in authority, in these particular circumstances, illustrates sufficient ambiguity about the intent of the federal estate
recovery language that we cannot say that Minnesota's reqUirement in Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. la, to Sf~k
reimbursement from the estate of a surviving spouse conflicts with federal law such that it is preempted.
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survivin!) spouse, and the
Accordingly, we hold that federal law does not preclude all recovery from the estate of a survivin9
authorization in subdivision la to make a claim against the estate of a surviving spouse is therefore not preempted. The
question remains whether federal law limits the scope of recovery against the estate of a surviving spouse and, in
particular, whether that recovery may reach all property previously held by the Medicaid recipient spouse either as
marital property or jointly with the surviving spouse during the marriage, as allowed by Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 2.

III.
We tum to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a surviving spouse's estate allowed under
Minnesota law is consistent with federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 2568.15 allows the state to recover from a
surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at
marriage." (Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority does not
any time during the marriage."
1396P(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993
conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 1396P(b}
amendments were intended to expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this

argument for broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent
conSistent with the dual goals of federal
law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting
community spouses from pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 1396P(b}(1}
1396P(b)(4} allows expansion of the estate only to include
allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 1396P(b}(4}
assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" recovery allowed
by subdivision 2 is preempted.
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of
the plain meaning of its language. Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre-1993 federal
m.3rriage but
law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of assets that were jointly owned during the m,3rriage
transferred by the recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed that authority to extend to assets that
were transferred before the death of the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882,885-86 (N.D.2000).

see

Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other than the Medicaid recipient's estate have
construed that authority to reach only assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time olf
o,f her death,
that is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state probate law or included in the
estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 1993 amendments to federal law. See
see Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27
(limiting recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006
(same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid
recovery statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under
• estate' in (section]
state probate law); Thompson, 586 N. W.2d at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of •estate'
clr interest in at
1396p(b)(4} extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits recipient' had any legal title (Ir
also In re Estate of Smith, No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CV,
M2oo5-01410-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Wl 3114250 at •."
•."
the time of death"');
death"'}; see a/so
(Tenn.ct.App. Nov. 1, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery against estates of surviving spouses have
death),
required that recipient had interest in assets at time of death).
surviving spouse's estatl!, our court of
Similarly, in relying on the 1993 amendments as authority for recovery from a surviVing
appeals acknowledged that the 1993 amendments limit the assets subject to recovery to those in which thE! Medicaid
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death. See Gu//berg,
Gul/berg, 652 NW.2d at 714 (hokling
(holding that Minn.5tat. §
2568.15, subd. 2, authorization to reach assets that were marital property or owned jointly at any time dUfl!ng
dUfling the
marriage, is partially preempted by federal law limitation to assets in which recipient had interest at time of death). And
8.Jrg, 722 NW.2d at 496 ("After Gul/bt.~, the
the court of appeals acknowledged that limitation again in this case. &1rg,
state's ability to recover was limited to the recipient's interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of the
recipient's death.").

see

As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting principle requiring

70
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an interest at the time of death is mrtz. Although the North Dakota court had acknowledged in its earlier Thompson
decision that recovery allowed under section 1396P(b} is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest
at the time of death (indeed that was the basis on which the court rationalized allowing recovery from the surviving
spouse's estate), 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3, the court held in Wirtzthat any assets conveyed by the ME!CIicaid recipient to
his spouse before his death were subject to recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. The court
1396P(b) to "assets in the surviVing spouse's estate that the Medicaid
stated that limiting recovery under section 1396P(b}
recipient had legal title to and conveyed through Joint
joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, SUrvivorship, life estate, or living
trust" would ignore the words "interest" and "other arrangement" in the federal law. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885.
Concluding that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied on the Congressional
intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-136. The court did
not explain why the same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was consistent with the limitation to rt:!Covery from assets
in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, yet also justified abandoning that limitation in Wirtz.
We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied
1396P(b)(4), is arrcmgements other
in Wirtz. The plain meaning of "other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396P(b}(4},
than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the time of the Medicaid recipient's death.
allows inclusion of
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional definition of "estate" clllows
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest
at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust, or other arrangement.
1396P(b}(4)(B} (emphasis added). The "including" clause further describes the assets that a state may
42 U.S.c. § 1396P(b}(4}(B}
include in this
thiS expanded estate. The clause describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjE!Ctive "such," and
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are "conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers
back to the immediately preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had an't' legal title or
interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to whom "such" assets may have bee'n conveyed·-a
conveyed--a
{emphasis added}.
"survivor, heir, or assign ofthe
of the deceased individual." Id. (emphasis
added). And finally, the clause describes several
methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place .-- "through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." Id.
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient having a legal interest at the time of
death. When we construe a federal statute we must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used." Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 5.0. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d
l.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To read "other arrangement" to include a
lifetime transfer would be to read the words "at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other
arrangement" cannot

71
include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context. "[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of examples of
conveyances that occur at the time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor" heir, or assign of the
deceased indiVidual,"
individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid recipient, must have died for the conveyance to
occur. A recipient cannot have heirs or survivors during
dUring his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "(Issign of the deceased"
during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language and its context, the conclusion of tht! Wlrlzcourt
that "other arrangement" is sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable.
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the federal law to allow recovery of assets in
which the Medicaid recipient did not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale for
finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates from the authority gr;!nted in the federal law
to recover from the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would nl,t
nl)t be part of the
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow
states to expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal law dearly limits
that expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold that
Mlnn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's
estate of assets that the recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any timedurinl~
timedurinl~ the
marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of
her death.
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IV.
This brings us to the question of whether Dolores Barg had any interest in property at the time of her death that
would allow the County to make a claim against the estate of her surviving spouse, despite her transfl:!f' of her joint
interest-at-time-ofinterest in the property prior to her death. As we have noted, the court of appeals acknowledged the interest-at-time-of
death limitation on spousal estate recovery, but nevertheless found that for these purposes Dolores retained a joint
tenancy interest at the time of her death that made the value of that interest recoverable from Francis's estate. Barg,
722 N.W.2d at 496, 497. Eschewing reference to either marital property law or probate law to determine the nature of
any interest at the time of death, the court of appeals looked to standard real property law and Gu//berg
Gu/lberg in deciding that
Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest. Id.
[d. at 496-97. We do not agree.
The court of appeals determined that Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest in the property baSE!d on its
understanding that the court in Gullberg
jOint tenancy interest because the lifetime transfer
Gu//berg had recognized a continuing joint
was an "other arrangement," and because the court apparently understood section 1396P(b)(4) to "explidtly allow[] a
jOint-tenancy interests
state to broaden the definition [of estate] beyond the meaning used in probate law and to include joint-tenancy
that have been prevkJusly conveyed to a spouse." [d. at 497. Section 1396P(b)(4) cannot be construed to include
indude lifetime
re.~uire that phrase
transfers of property in the phrase "other arrangement" because the plain language and the context n!l~uire
to be limited to conveyances occurring upon the death of the recipient. For that reason, we cannot

72
agree with the court of appeals' characterization of section 1396p(b)(4) as allOWing
allowing the expanded definition of estate to
include "previously conveyed" joint tenancy interests. The language of section 1396P(b)(4) requires that any interest
included in the expanded estate must be one in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death,
not one that was previously conveyed. We conclude that Dolores did not retain a joint tenancy interest in the property at
the time of her death, because that interest was effectively and legally transferred before her death.
The question remains whether Dolores had any other interest in the property at the time of her deal:h that may be
considered part of an expanded estate for recovery purposes under Minnesota law. We agree with the court of appeals
Jaw to find such an interest, because the statute in which marital property
that courts should not look to marital property law
is defined limits the definition to the purposes of that chapter. Minn.Stat. § 518.003, subds. 1, 3b (2006);(fn8) see Barg,
722 N.W.2d at 496. Similarly, we agree that the recognizable interests at the time of death cannot be limited to those
defined by probate law, because the purpose of section 1396P(b)(4) Is to allow states to expand the definition of estate
beyond probate law. See Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 497. We therefore agree that real property law prindples, informed by
principles of probate law, should be the basis for ascertaining any interests at the time of death. Any interest recognized
must be consistent with the underlying foundational rationale that recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is allowed
only because of its relationship to the recipient's estate, from which federal law expressly allows recovery. With those
principles in mind, we caution that for an interest to be traceable to and recoverable from a surviving spouse's estate,
prinCiples
the interest must be (1) an interest recognized by law, (2) which the Medicaid recipient held at the time o,f
olf death, and
(3) that resulted in a conveyance of an interest of some value to the surviving spouse that occurred as a result of the
recipient's death. Further, to the extent the interest is not part of the standard probate estate, Minnesota law must have
expanded the definition of estate to indude the interest, as authorized by section 1396P(b)(4).
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead and certificates of deposit no longer existed at the time of her death. No
other recognizable interest has been identified.
The County argues that the reference to marital property in subdiVision 2 reflects the Minnesota legislclture's intent
to make all marital property subject to spousal estate recovery. But subdivision 2 makes no reference to an interest at
the time of death or to re-defining the probate estate to include all marital property, even property transferred prior to
death. This is not surprising because subdivision 2 was enacted long before the optional estate definition authOrity was
added to federal law.
The district court indicated that because Dolores was married to Francis even after the transfer of her interest in the
homestead, she retained some interest in the property. But whatever that interest, it dissipated at Dolores's death,
rather than resulting in transfer of an interest of value to Francis.
We conclude that Dolores had no interest in assets at the time of her death that were part of a probate estate or an
Jaw, and therefore there is no
expanded estate definition permissible under federal law,
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73
basis for the County's claim against the estate.
Finally, we note that in 2003 the Minnesota legislature amended section 2568.15 by extending thE! definition of
estate for Medicaid recovery purposes to include assets owned by a recipient spouse in joint tenancy or life estate at the
5ess. 1751, 2205-2217
time of her death. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 40-50, 2003 Minn. laws 1st Spec. Sess.
256B.15, subds. 1, lc-lk). The amendments do not mention the other forms of
(codified as amended at Minn.Stat. § 2568.15,
conveyance at death listed in the federal definition of "estate," except that the "right of survivorship" is mentioned with
/d. subds. 1(a)(6), Ig, Ih(b). Thus, the legislature chose only to indude Mel
respect to joint tenancies. ld.
twcl forms of
jOint tenancy and life
ownership in the expanded definition of estate. Also, as provided in the federal law, the inclusion of joint
estate interests in the recipient's estate is expressly limited to interests the recipient owned at the time of death.
256B.15, subds. Ih(b)(2), 1i(a).
Minn.Stat. § 2568.15,
U(a). The amendments further limit the scope of recovery by e)(ernpting from the
lc through 1k
reach of subdivisions Ie
lk a "homestead owned of record, on the date the recipient dies, by the recipient and
the recipient's spouse as joint tenants with a right of survivorship." Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. 1(a)(6). In 2005, the
prOvisions continuing life estates and joint tenandes effective only fat' life estate and
legislature retroactively made the provisions
joint tenancy interests created on or after August 1, 2003. Act of July 14, 2005, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 4, art. 7, 2005 Minn.
256B.15, subd. l(c».
Laws 2454, 2649 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 2568.15,

It is difficult to discern the intended reach of the 2003 amendments.(fn9) If the pre-2003 law allowed recovery
against the surviving spouse's estate as argued by the County, there was little need to enact the 2003 almendments to
reach those assets in the case of a recipient who leaves a surviving spouse. The parties apparently agree that the 2003
amendments do not apply to or influence this case, for reasons that are not clear to us.
It suffices to say that even if the 2003 amendments were applicable, they would provide no basis fc,r
fClr the County's
claim. The new subdivision Ii specifically applies to circumstances in which a Medicaid recipient against whom a recovery
256B.15, subd. li(b). That subdivision provides
claim could otherwise be filed is survived by a spouse. Minn.Stat. § 2568.15,
prOVides
/d., subdl. 1(f).
1(t). If this
procedures for filing a claim without making a recovery until the death of the surviving spouse. ld.,
subdivision were to be applied to this case, several limitations would preclude recovery. Dolores Barg, the recipient,
owned no life estate or joint tenancy interest at the time of her death. If she had owned a joint tenancy at the time of
her death, it would have been a homestead owned of record by her and her spouse as joint tenants with a right of
/d., subd. 1(a)(6). Finally, that joint tenancy was
survivorship, and thus exempted from the reach of subdivision Ii. ld.,
established in the 1960s,
19605, well before August 1, 2003.
In summary, we hold that federal law does not preempt all Medicaid recovery from spousal estates, .md Minn.Stat. §
subel. la, is therefore not preempted to the extent it allows claims against the estate of a surviving spouse of a
2568.15, sUbd.
Medicaid recipient. However, the allowable scope of spousal estate recovery is limited. Subdivision 2 of sE!ction 256B.15
is preempted to the extent that it allows recovery from assets in which the deceased Medicaid recipient did not have a
legal interest at the time of death, and to

74
the extent that it permits recovery beyond the extent of the recipient's interest. Rnally, we hold that Dolores Barg had no
interest in property at the time of her death that can form the basis for recovery against the estate of Francis Barg.

v.
We have concluded that the County's claim for full recovery against all the assets in Francis Barg's estate was
preempted by federal law because recovery is limited to assets in which Dolores had an interest at the tim(~ of her death,
but the question of the appropriate remedy remains, because the County argues that the Estate waived the right to deny
the claim in its entirety. Although we have decided as a matter of law in our preemption analysis that the state is
preempted from requiring reimbursement from assets in a spouse's estate in which the recipient spouse had no interest
at the time of her death, that does not resolve the remedy issue here. Although a state may not compel payment from a
spouse's estate beyond the scope authorized by federal law, federal preemption does not preclude an estate from
voluntarily paying all or part of a claim that could not be compelled.
Here, the Estate only partially disallowed the County's claim, thus allowing the remainder of the claim. ,Minnesota
Statutes § 524.3-a06(a) (2006) provides that, on petition of the personal representative after notice to the daimant, the
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court may "for cause shown permit the personal representative to disallow"
disallow· a previously-allowed claim. But the personal
representative made no such request here. When questioned at the hearing in district court whether the personal
representative was challenging the entire claim of the County, the representative affirmed that he wa!; challenging only
the part already disallowed. When the district court affirmed that partial disallowance and the County appealed, the
Estate did not file a notice of review in the court of appeals to challenge the implidt award to the County of the allowed
part of its daim.
claim. A respondent who does not file a notice of review to challenge an adverse ruling of the district court
waives that issue in the court of appeals. See Minn. R. Ov.App.
av.App. P. 106; Ford v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R.
Co., 294 N.W.2d 844, 845 (Minn. 1980). Having partially allowed the County's claim
daim and having then failed to properly
seek a reversal of that allowance in both the district court and court of appeals, the Estate will not be permitted to seek
that relief for the first time in this court.
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court's denial of the
County's claim for full recovery is affirmed. The court's remand for an award to the County based on the existence of a
joint tenancy interest is reversed. The matter is remanded to the district court for entry of judgment based on the partial
allowance made, but not subsequently challenged, by the Estate.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
ANDERSON, PAUL H., J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
DIETZEN, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case.

Footnotes:
FNl.
FN1. "Medicaid" is the popular name for this cooperative federal-state program. See42 U.S.c. § 13S16-1396v (2000).
In Minnesota it is referred to as "medical assistance." Minn. Stat. § 2568.02, subd. 8 (2006).
FN2. For purposes of determining eligibility of one spouse for Medicaid, the value of a couple's home is excluded. 42
U.S.c. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (5) (2000); 42 U.S.c. § 1382b(a)(1)(2oo0). In the asset assessment for Dolores IBarg, $104,875
was excluded. This amount corresponds to the value of the home, one jointly-owned vehicle, and a buriall
burial lot. When
completing the asset assessment, a portion of the couple's resources is reserved for the needs of the spouse not
applying for Medicaid. 42 U.S.c. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (f)(2)(A) (2000). Protected assets for the nonrecipient !;pouse,
!ipOuse, Francis
Barg, were calculated to be $24,607.
FN3. The Commissioner's motion to supplement the record on review is granted as to the following documents:
North Dakota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 95-016; Indiana Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 05-012; Idaho
Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 01-006; and Minnesota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No.
No. 06-10. The motion is
denied as to the e-mail correspondence dated November 4, 1999.
FN4. Formerly the Health care Financing Administration (HCFA). See Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Sl!~.
Si!~. v. Blumer,
534 U.S. 473, 479 n. 1, 122 5.0. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d
LEd.2d 935 (2002).
FN5. Throughout this opinion, our discussion of spouses is premised on circumstances similar
simila,. to those' of the Bargs.
One spouse, who we refer to as the recipient spouse, applies for and receives Medicaid benefits. The other, who we refer
to as the community or surviving spouse, receives no Medicaid benefits and survives the recipient spouse.
FN6. The Estate sought cross-review on this issue of "whether the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly
paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a surviving spouse." We requested briefing on whether that
issue had been adequately preserved for review. The County argues that the Estate failed to preserve the issue because
it only partially disallowed the County's claim, it confirmed before the district court that only the disallowed portion of the
claim was contested, and it asked the court of appeals to affirm the district court's decision. The County's arguments go
to the scope of the remedy available in this case, an issue that we address infra. But this issue also has a IE!gal aspect
independent of the specifIC scope of recovery available in this case. That legal component is necessary to a thorough
analysis of the preemption issues presented here, and we will therefore address the issue in that context. No new or
controverted facts are needed in order to address this purely legal question, and no prejudice will result from our
consideration of the issue because the parties addressed the issue in their briefs to the district court, the court of
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appeals, and this court. See Watson v. United.5etvs.
United Setvs. Auto.

Assn, 566 N.W.2d 683,687-88 (Minn. 199'7).

FN7. The United States Supreme Court has described Congress's passage of the anti-impoverishment provisions as
an effort to "protect community spouses from • pauperization' while preventing financially secure couples from obtaining
480, 122 S.O. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935
Medicaid assistance." Wis. Dep't of Health a Family.5etvs.
Family Setvs. If.
v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, <$80,
(2002). Allowing recovery from a spouse's estate does not risk impoverishing a community spouse, bE!Cause the spouse
must be dead for the recovery to occur. Nor does it impede the furnishing of Medicaid benefits to other impoverished
individuals; indeed, it can be expected to do quite the opposite. See West Virginia v. u.s. Dep't of HaJIth
HaJ/th a Human
Ser\o5'.,
5"er\o5'., 289 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Or.2002) (noting that Congress expected the estate recovery provisions to allow
government to realize savings of $300 million over flve years, and that the savings have been even g,.,eater).
g"eater).
FN8. Formerly Minn.Stat. § SI8.54, subds. 1, 5 (2004).
FN9. The parties' supplemental briefs shed little light on this question.
MN
N.W.2d
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No. 08-603
LBo Voe, DnmCl'Oa,
MU,I E LAcs CoUNTY.
DIRECI'Oa, MU,l
SERVICES AND WKLFARE
MINNE9OI'A. FAMILY SBRVICES

DEPAR'l'MENT, ET AL., PETITIONERS
PETrrlONERS
DEPARTMENT,
fl.

MICHAEL F. HAaG
ON PTif'If'ION FORA WlU'l'OFCBRf'IORARI
ro 771. SUPRBM6 COURf' OF MlNN8SOf'A

lJNlI'ED STATES AS A.lUClJ8 CUlllAB
CU1llAB
BRIEF FOa THB UNlI'ED

Thia brief is tiled in reapOlUl8 to the Court's order
invitin, the Solicitor General to expreae the viewa of the
invitinl
Statea, the peti
petiUnited Statea. In the view ot the United State8,
tion for a writ ot certiorari should be dented.
STA.TEMENT
1. .. The Medicaid Pl"OII'aDI.
Pl"OII'aDI, established in 1966 in
Title XIX of the
Act). 42
tbe Sodal Security Act (MedIcaid Act),
U.S.C. 1396 ., aeq., is a cooperative federal-etate pr0
U,S.C.
pr0gram under which the tederalgovemment provld. fund
fundlnl
In, to Statu to provide medical auiltance to eligible
McRQ,f, «8 U.S. 297.
297, 301
needy pertlODi. Ham. v. McRa.I,
(1980).

To participate in the Medicaid prorram. a State must
develop a plan 8peeitytng,
epeeitytng, among other thing.,
things, the eat&
eat&goriea ot Individuall who win receive medical sulttanee
(1)
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\l.Dder the plaA aacl
uacl the apeelfta Idnda of medlcal care ancl
wtll
coyered. a U.S.C.
wtU be covereeL
u.s.o. lase..
laeea. State
MedJMecltcatd plana are nmfl'W'ttd
nmfl'W'ed bJ' the Centel"ll tor MedI
s.-ria. (OMS)
care aacl Medicaid s.-riae.
COMS) (tOnDerV
CtOnDerV th. BeaJtb
0 .... Ftnaa~
Ftnaa~ Admlftlatratton) 1ft the DtIpArim.st
DtIpArim.s~ ot
a_tb aDd Ruman 8erYtcee (AHS). 48 U.S.O. 1888; . . .
se Feci. R...
R ... sa,48" (2001). U OMS
CMS approv. a Staw'.
se
plaD.. the State t. th..-.atter
P1aD..
th.....tt.er eUaible for federal retm.
ba.........
t for a apedtleet
ba.......ent
apedtlect pereentap of the amoaDt.
-ex:pe1lded • • • _ medical .....taDee
......;alle:. ODder the State
Illexpeuded
plan." .u U.S.C. 18geb(a)(1),
18geb<a)(1), 18Hd(b).
r.qu ..... parttdpatJns Staw.
b. Tbe Medicaid Act ..-qu.....
Statee
too provide Medicaid benetlta
benetlt. to the Mcateprical
Mcatepricalto
Iy needy." that fa. tba..
tb~ pel'Wcma eJIaIble tor ftaaac:ial __
ei8t.anee uDder apecifted
apectfted lederaJ
lede..aJ prop-amL A.~tU
A.~,.,.
ei8tanee
Y. Roi".,.,.,
•.
R""."., 47'7 U.S. IN, 167 (1986); aee a V.S.ct
u.s.c:.
'I"¥t~ that
. .'I"¥t~
tha~

(VII).
18Na<a)(10)(A)(J)(IV). (VI) and (VI!).
permtt. 8tatee to extend btta.ftt.
bea.ftt. to
The Act &lao permtta

--meclle~ fteeCl7.·
fteeCl7.- that.
th.to ... "penlO~
"pe!'llO~ lacldn• the abO
abOthe --meclle~
1t7 to P&7
Pa.F tar medial e:xpeneee, but with lDcomee too
1..... to quaU(J tor catAtlOrlaallllNdat.Ulce."
catAtlOrlaallllNdat.aace." 8e1twftJtser
8~ ••
Y.
GrdtI POftIMr., 451 U.S. N.
N, 8'7 (1981); . . . a U.S.c.
U.S.C.
qlUlllf7 .. medtcaJb' 1leed7.
1leed7••
18Na(a)(10)(C). To quallfT
a penon
htper tbaD a defIJu!d tJuoeaho1d
tJuoeahold aad
&Dd
mq h . . . Ineame no hlper
mQ O'WII - . t a ot DO more thaa a deftned ."11..
y"a.. It the
qualJ(yfa.
_ete of a MedJcald appUcaat e.o.ad the quaU(yfa.
t.bre.hold
••be muet ".pend down" her
h .......
tlaq
t.bretthold••be
....&.8 until thq
..... at or below the quaJlt,ylDa
quaUt,yIDa tJuoeuolcl. S.
S . . 42 U .8.C.
189&1(a)(1 '7).
WIleD • married penOD .. lnatitutionallHd In •a nunnun
other
home or oth.
. tadlIt,', the Medfeald Act eoD8fdere the
_eeta of both the tDadtattOllallsed
tnadtationallsed .po",
.po. . . and the non
nonbwdt.adonalfad. or Hcommunit7."
Hcommunit7.- apoa..
apoa .. In determtn·
bwdt.adonalwed.
Ina the appUout·.
eUctbDlty to..
~D.ftte. 48 U .8.C.
appUoaJI'·. eUcfbDlty
to.. "'aeftte.
.S.C.

tn.
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.......
........

1898r-6(c). To preYetlt
preveDt the

•

cOlDlllUDI~ apou.
apou. . C&"OID
fl"OlD
cOlDlllUDI~

beia8

Impov
..... bed . . . reaalt.
apeDd-(hnwn or
of
Impov.....bed
naalt. of • required apeDd-chnwn
UMt8, tile datate
. . . .pte certaiD ....u,
data
uaeta, aacb . . the
coapl.·a
l_t~aX1),
coapl.'a bom. aDd aD automobUe, d U.S.C. l_t~aX1),
laaer-a(c)(a),
retain
laaer-a<c)(Ii), Aftd aUow.
aU~ the comm1llllt7 apoaae to retaiD
• ftrtaID 11....
.... of re.oureee
tacome that. .... not COIl
COIll'eIIOUI"Cee aDd lllcome
alderecl ••
ailable to Pt9 for the appllCUlt'.
appllcuat'. medteal
medieal care,
••ailable
-&2 U.8.0. 1
....
-l(d) ...d (t)(S).
(1)(21). See WUootwiti
WUootwi. D.re
D.-pre qf
1.
. . .-l(d)
S..... Y. BI",...,., 8M U.9••
-nI, .
.
H..uA .. FGWlU. 8
U.9. ''nI,
..,
(2002) (aati-lmpcwerlaluDeat pI'OVIaIoaa
proviaIoaa are LatentJed to
""prot.ect.
·pauperi..uoo· wha.
MpI'Ot4tCt. com m umlo7
uDit.7 apou_ froom ·pauperi..uoo'
PNYtllltm. tbuanetall7
tbuanetal17 aecare coup... from obtaln ' n •«
Medteatd
FurthenaOl"8, IIltboup the :Medl
:MedlMedteald ~..,.
~"). FurthenaOl"e,
cald Act pnerall7 torblcla a Med:leafd appUcaat or her
tzoaDaferrlq ....... at below ~ yalae
spoue from tn.Daferrlq
Yalae In
order to become eUaible
eUetbl. tor
for bendig, U U.8.0.
U.S.O.
18Mp(c)(1)(A),
exPreul7
applt18Mp(c)(1)(A). the .tatuta
atatuta .
.p.....17 permlta the applt
cant. to ........,
. . . . . . . tDclacUq
mclacUq -1A~t
-1A~t III
ta the hom.
home........,.
ateacI,
UI98p(.c)(2).
8teaCI. to the commWlft,y
COIDIDUDft,y apou_, . . U .8.0. UI98P(,c)(2).
ODce the lDatltudcmalfMd
lDatitudonalfMd apouae Ie determiDe4 1~ be
elt.sble
.. that "no re
re.I~ble for beDeftq, tbe atat.ute provfd
provfd..
lIOarce. of the commaDit7 apoaae aball be deemed avail
available to th.
apoaa....
the bYtitatloaallzecl apoaa..
II
402 U.S.O. 18gerlaser
IS(c)(4).

o. Aa a pneral raJ
.. the MecUca!d ~ torbld8 State.
raJ..

tram _eki
. . r8Coyel7 of Medicaid beDeflta
_eki.

that were
eorrect17 .-Id.
pmd. a U.S.O. 18Mp(bX1);
18Mp(bXl); _ aiM) 42 U ..9.C.
..9.C.
1398.(a)(18). The .tat.UN prOYtdea aD
1398.(.)(18).
an esc:eptloD,
esceptioD. llIow
bow_tata of certatD lnetltattoa
ever, tor NOOYft7 from tbe Mtata
InetitattODaItsed aDd older beaeftotartea.
B.lore
proviafoll
B.fore 1998, the Medicaid Act'. recOYe17 provtafoll
permitted, but did Bot
require. Statea
State. to reccwer benefit..
11M require,
benllfttll
paid OD b.balt
lIuHvldu·
b.ba1t of certalllllldlYldaala,
certalllllldh1daala, from the Imdtvldu·
eatatea.
d U.S.C. 18Np(b)(1)(B) (1081). tn 1998,
ala' ••
tatea. 42
1998.
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Congreae amended Section 1396p to reqaire States to
recover correctl,. paid benetita in eertatD
eertaiD drcwnataDce8.
drcwnataDcea.
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993), Pub.
L. No. 103-66, I 13612, 107 Stat. 62'7. AA amended, the
Act'. e.tat.reeovery
e.tat..reeovery pruvlaloD requires States to aeek
recover)"
permarecoveq in the cue ot an iadividuai
iJlwvidual who was perma
nently iaatitutionalUed, "2
42 U.S.C. 1396P(b)(lXA),
1396P(b)(1)(A), and m.
UJ.
the cue of a person who received, at age 56 or thereat
thereafter, nursin, facility
communitytacilit,. semeee,
serneee, home and community
based servicee, or related hospital and prescription drug
services, 4Z U.S.C. 1996p(b)(l)(B).
1996p(b)(I)(B). In addition, a State
haa the option to seek recovery ot the coat or ot.her itema
or aervleea paid on behalf of
ot individuals over the age ot
56. Ibid. The recover)'
recovel')' "may be made only after the
death ot the individual's surviving spouse, it
if &n)","
an)"," and
only at a time when the indivfdual hu no 8urvfvtnr chil
children Qnder the age at 21 or children
chlldren who are blind or
dllabled. 42 U
.S.C. 1396p(b)(2) and (2)(A). Such recov
recovU.S.C.
erJ may be waived in caaea where it "'would
"Would work an un
undue hardship." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(3).
The statute provide. tor recovery of the COlt of
at bene
benefita
ftta paid on behalf of an individQal over the age of 65
from "the Individual's
Individual'. estate." 42 U.S.C. 1396P(b)(1)(B).
The term "estate,"
"eatate," tor tboee
tbOl!le pUI'pOI88,
pul'pOIeB, "shall include all
real and personal propert,. and other MIIeta Included
within the indfvtdual's
aa denned tor purpoae.
purpoaes of
indfvtdual', estate, 81
State probate law." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(bX4)(A). The stat
statute further provides that an individual's "estate"

may inelude, at the option ot the State • • ., any
other real aDd
and per80nal property and other aaaeta In
which the individual had aD¥ legal title or Intereat at
the time of death (to the extent at such
sucb interest), in
includlns
c1udlns luch aaaete
auete conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
asaip ot t,he deceaaed individual through joint ten
ten-

:~
~
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5
ancy, tenancy In common, survivonhip, life e.tate,
estate,
t.ruat, or other arrangement.
living t.ru.t,
42 U.S.C. 1396P(b)(')(B).
1396P(b)(")(B).
2. Since 1987, Mlnneeota law haa
recovh.. provided for recov
reclpieDt.'s
ery of Medicaid beneftta from the estate of a reclplent.'s
surviving apouee,
apoUH, ae well .. from the eetate of • recipi
recipisurvivtng
ent.. Act of JUDe 12,1987,
12, 1987, ch. 408, art. 2, f 82 (Minn. St&t...
ADD. t 2668.15 (2007). MInnesota's estate-recovery law
Ann.
provid.
provides that M[a] claim aaainat the estate of a surviving
assistance, for medl
medlspouse who did not receive medical usiatance,
predeceued apouee, is
eal aulstanee rendered lor the predeceased
UNte of the estate that were
lfmtted to the value of the asNtI
marital property or Jointly owned property at any time
durlna tile marriage." MInD. Stat. AnD. 1 256B.l&, BUbel.
durtnl
2(2007).
8. In 2aa..
2()().6, petitioner tiled a claim against the estate
of Francll Barr, In whleb he .ought recovery of Medicaid
benetita paid on behalf of Mr. Barg's predeceaaed
spouse, Dolores Bar,. Pet. App. 4L I
..
a. Darin. their marri..e,
marri..e, the Sarp purchased real
property In Princeton, Minnesota, to wblch thq took
title &IS joint tenanta. In 2001, Me.
Ma. Barg entered anura
anuralng home, and shortly thereafter applied
applted lor, and re
received,
ceived. long-term Medicaid benefttl.
beneftta. Pet. App. !a-Sa.
Ms. Bug subsequently tranaferred
traDaferred her joint tenancy
intere8t in the homestead property to Mr. Barg. At the
intereat
time of the tr8JUlfer, the l118eued value of the property
wu S120,800.
S120.8OO. Ma. Barg also terminated her ownenhlp
ownership
interest in certificates of deposit the couple had held
3.-4..
jointly. It!.. at 3.-4
..
I On March 2,
Z. 200t, this CourtsnnWd
Courtsnnt«l the State ~MlnDeIota'. eon
c0ndltlonal
I*tllUped wi~ petitioner VO&. An
ditional motion to IntriC'.
Intrl.n. II a i*tllUped
All
reteNneee in thJa brfef
brief to '"petIUonr'
ref...
reter.neee
'"petIUonar" ref
... to peUtioaIr VOL

0td

~:0t
~:0t

600Z 91 'Inc
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havinl received a total of
Ma. Barl died In ZOO4, havln.
beneftt. tbroulh the
beneftta
.ta~ Medleald proll'UD.
proll'am. Mr. Bars cUed an montU
.ta~

'I08,~la.68 In medlc:al·...latance
medlc:al-uatatance
'los.~la.68

later. Pet. App. u.

B...... atate. petitioner
b. In h18 claim aca1nat Mr. B......
tun amount 01 Medlcald benetlta
lOulht \0 recover the tull
paid OD bebalt ot Ma.
ML Bq. PeL App. 4L Respondent,
repreaentatl-te of Mr. BaJ'I"l
BU'J'I ..ute,
..tate, allowed
who" the repreaentatfote
.,880 .. a claim ..aiMt the Atate.
ntate. but d1eallowed
. .,880
844,538.63.
$44.538.63. Ibid.·
c1aim-allowance petition in .tate
Petitioner tlled a claim·allowance
state
dlaallOWUlce.
coart. 'nie diatrict eourt
court upheld the partial dlaallOWaDce.
PeL App. 48a-61L The court reUed on the MiDneeota
Court of Appeala' dec1lloD In I.
o/~,
I" "" E.~ 01
G14llIwrr,
N. W.2d 701 (2002),
Minneaota',
661 N.W.2d
(200%), which held that. Minnaota'.
ntate-reeoyel'11aw fa preempted luotar .. it permit.
Atate-reeoyel'11aw
th...tate that
reeov..,. up "to the value of tbe uaeta or th...
marital propertY' at aDJ
bewere marit&1
aD1 poiDt in the marrfap, be
caue a U.S.C. 13gep(b)(2XB) permitl rec:overy on1r"to
Medicald recipient', IDtereei
IJltereei at the
the extent of" the Medicaid
G~. 862 N.W.2d at 714. The court
time otdeaLb. G~.
concluded that, at time of her death, MI. SUI'.
SU'1'8 interest
te of Mr. BuTpropin the ....
ueete
BuT' e.tate tha& were marital prop
includin,alit.
mterellt In the homntad and
includin,alit. .tate lntereet
a perso....
perso.... property aDOWUlC!8, totaled N8,880. Pet. App.
6C)a·61L
6Oa·61L
c. The Minnesota Court. of Appeal. revened ad
remanded tor reweulation 01 petitioner'.
petitioner', allowable
claim. Pet. App. 52&-Ua. Like the dlttrlet
dlttrlct court., the

erv,

*,880.

.-u.r
.-u-r

a-pondenr•
lI10wlllCl of .
__
IIIPIJWltlJ l"IItAId «III
«18
• a-pondenr•
lIlowlllCl
. IIJIIIIWltlJ
tM ...... til.
thll& Ma. Bq(l)bM . . .
tn tbebom.tMd,
valued at
die am.
dim atMr deItII, dIIpite tbe In_YIvoIInM
In_YIvoIInMr...
r... and (2).
(2) . . . _titl.d
_titl.t to. p.naaaI pros-tJ aIJowmeIlD
aIJowmee III tile amoanl
~
See Pe&. App. _

".11&

w .....
......

seooo.
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court of appeals concluded that., under rederal
federal law,
law. the
claim was neeeaaaril7limited
Barl's
neeeaaariJ7limited to the value of Me. Barl'.
interest in speclfted
specltled aaaete at the time at her death.
Id.. at 68a (citing Gullb.,."
Gullb..,." 652 N.W.2d at 714). The
court 01 appeala conclnded, however, that Ms. Barg's
interest in t.he homestead at the time 01 her death W8II •
joint tenauq
teD.allq intereet,. valued sa a one-half interest In the
property's value of $120,800, or $60,0&00. I do at 62a.
d. The Minnesota Supreme Coart
Court afftrmed in part
and reversed in part, concluding that petitioner wu not
entitled to full reeovery from Mr. Barl's estate. Pet.
App.1a-45a.
~ an initial matter,
matter. the conrt rejected respondent's
contention that federal law completely preempts Minne
Minnesota's
Iota's estate-recovery law fuolar u It permit. reeovery
from the estate of the Medicaid recipient'. surviving
apouse. Pet. App. 19a-30
.. The court concladed
concluded that
19a-30..
allowing recovery from a surviving spouse's ettats
eetats 18
is Con
Conalstent
with
both
the
Act',
preeluaion
ol
recovel'1
from
st.tent
Act's preelusion
the Medlcatd
ola
Medicaid recipient'. estate unUl after the death 01
a
surviving spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2)(A), u well .. the
pUrp08es of the Medicaid Act', recovery provisiona. Pet.
App.29a.
however, that federal
law
The court concluded, however.
tederalla
... Itmlte
limite
the scope of recovery qalnat a sut'Viving spoule's
spoule'.
estate to the value ot useta in which tbe recipient spouse
had an interest "at the time of death," 42 U.S.C.
1396P(b)(4)(B), and thereby preempt8
preempta Minne,ota',
Mlnn8lota's
insofar 88 it pennJta the Stats
estate-recovery law lnsofar
to reach any other asaeta
asaetl "that were marital proper
properproperty at an, time durillg tIN mtlr
t.y or joinUy owned property'"
mtlrnag_." Pet. App. 31a (quot1n, MInn. Stat. Ann.
nag....
I 256B.16, subd. 2 (2007); see ilL at 308-37a.

Bar".

or

lId

~0:01

60BZ 91 '(nr
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The court tGrther coDcluded that Ma. 8are
Bare did Dot
hh....
.... &a¥
&IS¥ lDtereat III t.be
the homeatead or baDk acc:OUDta at.
the tJme of her death.
. . ah. had tl'uaf.rred
truaf.rred her
death, beeau
beeau.
iD
. . . . . ill
in tlioee .
__
De died. The
iD.
. .toe
t.e to Mr. B
8 .... beIww
beIw'e.e
court therefore held that petitioner hed no 1.
lep
entitle. . . entitle
ment. to ••tiaI.cUOD ot
lroaa tboee __ .
0' the SteW. cllaim lroaI
_t..
_u. Pet.. App. lTa~
lTa~ Bat. becauae reepondeat b.s
part;ialq aUvwed pet.ltlOll8l"a
pet.ltlcmer'a c:Jaba,
chelleapeS
C:JabD. aDd D8Yer cbaneapeS
the dlatrict eoart·.
.ward 01 that. partial allOW1lDC. of
eoart·.......d
.,880,
MlDDe.ota Supreme Court held that ped
•
•880. the MiDDe.ota
ped-

tloner eould NCOYeI"
4&8.
rec091!l" that amount. 1tJ. at ..... 468.
DI8C1JII8ION

The M'iallMOta
Mlan...,.,. Supreme Court'. dedmoD
dec:l_OD .. eorrect
aDd doea Dot "IIIFUTIUIt
nview. n. federal
"III"UTIUIt lUrtber nvtew.
Medtc:aid Act JMll"lDltII
COIT8CtI7 paid beD.tIw
beDeflw
JMI"IDitil recoYeI'J'
recoYWJ' at COIT8CtJ7
from
apouee. bat
trom the .tate
atate of the reclpleat'a
reclpl_t'a nrririuc apouee,
limit.
_ _til lD wbleb tale
ttmlta that r"eCO'f'er"
recO'f'er" to the yalue of __
rec:1pleat. had •a le.-t
le~ bltereet at the Ume
UIDe of h_ death.
AltboaSb the ....wt Sa
bI tibia c:Me dUI'en froID tile NMIlt
b:a I.,.,...
aooo). the
/.,.,... B.toN
BnoN qfWiN, eoT N.W~
N.W.2d 881 (N.D. aooo),
dtaq'reem.Dt about. tile
dtftenac:e ID&7 not; reflect a dtaqTeemeDt
the
KedJc:akt law. but 01117 cItY.leat COD
mean1Da 01 tederal KedJc:akllaw.
CODcl_ou
• .., uDder
fIIdfvfduai re
reel_o... abou' wh
wh....
UDder .tate law, .. tIIdtvfduai
tIdu alepllDtuut
alepllDt4ll'Ut III &IMUI COIIYe,wd
COIIY8J'Id to • apoo... The
taaa..
petttloa tor • wrtt of eertJOI'U'I .b01lld
.1l0000d be denied.
petitiOil
A.. ft.
TIle.,.......
o.c..- 01 ..................
............... ,. . . . Cotut Ia c...

qfW""',

"JI'"

r.a
MlDDeaota Supnme Colllt
1. The MiDDeaota
Coan correotl7 con
con-

--irina'

torblda peddoDer
petitioDer trom
eluded that the MecUcaid Act torbida
co~ paid benetlte trom
to reoover co~
from .-eta In
..hleh
Medicaid recipient had DO lep.llDtene&
..
hleh the Medleatd
leplblt.ene& at the
time of her death.

------------------------------ --,------
-----,-------------_.
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Und. . the Medicaid Act. • State general17
genera117 m&¥
mA¥ DOt.
Und.
ec:tq paid Medleald benetlta. a
Mek to nteO'91tr COl I ectlT
prorid... bowwyer, that.
U.S.C. 18Hp(b)(1). The Act prorid...
State (1) "'
... Hell.
of 1Iunm.
re"'...
Mel&. reeqy~ ot
II~ home Uld re
lated bezletlta
baletlta palcl on behalf of UllDdtYldual oyer the . . .
•••tate" .. deftAed by .tate
ot &6 froID "the iDdh1chtu·
lDdh1chtu·•••
probate law; aDcS
optJOII, d4lftn. "th. Indt
aDCS (2) mow, 8& lte optJoa.
Indt..__.... In
'ridual'. _tate"' more broadl,y to malad. AII7 ..__....
Inter. .,
., - ' the
wbich the iDc:UYldual had Ul7lepl title or Inter.
of death (to tbe extent. of aucb intereat).
tlm. 01
Intereat). iDdudJDar
eta coDveyed to • aanWor, hell'
heir or -'aD of the
such ...
uaeta
deee_d iDclhidaal
IDclhidaal tbrouall Joint teDaDq. tenanC!7 In
COIIUIlOa, aantronhlp, ute _tate, 1tnnS tr1a....
tr1a.... 01' other
COIiUIlOa,
lII'I"UlPJDeDL If a U.s.o.
llMp(b)(l)(B), (b)(4)(A) aDd
lII'I"UlPJDeDt."'
U.S.O. 11Mp(b)(1)(B),
M.tfcald Am.. which permita neover,r
(D). Tbua, til. M.s:tcald
onb alter the deatb oftbe
of the reetpt_t'.
reetpt_t'••81J1'.iYhc
,u.IYhc apoa.
.,
apoa...
aat.bon.. a State to m••
m•• reim
retma U.S.C. 1898P(b)(JI), aathon..
bunemeat claim . . . .'t the lIamvtnc
aamvtnc epou.e'.
bUneDleat
.~'. eataC4.
...&1_ of IUQ' . . . .to. In which the Medicaid rec:i~
rec:i~
up to tbe ...&1_
teat had • 1••&1
••&1 iDternL
tDtei'nL at. the time ot her death.
ieat
Th. Mlnneaota .tate-reeovel')' law exceed. the acope
authOriaatiOD. It pennlta
permlta the State to reeover
of that authOriaattOD.
apoua.'a _tate MU1e
MUae value of the ....ta
from a .al"Ytvbla apouee'a
..tate that.
propert:;y orJotDtI,y
or JotDtI,y owned
01 the ..tate
that were marital propel1:.y
~
U".. d"ring tIN mAf"t"'iag.,"
mGf"t"'iag.," Minn. Stat..
Propert7 ca'
U"N
AIm. • 2688.16, IIGbeI. a (100'1) (mnphuia
(mnph . . . added), without
withou'
recard to wh.ther tbe recipient. retaiaed . . iDtere.t lD
Becau. . a State !DaY
the ....ta at the time of her datil. Becau.
DOt. ncoYer cornetl7
cornet1J' paid Medicaid beneftta except to
the extellt authorised boY federal law,
law. He a U.9.0.
U.S.O.
Minnesota'. atatute coatUc:ta with federaJ
18Hp(b)(1), Mlnne80ta'.
lederaJ
tIIereloN preempted. S •• Col~_
Col~_ , • .
law and fa tIIereioN
4- Loa" A •• '" v. GKanu.
Sq..,. 4'
GKanu, 479 U.S. 2'72. 280-282
(198'7).
(198'7>.

GA..beI.

m.
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2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 20-28) that the tat of the
Medicaid Ad imposes no limit on permiaaible recoverJ
from the
t.he estate of the Medlc:aid recipient's surviving
the Act definel
.....ete" to in
inspoue., because t.he
deftnel the term .....ete"
clude "alllncome and resoQI'Cea
resovc:ea of the individual and ot
Accordthe individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C.l396p(hXl). Accord
ing to petitioner, u(b 17 ineludln, resources of both 'the
Individual' and 'of the individual', epouee' in the meaning
IPOuae'S
of 'aalete:
'aBeete: Congren clearly Intended that the spouae's
resources fall within the scope of IlS96P(bX4XB)." Pet.

27.
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general atatuatatu
"aasete" does enrompaae resources
tory defmition of "aBsete"

ot

both "the iDdfTidual" (i
(i....
.. , the Medfeaid recipient) and
"the individual', epoule," the partic:ular
particular provleton of the
fesue here
bere reten specltlcally
specJtlcaDy to ~ "as
"asMedIcaid Act at flsue
seta in which tla. indi11iclv.al had any legal titJe
tltJe or interinter
(emeat at the time of death." 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(4)(B) (em
phaala added). PetlUol1er's argument finds It necueary
phaals
elaule to read "'any • • • useta
ueeta in
to rewrite that elauee
which
[sith4W Of' boCA tM individual and tM
eM i·ncliviclteal'.
i·nclivicltcal'.
whjch [sithlW
any legal title or intereat.'" Pet. 28 (brack
(brack",oua.) had an,.
eta and asteriks in original) (emphaeie added). But this
'" etl
nothln,leea than make the statute say the
editing doea nothlu,leea
lanruage of the operopposite of what It
The plain language
oper
ative provision of the Aet retutes petitioner's reading.'

"ye.

• In d8letfbm, the QP8I'StJoa of
or the amended ~~
.tat.e-~ ~
1M amendmenta alto loc:uMd on
vilJon. the legtalattvw
legtalattfw hiItory 01
of th. 1_
the USN 01 the individual who hid received Medicaid beneftq, rather
thUl the .--oun:..
.-.o~ at both dle individual and hiI or he' lpoute. See

g.R. Cont.
Rep, No. 211, lCltd eon,., 11& Sea 886 (1988) (..
At eM
".R.
Coni. Rep.
("At
1l1OU1b~
option of the State. the ettate .,.mat
Iplnat [whN:h) • • • reetJIIfIq
reetJ1I«1l1lOU1b~
pzopeit7.
may IndudeuJI'MI
Include Illy real 01' penonal
personal POI*t7
'" other ...... 1n
In wbfell toW

~td ~:e1

600Z 91 'Inc
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3. Petitioner's readinJ
&lao linda
readiDJ of the Medicaid Act aJao
little support in the Act's other provfaiona
provfatona concerning the
treatment of spousal aaeeta. See Pet. 27-28. AI, peti
petitioner note., the Medicaid Act generally eoulden
(oulden the
community spou.e'. uaeta for purpoeee of determining
institutionalized individual ia elipble
whether an instltutlona1.lzed
eliaibJe to re
receive benentl.
propbenefitl. But the Act also exempts certam prop
home, from consideration,
erty, such as the couple'. home.
consideration. 4!
1396r-5(c)(5), and aJlowa the commu
U.S.C. 1382b(aXl), 1396r-5(cX5),
community spouse to retain certain amounts of reaoureea and
income t.hat are not considered available to pay for the
appllcant'l medical care, 4.2
42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and (1)(2).
Moreover, once the irultitutionalized spou••
spou •• fa deter
determined to be eJigible
proeligible for beneftu,
beneflta, the Medicaid Act pro
uno resources of the community spouse shall
videa that "no
be deemed available to the fnltftutfonaJfzed
fnltftuUonaJfzed spouse." 42
imU.S.C. 1396r-5(cX4). The Medicaid Act, in abort, Im
poe.e
limitations on petitioner's asserted
aaserted
poe.. 8ignllleant
eignllleant UmftaUona
prfndple that "spouses are expected to support each
other." Pet. 27. To read Section 1396P(b)(4XB)
1396P(bX4XB) in accor
accordance with ita plaiD terms thus is consistent with the
broader stat.utory scheme.
4. Because Section 1398p(b)
1396p(b) leavee DO ambiguity
about limiting spousal estate recovery to the value of
asaete in which the Medieafd recipient had a legal
le,al inter
interest at the time of death, the presumption agaInat
agalnat pre
preemption does not come into play, Pet. 28 (cfttnr Mtdtrrm
Mtdtrrm·
LoA.,., 518 U.S. 470, 486 (l996)~en
ic, I'M. v. LoA",
(1996)~en alsum
as8uming, arguendo, that thil presumption hu
baa force In the COD
CODtext of a comprehenstve
procomprehensive federal-state cooperative pro
gram Uke
sublike Medicaid in which the State'. program Is sub
~ hid any Ifill Utle or InterMt at t.lM
tM time at death, iueludfnl

the home.
., (empbaRIldded).
home..,
(empbllUldded).

~td ~:0t
~:0t

60BZ 9t '(nc
·(nc

:~
:
~
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jed to lederal
petIfederal approval. And for simUar reMone, petI
tioner's aUlle.tion that. the declslon below improperl,.
enforces &piNt
agaiNt Lhe
Lbe State "[ajn ambipoua condiUon" on
the
Clause
lobe ac:eeptaDce of federal funda under Spending Clauae
legtalatfoD lacks IIDf merit. PeL 28 n.8 (citing Ariitlgtcm
C",," SeA..
BtL 0/ Edvc.
CetIl
ScJa.. Did. Bd.
Edvc.. v. Mu",h"
MU17'h" 648 U.S. 291,
296 (2006».
Petitioner aIao ern (Pet. 2O-ZS, 28 n.S) In
that the Minneaota
MlnOe80ta Supreme Court'. Interpretation ot
Section 1896P(b)(4}(B) Is
interprela Inc:oualatent
inconsistent with the interpre
tation of the responsible federal agency. HRB hae
hal nei
neither
iDtert.her promulgated replatlon. nor iuued guidance iDter
preting Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) to authorfze the kind ot
estate recovery that petitioner urges in this cue. To be
8ure, CMS in 2007 approved Minnesota',
8ure.
Minnesota'. state plan
amendment inCOrporatinl
inCOrporatiol ita statutory apoueaJ recovery
proviaiona. See Pet. App.89&-98a.
App.89&-98.. But eMS', approval
fa not the equivalent ot blndin, Interpretive guidance.
pIau or plan aDlend
aDlendCf. 42 C.F.R.
a.F.R. 48O.16(a)(1) (a etate piau
ment Is deemed approved if
not act within 90
If eMS does oot
days after submiseion). Moreover.
folMoreover, CMS', approval fol
lowed binding Judlclal
Minnesota'. own
Judicial declaloDi In MJnnesota'.
conN lnterpretin,
lnterpretml the Medicaid Act to limit recovery to
coaN
whicb the Medicaid recipient
recipieot had aD
888eta in which
an interest at
time of death. See, "II.,
GN.llHrg, 662
"11., 111
/11 ,..
" E,tale
E'tale 0/
o/~,
N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. CL App. 20(2). A.a
AI aet forth
brief, see p. 9.
9, "'pro,
_pro, BHS 1110
above In this brief.
allO Interprets
Interpret.
the Medicaid Act to limit recovery in that manner.

.eertiD.

B. Th. Dedaon Below DoeI Not WUTUIt FurtII..
FurtII.. Rm."
am."

1. Petitioner contend. (Pet. 24-25) that review fa
resolve a conflict between the dedeion be
resoive
below and the North Dakota Supreme Court's dect8loD
dectaloD In

warranted to

: \o.GfJ
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WiTtl,
cue, a Medicaid
WiTtI. lUpN.·
tupN.· In WiTt.,
WiTt•• much as in thia cue.
recipient had t.raDafen-ed .eeta
.Nta to bfa apouae before hi'
death,
death. and tbe State sought to recover the COlt of the
Medic:aid
after her
Medicaid benefits from the spouse's estate alter
death. The court held that the State was pennitted un
under 42 U.S.C. 1896P(b)(4)(B) to reeover the value of any
assets uiJl which the daceaaed
indeceaaed rectplent once held an in
tereet,
tereet,"" including
inclUding aaseta
useta conveyed to hi, spouse betore
bia
60'1 N.W.2d at 886.
bis death. Wim,
Wim,6O'1
But the ditfereut result. in thia caae and in Wim may
not. renect a disagreement about the meaning of federal
Medicaid law. Notably, the North Dakota Supreme
Court, Uke the Minnesota Supreme Court. stated that
the State "[could] assert a claim agaIDat real or penonal
penona!
4 IU
Ju the Mlnnaota Supreme Cout1. noted (PeL App. 21&-22&), two
oth
...,tate
tate courtl haw eonc:ludecl
reoth.
eonc:luded that Sect10a 139Gp(b) autborl_ re
covery ual1 from t.he . . . . of. Medieaid recipient, and not !rom the

_ _ olhia or her apouee. See Hi1tu
v.lNpor
,,,..,. 01
0/PtIb. Aid, 860
HiJMI v.
Dqor e"..,.
N
.E.2d 148 (DL 20(8);
E",*
(Wfa. Ct.
N.E.2d
EItc* oj'Bwlnq,
ofBwlnq, 641 N.W.%d 246 CWfa.
App. 1996). But. tboee deci8lou
decillion belotr .... not III COD
CODdeci8tou and the decllllcm
Both Hm..lIftd
IIwltwr .... ~t with tile prfDdple that.
Hirtallftd 11wltwr
State 111&1
J1l&1 reemw from the atate fila ft&dic:ald ndpi.at', ~
spouM
Sec:ticIn 189Gp(b)(4)(B) to deftDe
spclUM If it. aerdla Ita opdoa UDdtr Sec:ticln
tndMdu..••
..w.. men ~ tbID
thaD It It deftDed =derltate
Lb. tndMdu
..•• ..tat.
=derll:ate pr0
pr0HiftM, 860 N.E.%d It
bate 1... See HittM,
at 168-1601 (apIaiIdna' tbat. the ttate
lepJatw'e could hP. det!ned
. ....
. to
det!Ded the redpCenfl
redpCenf. 8Itate In
tD web a .
~. tor ret:o'oflr1
I'tom th.
th. . . . . ~ hfa
hIa IIUI'VIvtni
ret:o'of/r1 01 ~ ..... ttom
IUI'VIvtnI
.pollNo
h..J ebOMD not to do.o); Budnq,
_POlINo but h.d
Budnq. 541 N.W.2d at 2411r
n.! (boldin,
lUI'(boldln, tJ1I1t
thllt a• .tate
.w.e llfatut.e
lItatut.e authOl"ilinlIWl
authorilinllWl recovery from a lUI"
_tate exceeded the State'. authorit7 and..
and.. a UAC.
vtvtnl
1398P(b).
p8I'IIdutbl.
1398P(b), without COIlIktc1nr
conaktc1nr whfthao
whftlwr It would have been p81'mfutb1.

1,,,,
1,,,,....

met..
met.

1\"

vtvtn, .pou.'.

(or the StaW to ~G"
~G" ft'Om tile 1Urvtv1ng 1IpCNM'11itatl the VIIu, fA
...... In which tJI. recipient had III IntC'eIt It
at the time 01 death). a.
.pond.."
h..... ln any
1MIIlt. doea not
chaIlIIlp the MiJmeIotaSupreme
l\IiJmeIota Supreme
.pondenth.....
anyiMlllt.
notchal1lllp
cone1uaton that • State "It permIUed to neOYer
Court', coneluaton
neo.er ftoom th, -.ate
sunMftI spouae III 101M dmlmaMacee.
Set BP. III Opp.1, 8-9, 19.
dmJmaMacee. see

or.

L td ~:91
~:91 600Z 91
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1.
property, and other ueete iD whieh [the recipient] had
80"1
an)' legal UUe or other Inwnet ac Ai. dMlll&."
dM:&l1&." WirtJ,
WirtJ,8O"1
N.W.2d at. 886 (emphuia
(emphaaia added); see also ibid. ("Our
Inquiry • • • fa • • • whether [the recipient] had
inquiry
'real and personal propert)' and
aDd other ....ta lD
tD wbleb
[be] had any legal tiUe
titJe or interelt at eM U1M
d«JUa,. ")
U".,. 0/ d«JUa"")
(emphaala added). Although
Althoulh ita reasoning
reasonfng fa not enUrel,.
entirel,.
(emphaa18
clear, t.he court In Win. appeared to conelude that the
cerrecipient in that cue, despite formal conveyance ot cer
tain aesete
aeset.e before death, retained an
au intereH
in
the
reletntereH
rele
propert)' until hia death. when the interelt W'&I COD
CODvant propertJ
hla apouee through "other arrangement." 60'1
veyed to h18
N.W.2d at 886 (quotma
(quotUla 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(4XB». The
elaborate on the nature of that Intereat,
court did not. el.boRte
although it referred to the State', arpment that
retained a "marital or equitable inter
interthe recipient had retained.
eat" iD the .....ta at the tim. of hit death, i<L at 888. 8Ild
Doted
noted that other COUN had interpreted SeetloD
1396p(b)(4)(B) to reach etate-Iaw eommuDity-propel't7
intereata, td. at 885.
aad homtltead lnteresta,
ditl'erent reaultl
reaulte reached by the North Dakota
The dittereat
Supreme Court and the eourt below on similar facta
faet8 thu.
may reflect not eontlictin.
eontlictinl interpretaUone of federal
Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under
state law, a apoue. ret.alna a legal mtereet in property
cODveyed to hte
hta or her lpoaee. Compare Win_,
Win_. 607
N.W.2d at 886-888, with Pet. App. 38&-4Oa (cOftcJadtn.
(cOftcJadJn.
that, after MI. Bar.
Bar, tranaterred her Jntereat In the
homestead
alepl
bomestead and bank accounts, ahe no longer had .lep]
Interest that could have been conveyed to Mr. BU'I upon
her
ber death), and id. at 40.
40a (Dotin, that Minnesota law
"makee no reference to • • • re-deftning the probate
eatat8 to include all marital property. even property
eatate
traD.ferred
traD.lerred prior to death").

SId

~a:01
~a:al

600Z 9t
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Even If the decla1oll8lD
decla1oll8ln Wim
Win. and thIa eue do retlect
EveD
Media dtaagreement .. t.o proper interpretation of the Medi
rwfew would DO~ be warraDted.
Court', rwlew
caid Act, thle Coun',
Mlaneaota Supnme eourrllntwpretadon
eourrllnterpl'etadoD of federal
The MlanElllOta
oDlJ the North Dakota Su
Sulaw II correct. aDd to date, oDIJ
preme Court baa allowed Medfc:atd rec:oYeQ'
rec:GYeQ' foUcnrfDI
foUcnrfDa aD
iuter vtvoe tranater
Aanminter
traIlater ot II8IetI betweeu spouaee. Aanm
-saeado thai; Lbe Nortb Dakota Supreme Coart mJa..
-aueado
uDdentood
tederal Medtcl1d
MedSclld law, rather thaD ,1mP17
undentood federal
applied a peculiar teatare of ttl own properiJ law, the
North Dakota eourt hu
lUI opportQDiv
h.. not had lUI
opportQnitJ to eoll
eonInterpretation, aDd the confJlet may work
sider HHS t , Interpretlttcm,
II further Iddreaaed in the lower
itaelf out as the fllue fa

In.

conN.
2. Although petittoner (Pet. 31-38) ia correct that
.tate-recovery etrorta are Important
lmportaDt to the ldedicald
Medicaid
qnutfou concernin, the scope of the Acto',
proll'UD, quutfou
prol!'UD,
eatate-recovef7 pro-riai01l8
pJ'O"riai01l8 ba.,. Dot arfaeD
ariaen frequently,
recoYand relativeq lew Stata have opted to seek estate recoY
b, federal law.
eq to the maximum extent permitted b7
EftluaSee otrIc:e at AIIfstaDt SecretaQ'
Secreta17 tor PoliC1 • Eftlua
tioD, BUS, Polq
Bf'. No.
No."
. RccowJ1l
PoliCJI St'.
" M,dictlidB.
M.dtctJid BdDU
Rccow,."
Cou.eticme
me State.
Statee mate
Cou.cticme tbJ••
tbJ•• (Sept. 2(06) (oob llbIe
maximum use of federal poUq opUona); eee aI80 Pet.. 81.
Moreover. altbou,b the fedenl
federal Medicaid Act Um1t11
estate rec:oveJ7 to thou ....ta III whleh the Medicaid
recipient had • legal iDtereet at the time of her death. the
natun and extent of euch lDtereeta
larP!1 the
Interesta remain larpl1
domam ot state law. Notably, M.lDIleeota'.
M.lDDeeota'. Governor hu
propoeed redetlnins
redellnins marital property fntereata
Intereata to permit
ree0gel7 of medical 88m-taDC.
aamtaDce tram the estate ot
of the
later-IurvWin,lpouse ill thll context. See {;OW,
(;OW, nor',
RfCOm~
Mi1l,..-oeaSta.tI BwII/.c.
B1UII/.c, 1010-11 Bi
Rtcom~ Mi1l,...oeaSta.tI
BiBwdg.c, HUfflGft
Hu"",,, SIf"I1fc..
SIf"I1fc.. DIfJ'r 182 (Jill. 2'1,
mnicU Bwdg."

6td Iot1l.Ban
lot1l.Ban 60IiE 91 ·tnC
"tnC

: loDl:f
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2009). That. proposal has not become law, nor hal
haa it been
reviewed by the Secretary ot
howof HHB. The proposal. how
ever, suggests that Mlnneeota may be able to work tcr
ward greater auet recovery consistent. with the clear
term.
terms of federal Medicaid law.
CONCLUSION

The petition tor a writ ot certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully sabmitted.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE POWER OF ATTORNEY CONTAINS NO EXPRESS
GIFTING AUTHORIZATION AND THIS FACT IS
DISPOSITIVE IN THIS APPEAL.
The personal representative contends that because George Perry, using his power of
attorney for Martha, conveyed Martha's property to himself before she died, I the Department
may not recover the property and it can be distributed to George's heirs. This argument relies on
the validity of the purported transfer. If the transfer by George to himself was invalid" then the
personal representative's argument completely fails and, even if Medicaid law is interpreted as
the personal representative suggests, the Magistrate must be reversed and the Department's claim
allowed.
A.

Standard of Review.
The standard of review for interpretation of an instrument, such as the power of attorney

in this case, is set forth in the case of Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P
.3d 1036 (2008):
P.3d
This Court's standard of review of a lower court's interpretation of an
instrument depends on whether the instrument is ambiguous. C & G, Inc. v. Rule,
135 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001) (citing DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110
Idaho 63, 65, 714 P.2d 32, 34 (1986)). The question of whether an instlUment is
ambiguous is a question oflaw, over which this Court exercises free review.ld. In
deciding whether a document is ambiguous, this Court must seek to determine
whether it is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Bondy v. Levy, 121
th(;:
Idaho 993, 997, 829 P.2d 1342, 1346 (1992). "In the absence of ambiguity, thl;:
document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, aceording to
the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument." C & G., 135 Idaho

When this matter began, Martha Perry was still alive. The Department has been informed by the personal
IIWhen
representative that Martha passed away on May 4,2010.
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P .3d at 78 (citing Juker v. Am. Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 645,
at 765, 25 P.3d
637 P.2d 792, 793 (1981)).
P .3d at 1043. Here, the power of attorney is unambiguous. The
Chavez, 146 Idaho at 219, 192 P.3d
fact that the power of attorney lacks any express gifting power is not "reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretation." Therefore, the interpretation ofthe power of attorney is a question of
law. Even if it were ambiguous, then evidence of intent would be required, of which there is
none but the document itself.

8.
The Personal Representative's Interpretation ofthe Power of Attorney Is Incredibly
Strained and Not Reasonable.
The personal representative takes seven sequential words out of context and constructs a
nonsensical sentence that he claims grants power to the principle to make a gift to himself of
Martha's real property. She contends the power of attorney gave George powE:r "To ... exercise
... any ... gift ... for the principle." See Respondent's Brief, p. 36 (top). She then incorrectly
states that the full sentence is found in footnote 17 of her brief. Actually the seven words are
taken from a much longer sentence with 164 words:
(H) Estate, trust, and other beneficiary transactions. To accept, receipt
for, exercise, release, reject, renounce, assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim
and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or payment
exercis{! any power
due or payable to or for the principal; assert any interest in and exercist:
over any trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary control; establish a revocable
trust solely for the benefit of the principal that terminates at the death ofthe
principal and is then distributable to the legal representative ofthe estate ofthl~
principal; and, in general, exercise all powers with respect to estates and trusts
which the principal could exercise if present and under no disability; provided,
however, that the Agent may not make or change a will and may not revoke or
amend a trust revocable or amendable by the principal or require the trustee of any
trust for the benefit of the principal to pay income or principal to the Agent unless
specific authority to that end is given.
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Exhibit "G" to the Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, ~
H (underline added). This paragraph is clearly intended to grant the agent the power to accept
gifts and exercise powers for the benefit of the principle. In no way can this language be
reasonably construed to grant George the power to make gifts to himself of Martha's property.
Indeed, the same paragraph contains several clauses prohibiting self dealing:
... establish a revocable trust solely for the benefit of the principal that terminates
at the death of the principal and is then distributable to the legal representative: of
the estate of the principal ... provided, however, that the Agent may not make;: or
change a will and may not revoke or amend a trust revocable or amendable by the
principal or require the trustee of any trust for the benefit of the principal to pa~
income or principal to the Agent unless specific authority to that end is given.
Exhibit "G" to the Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, ~
H (underline added).
If a text is long enough, words can be pieced together to say almost anything. For
example, some people claim to find hidden messages in the Bible. 2 The phrase extracted by the
personal representative is: "To ... exercise ... any ... gift ... for the principk" Respondent's
Brief, p. 36 (top). What does it mean to "exercise" as gift? One can "make" a gift,

"~~ve"

a gift,

"accept" a gift, but "exercise" a gift? One can exercise a "power," but a not a ·"gift." Such a
sl~arching the
construction exists only in the imagination of the personal representative. In sl;!arching

"all
states" and "allfeds" databases on Westlaw, this construction is not found in any case. 3
"allstates"

22See
See

e.g. http://www.nmsr.org/biblecod.htm.

3The personal representative's claim that'll B of the power of attorney permits gifting of /personal property
(Respondent's Brief, p. 39 fn. 22 (carried over from previous page» is similarly vacuous. Broad authority 1:0 purchase,
seJ I and transact business is not authority to make a gift, especially to oneself.
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The simple fact is that the power of attorney lacks any express provision giving George
the power to make gifts to himself of Martha's real property.
C.
The Lack of Express Gifting Power Is Fatal to George's Purported Transfer ofthe
Property to Himself.
The personal representative seems to argue that even without express gifting authority,
the gift should still be valid because the power of attorney is "incredibly comprehensive" and
because "one is struck by the comprehensiveness of the document." Responde:nt's Brief, pp. 35
and 38. The argument seems to be that the right to make gifts should be inferred from the tone of
the document. However, this argument is a two-edged sword. The fact that the power of
attorney is comprehensive suggests the drafter omitted gifting powers on purpose.
More importantly, it is express gifting language that is required by the authorities cited by
the Department at section VIII(A) of the Appellant's Brief and that is required by Idaho Code §
32-912:

32-912. Control of community property. - Either the husband or th(l
th(~
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and
either may bind the community property by contract, excypt that neither the
husband nor wife may sell, conveyor encumber the community real estate unless
the other joins in executing the sale agreement, deed or other instrument of
conveyance by which the real estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and any
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the
consent in writing ofthe other shall not obligate the separate property of the
spouse who did not so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife ltll!Y
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell,
conveyor encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds,
conformity
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in confonnity
herewith are hereby validated.
Idaho Code § 32-912 (emphasis added). There is nothing "express" in the power of attorney
used by George in his attempt to convey Martha's property to himself.
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D.
The Power of Attorney Didn't Grant Gifting Powers Before the Unifonn Power of
Attorney Act and Does Not Grant Them after.
The personal representative claims that the power of attorney "Met The Requirements of

I.e. § 15-5-501 et. seq." Respondent's Brief, p. 39. The personal representative seems to
suggest that under the fonner law, George's gifting to himself would have been authorized. This
is incorrect. The section cited by the personal representative reads as follows:
15-5-502. Durable Power of Attorney Not Affected by Disability. All
acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during any
period of disability or incapacity of the principle have the same effect ~md inure to
the benefit of and bind the principle and his successors in interest as if the
principle were competent and not disabled.

Idaho Code § 15-5-502 (1982) (underline added). This section (nor any other section of the old
law) grants powers to the agent that are not found within the four comers of the power of
attorney.
The personal representative also suggests the Unifonn Power of Attorney Act,. adopted in
2008, would not have required express gifting language for an agent who was also a spouse.
Respondent's Brief, pp. 40-41. This is also incorrect. Idaho Code § 15-12-201(1) provides as
follows:
15-12-201. Authority that requires specific grant - Grant of general
authority
(1) An agent under a power of attorney may exercise the following
authority on behalf of the principal or with the principal's property only ifthe
power of attorney expressly grants the agent the authority and exercise is not
otherwise prohibited by other agreement or instrwnent to which the authority or
property is subject:
(a) Create, amend, revoke or tenninate an inter vivos trust;
(b) Make a gift;
gi ft;
(c) Create or change rights of survivorship;
(d) Create or change a beneficiary designation;
(e) Delegate authority granted under the power of attorney;
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(f) Waive the principal's right to be a beneficiary of a joint and survivor
annuity, including a survivor benefit under a retirement plan; or
(g) Exercise fiduciary powers that the principal has authority to delegate.

Idaho Code § 15-12-201 (underline added). The personal representative points to the comments
in the Uniform act for the proposition that the "default rule" would not apply to the spouse as
agent. Respondent's Brief, p. 40 (bottom). The personal representative quotes the foUowing
language in the comment, but incorrectly inserts the bracketed material making it appear that this
comment applies to the requirement for an express authorization to make a gift:
15-12-201(l)(b)] contains an additional safeguard
Subsection (b) [I.e. § 15-12-201(1)(b)]
for the principal. It establishes as a default rule that an agent who is not an
ancestor, spouse, or descendant ofthe principal may not exercise authority to
create in the agent or in an individual the agent is legally obligated to support, an
interest in the principal's property. For example, a non-relative agent with gift
making authority could not make a gift to the agent or a dependant of the agent
without the principal's express authority in the power of attorney. In contrast, a
spouse-agent with express gift-making authority could implement the principa.l's
principal's
expectation that annual family gifts be continued without additional authority in
the power of attorney.
Official Comment to Article 2 of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. However, contrary to the
personal representative's insertion, the comment does not apply to section 15-12-20 I (l
(I )(b) at all,
it applies to section 15-12-201(2t
l5-l2-201(2t which provides as follows:
(2) Notwithstanding a grant of authority to exercise authority in
subsection (1) of this section, unless the power of attorney otherwise provides, an
agent that is not an ancestor, spouse or descendant of the principal, may not
exercise authority under a power of attorney to create in the agent, or in an
individual to whom the agent owes a legal obligation of support, an interest in the
principal's property, whether by gift, right of survivorship, beneficiary
designation, disclaimer or otherwise.

4That

this comment applies to subsection (2) is clearly and correctly shown by the compiler ofth(: Idaho Code in

the Official Comment following Idaho Code §~ 15-12-201 in the official Michie publication of Titles 14-17"
14-17,. at page 468
(second column, halfway down).
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Idaho Code § 15-12-201(2). In other words, subsection (1) prohibits the making of gifts, or
doing the other things specified in that section, without express authority, and subsection (2)
imposes an additional restriction that applies to non-relatives. The comment in no way suggests
that an agent-spouse can make gifts, whether to himself or others, without an express grant of
authority.
Therefore, neither the original power of attorney law, nor the current power of attorney
law permits the making of gifts without express authority within the power of attorney.
E.
There Was Absolutely No Benefit to Martha in George Transferring Martha's Real
Property to Himself.

The personal representative also incorrectly makes it appear that Idaho Code § 15-12
15-12217(3) would permit George's gift to himself in this case. Respondent's Brief, p. 41, fn. 25.
However, section 15-12-217 doesn't eliminate the requirement for express gifting authority.
Instead, it applies where gifting has already been authorized. Moreover, this

sl~ction imposes

additional requirements for making gifts:
the principal's property only as the agent
(3) An agent may make a gift of
ofthe
determines is consistent with the principal's objectives if actually known by the
agent and, if unknown, as the agent determines is consistent with the principal's
best interest based on all relevant factors, inclUding,
including, but not limited to:
(a) The value and nature of the principal's property;
(b) The principal's foreseeable obligations and need for maintl;:nance;
mainh;:nance;
((c)
c) Minimization of taxes, including income, estate, inheritanc1e,
generation-skipping transfer and gift taxes;
(d) Eligibility for a benefit, a program, or assistance under a statute or
governmental regulation; and
(e) The principal's personal history of making or joining in making gifts.
Idaho Code § 15-12-217 (underline added).
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The personal representative suggests that the transfer was in Martha's best int{:rest in light
of eligibility for government benefit programs. Respondent's Brief, p. 41, fn. 25. Thi s ignores
V.S.c. §
the fact that the home is not counted when it comes to eligibility for Medicaid. 42 U.S.C.
II396r-5(c)(5).
396r-5(c)( 5). It was completely unnecessary for Martha to divest herself of the home in order to
qualify for Medicaid. This transfer benefitted George, not Martha. There was nothing in this for
Martha at all.
The personal representative makes several other statements that are completely
unsupported by any evidence in the record. She states that "Martha would have signed the deed
at issue were she able to do so." Respondent's Brief, p. 39, fn. 23. There is absolutely no
evidence in the record to support that claim. To the contrary, the evidence in the record is that
Martha, as the personal representative states, "put George's name on the title,,5
title,,$ to the propertywhile retaining her own interest in the property. Moreover, she gave George a power of attorney
that did not include gifting powers, and to the contrary, imposed specific restrictions on self
dealing. 6

See,-r,-r G and H of the Power of Attorney (Exhibit "G" to the Department's

Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim). Contrary to the suggestions of the
personal representative, the power of attorney did not give all power to Georgt::, it limited those
powers. The only evidence of Martha's intent to be found in the record is the documt::nts

5Respondent's Brief, pp. 37-8.
6The personal representative calls these anti-self-dealing provisions "standard provisions" and "boilerplate."
Respondent's Brief, p. 39 (first paragraph and fn. 23). However, it is ~ H that the personal representative relies upon.
Therefore, apparently, the personal representative's view is that part of~ H is important and represents the intent of the
principle, but the other parts of that same paragraph are mere "boilerplate." These sections are as important as any others
in the power of attorney and demonstrate that George, as the agent, was not given "comprehensive" authority; he was
given limited authority as the document clearly shows, and was limited to the powers actually expressed therein.
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themselves, which documents evidence the intent to retain, not give away, her interest in her real
property.
Also, there is no evidence that Martha was not competent to sign a Quitclaim Deed at the
time George purported to transfer the property to himself. Likewise, there is no evidence in the
record to support the personal representative's claim of title company "standard procedure" as
stated at Respondent's Brief, p. 36, fn. 18. There is also no evidence that transfers of the home
are "typical in cases of married couples" as stated at Respondent's Brief, p. 37.
Finally, the personal representative states that there are no concerns here of "negation of
the principle's estate plan." Respondent's Brief, p. 38. That assumes, however, evidence of an
estate plan contrary to the plain language ofthe documents in the record. The documl~nts in the
record suggest only an intent on Martha's part to retain her property, not give it away. No
evidence to the contrary is found in the record.
F.

The Alleged "Finding of Fact" Is, at Best. a Conclusion of Law.
The personal representative claims the Magistrate made oral findings of fact to support

the personal representative's claim of "interspousal agency." Respondent's Brief, p. 43. There
are, however, no findings of fact. There are simply unexplained and unsupported conclusions of
law. The statements of the Magistrate cited by the personal representative are the Magistrate's
conclusions drawn from the four comers of the document itself. The lines quoted by the personal
representative are the following:
The power of attorney issue was - is interesting to me and - because I
don't think that that - that paragraph where the word gift is written, paragraph H,
r1ead
is the clearest kind of authority to make a gift of property. It certainly can be r,ead
way...
that way
...
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But I think - when everything - all of the language in that power of
attorney is considered, it's so - the intent that you just can't get around is that
document was entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as possible, it
seems to me, including the right to deal with interest in real property. So I'm
going to make a determination for purposes of this case that that is a valid power
of attorney for purposes of dealing with - including giving Martha Perry's int(;:rest
int<::rest
in that property.
So I'm going to decide that question for purposes ofthis case. (emphasis
added)
Respondent's Brief, p. 43 (emphasis by personal representative omitted; underline added). There
is nothing here but reference to the document itself. This is a legal, not a factual detelmination.

Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Properties, L.L.c., 148 Idaho 638,

,227 P.3d 568,570 (2010);

Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562, 566, 212 P.3d 992,996 (2009). The
Magistrate made no findings of fact that would support the personal representative's claim that
there was somehow implied spousal authority for George's self dealing.
Georg(;~'s Gift of Martha's Property to HimselfIs Sufficient to Require
G.
The Failure of Georg<::'s
Reversal of the Magistrate and the Allowance of the Department's Claim.

The personal representative's disallowance of the Department's claim rests entirely upon
the Minnesota case of Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008). The holding in the Barg
case was that the state could recover only property in which the decedent had "any title or
interest" at the time of death. In this case, it is clear that George's purported conveyance to
himself fails and, therefore, Martha had an interest in the real property, or its proceeds, both at
the time of her death and George's. Therefore, the Department's claim, even if Barg is applied
in Idaho, must be allowed in this case. The Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim should be
reversed.
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II.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

A.
The Personal Representative Is Asking the Court to Eviscerate Idaho's Medicaid Payment
System.
The personal representative attempts to minimize the importance of her attack on the
Department's recovery of Medicaid payments by claiming she is merely challenging the
"application" of Idaho Code § 56-218, as if the Department is on some frolic unexpected by the
legislature that passed this law. However, the fact scenario presented in this case is exactly the
kind of case this law was enacted to deal with. Either an elderly Medicaid recipient has a spouse
or does not. Where a single person applies for long term care Medicaid, she must have spent all
her available resources except the last $2,000 before she can be eligible. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).
subj,~ct to estate
She can keep her house if she intends to return home, but it is completely subjl~ct

recovery. Her heirs will receive nothing until Medicaid is repaid in full. However, under the
personal representative's argument, if one of a married couple needs assistance, she may simply
convey her home to her spouse, and it is then forever protected from estate recovery. Her heirs
will get the house when she and her husband pass away (or, according to the view of the personal
representative, the husband can simply give the property to the children whenever he likes). The
taxpayers are left holding the bag and have subsidized and protected the inheritance of the
Medicaid recipient's non-dependent children.
Obviously, when the legislature approved a plan to protect the elderly poor and their
casco The personal
spouses, this is not what they had in mind. This is what is in issue in this case.
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representative wishes the court to nullify the requirement to reimburse Medicaid anytime the
Medicaid recipient has a spouse. 7
B.

Standard of Review.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the court exercises free

review. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 224 P.3d 458 (2008) citing

State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850,852 (2001).
III.
MEDICAID IS A PROGRAM FOR THE POOR AND IS NOT
INTENDED TO SUBSIDIZE THE INHERITANCE OF NON
NONDEPENDENT CHILDREN OF MEDICAID RECIPIENTS.
A.

Medicaid Estate Recovery Is Simple in Concept.
Medicaid for elderly c:ouples is simple in concept. Long term care is Vl~ry
VI~ry expensive.

Many elderly couples are unable to pay for needed medical care. Medicare dOles not cover long
term care. Medicaid is not insurance as Medicare or Social Security is. There is no payroll tax to
support it. It is a public welfirre program funded by the general funds ofthe state and federal
government. It is intended to be the payer of last resort. The elderly can obtain medical
assistance (Medicaid) without divesting themselves of all their assets. Where a couple is
involved, there are complex rules to allow one spouse to obtain needed medical care while the
other remains living in the community. When both spouses have passed away, their assets are
recovered to reimburse the Medicaid program and provide for others who are in need.

7The
7The personal representative has also asked the court to strike down the Department's rules, also approved by
the legislature, which implement the recovery law where there is a spouse. Respondent's Brief, p. 15.
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B.
The History of Estate Recovery Reveals a Clear Intent to Recover the Assets of this
Estate.
The history of Idaho's estate recovery program is relevant here. While Idaho has long
had estate recovery laws relating to public assistance, the first iteration of Idaho's modem estate
recovery law was passed in 1988. The first paragraph provides as follows:

56-218 Recovery of certain medical assistance.
(1) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an
individual who was sixty-five (65) years of age or older when the individual
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate,
estate. or if there be no estate
spouse. if any, shall be charged for such aid paid to
the estate of the surviving spouse,
provid(~d, however, that claim for such medical assistance corre:ctly
either or both; provid(~d,
paid to the individual may be established against the estate, but there shall be no
adjustment or recovery thereof until after the death of the surviving spouse, if any,
and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child who is under
twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally disabled.
Transfers of real or p(;~rsonal
p(;~rsonal property by recipients of such aid without adequate
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district court.
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (1988). Not coincidentally, 1988 was the year Congress passed the
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA). The MCCA included provisions that for the first
time permitted one spouse to qualify for Medicaid long term care without impoverishing the
community (or at-horne) spouse. 8 This process includes allowing spouses to make transfers
between themselves. The concern of the legislature to be able to recoup these transferred assets
can be read in the language of the original estate recovery statute.
Congress has always sought to counter the attempts of some to use the Medicaid program,
not as a payer oflast resort, but as an estate planning tool to protect and retain their own assets.
The language of the congressional committee, cited by the court in Cohen v. Commissioner of

Div. ofMedical
ofMedical Assistance, 423 Mass. 399,668 N.E.2d 769 (1996) is often quoted:

8The

MCCA was later repealed, but the anti-spousal-impoverishment provisions for Medicaid were retained.
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The Committee feels compelled to state the obvious. Medicaid is, and
always has been, a program to provide basic health coverage to people who do not
have sufficient income or resources to provide for themselves. When affluent
individuals use Medicaid qualifying trusts and similar "techniques" to qualify for
the program, they are diverting scarce Federal and State resources from
low-income elderly and disabled individuals, and poor women and children. This
is unacceptable to the Committee.
H.R.Rep. No. 265, 99th Cong., 11st
st Sess., pt. 1, at 72 (1985).
Cohen, 423 Mass. at 403-4, 668 N.E.2d at 772. By 1988, the committee report for the MCCA

continued to echo these same concerns:
The Committee is informed that a number of States have not made
effective use of the authorities under current law to prevent affluent individuals
from disposing of resources in order to qualify for Medicaid nursing home
coverage. In the view of the Committee. Medicaid-an entitlement program for
the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing
home patients to their non-dependent children.
H.R. Rep. No. 105(II), 100th Cong., 1ST Sess. 1987, p. 73 (reprinted at 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
857,896,1987 WL 61566, p. 31).
The battle had not ceased, of course, in 1993, when OBRA '93 was passed. 9 This law
included provisions which expanded the powers of the states to recover Medicaid benefits. The
accompanying legislative history shows Congress's intent that assets divided for purposes of
Medicaid eligibility be tracked and recovered.
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The proeram must identilfr.
and track resources (whether or not excluded for elieibility purposes) of
individuals who receive nursing facility. home and community-based services,
and other specified long-term care services. The program must promptIy
promptlly ascertain

9The battle still hasn't ended, of course. In 2006 the president signed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 giving
the states additional tools to assure couple's assets are used for their own care or available for recovery, rather than being
protected for the Medicaid couple's heirs. The provisions of the DRA go to enhanced asset transfer penaltJies and the
treatment of annuities and are not in issue here.
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when the individual and the surviving spouse, if any, dies, and must provide for
the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the
long-telm care services from the estate of the individual
individuul or the
individual for long-term
surviving spouse. The term "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally
cognizable title or interest at the time of his death, including assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living
trust, or other arrangement.
2S, 1993), Section Sl12.
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25,
5112. (emphasis added).
Among the tools provided in OBRA '93 is the addition of a definition of "asst::ts" for
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p which provides as follows:
(h) Definitions
In this section" the following definitions shall apply:
(1)
The telID
term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all
income and resources of the individual and ofthe individual's spouse, including
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is
actionentitled to but does not receive because of action
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf ofthe individual or such individual's
spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p{h)(1) (emphasis added). "This section," of course, is 1396p. "Assets"
includes the "resources" of the individual and the spouse and includes resourC4:;:S transferred by
(h)(S):
the individual or the spouse. "Resources" are defined in subsection (h)(5):
(S) The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in st::ction
(5)
1382b of this title, without regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to
the exclusion describ(~d in subsection (a)(1) of such section.
1396p(h)(S). The reference to section 1382b and the exclusion in subsection (a)(1),
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(5).
is to the couple's home. In other words, the "assets" defined in subsection (h){l) specifically
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includes the couple's home whether held by one, the other or both. It is hard to imagine language
that more clearly includes the property at issue in this case.
Another tool given to the states by OBRA '93 was the expanded definition of estate found
in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4):
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a
individualdeceased individual
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i)
(1)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or :interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). The personal representative argues that the definition
of assets in subsection (h) doesn't apply to this section. However, subsection (h) says, "[i]n this
section" and doesn't make an exception for subsection (b). Subsection (b), of course, is the
section that mandates estate recovery.
The personal representative urges the court to ignore the legislative history and find that
Idaho's estate recovery law preempted by federal law. Respondent's Brief, p. 34. However, the
personal representative herself cites Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed.
581 (1941), for the proposition that "Conflict preemption also occurs when the state law is 'an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'"
Respondent's Brief at 12. If one is to determine whether the state law is "an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" one must inquire
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into what the purposes and objectives of Congress are. Clearly the intent of Congress and the
legislature is relevant and important to deciding this case.1O
case. 1O
Understanding that Congress has said that Medicaid is for the poor, that it "should not
facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing home patients to their non-dependent
children," and that the state should "track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility
purposes)" and collect them "from the estate of the individual or the surviving spouse," one can
only make one of three conclusions: (1) Congress didn't mean what it said; (2) Congress made a

huge mistake in drafting the law; or (3) the personal representative is wrong.
IV.
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE RELIES UPON A
SINGLE PHRASE OF THE FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW
READ OUT OF CONTEXT.

A.
The Personal Representative's Entire Preemption Case Relies on Reading a Phrase of 42
U.S.C. § 1396p out of Context.
The personal representative's argument is that any property transferred by a Medicaid
recipient to her spouse, while she is alive, is forever off-limits to Medicaid estate recovery. She
arrives at this argument because 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) contains the following language:
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest) ....

IOThe personal representative also states that where a statute is unambiguous it must be read literal1y
literally and no
legislative intent is necessary. Respondent's Brief, p. 34. The personal representative, however, offers her own statutory
1396p(b)(4)
4) doesn't mean what the definition in
construction and interpretation asserting that "asset" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(
subsection (h) says it means. Respondent's Brief, p. 28. If we are to read the statute literally, then the definition of
"asset" provided in subsection (h)(l) must be applied in subsection (b)(4).
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w
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The argument is that if the individual divests herself of her property
during life, it may not then be recovered after her death.
The problem with this argument is, of course, that it is overly simplistic and totally
ignores the entire body of Medicaid law including (1) an eligibility system that permits spouses
themselves, 11 (2) a definition of "assets" that includes
to freely transfer property between themselves,11
property transferred to the spouse during the eligibility process and specifically includes the
home,12 (3) the expansive nature of subsection (b)(4) and it's purpose in recapluring the couple's
assets,13 (4) the legislative history and purpose ofCongress,14 and (5) the absurd and unfair
I5
results of this narrow interpretation. 15

Recovered. Not
B.
Subsection (b)(4) Was Intended to Expand the Scope of Property to Be Recovered,
Limit it.
Recall that subsection (b)(4) was part ofOBRA '93 and that part oftht:: intent ofOBRA
'93 was to "identify and track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes) ... and
... provide for the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid ...from
... from the estate of the
individual or the surviving spouse." H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25,
1993), Section 5112 (cited above). This section is very broad and expansive:

11 See
II

discussion beginning at page 13 of this Brief.

I2 See discussion on page 15 of this Brief.
12See
I3 See discussion on page 16 of this Brief.
13See
14 See discussion beginning at page 13 of this Brief.
14See

15 See

discussion beginning at page 34 of this Brief.
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(4) For purposes of this subsection, 16
16 the tenn "estate", with respect to a
individualdeceased individual
l7
included
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets 17
18 and
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; 18
(and shall include, in the case
(B) may include, at the option ofthe State {and
)(C){i) applies), any other real and personal
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i)
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), includinK such assets conveyed
to a survivor, heir, or assign ofthe deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
1396p{b){4) (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)
Thus, when the language relied upon by the personal representative is read in context
with the remainder ofthe subsection and the definition of "assets" in subsection (h), it becomes
clear. The phrase beginning with "including" shows the breadth of this section. In case the
drafters missed something, they included the words "or other arrangement." The North Dakota
Supreme Court found this language sufficiently expansive to include property such as that at

afWirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000).19
issue in this case. In re Estate a/Wirtz,
The personal representative contends that the "including" phrase only applies to property
which passes instantly at death. Respondent's Brief, p. 7. This distinction, however, is not found

16The "subsection" is 42 US.c. § 1396p(b) which includes the federal mandate that statl!S
statl~s pursue estate
recovery. See 42 US.c. § 1396p(b)(I).

17The
17The personal representative says the word "assets" used here should not be given the definition found at
subsection (h)(I) of this section. Respondent's Briefp. 28. However, if Congress did not want the expansive definition
of "assets" to apply here, it could have used the word "property" or some other undefined word.
18The
18
The personal representative, taking the Department's argument out of context, says "[t]he Department argues
that estate recovery is really controlled by state law." Respondent's Brief, p. 14. Of course, what the Department
actually said was that state law defines what property is available for purposes of both state probate law and Medicaid
estate recovery. Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10. This subsection and the following clearly confirms the Department's
position.

The personal representative suggests the Department believes Wirtz to be weak because the Department does
19The
19
not rely solely on the "other arrangement" language. This is simply because the issue in this case is controlled by Idaho
ofHealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998), discussed below, and Wirtz is merely
Department ofHealth
persuasive authority.
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anywhere in the law and is not supported by the language of the law itself. For example, where a
ofHull v.
living trust is created the "legal title or interest" is passed immediately. Estate ofHull
Williams, 126 Idaho 437, 443, 885 P.2d 1153, 1159 (App. 1994). The beneficiary holds only the

beneficial, not legal, interest, and no legal interest passes on death. Subsection (b)(4),
(b)(4}, when read
in context, is clearly intended to capture all property the Medicaid recipient, by whatever means,
may have attempted to shelter or protect.
C.

The Jackman Court Ignored the Same Preemption Arguments Being Made Here.
The record in this case includes a lengthy binder of exhibits included with the

Departments Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim. Induded in these
of Health and
exhibits is the full set of briefs filed in the Supreme Court in Idaho Department ofHealth

.2d 6 (1998). The Department provided thf:se
Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P
P.2d
documents so the court could see that these very same preemption arguments have already been
made to the Idaho Supreme Court. 20 The Respondent's Brief in Jackman gives as an issue on
appeal, the following:
3. Does Federal Medicaid law allow the state to recover a recipient's
Medicaid costs from the estate of the surviving spouse beyond a tracing of the
recipient's assets owned at the time of death.
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, Exhibit "D" Respondent's Brief, p.
5. The discussion of this issue begins at page 16 of the brief and continues to page 23. These
same preemption arguments were continued in the Respondent's Rehearing Brief.

MI~morandum
Ml~morandum

20 The Department also provided a copy of the superceded decision in the Jackman case. Contrary to the claims
of the personal representative (Respondent's Brief, p. 22), the Department has never cited that decision as JlUthority.
However, like the underlying briefing it is important to provide context for the Court's ultimate holding, especially in
light of the identical arguments being made in this case. The personal representative, apparently, would prc~fer Jackman
be taken out of context.
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in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, Exhibit "D" Rehearing Brief, pp. 27-33. The
Respondent in Jackman also made the same arguments the personal representative makes here
regarding the inapplicability ofthe federal definition of "assets" at pp. 27-8. Yet, the only place
that the Idaho Supreme Court found the Department preempted was in the appllication of Idaho
Code § 56-218 to a transfer of property that took place before the effective date ofOBRA '93.
The remainder of the court's discussion deals with the timing of the particular transfer in the
Jackman case. The court stated:
This is true even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicai<1
payments for calendar quarters be2innin2 on or after October 1, 1993,
authorizes the Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "othe1r
assets." Without the definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(e)(11.
"other assets" are only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C:.....§.
15-1-201(15).
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 9-10,970 P.2d at 216-7 (emphasis added). Once the OBRA '93 changes
were in place, the preemption argument failed.
The personal representative argues as follows:
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is
impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143,83
S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when the
state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399,
85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
Respondent's Brief, p. 12 (underline added). The Medicaid system exists to provide health care
for the poor. The personal representative does not explain how Idaho Code § 56-218" in any
way, makes compliance with the federal Medicaid law impossible. Certainly the personal
representative is not arguing that the "full purposes and objectives of Congress" include
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preserving an inheritance for non-dependent children. Therefore, the personal representative has
not shown how both federal Medicaid law and Idaho Code § 56-218 are in conflict.
D.

The 1993 Changes in OBRA '93 Are Central to the Court's Holding in Jackman.
The personal representative argues that the Supreme court's discussion of OBRA '93 in

Jackman is merely dicta. Respondent's Brief, p. 24. Similarly, the personal represenltative
suggests that Jackman is a pre-OBRA '93 case and is, therefore, not relevant. Respondent's
Brief, pp. 13, 23-4. Actually, Jackman is a post-OBRA '93 case with a pre-OBRA '93 property
transfer. The discussion ofOBRA '93 is central to the court's holding, and Jackman is an
important case because it demonstrates what Congress did with OBRA '93 and how the outcome
of the case would have been different had the transfer been after the effective date of OBRA '93.
If the personal represt:ntative is correct, the Court could have simply said that the assets
were transferred before death, and therefore, the Department cannot have a claim. That is not
what the Court did. The court began with the over-arching holding:
The Department asserts that I.C. § 56-218, as it existed21 at times
applicable to this case, authorized recovery of the balance of the Medicaid
payments from Lionel's estate. We agree.

Jackman, 132 Idaho at 8,970 P.2d at 215. The Court then goes on to state that the Department
was preempted from recovering the assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to her husband
before the effective date of OBRA '93. If the Court had agreed with the personal representative's
preemption argument in this case, it could have simply said that transferred property was out of

2J The personal representative reads this "as it existed" language out of context and says that the court was
limiting it's holding to the facts of the case because it was pre-OBRA '93. Respondent's Brief, p. 23. However, if one
reads the context, it is clear the court is talking about the "if there be no estate" language that existed in the original
statute (see page 13) and was changed in 1998, the same year Jackman was decided.
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the Department's reach forever. However, the Court went to great pains to discuss the effective
date of OBRA '93 and the effect that had on their holding in the case. The court discussed the
expanded definition of estate enacted by OBRA '93 and discussed the federal definition of
"assets." There was no disagreement by the court on the legal effect of the federal definition of
"assets." Rather, the court merely concluded that because the marriage settlement agreement was
felTed property:
transfeJTed
executed before the effective date of OBRA '93, it did not apply to the trans
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8,
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of
the enactment ofthis Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 13611(e).
Therefore, it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Departm(;:nt
to recover the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separat1e property.
Medic~lIid
This is true even though 42 V.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medic~lIid
payments for calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993,
authorizes the Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "othelr
assets." Without the defmition of "assets" contained in 42 V.S.c. §
1396p(e)(I), "other assets" are only those included within Hildor's estate, as
defined by I.C. § 15-1-201(15). Lionel's separate property, including the
community property transmuted by the agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate.

Jackman, 132 Idaho at 9-10, 970 P.2d at 216-7 (emphasis added). The obvious and necessary
inference is that with "the detinition of 'assets' contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p([h])(1), 'other
assets '" would include the property transferred by the Medicaid recipient to her husband through
the marriage settlement agreement.
The personal representative says that the Department is asking this court to "speculate as
to what our highest Court would have opined had it ruled on the issue at bar." Respondent's
Brief, p. 23. However, the necessary implication from the Court's language is direct and the
inference is necessary and unavoidable. Things that are necessarily implied are not speculative,
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they are real and can have legal effect. There can be implied consent (State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho
300,302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007», implied authority (Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure
Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 112,206 P.3d 473, 476 (2009», and implied promises (Gray v.
Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 387, 210 P.3d 63, 72 (2009» among other things.
There is no need to speculate about the meaning of the Court here. The Court was cle:arly
OBR<\ '93 when it comes to spousal recovery in Idaho. 22
explaining the effect of OBRi\
E.

The Solicitor General's BriefIs
Briens Not Legal Authority.
The personal representative is incredulous that the "Department fails to even mention"

the Solicitor General's brief. Respondent's Brief, p. 27. The reason for this, of course, is that the
Solicitor General's brief is not legal authority and is not binding on anyone. The personal
representative, without any authority at all says: "The u.S.
U.S. Solicitor General's position is in fact
HHS's (and therefore CMS's) opinion on the issue." Respondent's Brief, p. 27. However, the
personal representative grants government attorneys, including the undersigned, too much
authority. While an attorney may represent an agency, a governmental agency's official
pronouncements come through the promulgation of regulations and rules. The: Deparbnent is not
bound by the statements of a government attorney in an amicus brief, however well re:asoned it
23
may be.
be.23
Likewise, undersigned does not have authority to make official pronouncements for

the Department of Health and Welfare. Those are made by rule-making.

22 At page 26, fn.ll of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative states that even if the court finds the
Court's discussion of OBRA '93 to be part of the Supreme Court's holding, it should still rule in favor of the personal
representative. The personal repres{:ntative
represt:ntative seems to be suggesting this court over-rule the Idaho Supreme Court.

It is easy to think of Medicaid as a federal program and the states as mere contract administrators. This is not
23 lt
the case. The two sovereigns are partners in this program. If the federal government believes a state has failed to abide
by its rules, it can deny federal financial participation, whereupon the state has administrative and legal remedies.
Neither party is bound by the statements of the other's attorney in briefing.
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That said, the personal representative has only cited those portions of the Solicitor
General's brief with which it agrees. The Solicitor General's brief also finds that In re Estate of
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D.. 2000) is not necessarily in conflict and suggests that the Supreme

Court deny certiorari because the state of Minnesota is remedying it's problem by the: same
legislation the personal representative says is "clouding marital property law in Minnesota and
p . 33.
raising serious practical and c:onstitutional concems.,,24 Respondent's Brief, p.
The Solicitor General recognized that the issue here is really what state: law allows to be
recovered, and noted that Wirtz is not necessarily in conflict with the Minnesota Supreme Court's
holding in Barg:
Although its reasoning is not entirely clear, the court in Wirtz appeared to
conclude that the recipient in that case, despite formal conveyance of clertain
assets before death, retained an interest in the relevant property until his death,
arrangem«~nt." 607
when the interest was conveyed to his spouse through "other arrangeml~nt."
N.W.2d at 885 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B)). The court did not daborate on
the nature of that interest, although it referred to the State's argument that the
recipient had retained a "marital or equitable interest" in the assets at the time of
his death, id. at 883, and noted that other courts had interpreted Section
1396p(b)(4)(B) to reach state-law community-property and homestead interests,
id. at 885.
The different results reached by the North Dakota Supreme Court and the
court below on similar facts thus may reflect not conflicting interpretations of
federal Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under state law, a spouse
retains a legal interest in property conveyed to his or her spouse.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, p. 14
(underline added).

24The
24The personal representative cites the case of Douglas County v. Lindgren (Minn., 7th Jud. DisL. No.
21-CV-09-477, August 4, 2010) and leaves the reader with the impression that the Douglas Coun~y case invalidated
Minnesota's new marital property law. This is incorrect. The Douglas County case had nothing to do with the issues
presented here. A copy of that case is attached as Appendix A.
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Continuing to recognize the importance of state law on this issue, the Solicitor General
noted that Minnesota was already enacting legislation to change the outcome of the Barg
decision:
Moreover, although the federal Medicaid Act limits estate recovery to
those assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of her
death, the nature and extent of such interests remain largely the domain of state
law. Notably, Minnesota's Governor has proposed redefining marital property
interests to permit recovery of medical assistance from the estate of the:
later-surviving spouse in this context. See Governor's Recommendation,
Minnesota State Budget, 2010-11 Biennial Budget, Human Services Dep't 132
(Jan. 27, 2009). That proposal has not become law, nor has it been reviewed by
the Secretary of HHS. The proposal, however, suggests that Minnesota may be
able to work toward greater asset recovery consistent with the clear tenns of
federal Medicaid law. 25
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, pp. 15-16
(underline added). The Department provided a copy of this legislation as Exhibit "F" to the
Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim.
So, if the Solicitor General's brief is entitled to as much weight as the personal
representative claims, then the Barg case is oflittle or no application in Idaho, since Idaho is a
community property state and Minnesota is not, and Idaho's marital property and probate laws
are quite distinct from Minnesota's.
A final word concerning the Solicitor General's brief: The personal representative
claimed that the Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General. Respondent's Brie:f, p. 27.
However, unless the personal representative has knowledge not available to the rest oEus, the
reasons for the denial of certiorari remain unknown and could have been for a hundre:d different

25 The personal representative speculates that Minnesota's new law will be found unconstitutional.
Respondent's Brief, p. 33. The Solic:itor General didn't seem to be so pessimistic.
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"'..a"
reasons. All the denial of certiorari states is: "Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
of Minnesota denied." Vas v. Barg, 129 S.Ct. 2859 (2009).
F.
Other Provisions of State and Federal Law Make Sense Only If the Property of this Estate
Is Recoverable.
At page 4 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative correctly notes that in
determining eligibility of a married person, the assets of both the husband and wife are
considered. As already noted transfers of assets can be freely made from one spouse to the other.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Since both ofa couple's assets are considered for eligibility purposes,
it doesn't really matter. Somehow, in the mind of the personal representative, all this changes at
Medi(;aid spouse
recovery time. The assets of both spouses no longer matter. It is only what the Medi<;aid
had (generally nothing ifthey transfer the home to the spouse) at death that can be recovered.
Still, even where the Medicaid spouse dies first, no recovery can be made from her estate until
after the death of the non-Medicaid spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2). This doesn't make sense.
The personal representative says this is because "it is only at that time that a final det(;:rmination
dett;:rmination
can be made as to what, if any, interest the Medicaid spouse has in any property at her death."
Respondent's Brief, p. 20. Yet, below, the personal representative contended that Martha's
interests could be decided now, even while she was still alive. 26 Even ifit were true that
determination of property rights requires waiting until after the death of both, that is a problem
non
for the state probate courts, not for federal Medicaid. No, the reason is more simple: the non-

26 In her "Reply Memorandum in Support of Objection to Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim," the
personal representative said, "The
'The Court should find that Martha has absolutely no interest in the house sale proceeds that
make up George Perry's estate, and that she will not have any such interest at her death." Reply Memorandum etc. p. 15.
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...... ,

•

Medicaid spouse is entitled to use the couple's assets for his own support during his lifetime;
after both are dead and the assets are no longer needed, they are subject to recovery.
Along this same line, the personal representative quotes a few lines of a 1999 letter to the
Department she claims stands for the proposition that "once one spouse qualifies for Medicaid,
any resources belonging to the community spouse are solely the property ofthat spouse and the
community spouse can do whatever he wants with them." However, when the letter is read in
context, it becomes clear that the question that was asked was whether the Medicaid spouse
would suffer an eligibility penalty if her spouse transferred assets without adequate consideration.
The question was not whether the spouse can do "whatever he wants" with the couple's assets.
When eligibility is being established, if an applicant has transferred assets without
adequate consideration within what is known as a "look-back" period, an eligibility penalty is
imposed: the person cannot be eligible for Medicaid until a certain amount of time has passed
calculated by how much the applicant has given away. The question asked by Mr. Gere was
whether the Medicaid spouse, once eligibility has been established, would suffer an eligibility
penalty if her spouse transfen'ed assets without adequate consideration:
The transfer of assets from the community spouse to his or her heirs via a will is
not grounds for invoking a penalty against the institutionalized spouse for
transferring assets for less than fair market value.
Respondent's Brief, Appendix 3 (underline added). In concluding, the letter states:
In the event an institutionalized spouse has already been determined eligible for
Medicaid, the resources belonging to the community spouse have no impact QI!
the institutionalized spouse's eligibility, and transferring those resources to
various heirs via a will likewise does not affect the institutionalized spouse's
eligibility.
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Respondent's Brief, Appendix 3 (underline added). Clearly, the language stating the spouse "can
do whatever he or she wants to with them" refers to not having an effect on the eligibJility of the
Medicaid spouse.
Idaho Code § 56-218(2) provides:
look-back dates
(2) Transfers of real or personal property, on or after the look-back
defined in 42 U.S.C. 1396p, by recipients of such aid, or their spouses, without
iln the
adequate consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in
district court.
Idaho Code § 56-218(2) (underline added). This language has been in Idaho Code § 56-218 since
the original 1988 law. See page 13. Idaho Code § 56-218 is a specific version ofthe more
general fraudulent transfers act found at Chapter 9 of Title 55. Virtually every state has a similar
act. Therefore, while it is true that the non-Medicaid spouse can "do whatever he ... wants to"
with the assets without affecting the Medicaid spouse's eligibility, any transfer without adequate
consideration is voidable.
G.

The Department's Construction ofIdaho Code § 56-218 Is Entitled to Deference.
The personal representative may find Idaho Code § 56-218(2) "offensive" just as it does

the Department's regulations.?7 However, the personal representative cites Kopp v. State, 100
Idaho 160, 595 P.2d 309 (1979) for the proposition that agency construction is entitled to "great
weight and will be followed by the courts unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise."
The actual quote is:

27Respondent's Brief, p. 15.
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The construction given a statute by the executive and administrative
officers of the State is entitled to great weight and will be followed by the Court
unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise. 28

Kopp, 100 Idaho at 163,595 P.2d at 312. While the personal representative intended this to
apply to the federal Medicaid agency, it would apply to the same extent to the Department. Kopp
after all was referring to a state, not federal, agency.
The Department's rules establish the Department's construction of its law in this area.
The Department has cited IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 and .24. Rule 900.20 makes it clear that the
Department's claim against a spouse's estate extends to all property that had been jointly owned
or separately owned by the Medicaid spouse after the effective date ofOBRA '93. Rule 900.24
states:

24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement.
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of the deceased
participant or the spouse. * * *
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (underline added). The personal representative deflects the court
Gourt from
the important part of this rule by referring to avoidance language in the final s(mtence (omitted
above). Respondent's Brief., p. 14. However, this rule is important because a marriage
qUlestion in Jackman.
settlement agreement is a living transfer of assets. This is the agreement in qu,estion
But it also includes "other such agreement which separates assets for a married couple" which
would include the Quitclaim Deed in this case. This rule makes it clear that the transfer of an

28 The Department recognizes that this holding in Kopp has been greatly weakened in later cases including J.R.
Simp/at Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 120 Idaho 849,820 P.2d 1206 (1991).

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 30

C:lDocuments and Settings\cartwriwIDesklop\Appeliants
Setlings\cartwriwIDesktop\Appeliants Reply Brief.wpd

000685

asset from one spouse to the other does not eliminate the Medicaid debt recoverable from the
estate of either spouse. 29

v.
THE LAW IN IDAHO IS WHAT IS IMPORTANT IN THIS
CASE.
A.
The Correct Question Is Whether the Property of this Estate, Even If Martha Transferred
It, Remains an "Asset" Subject to Estate Recovery.

The personal representative refers (out of context again) to a colloquy with the Magistrate
and claims the Department "was unable to answer that question." Respondent' s Brie1~ p. 11.
The problem was not the Department's response to the Magistrate's question, however, but, with
respect to the Magistrate, the fact that the Magistrate was asking the wrong qw~stion. The
Magistrate asked:
THE COURT:: Get me to - to the place statutorily that the timing includes
- sort of the time of death is certainly part of the - of the equation because in the
federal statute and in the state statute 218(4)(B), that's what they're looking at.
But get me to the part that says - that was transferred, which I'm assuming you're
arguing means at any time during their marriage and when she was receiving -- I
mean, would it also include a transfer made before she was receiving any - any
Medicaid benefits?
Tr. p. 24, 1. 19 to p. 25. 1. 6 (underline added). The Magistrate was focusing on the question of
(if it took place) between Martha and George. The underlying
the timing of the transfer (ifit

assumption was that if Martha had executed a Quitclaim Deed to George, then the property was

29 The personal representative complains that in citing this rule and Idaho Code § 32-901, the Department is
raising new issues for the first time on appeal. Respondent's Brief, p. 34. The personal representative is confusing
"issues" with "authorities." The issue has always been the same one: Whether Martha's property conveyed by George to

himself is subject to recovery. The Department is merely citing additional authorities relating to this issue. If additional
authorities could not be cited much of the Respondent's Brief would have to be excluded.
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no longer an "asset" subject to recovery. This assumption, of course, was wrong and the
Department attempted to refocus on the Magistrate on the correct question:
MR. CARTWRIGHT: If! could be a little bit bold, Your Honor. I think
thatTHE COURT:: Be bold, please.
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I think that's the wrong question.
COURT: Okay.
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I think that the correct question is not was this
property transferred. The correct question is was this property the property of the
individual.
Tr. p. 25, 11. 9-20 (underline added). This is the correct question because, the whole point of the
definition of assets in 42 U.S"c. § 1396p(h)(l) is that the term assets includes property
transferred by the Medicaid recipient to the spouse. It wasn't important when the asset was
transferred (so long as it was after OBRA '93), or even ifit was transferred. The important
question was whether even after any purported transfer, it is subject to recovery under the
expanded definition of estate found in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4). In this case, it clearly was.
There are several factors that make this so. The first, of course, is the definition of asset
found in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)(1) which as been thoroughly discussed. Another is Idaho Code §
56-218(1) itself, which effectively alters marital property law in Idaho when it comes to the
property of Medicaid recipients and their spouses. Idaho Code § 56-218(1) sta.tes that:

... medical assistance ... may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the
estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both ....
Idaho Code § 56-218(1). This statute affects both probate and marital property law. The
legislature is not required to put all statutes affecting probate in the probate code and is not
required to put all statutes affecting marital property in the marital property law. It can place
statutes affecting these matters anywhere it likes.
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The Department attempted to explain this to the court in the lines following those already
quoted above. At Tr. p. 26, L 4 to p. 28, 1. 1, the Department explained how Idaho Code § 56
56218 can change marital property law by reference to a more obvious example fDund in Idaho
56-218(4)(b). That
Code § 56-2l8(4)(b).

s(~ction,

.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)
1396p(b)(4)
which adopts the language found in 42 U
U.S.C.

states, in part, as follows:
(4) For purposes ofthis section, the term "estate" shall include:

***

(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets ... including
such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign ofthe deceased individual
through .. .life estate ....
Idaho Code § 56-218(4). This section modifies the common law in Idaho when it comes to life
estates. In essence, it says that where a Medicaid recipient transfers real property to a "survivor,
heir, or assign" and retains a life estate, that life estate interest is not extinguished on death, but
remains an "asset" of the estate. 30 The Department concluded:
That is the same thing, is the effective date ofthe law says that we've
modified Idaho's property transfer and marital property law, or the legislature has,
by Idaho Code section 56-218 to say ifthis person is on Medicaid in the futun~
this property remains subj ect to recovery.
Tr. p. 27, 11. 20-25 (underline added).
Because the correct question is, under Idaho law (together with the federal definition of
"asse!'" subject to
assets and expanded definition of estate) is the property in this estate an "assef"
recovery, the whole tortured "at the time of death" argument become irrelevant. This is not an
attempt to grab back property transferred away. Rather, this is merely recognizing that under
ofHuman Services v. Willingham, 206 Or.App. 156, 136 P.3d 66 (2006) ("For purposes
30See e.g. State Dept. ofHuman
of the recovery of medical assistance paid by the state during the lifetime of the holder of a life estate interest, the life
estate continues to exist after the death of the person holding the interest"); In re Estate ofLaughead,
ofLaughead, 696 N. W.2d 312
(Iowa 2005) (life estate in farm owned by deceased Medicaid recipient was required to be included in the estate for
purposes of estate recovery).
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Idaho and federal law, whether transferred or not, the property ofthis estate, like the life estate
discussed above, is an "asset" of Martha's subject to estate recovery.

B.

Barg Has No Applicability in Idaho.
ojBarg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn.
The personal representative claims that In Re Estate ofBarg,

2008) "is on all fours" with this case. In light ofthe fact that it is state law, not federal law, that
governs what property is subject to estate recovery, this seem highly unlikely. While the
Minnesota Supreme Court can best interpret Minnesota's probate and marital property laws,
other states are better at interpreting their own laws as the Idaho Supreme Court has done in

Jackman.
As noted in the Appellant's Brief, beginning at page 23, the Barg court did not even
consider the federal definition of "assets" found in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h). The personal
representative contends otherwise, apparently because the court there used the word "assets."
However, one can search high and low and find no reference (even oblique) to the definition of
assets in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h). It was simply not raised before the Minnesota Supreme Court.

Barg isn't even good law in Minnesota any more.
VI.
ABSURDITY, INEQUITY AND UNFAIRNESS WOULD
RESULT FROM THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S
INTERPRET ATION.
AT ION .

As already mentioned on page 11, above, if the personal representative's argument is
correct, then those who are single must reimburse Medicaid and can pass no property to their
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heirs until Medicaid is paid in full, while those with spouses have no obligation to reimburse
31
at taxpayer expense.
Medicaid and their non-dependent children receive a windfall 3l

Likewise, if a married couple (or perhaps the couple's children) get the advice of an
attorney, they will not have to reimburse Medicaid, but ifthey are too ignorant or unsophisticated
to transfer their assets away, their estate will have to pay.
Again, under the personal representative's argument, where the Medicaid spouse dies
first, a horne which becomes the sole and separate property of the surviving spouse by operation
oflaw will be subject to recovery, but on the other hand, if the Medicaid spouse had signed a
Quitclaim Deed, making the property the non-Medicaid spouse's sole and separate property, a
moment before death, there can be no recovery.
CONCLUSION

The fact that the powt:r of attorney lacked express language allowing George Perry to
make a gift, especially to himself, of Martha's real property, is sufficient, all alone, to require the
wlere valid,
Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim should be reversed. Even if the conveyance Wlere
the Department retains the right to recover the property of this estate as "assets" oftht: estate
under both state and federal law.
DATED this 16 day of September, 2010.

~./4~~~
CgR YCARTWRIGHT

Depufy Attorney General

31 lt is not unfair to use this word. If Medicaid had not paid their antecedent's medica]
31lt
medical bills, their inheritance
would have been consumed by those costs.
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STA TE OF MINNESOTA
STATE

IN DISTRICT COURT

COLIRT
DISTRICT COLIAT
COUNTY OF DOUGLAS DOUGLAS COUNTY SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

_______--El.J...E...a
FILE P
D
Douglas County,

AUG 04 2nlO
~urt
~?urt

Plaintiff,

v.

_

COUr1Ad~l7
COUr1Ad~C"

File No.: 21-CV-09-477

--------=::--
--------------~--Deputy

Alexandra Kjerstyn Lindgren and
Bruce Dale Lindgren,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on May 19,2010 on cross motions for
Summary Judgment. A hearing was held in front of the Honorable David R.

Batu~y

at the:

Douglas County Courthouse, Alexandria, Minnesota. Plaintiff, Douglas County, was
represc~nted
represented by attorney Megan Burkhammer. Defendant Alexandra Lindgren was represc~nted

by attorney JoEllen Doebbert. Defendant Bruce Lindgren was present and unrepresented. The
matter was taken under advisement on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on M~LY 12,
010._.
__.72010.

__........:..:==..:--. - _ . _ - " _ ..... _ ...... .
. ..•... __........:.:==..:._.

followmg:
Based upon the file and records herein, the Court hereby makes the foHowing:
ORDER

1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

2.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

3.

The attached Memorandum is hereby incorporated by reference, and approved in

all respects.

&

It is '0
so ORDERED this..ill
this

itl;f; of~~~:;,..t:=of~~~:;..t:=-

_ _,
_,

Hon. David R. Battey
Judge of District Court

000692

2

(THU)AUQ

S 2010

1·'~.lST.11:es7.1NO.71S17• • • •7.
•7 .
1\~/ST.11:n7/NO.7517

p

JUDGMENT

I hereby certify that the foregoing Order constitutes the Judgment of this Court.
Dated:

'K 44_
Au tK

.2010

~
.J'.

•
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..••

•

Rhonda Bot

Douglas County Court Administrator

:mu.o ?$ru..uJ

By;

Deputy Court Administrator
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MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Douglas County brings this claim against Defendants Alexandra Lindgren and
Bruce Lindgren, alleging it is entitled to recover the value of certain gifts given to Defendants by
their mother. The parties agree that this is a legal issue, and for the purpose ofthi:; motion, none
of the facts are disputed. Douglas County moved for partial summary judgment with respect to
ofthe
the gifted homestead, alleging that, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 256B.0595, suM.
4b(5), Defendants are required to pay a portion of their mother's long-tenn medicill
medical assistlmce,
originally paid for by Medicaid. Defendants move for summary judgment, claiming that !;ection
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) is preempted by federal law.
Facts
On December 31, 2003, Dale and Marlys Lindgren ("Mr. Lindgren and Mrs. Lindgren"),

transferred an undivided one-half interest in their home to their children, Alexandra and B,ruce
Lindgren ("Defendants"). On March 18, 2004, Mr. and Mrs. Lindgren transferred the rest of
their interest in the home to Defendants. At the time, the house was valued at $109,000.
- O~-November

200t~. £~~ ~ ~itted to-ilie-Be~yHoin~,'allumng------'-"9, 200t~.
to-ilie-Be~yHoin~,'allumiig------'--

facility in Alexandria, Minnesota. Alexandra Lindgren then applied for long-term care benefits
applicaljon.
on her mother's behalf beginning in January, 2006. Douglas County approved the applicalion.
However, because of the uncompensated transfers, Minnesota and Federal law required Mrs.
Lindgren be subject to a penalty period during which she was ineligible for medical assistance.
Despite the statutorily-mandated ineligibility period, Bethany Home requested a waiver
of the penalty period because continued denial of eligibility would lead to undue hardship. Mrs.
Lindgren's bills were not being paid, and she was facing eviction. Douglas County granted the
waiver, and at the same time infonned Mrs. Lindgren that the case would be referred to the

3
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Douglas County Attorney's office. During the thirty six months following the homestead's
transfer, Mrs. Lindgren received $53,893.30 in government-paid medical assistance. Evt:ntually
EVt:ntually
Mrs. Lindgren passed away on October 13,2009, and this action was brought by Douglas
County against Defendants, the recipients of the transfer, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) to recover the $53,893.30.
Analysis
STA TlITES SECTION 2568.0595, SUBD. 4b(5) IS PREEMEPTEJ)I, AND
MINNESOTA STATlITES
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE
A. Summary Judgment Standard

"Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most filvorable
to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club.
UC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 753 (Minn. 2005) (citing Minn. R Civ. P. 56.03). A court is to e~:amine
e~:amine
on-£Je;togetber with the
all "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,--and-admissions on-£Je;together
summMY.,J~g!p~~t.. Mj~. R. qy';1;'.5~.Q3
. Suror.!~_ .
. Jlffi9.av:i.~:.inji~sjnE:QMJI!Q!i9nf'?r
Jlffi.fl.av:i.~:.inji~sjnE:Q.MJI!Q1~9nfC?r SUnmlMY:J~g!p~~t..
qy';l;'.5~.Q3.Suror.!~_

judgment should be granted only when it is clear no fact issue remains, and it wO\l~d be
unnecessary to inquire further into the facts. Larson v. Independent School Dist. No. 314.
Braham, 252 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Minn. 1977).

For the purpose of these Motions, the only issue this Court must decide is whether
1ederal
Minnesota's statutorily-created claim being asserted against Defendants is preempted by 111ederal

If the
law. If that provision is not preempted, then it is clear that Defendants are liable. Ifthe
provision is preempted, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

4
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B. Minnesota's Statutory Cause Of Action Against Transferees Under MiDlJtsota
5ubd. 4b(5) Directly Conflicts With Federall,aw
Statutes Section 256B.0595, subd.
And Is Preempted

Medical assistance, better known as Medicaid, is an "enonnously complic.ated" program.

Stephenson \I. Shalala,
rule on the!.e Motions, it is
8halala, 87 FJd 350, 356 (9th Cir. 1996). To properly role
essential to understand the relevant statutory framework governing Medicaid. In 1965, (;ongress
C;ongress
enacted Medicaid as a part of the Social Security Act. In re Estate ofBarg,
of Barg, 752 N. W.2d 52, 58
(Minn. 2008). The program is jointly funded with the stateS.stateS: Id. To receive-fundin-g;astate
receive' funding; 8 state

must create a medical assistance plan by enacting legislation and rules governing Medicaiid
within the state, and submit that plan to the United States Secretary of Health and Human
Services. Jd. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396). Each state administers its own plan, however those
plans must comply with the Federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a). Relevant to this elise is section
1396a(18), which requires that states "comply with the provisions of section 1396p of this title

medical assistance correctly paid."
ofmedical
with respect to liens, adj ustments and recoveries of
(emphasis added).

-. 'i~~M~e-;~ia:
by-ChAptCr256B.
'i~~M~e-;~ia: metUc-;l assi~tmce f~~ ~-~edype;S~~is'gov~~
~-~edype;S~~is'gov~~ by-ChaptCr256B.
Eligibility for medical assistance is governed
256B.055governed. by Minnesota Statutes sections 256B.055
256B.057. When a person be.lieves that she is eligible under one of these sections" she may
apply for assistance. Even if someone is otherwise eligible, that person may be deemed
seventy·two months
ineligible if she transferred property for less than fair market value within seventy-two
prior to the application. Minn. Stat. § 256B.0595. The person is deemed to be ineligible ior an
amount oftime based on the amount of the uncompensated transfer. ld.
Jd. subd. 2(b). Despite this
penalty period, the determining agency must waive that penalty period if not doing so would
cause undue hardship. [d. at subd. 4b(5). When the penalty is waived, a cause of IIlction arises

5
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seventy-h~o months from
against the transferee for any amount of medical assistance paid within seventy-h~o

the date of application for assistance, or for the uncompensated amount, whichevc:r is less. [d.
Defendant asserts that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p preempts Minnesota Statutes se(:tion
256B.0595. To make this detennination, the Court must look at the language of those sec:tions.

Federal Law - 42 U.S.C. § 1396p
Section 1396p addresses, among other things, a state's ability to recoup correctly paid
medical assistance. Specifically, subdivision (b)(I)
(b)(1) states:
''No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of

an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:
(A) [Inapplicable exception].
(B) [Inapplicable exception].
exception]."
(C) [Inapplicable exception]!'

Minnesota Law - Minn. Stat § 2S6B.0595, subd. 4b(5)

penaltilCS for
Minnesota Statutes section 256B.0595 governs prohibitions on and penalti1cs

also enumerates exceptions to this prohibition. Subdivision 4b(5) is one of those c:xceptio:ns. It
states:
"[A person or a person's spouse who made a transfer prohibited by subdivision 1I b
is not ineligible
illeligible for medical assistance services if] the local agency determines
that denial of eligibility for medical assistance services would cause undue
hardship and grants a waiver of a penalty resulting from a transfer for less
than fair market value because there exists an imminent threat to·
to' the
granted, a ceruse of
individual's health and well-being ... When a waiver is granted.

action exists against the person to whom the assets were transferredfor
transferred/or that
portion of medical assistance services granted within 72 months of tlae date
the transferor applied for medical assistance and satisfied all other
trlansfer,
requirements for eligibility, or the amount of the uncompensated trlans!er,
whichever is less, together with the costs incurred due to the action. The
action shall be brought by the state unless the state delegates this

6
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responsibility to the local agency responsible for providing medical
chapter. " (emphasis added).
assistance under this chapter."
Pr~emption
Pr~emption

Standard

Defendants allege that Federal law, specifically 42 U.S.c. § 1396p, preempts
Minnesota's statutory cause of action set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 256B.0595, subd.
4b(5),
4b(5). The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution],
Constitution!, and invalidates any state law contradicting or interfering with an Act of Congress.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504,516 (1992) ("state law that conflictswith federal law

is 'without effect. "')
n') (citation omitted). Congressional intent is the basis by which the Court
Jaw is preempted. Gade v. Nat
Nal'l'I Solid Wastes
Wasles Mgmt.
Mgmt, Ass 'n, 505 U.S.
determines whether a state law
88, 96 (1992).
(J 992). Preemption is generaJly disfavored, unless the Congress clearly intended it.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.

occurs
There are three main categories of preemption: (1) express preemption, which occms
when Congress specifically states its intent to preempt in the text of the Federalla.w; (2) field

the field" in that area of law; and (3) conflict preemption, which applies when state and fe:deral
both, Engl'ish v.
law directly conflict, making it impossible to comply with the requirements of both.
General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1990). A preemption analysis requires an examination of

Congressional intent, using both the text and purpose of the statute. Medtronic, /r.!c.

11.
'V.

Lo"", 518
La"",

U.S. 470,484-5 (1996). Defendants argue that the conflict preemption doctrine applies, and
preempts Minnesota's statutory cause of action in section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5).
U.S,C. § 1396p(b)(1) is clear. It directs that states shall not Te<;over
TC(;OVer
The language of 42 U.S.C.
correctly-paid medical assistance unless recovery would fall under one of the three: listed
!] The "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur:suance
thereof...shalJ
thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S.
U,S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2.
7
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exceptions. Id. ("No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf
of an individual under the State plan may be made
... ")
made...
n) (emphasis added). There is no dispute
that Minnesota's statutory cause of action against a transferee who received prop~~rty from a
medical assistance recipient does not faJl within one of the exceptions listed in sel;tion
1396P(b)(1). Thus, bringing an action against a transferee under Minnesota's section
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) conflicts with the Federal mandate prohibiting recovery under th~~
th~: State
plan for correctly-paid medic:a1 assistance. Even in light of the presumption against preemption,
this Court fails to see how bringing a cause ofaction-pursuantto-section-256B.0595,-subd.
ofaction-pursuantto·section256B.0595,-subd. 4b(5)
would not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l). Minnesota's statutory cause of action under section
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) is preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b).
The County argues that "section 256.0595 does not conflict with and is not preempted by
the federal estate recovery laws embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p because Minnesota Statutes
Statut.es
256.059~ has nothing whatsoever to with estate recovery." Pl.'s
section 256.059~
PI. 's Mem. Supp. Sum. J. 8.

This statement, however, misinterprets section 1396p. Section 1396p does not simply apply to

r~~~~rin~~-fr;;:;~di~d~F~··~;t~t~,·id;a'.:sa· ~~~s "~tt~~ptt~
r~~~~rin~~-fr;;:;~di~d~l~~-·~;t~t~,-id;a'.:sa·
-~tt~~Ptt~ recover Q,;y ~ed[car~~istmCe
~ed[car~~istmCe
1396p(bXI) ("No adjustment or recovery of any medical
correctly paid. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(bXl)

assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made...")
made ... ")
(emphasis added). This prefatory language is not qualified or limited.
limited, and it applic~s
applic~s to any
attempt by a state to recover correctly-paid medical assistance.

256B.OS95, subd. 4b(S).
4b(S), it i!; impos!lible to
When bringing a cause of action under section 256B.OS95.
1396p(b). and the conflict preemption doctrine requires this Cowt find
comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b),
the cause of action created by section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(S) preempted.

8
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Legislative Inunt and Policy
The County argues that legislative intent and public policy dictate a fmding that the cause
of action created by section 2568.0595 subd. 4b(5) not be preempted. For this proposition, the
Qif 1988
County cites a portion of the House Report for the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act OIf
("MCCA"), which states, "in the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlement prognlIn for
the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing home patients to
their non-dependent children." H.R. Rep. No. 100-105, at 73 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 857,896. While this quote is on-point, it must be taken in context. The relevant
portion of the MCCA was added to the bill because a number of states were not eiIectively
J)foperty for
utilizing the ineligibility period for medical assistance recipients who transferred J)1'operty
less than market value. Id. lbus, the MCCA created a mandatory ineligibility period for Ithose
people who disposed of assets for less than fair market value.
The County is correct; Congress was in fact concerned that people would transfer nssets
for less than fair market value. However it addressed the issue by requiring a period of

ineligibili~ f~;tho~~~odi;r
it did
eiici n~t:k;;~-~j;~tli~~~sibilitYi~~-~tes
n~t:k;;~'~j;~tli~~~sibilitY i~~'~tes w~~te sepilra~'
ineligibili~f~;tho~~
~odi;rit
sepilra~- ..... .
claims against third parties for medical assistance correctly paid. The Court acknowledge!> that.

from a policy standpoint, preempting Minnesota's cause of action against transferees coulcllead
to individuals transferring large amoWlts of assets to non-dependent children in hopes of
receiving publicly-funded assistance; however, it is clear Congress considered this, and added
the ineligibility period to combat this potential problem.
For those reasons, the Court finds that 42 U.S.C. section 1396p(b) preempts Minne~;ota
Minne!;ota
2568.0595, subd. 4b(5). Because section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) iis preempted,
Statutes section 256B.0595,
summary judgment is granted in favor of the Defendants.
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District Court
Seventh Judicial District
ll-CV-09-4771
Court File Number: 21-CV-09-477!
Case Type: Civil OtherlMisc.

State of Minnesota
Douglas County

Notil~e

JOELLEN PFEIFLE DOEBBERT

of Entry of

Jfudgment

1022 BROADWA
Y
BROADWAY
POBOX 1175
ALEXANDRIA MN 56308

In Re: DOUGLAS COUNTY \IS Alexandra Kjentyn L1Ddgren-,--Bru~eL1Ddgren-,--Bru~e- Dale
Lindgren
You are

notifie~
notifie~ that judgment was

entered on August 04,2010.

Dated: August 4,2010

Court Administrator

......l.-L\~~~.,JIw&.A..y
B~~Jl~

B .
Deputy Court Administrator
Douglas County District Court
305 8th Avenue W
Alexandria MN 56308
320-762-3033
cc:

MEGAN ELIZABETH BURKHAMMER

A true and correct copy. of this notice has been served by mail upon the parties herein at
'of-~a¢h, pursuant to Minnesota Rules of Civil Pro(:edure, Rule
the last knoWn address'of-~ach,
77.04.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

:33
<1

5
6

MATIER OF:
IN THE MATIER
Case No. CV-IE-0905214

GEORGE D. PERRY,

7

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Deceased.
13
9

10
lO
11
12

This case is before the court on a motion for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117.
For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.

13
14

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1 -),,-

This is an appeal from a magistrate's order denying the Idaho Department of Health and
16

Welfare's (the Department's) claim for Medicaid reimbursement from the estate of George D. PelTY.
PelTy.
17

Barbara McCormick (McCormick) is the personal representative of the estate. After filing the
113
19

appeal, the Department sought a stay of disbursement or distribution of any estate funds pending the

20

outcome of the appeal. The personal representative did not oppose the stay, except to the extent that

21

such a stay would prohibit payment of her attorney fees in defending the appeal. The Court

22

ultimately granted the stay except for payment of McCormick's counsel's fees. McCormick then

23

filed the pending request for attorney fees and costs incurred in relation to the Department's motion

24

to stay, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117.
2'·-,

)IJ

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 1

000702

ANALYSIS
1

Idaho Code § 12-117 provides in relevant part:
3
4
5
6
7'7

8
9

10

(1)
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political
politicaI
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as
the case may be, shaH
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.

If a party to an administrative proceeding or to a civil judicial proceeding
(2)
prevails on a portion of the case, and the state agency or political subdivision or
the court, as the case may be, finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the case, it shall
award the partiaHy
partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and
other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the case on which it
prevailed.

11

This Court is not convinced that Idaho Code § 12-117 is applicable to a motion during the
1:2

course of an appeal (or any other civil action.) While subsection (2) of the statute addresses an award
13

to a party who prevails on a portion of the case, it appears that the language is designed to allow a
15

court to apportion attorney fees after the outcome of the case, not at each event or decision within the

16

case. This is intended to be similar to the language in Rule 54(d)(1)(B)
S4(d)(1)(B) regarding detc:nnination of th

1'7

prevailing party and apportionment of costs. For these reasons, the Court denies the motion for costs

18

and fees at this time, without prejudice to renewing it at the conclusion of the appeal.

19

IT IS SO ORDERED.

20

Dated this

11v~

day of October 2010.

21
22
23

Kathryn . Sticklen
District Judge

24
2 .J'-'

26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1

2
3

I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I havemailed.by
United States Mail, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice
pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.R.c.P.
LR.C.P. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes
addressed as follows:

4
5
6

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
ATIORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
IDAHO ATIORNEY
PO BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0036

'7

8
9

10
11

PETER C. SISSON
SISSON & SISSON, THE ELDER LAW FIRM, PLLC
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE, ID 83702
HON. MAGISTRATE CHRISTOPHER BIETER
INTERDEPARTNIENTAL MAIL
VIA: INTERDEPARTNIENTAL

12
13
14

15
16

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, daho

17
18

19
20

Date:
Date:

{O(13[(O0
_10(13[(

21
22
23
24

25
26
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I~AR 16 2011
1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST~t4~IS,fePHER D. RICH,
By NICOL TYLER

2

OEPUTV
DEPUTV

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3
4

5
6

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:

7

GEORGE D. PERRY,

8

Deceased.

Case No. CV-IE-2009-05214
MEMORANDUM DECISION
DEC]SION
AND ORDER

9

10
11

Currently before the Court is an appeal from the March 10, 2005, order of the Honorable

12

Christopher M. Bieter, dismissing the State's Medicaid reimbursement claim in probate

13

proceedings. For the reasons stated below, the opinion of the magistrate will be affirmed.

14
15

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
16

George D. Perry ("George") died February 25, 2009.

His late wife, Martha J. Perry

17
18

("Martha" or "recipient"), was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of certain real

19

property in Ada County prior to her marriage to George. On November 18, 2002, well into the

20

couple's marriage, Martha executed a quitclaim deed on the real property, with the grantor

21

named as "Martha Jean Boyle" (her prior name) and the grantee as "Martha Jean Perry &

22

George Donald Perry." Several years later, with Martha's health declining, George and Martha

23

needed assistance in paying for Martha's medical care. To qualify for government assistance
24

with medical costs, the couple and Martha, individually, could not exceed certain maximum asset
25
26

criteria.

On or about July 31, 2006, George made the transfer now in dispute, assigning
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Martha's remaining interest in the real property to himself alone, by signing a quitclaim deed on
1
2

behalf of Martha pursuant to a power of attorney.

3

A few months later, on or about September 15, 2006, George and Martha applied to the

4

Department of Health and Welfare for medical assistance to help pay for Martha's medical care.

5

Since October 1, 2006, Martha has been a recipient of medical payments.

The Department

6

provided payments for Martha's medical care through the Medicaid program in the sum of at
7

least $108,364.23.
8
9

Although it was Martha's health which was in decline, George predeceased Martha.

10

After George passed away, the Appellant, Human Services Division of the State Attorney General,

11

(the State) sought funds from his estate, specifically from the sale of the property, as reimbursement

12

for taxpayer funds previously expended on his wife's behalf. The magistrate denied this request,

13

holding that because Martha had conveyed her interests in the property during her lifetime, she had

14

no interest in the property from which the State could seek reimbursement. The Attorney General
15

subsequently filed this appeal. Martha, the recipient, died while this appeal was pending.
16
17

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
19

A.

Whether the magistrate erred in determining that the general power of attorney held
by George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha Perry's real
property.

B.

Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation ofIdaho Code § 56
56218, in refusing to allow the State's claim against the estate of George Perry.

c.

Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p as preempting application ofIdaho
ofldaho Code § 56-218.

D.

Whether the magistrate erred in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding
in Idaho Depanment of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d
6 (1998) to the facts ofthis case.

20
21
2:2

23
24
2 _J'-'
26
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1

E.

Whether the State is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

3
4

When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge, the district judge is acting

5

as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308

6

(1992); IRCP 83(u)(1). Accordingly, the standards of review are the same as those applied by the

7

Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals in a regular appeal: the district court upholds the lower
8

court's factual findings if based on substantial and competent, though connicting, evidence; and
9

10

affirms conclusions of law which demonstrate proper application of legal principJles
principlles to the facts

11

found. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194,765 P.2d 1094 (Cl.
(Ct. App. 1988).

12

an instrument, such as the power of attorney, is a question of law. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho

13

212,192 P.3d 1036 (2008)

14
1 ,--,'

Interpretation of

Where issues on appeal involve questions of law, a reviewing court exercises free review.
Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185,814 P.2d 917 (1991). An issue involving

16

statutory construction and interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. State
17
1B
1ll

Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96,100,102,90 P.3d 321,325,327 (S. Cl.
Ct. 2004).
Dept. of
ofHealth

19

ANALYSIS

20
21

I.

Power of Attorney and Transfer of Property

The parties agree that the transfer of Martha's interest in the property to George was not
23

performed by Martha, but by George acting pursuant to a power of attorney from Martha. The

24

State argues that the magistrate erred in its determination that George had the authority and valid
25

power of attorney to transfer Martha's interest in the property to himself. The State argues that
26
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George could only make a valid transfer with an express power of attorney, which specifically
1

2

granted him the authority to make gifts of Martha's property on her behalf. It argues that the

3

magistrate failed to make any requisite factual inquiry regarding whether Martha consented to the

4

transfer by interspousal agency or any other form of consent.

5

6

Although not addressed in detail in the magistrate's written opinion, at the hearing this issue
was addressed and decided by the magistrate.

The magistrate made a factual and legal

7

f(Jund that although the
determination regarding the extent of the authority granted to George, and [<Jund
8

gifting language in paragraph H was not the "clearest kind of authority," "[i]t certainly can be read
9

10

that way"; and considering "all of the language in that power of attorney"', "the document was

11

entitled to give George Perry·
Pen)' as broad of authority as possible, .. including the right to deal with

12

interest in real property."

13

14

Idaho Code § 32-912 prohibits either spouse, individually, from conveying the community
estate, unless by use of an "express power of attorney."

15

As cited by the parties, the opening statement of the power of attorney, which declares in all
16

capital letters that "powers granted by this document are broad and sweeping." A subsequent
17
18

19
20
21
22

23
24
25

section states:
(H) Estate, tmst, and other beneficiary transactions. To accept, receipt for,
exercise, release, reject, renounce, assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim
and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or
payment due or payable to or for the principal; assert any interest in and
exercise any power over any trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary
control; establish a revocable trust solely for the benefit of the principal
that terminates at the death of the principal and is then distributable to the
legal representative of the estate of the principal; and, in general, exercise
all powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could
exercise if present and under no disability; provided, however, thaI: the
Agent may not make or change a will and may not revoke or amend a trust
revocable or amendable by the principal or require the trustee of any trust

26
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for the benefit of the principal to pay income or principal to the Agent
unless specific authority to that end is given. (emphasis added)

1

2

The Court agrees with the State that the language relied upon by the personal representative

3

in Paragraph H is attenuated, and appears to refer to the agent's ability 1:0
to act with regards to
4

additional property that the principal may obtain. However, Paragraph A of the power of attorney
5

6

allowed George to convey Martha's interests in real property as he deemed proper. The power of

7

attorney was executed in 2005 prior to the enactment of the current Uniform Power of Attorney Act,

8

Idaho Code § 5-12-101 et seq, in 2008. The present act requires express authority to make gifts, but

9

it is not applicable here. No authority has been cited requiring such language prior to the adoption

10

of the act. Based on the record before it, this Court affirms the interpretation by the magistrate.

11

II.

Statutory Interpretation and Preemption

12

This appeal also involves a question of statutory interpretation. A statute must be construed
13

14

as a whole, taking the literal words of the statute, which words must be given their plain, usual, and

15

ofLewiston,
Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002); State v. Hart,
ordinary meaning. Thomson v. City of

16

l' .3d 850 (2001). If a statute is not ambiguous, the court does not construe it, but
135 Idaho 827, 25 P

17

simply applies the ordinary meaning. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735

18

l'
P .2d 974 (1987). Unless the result is palpably absurd, or legislative intent is dearly to the contrary,

19

a court must assume that the legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. Miller v. State,

20

110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 (1986); Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 82 1'.3d
P.3d 445 (2003).
21

Both parties agree that the Medicaid program is a jointly funded and "cooperative endeavor
22
23

in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in

24

furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65

2':;
2"i

L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Thus, participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into

26
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state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the US. Secretary of Health and Human
1

2

Services ("HHS") for approval. 42 US.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).

3

At issue in this case are those provisions dealing with the ability of the State to recover costs

4

of medical care from the estate of the recipient and the recipient's spouse. The State argues that the

5

state and federal provisions allow it to recover costs from the estate of the recipient and the

6

recipient's spouse if those assets were once part of the recipient's estate and were transferred from

7

the recipient to the recipient's spouse. In other words, the State argues that I.e. § 56-218(1) allows
8

recovery from the estate of a recipient's spouse, including any "assets" within the definition of
9

10
11

"estate" under 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4). The definition of "assets" includes property transferred to
one's spouse prior to death under 42 US.e. 1396p(h)(1).

12

The personal representative argues that the magistrate's position is correct. The magistrate

13

held that the State's ability to recover costs is limited to those "assets" which were transferred to the
recipient's spouse at the time of death by operation of law. Because the recipient transferred her
property prior to her death, and because that transfer was not of the same nature considered in the

16

statutes allowing state cost recovery, the magistrate disallowed the State's claim.
17

A.

Interpretation, Construction, and Application of 42 U.S.c. § 13961,(b)(4)
13961~(b)(4)

1:3

19

Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1396p is entitled "Liens, adjustments and

20

recoveries, and transfers of assets." Subsection (b) addresses "[a]djustment or recovery of medical

21

assistance correctly paid under a State plan" and requires "the State shall seek adjustment or
recovery from the [receiving] individual's estate" under certain circumstances.

23

42 US.C. § ,

1396p(b)(1)(A),(C)(i). Subsequent sections further define what is meant by an individual's "estate,"

24

and define which forms of property are subject either to mandatory or discretionary recovery by a
2 -,C"

state. Those provisions state:
26
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1

2

3

(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a
deceased individual-individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law;
and

4

5

6
7
8
9

10

(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of
an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and
personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest),
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
In common,
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
The State disputes the magistrate and personal representative's interpretation, which places
emphasis on the phrases limiting the property and assets ofthe recipient of benefits held "at the time

11

of death." The magistrate found that this definition of "estate" did not permit a state agency to look
12

back and recover property interests that the recipient divested prior to death. This Court agrees.
13

The language and definition of "estate" is broad, and includes all interests, including any which may
1 .),-,

of the recipient. However, it goes without saying that
have automatically transferred upon the death ofthe

16

where a recipient has long ago been divested of any particular interest, it would not fall within that

17

individual's estate.

113

divested well before death, something which the drafters were clearly able to articulate in those

19

Moreover, nothing in this provision seeks to preserve interests that were

provisions dealing with Medicaid eligibility requirements.

20

Indeed, when addressing the eligibility requirements for assistance, under § 1.396p(c)(l)(A),
21

the drafters made those who transfer property "for less than fair market value" ineligible for
2"

23
24

assistance. The State argues that it would be absurd to prohibit the recipient and/or recipient's
spouse from disposing of assets below market value in eligibility determinations, while allowing
assets to be transferred at no cost post-eligibility for purposes of avoiding reimbursement or

26
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recovery payments in probate. However, § 1396p(c)(l)(A) deals specifically with eligibility, not
1

2

recovery. Had the drafters sought to include this same provision in the area of probate and recovery

3

matters, they easily could have made such distinction. The Court notes, however, that even in the

4

a]n individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance ... to the extent
context of eligibility, "[
"[a]n

5

that (A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was transferred to (;l) the spouse of

6

such individual[.]"

42 U.S.c.
c)(2).
U.S.C. 1396p(
1396p(c)(2).

Thus, even in the stricter setting of eligibility

7

detenninations, the drafters recognized and pennitted the transfer of a recipient's interest in the
8

home to that recipient's spouse. In addition, the drafters were clearly able to artiiculate specific
9

10
11

instances and circumstances where look-back dates should be used to counteract suspect transfers of
property.

12

Finally, for reasons which will become apparent later, the Court notes that: provision (B)

13

allows the state latitude in applying this expanded definition of "estate," except "in the case of an

14

individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies[.]" Paragraph (l)(C)(i) addresses "[a]djustment or

15

recovery of medical assistance", mandating state recovery of medical assistance where benefits were

16

paid to any individual of 55 years of age or older when the medical assistance was received.
17

Df medical assistance,
However, that clause and related provisions limit recovery to certain fonns of
18
19

20

including long-tenn care services and nursing facility services. Id. In this scenario, which appears
to be the circumstance in this case, the state is required to include this expanded version of "assets."

21

B.

22

The State also disputes the magistrate's interpretation of the definitions under § 1396p(h),

23

Interpretation, Construction, and Application of 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)
1396p(b)

1396p(b)(4).
particularly as applied to § 1396p(b)(
4). That provision states:

24

(h) Definitions[:] In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
'
2 '-oJ.J

26
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(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse
action-is entitled to but does not receive because of action-

1

2
3

(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
4

The State argues that "assets" includes the property which originally belonged to the
5

6
7

recipient, but of which she was divested due to the action of her spouse, even it he was acting as her
agent at the time. The Court has several problems with this interpretation.

8

First of all, "assets" as described in this definition include "income or resources." The Court

9

notes that real property, while it might be described as an "asset" or "resource," is much more

10

clearly described as "real property." The drafters of this section were likely aware of this, as they

11

had previously used the phrase "real property" in mUltiple sections, including § 1396p(b)(4)(A),(B),
1396p(b)(4)(A),(B),
12

above.
13

14

More importantly, the definition of "resources" as listed in 1396p(h)(5), "has the meaning

15

given such term in section 1382b[.]" Thus, the definition of "resources," specifically excludes "the

16

home (including the land that appertains thereto)." 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(1). Accordingly, where

17

"resources" as contained in this section (1396p(h)) specifically excludes the home, the Court finds it

18

necessarily excludes it from the definition of "assets" as well. Thus, even with this expanded

19

1396p(b)(4)(A),(B),
4)(A),(B), the Court finds it fails to expand that
definition of "assets" applied to § 1396p(b)(

20

recovery provision to include real property owned by a recipient prior to death.
21

C.

Interpretation, Construction, and Application of I.C. § 56-218.

22
23

24
2 .,'·

Idaho Code § 56-218( 1) is entitled "Recovery of certain medical assistance" and states:
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 9

000713

-._.
1
2

assistance may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of
the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both:
The State argues this language clearly includes the option ofrecovery from "the estate of the

3

spouse" and does not limit the "estate of the spouse" to property in which the recipient had an
4

interest at the time of death. The Court recognizes and agrees that this departure from the language
5

6
7

of the federal provisions indicates a more aggressive policy adopted by this state to recover costs
from the estate of the recipient's spouse.

8

As far as I.C § 56-218 is concerned, the Court agrees with the State that this section clearly

9

indicates an intent to recover medical costs from the estate of the spouse of a recipient
recipient. However,

10

several concerns remain regarding whether this provision, standing alone, allows the state to look

11

back to any period beyond those transfers effectuated at death.
12

First of all, the subsequent provisions of §56-218 further define and limit what is meant by
13

"estate." Subsection (4)(a)-(b) ofI.C. § 56-218, states "the term
tenn "estate" shall include:"
1 .),),-,

(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and

16

IB
1B
19

(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent
of such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
111
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement
arrangement.

20

Id. This language should look familiar, because it is, almost without exception, the same language

21

used in the federal code, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A), (B). The personal representative argues that

2 ')
"

23

§56-218(4)(a)-(b)
because I.C §56-218(
4)(a)-(b) mirrors the language of the federal statute, it should be interpreted
accordingly. As discussed above, this language taken in the context of the federal statute clearly

24

limits the recovery-eligible estate of the recipient's spouse to property transferred at or around the
time of death. Thus, the "assistance [which] may be recovered from the ... estate of the spouse"
26
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appears to be limited accordingly. However, when taken in the context of the Idaho Code section,
1
2

and the broader language targeting recovery costs from the estate of the recipient's spouse, the

3

ability to recover from a spouse appears to be expanded.

4

56-218(4)(a),(b)
recipient as the "individual," and the spouse as the "spouse." The language of § 56-218(4)(a),(b)

5

refers only to the "individual's estate" or the estate of the recipient. It contains no reference or

6

In I.C. § 56-218(1), it refers to the

limitation on the estate of the spouse.

7

The State's interpretation of these provisions, and the intent to reach the assets of a Medicaid
8

recipient's spouse is further supported and explained by the internal rules and regulations of the
9

10

Department.

IDAPA 16.03.09.900 is entitled Liens and Estate Recovery, and '''sets forth the

11

provisions for recovery of medical assistance," among other things. IDAP
A 16.03.09.905.01, states
IDAPA

12

in relevant part:

13

A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the
value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1,
1993, community property, or the deceased participant's share of the
separate property, and jointly owned property.

14
,,1 .J

16

Id. The plain language of this section does not restrict the language of I.C. § 56-218, which allows

17

the Department broad authority to seek recovery against the "estate of the spouse." I.e. § 56
56-

18

218(1). A subsequent provision, IDAPA 16.03.09.905.05 states:

19

A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates
assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of
the deceased participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage
settlement agreement or other such agreement may be voided if not for
adequate consideration.

20
21
2 -,<.e,
23

Id.

24

Taking into account the broad language of I.C. § 56-218, in addition to the specific

25

provisions in the Idaho Administrative Rules (which have the same force and effect of law per

26
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Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551,555 (2004)), it is clear that Idaho law permits
pennits
1

2

recovery from the estate of the recipient spouse, limited only by the broad interpretation of "estate"

3

of I.e. § 56-218(4)(a)-(b) and time and community property restraints of IDAPA 16.03.09.905.01.

4

Thus, the clear and plain language of Idaho law (without considering the federal provisions and

5

effect they have) would allow the State to recover from the estate of the spouse, so long as the

6

property sought was community property held by the participant after October 1, 1993, which was

7

the case here.
8

E.

Preemption Doctrine

9

10

This Court has found that the plain meaning of the Idaho and federal Medicaid provisions

11

differ, in that the Idaho provisions clearly and unambiguously broaden the ability of the State to

12

recover from separate assets of the recipient's spouse beyond those assets in which the recipient had

13

an interest at the time of death. This juxtaposition requires a discussion regarding the validity of the

14
15

Idaho regulations in light of the doctrine of preemption.
The basis for the doctrine of preemption is found in Article VI, cl. :2 of the United States

16

Constitution, which states that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
17

. . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding."
18
19

Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has established that a state law that conflicts with

20

federal law is "without effect." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, Il2 S.Ct. 2608,

21

M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.(4 Wheat) 316, 427, 4 L.Ed.
2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, 422-23 (1992); M'Culioch

22

ofTransp., 143 Idaho 418,146 P.3d 684 (Ct. App. 2006).
579,606 (1819); Lewis v. State, Dept. ojTransp.,

23

Congressional purpose is " 'the ultimate touchstone' " of the preemption inquiry. Malone v.

24

White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504,98 S.Ct. 1185,55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks
25

Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96,103,84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)).
26
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This Court's primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Cal. Fed.
1

2

Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
S.Ct 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The
Guerra. 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107 S.Ct.

3

United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration
"[ c]onsideration of issues arising under the

4

Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are]

5

not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'"

6

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407

7

(1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230,67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447
8

(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 518, 112 S.Ct.
9

10
11

2608).
Federal law may preempt state law in two ways, either expressly or impliedly. Boundary

12

Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996).

13

preemption occurs where Congress exhibits intent to occupy a given field of law. Lewis v. State,

14
15

Express

Dept. of Transp., supra. Where such intent is shown, then any state law encroaching into that field

is preempted. !d.

In this instance congress clearly did not intend to occupy the entire field of

16

Medicaid law. Rather, the intent appears to be to the contrary, as the laws in this area are full of
17

provisions which encourage the States to enact legislation and rules, and incorporate them into their
18

19

overall medical assistance plans. See inter alia 42 U.S.c. § 1396a(a)-(b). Nevertheless, many of

2:l

the sections contained in the federal code require that the states must "comply with the provisions of

21

the federal code, particularly with respect to liens and other recovery for assistance paid. 42 U.S.C.

22

§ 1396p; 42 U.S.c. § 1396a(a)(18).

23

Thus, where congress has not expressed the intent to occupy a given field of law, state law

24

may still run afoul of the preemption doctrine to the extent the state law conflicts with federal law.
2 .)
'·"

Lewis v. State, Dept. of Transp., supra. This is called "conflict preemption" and requires that state
26
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law is preempted to the extent it conflicts with the federal law. !d. However, conflict preemption is
1

2

only found where compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible (Fla. Lime Avocado

3

Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963)), or when the

4

state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of

5

Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).

6

In Stafford v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 145 Idaho 530, 534, 181 P.3d 456, 460 (S.

7

Ct. 2008), the court conducted a review of the Idaho rules regarding Medicaid, in particular the rules
8

involved with Medicaid qualification. While that court noted the need for the State to promulgate
9

10
11

rules, it also found that "both the federal government and state government expect federal law to
predominate" in that regard. !d. at 460, 534.

12

In the case of In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 64 (Minn. 2008)" the court specifically

13

dealt with a conflict involving the federal statutes at issue in this case. As that court noted, the
federal statute regarding recovery contains specific language limiting the field of available recovery.

1 .J,-,

Id. Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1396p is entitled "Liens, adjustments and recoveries,
16

and transfers of assets." Subsection (b) addresses "[a]djustment
"[a]djustment or recovery of medical assistance
17

lB
19
20
21
22

23

correctly paid under a State plan."

Parenthesis (1) begins the subsection with the broad rule

prohibiting recovery in general, and then requiring the State seek recovery in certain circumstances.
That provision states:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on
behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the
State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the
following individuals:

24

42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(1).

Thus, the federal government has outlined a general mle prohibiting

2 -,c·C·

recovery. As such, Congress has indicated its object and desire to prevent recovery in all but a
26
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limited number of circumstances. It follows then, that if these circumstances are expanded by a
1

2
3

particular state law, the state law becomes an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress to limit recovery, and is thereby preempted.

4

Subsection (B) explains the required recovery exception against the estate of the recipient

5

individual who was 55 years of age or older when assistance was received, but further limits

6

recovery to care costs at nursing facilities, home and community. For convenience" that provision

7'7

states:
8

9

10

In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical
of-
assistance consisting of--

11

12
13

(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based servIces, and
related hospital and prescription drug services, or
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State plan
(but not including medical assistance for medicare cost-sharing or for
1396a(a)(1
a) (1 O)(E) of this title).
benefits described in section 1396a(

1 .J,-,

42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(1)(B)(i-ii). This provision limits recovery by age, by type of service, or by
16

types of allowed services any particular state might choose to include. Neither party has argued
17

regarding the ability to recover for services in this case. Thus, the issues in this case bring us back,
1:3
18

full circle, to the interpretation and effect of 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(I), and
20

I.C. § 56-218(1), regarding whether recovery may be had against the assets of the recipient's spouse

21

in which the spouse did not have any interest prior to the time of death. As discussed in detail

22

above, the federal provisions limit such recovery to assets of the spouse in which the recipient had

23

an interest at death.

24

Because the federal provIsIOns seek, overall, to limit recover:v
recover)' except in certain
25

circumstances, because exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed narrowly, and
26
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I

because the state provisions expand this recovery policy, the Court finds the State provisions are
1

2

preempted. Comm 'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989).

3

D.

4

Up to this point in the process of interpreting and applying the provisions above, the Court

5

6

of Health and Welfare v. Jackman
Effect of Idaho Department ofHealth

has relied upon relatively little case law.

By so doing, the Court has followed the rules of

statutory construction as required by Idaho law. The Court first considered the plain language

7

contained in the provisions, which it found unambiguous.

Consequently,
Consequently legislative intent and
l

8

case law are not necessary to further interpret the language.

George W. Watkins Family v.

9

10

Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990); Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley

11

County, 137 Idaho 192,197,46 P.3d 9,14 (S. Ct. 2002) (citing Lawless v. Davis,_98 Idaho 175,560

1:2

P.2d 497 (1977) ("Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the

13

legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to construe the
language.")).

''1 .J

The State, however" argues throughout its briefing that Idaho has clear precedent
16
17

interpreting these provisions differently. In the case of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare

18

v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998), the recipient's

19

community property of the recipient pursuant to a marriage settlement agreement. After both the

20

recipient and the spouse had died, the Department sought recovery from the estate of the spouse.

spouse received nearly all

Id. at 214, 7. The language of I.C. § 56-218 as it existed at that time allowed recovery from the
,.,2 "')

spousal estate only where the estate of the recipient contained absolutely nothing. Thus, although
23

there was clear legislative intent that the State should be able to seek recovery from the spousal
24

estate, this expressed intent of the legislature would virtually never occur, where the imprecise,
26

express language of the statute led to an absurd result. Id. at 215, 8.
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The Idaho Supreme Court found that a more reasonable interpretation, which would be in
1

2

line with the legislature's intent, would be to allow recovery against the spousal estate where the

3

estate of the recipient was insufficient. [d. However, in the very next section, the court found

4

federal law preempted the Department's authority given by I.C. § 56-218 to recover from the

5

spouse's separate estate. [d. at 216, 9. The court's analysis in that case involved state and

6

federal provisions which have since been replaced and/or amended. This Court finds it offers
7

little or no guidance to the relevant and determinative issues in this case.
8

The State's reliance on Jackman is based largely on the original opinion in that case,

9

10

which has since been substituted. The State urges this Court to consider this opinion, arguing that

11

it clearly shows the court's intent to give "assets" a broad interpretation, and that the decision

12

would have been different if the court had been able to apply the statutes in their current form.

13

The Court does not agree. The full reasons for issuing a substitute opinion are not ascertainable

14

by simple comparison of a substitute opinion. Given Internal Rule of the Idaho Supreme Court
15

15(t)'s prohibition against citation of unpublished opinions, the Court will not speculate about a
16

1'7
17

withdrawn opinion to determine how the clear and unambiguous language of the statutes

18

question should be interpreted, or to determine the applicability of the preemption doctrine.

19

III.

20
21

111

Attorney's Fees

Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b)(5) and I.e. § 12-117, each party has reserved the right to attorney's
fees on appeal. Idaho Code § 12-117(1) requires this Court to award reasonable attorney's fees and

22

expenses to the prevailing party "if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable
23

basis in fact or law."
25
26

Where questions of law are raised, attorney's fees should be awarded only if

the nonprevailing party advocates a plainly fallacious, and, therefore, not fairly debatable, position.
Lowery v. Board of County Com 'rs
Irs for Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 764 P.2d 431 (S. Ct. 1988). A

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 17

000721

state agency acted without reasonable basis where it has no authority to take a particular action.
1

2

Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 90 P.3d 340 (S. Ct. 2004). In this

3

case the State acted in accordance with the authority granted it by I.e. § 56-218 and corresponding

4

agency regulations. Although this Court found that provision to be preempted, the magistrate did

5

not make such a clear finding. Given this, and the fact that this is a matter of first impression, the

6

State acted based on reasonable argument and authority.

7
8

CONCLUSION
9

10

Based on the reasoning above, the decision of the magistrate is AFFIRMED.

11

ORDERED .
IT IS SO ORDERED.

12

Dated this

\V ~
lv

day of March, 2011.

l3
13

14
15

Kathryn A. ticklen
District Ju ge

16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
2 .)'-t

26
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0009
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515
ISB No. 3361
cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
In the Matter of the Estate Of:

)
)
)
)

George D. Perry,
Deceased.

Case No. CV IE 0905214
NOTICE OF APPEAL

--------------)
-----------------------------)
State of Idaho, Department of Health and
Welfare,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
Barbara K. McCormick, Personal
Representative of the Estate of George D.
Perry,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

------------_-----:)
---------------------------~)

TO:
Barbara K. McCormick, Personal Representative and her Attorney, Peter C. Sisson, Esq.,
and to the Clerk of the above Entitled Court:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

Y:\MRCaseslEstate\WCC\WCC
Y:IMRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\PerryM&G\Supreme Court\Notice of Appeal.wpd
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1.

The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "the

Department"), appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision ,md Order,
entered on the 16th day of March, 2011, Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, District Judge,
presiding.
2.

The Department has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the judgment or

order described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pursuant to Rules II(a)i(2) and II(b),
Idaho Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code § 17-201(7).
3.

The issues on appeal include, but may not be limited to:

a.

Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that George Perry, through a general

power of attorney, had the power to divest Martha Perry of her interest in the couple's home, and
gift that interest to himself, even though the power of attorney did not include any gifling power.

b.

Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that Idaho Code § 56-218(1) -- which

authorizes recovery from the estate of the spouse where the assets had been community property,
or had been the property ofthe Medicaid spouse - is preempted by federal law.

4.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript is requested.

(b)

The Department requests the preparation of the following portions of the

reporter's transcript: The standard transcript supplemented by:
1.

Oral argument presented to the district court at the hearing held November

18,2010 at 2:00 p.m.
11.

Oral argument presented to the magistrate division at the hearing held

February 26,2010, at 9:00 a.m.
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

Y:\MRCases\EstateIWCCIWCC Open CasesIPerryM&GISupreme
CaseslPerryM&GISupreme CourtlNotice of Appeal.wpd
Y:\MRCaseslEstateIWCCIWCC
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6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the c:lerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

m.
n.
o.
p.

Last Will And Testament (0311912009)
(03/19/2009)
(4115/2009)
Claim Against Estate (4/15/2009)
(4115/2009)
Demand For Notice (4/15/2009)
Inventory (5/28/2009)
Notice of Disallowance of Claim (6/4/2009)
(6115/2009)
Petition for Allowance of Claim (6/15/2009)
Affidavit of Barbara K McCormick In Support of Objection To Dept of Health
and Welfare's Petition for Allowance of Claim (11/27/2009)
(11127/2009)
Memorandum in Support ofthe PR's Objection to Dept of Health And Welfare's
Petition for Allowance of Claim (11/27/2009)
(11127/2009)
(0112912010)
Memorandum in Support Of Petition for Allowance of Claim (01/29/2010)
Exhibit Cover Page (Memorandum In Support Of Petition for Allowance of
Claim)
Exhibits A, B, C, E, F, G (Memo In Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim)
(311 0/2010)
012010)
Order Disallowing Claim (3/1
Appellant's Brief (District Court) (07/08/2010)
Respondent's Brief (District Court) (08126/2010)
(08/26/2010)
Appellant's Reply Brief (District Court) (0911612010)
(09/16/2010)
Memorandum Decision and Order (0311612011)
(03/16/2011)

7.

Not applicabh::.

8.

I certify:

h.
1.

J.

k.

1.

(a)

That a copy ofthis notice of appeal has been served on 1he
lhe reporter.

(b)

That the clerk of the district court has been contacted and arrangements

have been made to have the court reporter bill this office for preparation of transcripts of the
hearings dated November 18, 2010 and February 26,2010.
((c)
c)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the

preparation ofthe record pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3212.
(d)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee pursuant

to Idaho Code § 67-2301.
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

Y:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\PerryM&G\Supreme Court\Notice of Appeal.wpd
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(e)

That s{:rvice has been made upon all parties required to be serv,ed pursuant

to Rule 20.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2011.

~~~-cfl~~::j.c
.C

~CARTWRIGHT
~CARTWRIGHT

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was ma.iled,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
BARBARA K MCCORMICK
C/O PETER C SISSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2402 W JEFFERSON ST
BOISE ID 83702
KASEY REDLICH
C/O ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT CLERK
200 W FRONT ST
BOISE ID 83702-7300
DATED this

1;L
l;L day of April, 2011.

{)m;v~.~
{)umJc.~

Dawn Phipps, Legal Assistan
Contracts and Administrative Law Division

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4

Y:\MRCases\EstateIWCCIWCC Open CaseslPenyM&GISupreme Court\Notice of Appeal.wpd
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:

Iii: ;/5

~~ ____

3 1 2011
MAY 31

Fax: 334-2616

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
LUNOOUIST
9, MARGARET LUNDOUIST
DEPUTY

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

State of Idaho, Dept of Health & Welfare
vs.
Barbara K. McCormick, Personal
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry

)
)
)
)

Docket No.

38694-2011

Notice of Transcript Lodged

Notice is hereby given that on May 23, 2011,
I lodged one (l)
(1) transcript of a total of 36 pages in length,
as listed below, for the above referenced appeal with
the District Court Clerk of Ada County, Fourth Judicial District.

~\ U~1.J---

SusaIIMii~lf, Ri>ltiSR No. 728

TRANSCRIPTS LODGED
11-18-10

Oral Argument
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: GEORGE
D. PERRY.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE,

Supreme Court Case No. 38694
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry,
Respondent on Appeal.

I, CHRlSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following document will be submitted as EXHIBIT to
the Record:
1. Transcript of proceedings held on February 26, 2010, before Magistrate Court Judge
Christopher M. Bieter, filed May 10, 2010.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 31st day of May, 2011.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: GEORGE
D. PERRY.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE,

Supreme Court Case No. 38694
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry,
Respondent on Appeal.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERIC'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCR[PT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT

PETER C. SISSON

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
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BOISE, IDAHO
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: GEORGE
D. PERRY.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE,

Supreme Court Case No. 38694
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry,
Respondent on Appeal.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk ofthe District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District of the

State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the
above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction as, and is a true and correct record ofthe
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as
well as those requested by Counsels.

I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
7th day of April, 2011.
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